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US Secretary of State Colin Powell on North Korea, July 1, 2004

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
Jakarta, Indonesia
For Immediate Release
July 2, 2004
2004/

REMARKS

REMARKS TO THE PRESS BY SECRETARY OF STATE COLIN L. POWELL
AND ASEAN POST MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE MINISTERS

July 1, 2004
Jakarta Conference Center
Jakarta, Indonesia

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Secretary Powell. I wanted to ask you about the possibility of a chat with the North Korean Foreign Minister I understand is expected here. Are you looking forward to it, are you ready to meet with him, will you do more than have coffee for 15 minutes as you did two years ago? Do you think that it might perhaps build on the discussions in Beijing last week? And also, Mr. Jenkins, the former U.S. Army officer who defected to North Korea, apparently will be coming to Indonesia for a reunion with his Japanese wife. Does the United States have any objection to his coming here? Thank you.

SECRETARY POWELL: My understanding is that the North Korean Foreign Minister will be here tomorrow, he'll be participating in the discussions of the whole group, and it remains to be seen what other discussions he and I may or may not be participating in tomorrow.

With respect to Sergeant Jenkins, I heard earlier this evening that such arrangements are being made, and this is a matter between the Japanese government, the Indonesian government and the DPRK.

QUESTION: Secretary Powell...

INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WIRAYUDA: Please identify yourself.

QUESTIONER: Yes, Glenn Kessler with the Washington Post. The United States last week at the six-party talks presented a more detailed proposal on resolving the crisis with -- over North Korea's nuclear program, yet it seems like the bottom line has not changed the United States that before ... Sorry, it's been a long day, as you well know ... that the bottom line for the United States seems to be that before, before that ... God, I'm sorry. (laughter) Yeah.

SECRETARY POWELL: Have a seat. I'll take care of it.

(laughter)

QUESTION: But what I wanted to get at was that it seems like that the United States wants the North Koreans to admit all their programs, have all ... everything that they put out verified by U.S. intelligence before the United States is willing to make any offers of direct aid, provide any even provisional security assurances. The North Koreans last week suggested that if the United States were to make some sort of gesture of aid directly before that process began, that they would lessen some of their demands. I wonder, is there any flexibility in the United States position on that, or is that the firm bottom line that you maintain?

SECRETARY POWELL: The firm bottom line for all six parties, and they have all said this, including the DPRK, is that we want a denuclearized Korean peninsula. It's in the best interest of the world, the region, the peninsula and North Korea. We showed flexibility in our position last week because we wanted our colleagues in the six-party talks to recognize the United States was seeking a peaceful, diplomatic solution. But the solution has to begin with North Korea acknowledging and being ready to acknowledge all of its nuclear programs that are of concern, and start down a road where there will be a cessation of all activity on those programs, leading ultimately in some subsequent phase to dismantle and removal of all parts of the program. This is how you denuclearize the peninsula. And unless there is an acknowledgement of that opening position on the part of the North Koreans, then we are not on a path to the denuclearization of the peninsula.

The United States does not want to find ourselves -- not only the United States, but other parties -- in a position where, some years later, as we found from the 1994 agreement, there was one program people knew about but not another one. So, I think all programs reasonably are expected to be presented. The United States has made it clear that, as we start down this road in the early phases of this plan that we put forward, as we follow the principle of word for word and deed for deed, we have to see deeds before we are prepared to put something on the table. We don't think this will take long. We don't think what has been asked for would be very difficult to achieve: identify all components, declare them, allow some verification to make sure that everybody is on a common understanding.

Other members of the six-party discussions have said that they are willing to provide some immediate assistance to North Korea, in terms of energy assistance and perhaps other assistance. The United States has made it clear to the DPRK for the past several years that we want to help the DPRK deal with its problems -- with the problems that its people have and that it has with its economy, but only when it is absolutely clear that the DPRK has taken irreversible steps that will move us in the right direction toward denuclearization.

We are prepared to enter into a security agreement with our other partners, that I think the DPRK should find reassuring, and deal with their concerns about the United States', as they say, "hostile intent." The President's made it clear that we do not seek to invade North Korea, have no hostile intent toward North Korea, and we are anxious to see the North Koreans move in this direction with us -- six nations moving together to reassure one another that the peninsula, the region and the world will be a safer place because there are no nuclear weapons or the capability to produce nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.

So, I think that the proposal we presented last week is a good one. I hope it will be studied very carefully by all parties, but especially the DPRK. They put forward some ideas, and I will assure them in the larger meeting tomorrow, and we have reassured them, that we will study their proposals carefully. But, we don't want to get in a position that we found ourselves in previously where we thought a program had been capped and it hadn't been capped.

Thank you...

Source: State Department, Washington File, http://usinfo.state.gov.

Korean Nuclear Freeze Could Lead to Expanded Aid, Armitage Says

Office of the Press Spokesman
Washington, DC
July 2, 2004

Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary
Interview on National Public Radio With Robert Siegel

...

MR. SIEGEL: I want to ask you about a couple of other areas of U.S. policy.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Sure.

MR. SIEGEL: Talks in Indonesia on North Korea. In those talks, the U.S. seems to have spelled out its position on the North Korean nuclear program in some detail. Could you clarify for us, does the U.S. now say that if North Korea were to freeze work on its nuclear program, that we then could see reason for aid to North Korea, if not from us, from Japan or South Korea, but some kind of aid for the North Koreans in exchange for a freeze?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Yes, we could, but that freeze would have to be on the road towards dismantlement. So, a freeze forever would not be sufficient. So I'll give you a qualified yes.

MR. SIEGEL: So you're saying a freeze as a first point, but in order for the aid to continue flowing, there would have to be progress toward dismantling or a commitment to dismantle?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, there were two -- Mr. Siegel, there were two types of aid. There were food aid, which the United States has been providing regularly, because we don't use food as a weapon and there is a humanitarian problem in North Korea. But the aid that is being considered in the six-party talks was fuel oil for energy. And you're correct, that would come from other nations, not from the United States. But we could consider this if a freeze is a first step.

MR. SIEGEL: Is Washington essentially back to where we began, at the handover from the Clinton to the Bush Administration? Back to where policy was then, where we're willing to see some kind of quid pro quo with the North Koreans and we don't regard that as blackmail by Pyongyang?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No. I think we're in a quite different place. We've made it quite clear, I think, to all concerned that we want complete, verifiable dismantlement. And one of the major differences from our predecessors is that the President has managed to have five states who have very high equities in the North Korean resolution on the same sheet of music and I think that's a significant diplomatic triumph for the President and that's a great difference from the past.

MR. SIEGEL: Making that a regional forum that discusses the North Korea problem?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Dead on.

Source: State Department, Washington File, http://usinfo.state.gov.

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