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'All states must fulfill their arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation commitments', G8 Summit Document and Comment, June 9

'G8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation', G8 Sea Island summit, June 9, 2004.

See also below: 'We must cut our nuclear arsenals', Oped in The Guardian by Madeleine Albright and Robin Cook, June 9, 2004.

G8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation

At Evian, we recognized the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, together with international terrorism, as the pre-eminent threat to international peace and security. This challenge requires a long-term strategy and multi-faceted approaches.

Determined to prevent, contain, and roll back proliferation, today, at Sea Island, we announce an action plan to reinforce the global nonproliferation regime. We will work together with other concerned states to realize this plan.

All states must fulfill their arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation commitments, which we reaffirm, and we strongly support universal adherence to and compliance with these commitments under the relevant multilateral treaties. We will help and encourage states in effectively implementing their obligations under the multilateral treaty regimes, in particular implementing domestically their obligations under such treaties, building law enforcement capacity, and establishing effective export controls. We call on all states that have not already done so to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

We strongly support UN Security Council Resolution 1540, calling on all states to establish effective national export controls, to adopt and enforce effective laws to criminalize proliferation, to take cooperative action to prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and to end illicit trafficking in such weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials. We call on all states to implement this resolution promptly and fully, and we are prepared to assist them in so doing, thereby helping to fight the nexus between terrorism and proliferation, and black markets in these weapons and related materials.

1. Nuclear Nonproliferation

The trafficking and indiscriminate spread of sensitive nuclear materials, equipment, and technology that may be used for weapons purposes are a threat to us all. Some states seek uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities for weapons programs contrary to their commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We reaffirm our commitment to the NPT and to the declarations made at Kananaskis and Evian, and we will work to prevent the illicit diversion of nuclear materials and technology. We announce the following new actions to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation and the acquisition of nuclear materials and technology by terrorists, while allowing the world to enjoy safely the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology.

• To allow the world to safely enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation, we have agreed to work to establish new measures so that sensitive nuclear items with proliferation potential will not be exported to states that may seek to use them for weapons purposes, or allow them to fall into terrorist hands. The export of such items should only occur pursuant to criteria consistent with global nonproliferation norms and to states rigorously committed to those norms. We shall work to amend appropriately the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines, and to gain the widest possible support for such measures in the future. We aim to have appropriate measures in place by the next G-8 Summit. In aid of this process, for the intervening year, we agree that it would be prudent not to inaugurate new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to additional states. We call on all states to adopt this strategy of prudence. We will also develop new measures to ensure reliable access to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology, including nuclear fuel and related services, at market conditions, for all states, consistent with maintaining nonproliferation commitments and standards.

• We seek universal adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and the Additional Protocol and urge all states to ratify and implement these agreements promptly. We are actively engaged in outreach efforts toward this goal, and ready to offer necessary support.
  
• The Additional Protocol must become an essential new standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements. We will work to strengthen NSG guidelines accordingly. We aim to achieve this by the end of 2005.

• We support the suspension of nuclear fuel cycle cooperation with states that violate their nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards obligations, recognizing that the responsibility and authority for such decisions rests with national governments or the Security Council.

• To enhance the IAEA's integrity and effectiveness, and strengthen its ability to ensure that nations comply with their NPT obligations and safeguards agreements, we will work together to establish a new Special Committee of the IAEA Board of Governors. This committee would be responsible for preparing a comprehensive plan for strengthened safeguards and verification. We believe this committee should be made up of member states in compliance with their NPT and IAEA commitments.

• Likewise, we believe that countries under investigation for non-technical violations of their nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards obligations should elect not to participate in decisions by the IAEA Board of Governors or the Special Committee regarding their own cases.

2. Proliferation Security Initiative

We reiterate our strong commitment to and support for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Statement of Interdiction Principles, which is a global response to a global problem. We will continue our efforts to build effective PSI partnerships to interdict trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials. We also will prevent those that facilitate proliferation from engaging in such trafficking and work to broaden and strengthen domestic and international laws supporting PSI. We welcome the increasing level of support worldwide for PSI, which now includes all G-8 members. The Krakow meeting commemorating PSI's first anniversary, attended by 62 countries, evidences growing global support.

We will further cooperate to defeat proliferation networks and coordinate, where appropriate, enforcement efforts, including by stopping illicit financial flows and shutting down illicit plants, laboratories, and brokers, in accordance with national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law. Several of us are already developing mechanisms to deny access to our ports and airports for companies and impose visa bans on individuals involved in illicit trade.

We encourage all states to strengthen and expand national and international measures to respond to clandestine procurement activities. Directly, and through the relevant international mechanisms, we will work actively with states requiring assistance in improving their national capabilities to meet international norms.

3. The Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

Since its launch by G-8 Leaders two years ago at Kananaskis, the Global Partnership has become a significant force worldwide to enhance international safety and security. Global Partnership member states, including the six new donors that joined at Evian, have in the past year launched new cooperative projects in Russia and accelerated progress on those already underway. While much has been accomplished, significant challenges remain. We recommit ourselves to our Kananaskis Statement, Principles, and Guidelines as the basis for Global Partnership cooperation.

• We recommit ourselves to raising up to $20 billion for the Global Partnership through 2012.

• Expanding the Partnership to include additional donor countries is essential to raise the necessary resources and to ensure the effort is truly global. Today we welcome the decisions of Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand to join.

• We will continue to work with other former Soviet states to discuss their participation in the Partnership. We reaffirm that Partnership states will participate in projects according to their national interests and resources.

• We reaffirm that we will address proliferation challenges worldwide. We will, for example, pursue the retraining of Iraqi and Libyan scientists involved in past WMD programs. We also support projects to eliminate over time the use of highly-enriched uranium fuel in research reactors worldwide, secure and remove fresh and spent HEU fuel, control and secure radiation sources, strengthen export control and border security, and reinforce biosecurity. We will use the Global Partnership to coordinate our efforts in these areas.

4. Nonproliferation Challenges

• The DPRK's announced withdrawal from the NPT, which is unprecedented; its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons, including through both its plutonium reprocessing and its uranium enrichment programs, in violation of its international obligations; and its established history of missile proliferation are serious concerns to us all. We strongly support the Six-Party Process, and strongly urge the DPRK to dismantle all of its nuclear weapons-related programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner, a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution.

• We remain united in our determination to see the proliferation implications of Iran 's advanced nuclear program resolved. Iran must be in full compliance with its NPT obligations and safeguards agreement. To this end, we reaffirm our support for the IAEA Board of Governors' three Iran resolutions. We note that since Evian, Iran has signed the Additional Protocol and has committed itself to cooperate with the Agency, and to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing related activities. While we acknowledge the areas of progress reported by the Director General, we are, however, deeply concerned that Iran 's suspension of enrichment-related activity is not yet comprehensive. We deplore Iran 's delays, deficiencies in cooperation, and inadequate disclosures, as detailed in IAEA Director General reports. We therefore urge Iran promptly and fully to comply with its commitments and all IAEA Board requirements, including ratification and full implementation of the Additional Protocol, leading to resolution of all outstanding issues related to its nuclear program.

• We welcome Libya 's strategic decision to rid itself of its weapons of mass destruction and longer-range missiles, to fully comply with the NPT, the Additional Protocol, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and to commit not to possess missiles subject to the Missile Technology Control Regime. We note Libya has cooperated in the removal of nuclear equipment and materials and taken steps to eliminate chemical weapons. We call on Libya to continue to cooperate fully with the IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

5. Defending Against Bioterrorism

Bioterrorism poses unique, grave threats to the security of all nations, and could endanger public health and disrupt economies. We commit to concrete national and international steps to: expand or, where necessary, initiate new biosurveillance capabilities to detect bioterror attacks against humans, animals, and crops; improve our prevention and response capabilities; increase protection of the global food supply; and respond to, investigate, and mitigate the effects of alleged uses of biological weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease. In this context, we seek concrete realization of our commitments at the fifth Review Conference of the BWC. The BWC is a critical foundation against biological weapons' proliferation, including to terrorists. Its prohibitions should be fully implemented, including enactment of penal legislation. We strongly urge all non-parties to join the BWC promptly.

6. Chemical Weapons Proliferation

We support full implementation of the CWC, including its nonproliferation aspects. We strongly urge all non-parties to join the CWC promptly, and will work with them to this end. We also urge CWC States Parties to undertake national legislative and administrative measures for its full implementation. We support the use of all fact-finding, verification, and compliance measures, including, if necessary, challenge inspections, as provided in the CWC.

7. Implementation of the Evian Initiative on Radioactive Source Security

At Evian we agreed to improve controls on radioactive sources to prevent their use by terrorists, and we have made substantial progress toward that goal. We are pleased that the IAEA approved a revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in September 2003. We urge all states to implement the Code and recognize it as a global standard.

We have agreed to export and import control guidance for high-risk radioactive sources, which should only be supplied to authorized end-users in states that can control them. States should ensure that no sources are diverted for illicit use. We seek prompt IAEA approval of this guidance to ensure that effective controls are operational by the end of 2005 and applied in a harmonized and consistent manner. We support the IAEA's program for assistance to ensure that all countries can meet the new standards.

8. Nuclear Safety and Security

Since the horrific 1986 accident at Chornobyl, we have worked with Ukraine to improve the safety and security of the site. We have already made a large financial contribution to build a safe confinement over the remnants of the Chornobyl reactor. We are grateful for the participation and contributions made by 21 other states in this effort. Today, we endorse international efforts to raise the remaining funds necessary to complete the project. We urge Ukraine to support and work closely with us to complete the confinement's construction by 2008 in a way that contributes to radiological safety, in particular in Ukraine and neighboring regions.

An effective, efficient nuclear regulatory system is essential for our safety and security. We affirm the importance for national regulators to have sufficient authority, independence, and competence.

Source: G8 Sea Island summit website, http://www.g8usa.gov/d_060904d.htm.

We must cut our nuclear arsenals

Madeleine Albright and Robin Cook, The Guardian, June 9, 2004.

he time has come to prevent the nightmare scenario of a nuclear attack. The rhetoric of international leaders about the spread of nuclear weapons and materials has not been matched by enough concrete action, even as Osama bin Laden declares that it is his "religious duty" to acquire and use a nuclear weapon against the west.

As the G8 leaders meet today in Sea Island, Georgia, we urge them to put aside their differences over Iraq and unite to implement a comprehensive non-proliferation strategy that includes concrete steps and increased financial commitments to control the spread of bomb-making materials and thwart the ambitions of those who would acquire them.

First, the G8 nations - Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, Britain and the United States - must fulfil their pledge to raise $20bn to fund the G8 global partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. Still $3bn short, this important effort helps Russia and other countries safely store and dispose of chemical and nuclear weapon materials.

Even if the pledges were fulfilled, there still would not be enough money to get the job done. Securing the nuclear legacy of Russia alone will cost $30bn, and there are other stockpiles of inadequately secured highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium around the world.

Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin have launched a programme designed to secure fissile materials across the globe. But their plan will take 10 years to complete, during which time terrorists will still be able to collect fissile materials for a bomb.

Our second recommendation therefore is that the G8 should commit itself to a far more aggressive timetable - within the next four or five years - for completing this important work.

Third, the G8 nations must bring to bear all the incentives and sanctions they have at their disposal to stop proliferation. This includes closing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty loophole that enables states like North Korea to develop nuclear weapons under the cover of programmes to produce nuclear energy.

Fourth, the G8 leaders should pledge themselves to active, person-to-person diplomacy that can help reduce the regional tensions that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. For example, the scaling back of the nuclear threat between India and Pakistan may have opened the door to further steps to reduce the risks of a nuclear exchange.

Fifth, the leaders must commit their nations to develop and maintain a global network linking intelligence and export control efforts with border, port and airport security to ensure that nuclear materials and technology cannot be moved undetected.

Finally, although France, Russia, Britain and the United States have taken good steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals, more must be done. A failure in this regard would encourage states that do not have nuclear weapons to rebel against nonproliferation norms out of dissatisfaction with what they perceive to be a double standard: some states get nuclear weapons, while others do not. We call on President Bush and the United States, therefore, to stop developing new nuclear weapons such as the so-called bunker-buster. The United States should also sign the comprehensive test ban treaty. Together, the United States and Britain should support a fissile materials cut-off treaty that would end the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons.

Given their nuclear weapons capacities, the US and European countries have a special responsibility to ensure that these terrible weapons do not spread further. Before they can fulfil this responsibility, however, they must be seen as credible proponents of nuclear nonproliferation.

The steps described here would help restore credibility to the calls for global nuclear nonproliferation, and enable the US and Europe to exercise the leadership that is so desperately needed to fight proliferation.

Imagine the G8 meeting that would follow a nuclear incident. The leaders of the industrialised world would be compelled to explain how such a terrible tragedy could have happened. It is their challenge - and responsibility - to take the necessary steps now to protect us all.

· These proposals were developed by Building Global Alliances for the 21st Century; the article first appeared in the Los Angeles Times. Madeleine Albright is a former US secretary of state, Robin Cook MP resigned as leader of House of Commons over the Iraq war

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