|
Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation '[T]he burden... is on North Korea to make a move...' US Secretary of State Colin Powell, August 13, 2004'Burden on North Korea to Advance Six-Party Process, Powell Says', US State Department Washington File, August 13, 2004. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE INTERVIEW Secretary of State Colin L. Powell August 12, 2004 (3:30 p.m. EDT) QUESTION: Thank you very much. My question is on North Korea. Libya voluntarily give up -- decided to give up its WMD program. But it took nine months to relinquish it and an additional several month, several month to actually dismantle the program, and the North Koreans have not even acknowledged (inaudible). Do you think it's possible to (inaudible) North Korea (inaudible) one year from now? SECRETARY POWELL: I don't know. I am Secretary of State, but not a fortune teller. (Laughter.) I would like to see the issue resolved within a year. I just don't know if it will be possible. I do know, though, that we have made progress over the last year and a half by getting all of the parties in the six-party talks to acknowledge that the mutual goal is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, even North Koreans agree to that. What we are discussing now is how to go about it in a way that serves the interest of each member in the six-party talks. The North Koreans want to feel safe, and that they will not be attacked or invaded by the United States. And we have said that repeatedly. We have no desire or intention to attack or invade North Korea. We have no hostile intention toward North Korea. The President has said many times that he is concerned about the North Korean people and he would like to see if it is not possible for the international community to help them, not to invade them, but to help them. But it has to begin with North Korea removing this danger to the region, this danger of nuclear weapons. And I think the six-party talks have shown some progress. These things take time, necessarily. As you noted, it took a long time with Libya, but Libya came to a very sound conclusion. Libya said, "What are we getting for this? We spent a lot of money on chemical and nuclear programs. And does anybody like us any better? Are we getting investment? The rest of the world is globalizing. The rest of the world is going into the Internet age, and we sit here with our health care system deteriorating, with all kinds of other things that are not favorable to us, so maybe we should get rid of this." And that's what they chose to do. We have described this example to the North Koreans. The North Koreans always respond saying, "We're not Libya." Well, we know you're not Libya, but you should make the same kind of assessment. And if you have a program that is not serving a particular purpose, then maybe it's time to think about how we could more rapidly get rid of that program and deal with that program. But the North Koreans want to be safe. They want to believe that if they didn't have this program, that the United States would not invade them. We're not going to invade them with this program or without this program. It's not our intention or the purpose we serve. South Korea wants to be safe. Japan wants to be safe from the threat of nuclear weapons in the region, and both China and Russia realize that this is destabilizing to have this kind of program in the region. So we all have a mutual goal, denuclearization of the Peninsula, and everybody is looking at their own individual needs in order to move forward. How long it will take, I don't know. The agreed framework in 1994 didn't happen all of a sudden, it took time. It took a lot of time and a lot of interlocutors, and a lot of meeting -- meetings before the agreed framework was arrived at, and it was a flawed agreement. And so, we want a good agreement. And we want an agreement that serves the needs and the purposes of all of the parties, and the President is looking for and hoping for a political and diplomatic solution. ... QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, back to North Korea. Is the Nunn-Lugar program something that can be applied to North -- SECRETARY POWELL: The what? QUESTION: Nunn-Lugar. Can that be applied to North Korea? If North Korea decides to dismantle its program, would you give them money and expertise to jointly sort of dismantle, the way we did that in the Soviet Union? SECRETARY POWELL: I don't know whether it would be under the Nunn-Lugar framework, but certainly if North Korea moves in this direction we understand that outside resources would be needed to help North Korea. I think the IAEA would have a role to play and all of the other parties to the six-party talks would have a role to play. QUESTION: In money and expertise? Would the U.S. give them -- SECRETARY POWELL: Yeah, mm-hmm. You know, under the Agreed Framework we had experts who were monitoring things in North Korea, as was the IAEA, but I think just as we did with Libya in helping to remove the burden that it had of these programs, we would certainly help North Korea. QUESTION: Also on North Korea -- SECRETARY POWELL: I think it's important for me to say, though, it has to be done in the context of something that is totally irreversible and it has to be done in the context of the entire program, all aspects of the program, and there has to be an acknowledgement of not only the previous programs of plutonium but the enriched uranium programs as well. So, in that context, and that's the six-party context, certainly the United States would be willing to assist with the cost of removal, destruction and total elimination of the programs. QUESTION: Also HEU program? So if North Korea continued to deny its HEU program at the next round of six-party talk, are you going to shift your forecast to the nonproliferation regime, such as PSI? I am wondering at what point would the U.S. decide to take this issue to the UN Security Council. SECRETARY POWELL: No, no decisions have been made. We are far from that kind of action at this point. There are other aspects to North Korean behavior that we don't like: selling of weapons, selling of knowledge of weapons, counterfeiting of money; there are drug trade issues that we have with North Korea. So there are many other aspects to their policies that we are disapproving of. But with respect to the enriched uranium program, we believe that the evidence is solid that they have done work in this program on this kind of technology and we don't see how we could get a complete solution to the nuclear question without getting questions answered with respect to the enriched uranium program. When we confronted them with the information that we had that they had such a program, they were distressed but then they acknowledged it. They said so. We do, yes. And they have acknowledged it subsequently and they have also denied it subsequently. So sometimes they say they have it and sometimes they say they don't have it. Sometimes they say, well, that was just a tactic we used in negotiations and sometimes they say it was not a tactic, we do have it. And so it's difficult to read them. Since it is difficult to read them, I think we have to insist that all parts of their program, plutonium and enriched uranium, have to be part of any agreement. When the Agreed Framework was entered into, it was clearly for the purpose of denuclearizing the peninsula, but everybody thought it was only a plutonium denuclearization at Yongbyon and we discovered in the last several years that they had been working on enriched uranium. And so we can't go down that road again. We cannot be put in a position -- the world cannot be put in a position -- of knowing of an enriched uranium program and not having it as part of the denuclearization process. QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, also thank you so much for (inaudible) appreciate it. I want to follow up my colleague's question about North Korea. In last round of six-party talks in Beijing you made a initial and a complete proposal. SECRETARY POWELL: Mm-hmm. QUESTION: If they made a commitment of dismantlement of the whole nuclear weapons programs, they can get some benefit and (inaudible) participate the HEU (inaudible) supply and (inaudible) but United States is not willing to do that and the North Korea now (inaudible) the United States to do some action, action for action. Do you have any, you know, flexibility to show some kind of symbolic gestures to North Korea to move the process forward just like a, such a teeny, small dollar value contribution or transportation or (inaudible)? Otherwise, and also, HEU issue -- it's -- United States proposal it's a total commitment of the old nuclear weapons. So commitment not including HEU, it's a nonstarter for United States? SECRETARY POWELL: How can we have a total commitment if it doesn't include the enriched uranium part of the program? Now, with respect to North Korean desires, what we have said is that we want to help North Korea but we are not prepared to start putting real benefits on the table in response to a promise to do something. We have seen this kind of tactic with the North Korean negotiators in the past. Now, some of our colleagues in the six-party talks are willing to put forward fuel and maybe other help to the North Koreans. Some of our party -- our colleagues are putting forward food now. We have made a contribution through. But we believe we need to see some progress. We need to see some things actually happen that shows absolute seriousness on their part before we would be willing to contribute support or resources to North Korea. This should not be something that is holding up progress. Since other members of the six-party talks have said they would put something up front to assist North Korea with its fuel and energy needs, that should be enough. The United States has said up front as we start down this road we will provide assurances with respect to our lack of a hostile intent and our assertion and statement that we have no plans to invade or attack, and this will all be part of an agreement that we will enter into over time. But the burden, frankly, in my judgment, is on North Korea to make a move, not constantly for people to come back to the United States and say, well, you made a good move at the last six-party talks, you showed a great deal of flexibility, you put down a clear statement of what you need, all of your other colleagues in the six-party talks thought that this was a significant move on the part of the United States, but the North Koreans are not happy so please make another move. No, this is not the way to negotiate with them. We showed flexibility. All five of the six members -- and you know which ones I mean -- showed flexibility and it really now is up to the North Koreans to take back that proposal, which they did, to Pyongyang, to study it carefully, to analyze it -- that's what I expect them to do -- and then to come back the next working group session or the next plenary session and respond to the proposal and we will be prepared to respond to the proposals that they put down. So the six-party talks are serving the intended purpose of bringing all of the countries in the neighborhood, plus the United States, together. We have made some progress. All six nations are committed to denuclearization of the peninsula. All six nations know that the North Koreans require assistance. All six nations are agreed in principle that some sort of security document will be appropriate at the right time. So we have made progress, but these things take time... Source: US State Department, Washington File, http://usinfo.state.gov. © 2003 The Acronym Institute. |