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Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation '[A] matter of serious concern', IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei on South Korea's uranium enrichment activities, September 13, 2004(See also: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2004/60, September 1, 2004, which has been widely leaked in advance of the IAEA meeting.) Introductory Remarks by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei to the IAEA Board of Governors, Vienna, September 13, 2004[Excerpts] Verification of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Status of Safeguards Agreements and Additional
Protocols Despite these welcome developments, there remain 42 States party to the NPT that have not yet fulfilled their Article III obligation to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency, and 133 States do not have additional protocols in force. Implementation of Safeguards in the
Democratic People´s Republic of Korea The three rounds of the six-party talks so far, involving China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the USA, are steps in the right direction. As I stated before, the Secretariat remains ready to work with all parties towards a comprehensive solution that would, inter alia, provide assurance to the international community that all nuclear activities in the DPRK are exclusively for peaceful purposes. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement of the Socialist People´s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya The report before you summarizes the details of our efforts since June. Our assessment to date is that Libya´s declarations on its uranium conversion programme, enrichment programme and other past nuclear related activities appear to be consistent with the information available to and verified by the Agency. As indicated in the report, some questions related to the acquisition of material and technology - including the origin of uranium contamination on some equipment - still need further investigation in order to verify the completeness and correctness of Libya's declarations of its nuclear programme. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Regarding the first set of issues, as you can see from the report, the Agency is making steady progress in understanding the nature and extent of Iran's nuclear programme, and no additional undeclared activities on the part of Iran have come to light during this period. Iran has continued to act as if its additional protocol were in force. The Agency has gained access to requested locations. Iran has also provided new information in response to Agency requests, although in certain instances the process needs to be accelerated. While in some cases information has been provided promptly, in other cases information has regrettably been provided so late that it has not been possible to include an assessment of it in this report. I am pleased to note that as a result of the Agency's investigations, some previously outstanding issues - namely Iran´s declared laser enrichment activities and Iran´s declared uranium conversion experiments - have reached the point where any further follow-up needed will be carried out as part of routine safeguards implementation. As I mentioned in my report to the June Board, two issues remain central to understanding the extent and nature of Iran's nuclear programme. Regarding the origin of uranium contamination found at various locations in Iran, as mentioned in the report, I should note that some progress has been made - in part due to the cooperation provided by other States - towards ascertaining the source of the high enriched uranium (HEU) found at the Kalaye Electric Company and Natanz. From the Agency's analysis to date, it appears plausible that this HEU contamination may not have resulted from enrichment of uranium by Iran at these locations. However, we are continuing to pursue the identification of sources and reasons for such contamination, as well as the source of the low enriched uranium (LEU) contamination found in various locations in Iran, including on domestically manufactured components. The Agency has also gained a better understanding of Iran´s efforts to import, manufacture and use centrifuges of both the P-1 and P-2 design; however, further investigation is needed, inter alia, to confirm Iran´s statements regarding the absence of P-2 centrifuge related activities in Iran between 1995 and 2002. This will require additional information on the part of Iran, and further cooperation by other States, as well as by companies and individuals that were involved in the illicit procurement network. With regard to confidence building measures that the Board requested be in place until certain conditions are met, as you are aware, Iran in June reversed some of its earlier decisions regarding the suspension of some enrichment related activities. I have continued to stress to Iran that, during this delicate phase while work is still in progress to verify its past nuclear programme, and in light of serious international concerns surrounding that programme, it should do its utmost to build the required confidence through the Agency. I would urge Iran therefore to continue to accelerate its cooperation, pursuing a policy of maximum transparency and confidence building, so that we can bring the remaining outstanding issues to resolution within the next few months and provide assurance to the international community. This is clearly in the interest of both Iran and the international community and should trigger a broad dialogue on many of the underlying issues. I would also urge those States from which components or materials may have originated to continue their cooperation with the Agency. I should note that their cooperation is indispensable to the Agency's ability to bring some of the important outstanding issues to closure. On a related note, I should mention that the Agency has been making progress in investigating the illicit procurement network responsible for supplying nuclear material and equipment, and in verifying some of the statements made by Iran and Libya in connection with this network. I will provide more information to the Board about the results of this investigation upon its completion. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in
the Republic of Korea The inspection team visited the facility where these experiments and associated physics measurements of uranium are said to have taken place, as well as other facilities where the ROK stated that its scientists had conducted uranium conversion activities in the 1980s. One of these conversion activities, which took place at three facilities that had not been declared to the Agency, involved the production of about 150 kilograms of natural uranium metal, a small amount of which, according to the ROK, was later used in the AVLIS experiments. The ROK authorities have pointed out that the uranium enrichment experiments took place in the context of a broader experimental effort to apply AVLIS techniques to a wide range of stable isotopes. According to the ROK, only about 200 milligrams of enriched uranium were produced. During the same trip, the inspection team visited another facility for which the results of environmental samples had revealed the presence of slightly irradiated depleted uranium with associated plutonium. The ROK authorities informed the Agency that, in the early 1980s, a laboratory scale experiment had been performed at this facility to irradiate 2.5 kilograms of depleted uranium and separate a small amount of plutonium. The ROK authorities have stated that all the above experiments were performed without the knowledge or authorization of the ROK Government. With the full cooperation of the ROK, the team was able, at each of the facilities visited, to examine the associated records available, perform measurements, take photographs, collect environmental samples, interview a number of the scientists involved, and view the dismantled equipment that the ROK stated had been associated with these experiments. The team was also able to place Agency seals on major components of the dismantled equipment and associated nuclear materials. It is a matter of serious concern that the conversion and enrichment of uranium and the separation of plutonium were not reported to the Agency as required by the ROK safeguards agreement. The Agency will continue its investigation of all aspects relevant to this new information. I will report to the Board as appropriate, and not later than at its meeting in November. I would ask the Republic of Korea to continue to provide active cooperation and maximum transparency, in order for the Agency to gain full understanding of the extent and scope of these previously undeclared activities, and to verify the correctness and completeness of ROK´s declarations relevant to its nuclear programme. Application of IAEA Safeguards in the
Middle East The General Conference has also asked me to organize a forum on the relevance of the experience of other regions with existing nuclear-weapon-free zones - including confidence building and verification measures - for establishing such a zone in the region of the Middle East. Based on my consultations with States of the region, including during my recent visit to Israel, I intend to organize such a forum early next year, and further consultations are in progress towards that end. Management Issues Technical Cooperation Funding
Issues As you are aware, efforts were made in the last few months to reach agreement on a target figure for contributions to the TCF for 2005 and 2006. I am pleased that the working group on the subject, chaired by the Ambassadors of Mexico and the Philippines, has reached an agreement on a target figure of $77.5 million for each of the two years. VIC Security Enhancements It should go without saying that security is of paramount consideration to all of us, and it is an area in which we cannot afford to cut corners. The measures under discussion here have been recommended by security experts. I would hope therefore that this request will be responded to with the urgency and seriousness it deserves. Conclusion The Agency continues to assume growing responsibilities in nearly all areas of its work, including verification, safety and security, and the use of nuclear technologies for sustainable development. In this context, I would stress the value of the close partnership between the Secretariat and its Member States, which I trust will continue to be forthcoming. Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org.© 2003 The Acronym Institute. |