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US Senate ratifies the Additional Protocol, March 31

Statement on the Additional Protocol Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency Regarding Safeguards in the United States by Senator Richard Lugar, Chair Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 31, 2004.

Additional Protocol to the Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency Regarding Safeguards in the United States, Floor Statement by Senator Richard G. Lugar, March 31, 2004:

Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require.

Mr. President, today the Senate considers the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Regarding Safeguards in the United States.

Last February, at the National Defense University, President Bush called on the Senate to ratify the U.S. Additional Protocol, and today, I am pleased to bring this resolution of ratification to the floor on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The United States signed the Additional Protocol in Vienna on June 12, 1998, and President Bush submitted it to the Senate on May 9, 2002. The State Department submitted the implementing legislation to Congress on November 19, 2003. At the Administration’s request, I introduced the implementing legislation in the Senate last December.

Since Senate ratification of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (the NPT) in 1969, and our Voluntary Offer to accept IAEA safeguards in 1980, 188 states have now approved the NPT. The NPT and the IAEA’s existing safeguards agreements sufficed to forestall nuclear weapons programs in the world’s advanced industrial states, several of which were weighing the nuclear option 40 years ago. Unfortunately, the NPT and the IAEA’s existing safeguards agreements have been insufficient to prevent the diversion of resources in Non-Nuclear Weapon States determined to cheat. At the same time, we have witnessed an increase in the global availability of nuclear weapons materials, reprocessing and enrichment technologies. To ensure that materials and technologies are devoted only to peaceful uses, it is in the interest of the United States that the IAEA have the power to conduct intrusive inspections and verify imports and exports of sensitive materials and equipment in states suspected of diverting resources to a weapons program. The Additional Protocol, when universally ratified and implemented by all member states of the IAEA, will not solve all of our proliferation problems, but Senate ratification will further ensure that U.S. efforts to persuade all member states to adopt the Additional Protocol will be supported by concrete U.S. action.

Mr. President, when the NPT was constructed, in order to gain its acceptance by states without weapons or complete fuel cycles, the world allowed for peaceful uses of the atom by states who forswore weapons. This was an outgrowth of the U.S. “Atoms for Peace Program�. Thus, Article IV of the NPT states, quote:

Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

Those last words, “in conformity with Article I and II of this Treaty,� are key in our consideration of the Additional Protocol. Non-Nuclear Weapon States under Article II of the NPT are obliged not to undertake any steps toward development of a weapon, and in so doing, secure their right to peaceful uses of the atom; peaceful uses verified by the IAEA under safeguards. When the Committee on Foreign Relations reported the NPT to the Senate in 1968, it did so with some reservations concerning this safeguards system. As the Committee report noted, quote:

[T]he implementation of the treaty raises uncertainties. The reliability and thereby the credibility of international safeguards systems is still to be determined. No completely satisfactory answer was given to the Committee on the effectiveness of the safeguards systems envisioned under the treaty. But [the Committee] is equally convinced that when the possible problems in reaching satisfactory safeguards agreements are carefully weighed against the potential for a worldwide mandatory safeguards system, the comparison argues strongly for the present language of the treaty.

Today, many have come to the realization that the existing framework of the NPT, as verified by status quo safeguards, is unable to provide adequate verification of Non-Nuclear Weapon States’ obligations and alert the world community to broken commitments to the IAEA and under the NPT.

Mr. President, I believe that acting today to ratify the Additional Protocol will put us back on the right track, a track toward complete verification and effective enforcement of Article II.

In 2003, the international community was confronted with two cases involving declared Non-Nuclear Weapon States violating their commitments under the NPT by pursuing nuclear weapon programs.

Iran’s clandestine drive toward a nuclear weapons capability was partly exposed by an Iranian resistance group and confirmed by the IAEA. Then, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom concluded separate negotiations with Tehran in which the regime agreed to abandon its uranium enrichment program and to cease all efforts to pursue nuclear weapons. Iran signed an Additional Protocol with the IAEA last December. In January, Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi appeared to hedge on Iran’s commitment by suggesting that Tehran had agreed “to the suspension, not stopping, of the uranium enrichment process.� Then, last February, in his latest report on Iran, IAEA Director General ElBaradei noted that inspectors had found in Iran technical designs for so-called “P-2" centrifuges similar to those the Agency discovered in Libya, designs not declared to the IAEA. Iran has also failed to declare a pilot uranium enrichment facility, importation of many nuclear fuel cycle components, and experiments with plutonium separation.

Lastly with regard to Iran, Mr. President, there are there are extremely disturbing press accounts of inspectors finding traces of highly enriched Uranium-235, which could have but one use, in a nuclear weapon. The United States has made no secret of our view that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.

In Libya, we witnessed an important non-proliferation success. Following intense negotiations with the Bush Administration and the United Kingdom, Libya admitted that it had WMD programs and agreed to abandon these efforts and work with international treaty regimes to verify Libya’s commitment. I applaud President Bush and his team for a victory in the war against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Through our experience in Libya, we have learned of the extent of the nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistan’s “father of the bomb,� A.Q. Khan. Similarly, we have also seen the dangers posed by exports of sensitive technologies by many European and Asian countries that contributed to Libya’s nuclear weapons program. It is important to note in this regard how the Additional Protocol incorporates and provides for reporting on the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) Trigger List items in Annex II as well as uranium mining, enrichment and reactor activities in Annex I.

Events in Iran and Libya are important to our consideration of the Additional Protocol. In 1980, the Senate ratified the U.S. commitment to voluntarily accept safeguards to demonstrate a firm commitment to the IAEA and to the NPT. As a Nuclear Weapon State party to the NPT, the United States is not required to accept any safeguards. Our decision sent an important message to the world: the preeminent superpower, with a large civilian nuclear power industry, could accept IAEA safeguards.

The Additional Protocol seeks to fill holes in the existing patchwork of declarations and inspections. It will require the declaration of many locations and activities to the IAEA not previously required, and allow, with less than 24 hours’ notice, inspections of such locations.

The United States, as a declared Nuclear Weapon State party to the NPT, may exclude the application of IAEA safeguards on its activities. Under the Additional Protocol, the United States also has the right to exclude activities and sites of direct national security significance in accordance with its National Security Exclusion contained in Article 1.b. This provision is crucial to U.S. acceptance of the Additional Protocol and provides the basis for the protection of U.S. nuclear weapons-related activities, sites, and materials as a declared nuclear power.

The Additional Protocol does not contain any new arms control or disarmament obligations for the United States. Although there are increased rights granted to the IAEA for the conduct of inspections in the United States, the Administration has assured the Committee on Foreign Relations that the likelihood of an inspection occurring in the United States is very low. Nevertheless, should an inspection under the Additional Protocol be determined to be potentially harmful to U.S. national security, the United States has the right, through the National Security Exclusion, to prevent the inspection.

For the past 9 months, the Majority and Minority staffs of the Committee have been working closely with the Administration to craft a resolution of ratification that will gain broad support in the Senate. On January 29, the Committee held a hearing with Administration witnesses. On March 4, the resolution of ratification before the Senate today was approved at a Committee business meeting by a vote of 19-0. I thank Senator Biden and his staff for their cooperation in this effort. I am pleased to inform all Members that the Administration fully supports the Committee’s recommended resolution of ratification, without changes.

Mr. President, in sum, I believe the Additional Protocol is necessary to further ensure effective verification and enforcement of the Article II obligations of Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Continued enjoyment of Article IV rights should come only with an increase in our ability to verify compliance with obligations to the IAEA and under the NPT. I do not believe that the Additional Protocol will be a burden for the United States, given that our ratification and implementation of the Protocol does not constitute a statement about U.S. adherence to non-proliferation commitments, but rather as a demonstration of our continued leadership in furtherance of the non-proliferation objectives contained in it. It is a first step toward realization of the objectives set forth by President Bush last February.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the Committee’s resolution of ratification and to ratify the Additional Protocol.

Thank you.

Further details of the US legislation can be found at: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d108:33:./temp/~bdTJut::|/bss/d108query.html|

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