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NATO Nuclear Fact Sheets, June 4, 2004

• NATO's Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment
• NATO's Positions Regarding Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament and Related Issues

NATO's Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment

The dramatic changes in the Euro-Atlantic strategic landscape brought by the end of the Cold War have been reflected in the Alliance's 1991 Strategic Concept. With its implementation, the Alliance has taken far-reaching steps to adapt its overall policy and defence posture to the new security environment. In realizing their new broad approach to security, which recognizes the importance of political, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension, Allies have taken full advantage of the opportunities provided by the momentous improvements in the security environment. NATO's nuclear strategy and force posture were among the first areas to be reviewed. They were also the areas that, beginning in 1991, were subjected to some of the most radical changes.

There have, however, been further deep-reaching political and security developments since then which are addressed in the Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept. Paragraphs 46 and 62-64 of this Strategic Concept set forth the essential principles for the role and characteristics of NATO's Nuclear Forces.

The Alliance's Heads of State and Government met in Prague, on 21 November 2002, to enlarge the Alliance and further strengthen NATO to meet the grave new threats and profound security challenges of the 21st century.

Purpose

This Fact Sheet provides an account of the most significant changes to NATO's nuclear policy and force posture. It highlights the consistency with which the Alliance has lived up to its commitment to maintain only the minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary to support its strategy of preserving peace and preventing war. Furthermore, it lays out the determination and realism demonstrated by Allies in their pursuit of a wide-ranging and ambitious arms control agenda, as an integral part of NATO's security policy. Lastly, this paper reviews the role of the Alliance's remaining nuclear forces.

Reduced Reliance on Nuclear Forces

During the Cold War, NATO's nuclear forces played a central role in the Alliance's strategy of flexible response. To deter major war in Europe, nuclear weapons were integrated into the whole of NATO's force structure, and the Alliance maintained a variety of targeting plans which could be executed at short notice. This role entailed high readiness levels and quick-reaction alert postures for significant parts of NATO's nuclear forces.

In the new security environment, NATO has radically reduced its reliance on nuclear forces. Its strategy remains one of war prevention but it is no longer dominated by the possibility of nuclear escalation. Its nuclear forces are no longer targeted against any country, and the circumstances in which their use might have to be contemplated are considered to be extremely remote. NATO's nuclear forces continue to play an essential role in war prevention, but their role is now more fundamentally political, and they are no longer directed towards a specific threat.

Reduced Nuclear Posture

NATO's reduced reliance on nuclear forces has been manifested in the dramatic reduction in the forces themselves. (The terms 'NATO nuclear forces' and 'NATO nuclear stockpile' are collective terms used in this document to delineate the total number of Alliance sub-strategic nuclear forces and weapons, respectively.)

• Number and Types of Nuclear Delivery Systems

  Throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s, NATO maintained a broad mix of nuclear weapon systems, including nuclear land mines, nuclear artillery, air-to-surface missiles (ASM), anti-submarine warfare (ASW) depth bombs, surface-to-air missiles (SAM), short and intermediate range surface-to-surface missiles (SSM), Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM), and gravity bombs delivered by dual-capable aircraft (DCA). The following graphic shows which systems were deployed by year, illustrating the significant reduction in the types of nuclear systems deployed.

As the Cold War ended, NATO took several unilateral steps to cancel planned modernization programmes for its nuclear forces. The United States and the United Kingdom, after intensive consultations with NATO Allies, both cancelled plans for a nuclear tactical air-to-surface missile. As a precursor of later decisions to eliminate all ground-launched sub-strategic forces, the U.S. also cancelled plans for a nuclear-capable follow-on system to the LANCE surface-to-surface missile, and for the production of a new 155 mm nuclear artillery shell. In addition, the United Kingdom eliminated the nuclear role for its dual-capable aircraft; thus, the Royal Air Force no longer has a nuclear role.

• Number and Types of Nuclear Warheads
  
  I n October 1991, following an initiative by U.S. President George H. W. Bush, NATO decided to reduce the number of weapons available for its sub-strategic forces in Europe by over 85 percent. This reduction was completed in 1993. As part of these reductions, all nuclear warheads for NATO's ground-launched sub-strategic forces (including nuclear artillery and surface-to-surface missiles) were eliminated and air-delivered gravity bombs were reduced by well over 50 percent. The elimination process included some 1300 nuclear artillery weapons and 850 LANCE missile warheads. All of the nuclear warheads that had been assigned to nuclear artillery and surface-to-surface missile forces have been removed from the NATO inventory and have all been dismantled. In 1998, the United Kingdom retired - and has in the meantime also completely dismantled - all of its WE-177 nuclear bombs.
  
  
  In addition, all nuclear weapons for surface maritime forces were removed.
  The chart below illustrates the dramatic reduction in the number of NATO's nuclear weapons stockpiled in Europe.

Not depicted on the chart are the sea-based nuclear systems belonging to the United States and/or the United Kingdom that could have been made available to NATO in crisis/conflict. The United States has completely removed all naval non-strategic/sub-strategic nuclear warheads from its surface ships and attack submarines, to include nuclear-armed Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), which are no longer routinely deployed. The United States has also completely eliminated the nuclear role for its carrier-based dual-capable aircraft. Royal Navy surface ships no longer have any capability to carry or deploy nuclear weapons.

The chart also does not reflect a small number of UK Trident weapons on nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), available for a sub-strategic role. Today, the only land-based sub-strategic nuclear weapons available to NATO are U.S. nuclear bombs capable of being delivered by dual-capable aircraft of several Allies.

• Nuclear Storage Sites

Continuing the trend begun during the Cold War, NATO nuclear storage sites have also undergone a massive reduction (about 80%) as weapon systems were eliminated and the number of weapons reduced. At the same time, a new, more survivable and secure weapon storage system has been installed. Today, the remaining gravity bombs associated with DCA are stored safely in very few storage sites under highly secure conditions. The following graphic illustrates this significant reduction.

• No Pre-Planned Targets
  
  

  With the end of the Cold War, NATO terminated the practice of maintaining standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans and associated targets for its sub-strategic nuclear forces. As a result, NATO's nuclear forces no longer target any country.

• Numbers and Readiness Levels of Dual-Capable Aircraft
  
  Taking further advantage of the improved security environment, NATO has taken a number of steps to decrease the number and readiness levels of its dual-capable aircraft. At the height of the Cold War, NATO maintained a portion of these aircraft, together with other nuclear systems, on peacetime quick-reaction alert, capable of launching within minutes. During crisis or conflict, much larger numbers of nuclear delivery systems could be placed on alert. In 1995, in a first major step of relaxation, the readiness posture of dual-capable aircraft was greatly reduced, so that nuclear readiness was measured in weeks rather than in minutes. In 2002, in a second step, the readiness requirements for these aircraft were further reduced and are now being measured in months. Readiness levels over the years are illustrated graphically below.

• NATO Enlargement
  
  The Allies have judged that the remaining much smaller sub-strategic force posture will, for the foreseeable future, continue to meet the Alliance's deterrence requirements. In another unilateral initiative, in December 1996, NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers announced that enlarging the Alliance would not require a change in this greatly reduced nuclear posture and that, therefore, NATO has "no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member countries, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy, and that it does not foresee any future need to do so". NATO Heads of State and Government reiterated this statement in the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security Between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation (May 1997). At the NATO-Russia Summit in Rome, in May 2002, when establishing the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), NATO and Russia's Heads of State and Government declared the continued validity of the Founding Act and reaffirmed the goals, principles and commitments set forth therein. At the November 2002 Prague Summit, the goals, principles and commitments in the Founding Act and Rome Declaration were reiterated by Allied leaders. New members are full members of the Alliance in all respects, including their commitment to the Alliance's policy on nuclear weapons and the guarantees which that policy affords to all Allies.
  
  
• Strategic Force Reductions
  
  The Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) reduced the deployed strategic weapons of the United States and Russia from well over 10,000 to less than 6,000 weapons for each country. Under the U.S.-Russia Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, signed on 24 May 2002, the United States will reduce and limit its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700 - 2,200 by 31 December 2012. The Treaty obligates Russia to make comparable reductions. As part of the Moscow Treaty, the U.S. and Russia also agreed that the START Treaty will remain in force in accordance with its terms. Both the U.S. and Russia have ratified the Moscow Treaty and it entered into force on 1 June 2003.
  
  Allies fully support START and the Moscow Treaty. They are convinced that both treaties help to establish more favourable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation, and enhancing international stability.
  In its 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the United Kingdom decided to reduce its independent nuclear forces by one third; it operates only one nuclear weapon system (submarine-based Trident missiles) and maintains fewer than 200 operationally available Trident warheads.
  
  France has also made major reductions to its independent nuclear forces. Of the six types of delivery systems that were operational in 1991, only two remain, submarine-launched and air-launched missiles.

• Allies are signatories and fully support the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). NATO has urged all countries which have not yet done so to accede to and fully implement the NPT, and NATO member states agree on the importance of universal adherence to and compliance with the Treaty. They have reaffirmed their determination to contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
• All Allies but one have ratified and continue to support the ratification, early entry into force, and full implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In October 1999, the U.S. Senate voted against a resolution which would have provided its consent to ratifying the Treaty. The U.S. Government no longer supports the Treaty, but abides by the existing unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. All Allies support the existing moratoria on nuclear testing and urge all states to maintain these moratoria. All Allies acknowledge that the CTBT will enter into force when all 44 states listed in Annex II of the Treaty¹ deposit their instruments of ratification with the United Nations.
• NATO strongly supports efforts to reduce nuclear weapons in a prudent and graduated manner. The Alliance has consistently welcomed progress with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and has expressed its full support for the May 2002 U.S.-Russia Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions.
• Allies remain committed to the immediate commencement, in the Conference on Disarmament, of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty that advances Allies' respective national security interests.
• Allies have proposed nuclear Confidence and Security Building Measures with Russia; they are intended to be pursued in consultations on nuclear weapons issues, including doctrine and strategy, and on nuclear safety issues, in the NATO-Russia Council.
• At the November 2002 Prague Summit meeting, NATO Heads of State and Government reaffirmed that disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation make an essential contribution to preventing the spread and use of WMD and their means of delivery. They stressed the importance of abiding by and strengthening existing multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes and international arms control and disarmament accords.

Source: NATO website, http://www.nato.int.

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• NATO Allies have maintained a long-standing commitment to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation as an integral part of their security policy, firmly embedded in the broader political context in which Allies seek to enhance stability and security by lowering arms levels and increasing military transparency and mutual confidence.
• Allies have repeatedly reaffirmed that arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play an important role in the achievement of NATO's security objectives.
• At the November 2002 Summit meeting in Prague, NATO Heads of State and Government reaffirmed that disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation make an essential contribution to preventing the spread and use of WMD and their means of delivery. They stressed the importance of abiding by and strengthening existing multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes and international arms control and disarmament accords.
• Over the past decade, the Alliance has continually reviewed its nuclear doctrine and posture, and has consistently supported realistic and practical measures towards arms control and disarmament.
• At the Washington Summit, in April 1999, Alliance leaders committed NATO to consider options for confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament, in the light of overall strategic developments and the reduced salience of nuclear weapons. In December 2000, NATO's Foreign and Defence Ministers welcomed/endorsed the comprehensive report on options for CSBMs. The Council in Permanent Session is following up on the recommendations contained in this report and particularly those for CSBMs related to nuclear issues with Russia. Allies see nuclear CSBMs as a suitable means to enhance mutual trust and promote greater openness and transparency on nuclear weapons and safety issues between NATO and Russia.

• NATO Allies view the NPT as a cornerstone of global nuclear non-proliferation efforts (NPT, Articles I and II) and an essential basis for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament (Article VI). They see the NPT as a balanced treaty in which the commitments of non-proliferation and disarmament are both important. Allies are in agreement that nuclear disarmament requires an incremental approach in which the other nuclear arms control treaties all play a distinctive role.
• All Alliance members are parties to the NPT. They have repeatedly stated their full support of the Treaty, including further strengthening the NPT review process, and their continued commitment to efforts aimed at reducing nuclear weapons. Allies agree on the importance of universal adherence to and compliance with the Treaty, and on the commitment of all States Parties to non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful nuclear cooperation under effective non-proliferation conditions and strengthened IAEA safeguards. They support early ratification and implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol. Moreover, Allies have reaffirmed their determination to contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
• The fact that NATO has reduced the number of weapons available for its sub-strategic forces in Europe by over 85 percent since 1991 and almost 95 percent since the height of the Cold War, is evidence of the Allies' commitment to disarmament.

• Allies remain committed to the immediate commencement, in the Conference on Disarmament, of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty that advances Allies' respective national interests.
• The United States, the United Kingdom, and France all ceased producing fissile material for nuclear weapons (highly-enriched uranium or plutonium) several years ago.

• For NATO Allies, CSBMs and rigorous verification are important elements of international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.
• CSBMs are intended to reduce the danger of armed conflict, to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation of military activities, and thus to contribute to stability.
• Allies agree that the CSBMs proposed by NATO on nuclear weapons issues - including on nuclear safety and security, doctrine and strategy, and data exchange on sub-strategic nuclear forces - have potential to enhance mutual trust and promote greater openness and transparency between NATO and Russia. Allies intend to pursue these CSBMs in consultations with Russia, under the NATO-Russia Council.

• The U.S. and Russia are deeply engaged in a process aimed at drastically reducing their strategic nuclear weapons to the lowest levels consistent with their national security requirements and alliance obligations.
• The START Treaty reduced each country's deployed strategic weapons from over 10,000 to less than 6,000. Reductions were completed before the required date of 4 December 2001.
• Under the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, signed in Moscow on 24 May 2002, the United States will reduce and limit its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700 - 2,200 by 31 December 2012. The Treaty obligates Russia to make comparable reductions. As part of the Moscow Treaty, the U.S. and Russia also agreed that the START Treaty will remain in force in accordance with its terms. Both the U.S. and Russia have ratified the Moscow Treaty, and it entered into force on 1 June 2003.
• Allies fully support START and the Moscow Treaty. They are convinced that both treaties help to establish more favourable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation, and enhancing international stability.

• The Alliance's arrangements for basing U.S. nuclear gravity bombs in Europe are in compliance with the NPT. When the Treaty was negotiated, these arrangements were already in place. Their nature was made clear to key delegations and subsequently made public. They were not challenged.
• The U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europe are in the sole possession and under constant and complete custody and control of the United States. They are fitted with sophisticated Permissive Action Links (PAL) that guarantee absolute positive control by the U.S. and prevent unauthorized use.

• NATO's nuclear weapons are stored under highly secure conditions. They have been well-tested and meet the highest safety standards.
• The U.S. PAL devices ensure an additional safeguard against accidental or unauthorized use.
• Allies are confident in the safety and security of their nuclear weapons.

• In the context of the NPT, the five nuclear-weapon states have given NSAs to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties of the NPT. These national political commitments contribute to global non-proliferation efforts.
• The Western nuclear-weapon States gave the following NSAs in 1995:
  • United States:
    " The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State."
  • United Kingdom:
    " The United Kingdom will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces, its Allies or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State."
  • France:
    " France reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT except in the event of an invasion or any other attack led or supported by such a State in alliance or in association with a nuclear-weapon State against France, its territory, its armed forces or other troops or against its allies or a State to which it has a security commitment."
• In NATO, the final decision on any employment of nuclear weapons would be taken by the Alliance's nuclear-weapon States. Thus, NATO strategy is in full compliance with the NSAs.

• In 1996, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.
• In this opinion, which is not legally binding, the Court concluded that:
  • neither in customary nor conventional international law is there any specific authorization nor any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat of use or use of nuclear weapons;
  • any threat or use of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter and that fails to meet Article 51 is unlawful.
• The Court was unanimous in its opinion that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control".
• The Court could not conclude definitively (7:7 vote) whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence.
• Allies are convinced that the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy fully conforms with international law.

• NATO does not follow either a nuclear First-Use or No-First-Use policy. The Alliance does not determine in advance how it would react to aggression. It leaves this question open, to be decided as and when such a situation materialized. In so doing, Allies seek to ensure uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to aggression.
• In the current international strategic environment, Allies have declared that the circumstances in which they might have to contemplate any use of nuclear weapons are extremely remote.

Source: NATO website, http://www.nato.int.

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