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Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation US Secretary of State Colin Powell rules out bilateral negotiations with North Korea, October 21, 2004No Direct Bargaining with North Korea, Powell Says, October 21, 2004. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE INTERVIEW Secretary of State Colin L. Powell By Murray Hiebert and Susan Lawrence of The Far Eastern Economic Review October 19, 2004 Powell: And in Korea there are also the issues with respect to our redeployment plans coming up, and, of course, the six-party talks. There are meetings that are under way or have taken place within this time period between senior Chinese leaders and North Korean leaders. And so as we get toward November, this is a good time to kind of review the bidding on where we are on six-party, sort of, talks and what the plan might be to get to the next round of six-party talks in due course. We have economic issues, of course, with all of these three countries as well. And we'll raise all of those. We are cooperating very closely on Proliferation Security Initiative activities, so I always have a pretty full agenda in the Asian theater, and this was a good time for me to go out and talk to people on the ground, as opposed to just phone calls or receiving them here... In the 25 or 30-odd years that I have been involved in Asia in one way or another, to see South Korea grow into a mature democracy and something of a -- more than something -- a real economic dynamo, and to contrast it to North Korea, and to see what's happened in China since my first visit 32 years ago... MR. HIEBERT: We thought with might start with North Korea, which is -- SECRETARY POWELL: Sure. MR. HIEBERT: One of the -- an observation one can easily make is that the situation has deteriorated in the last three years with the Intelligence Estimates going from one to two nukes to six or eight nukes. And if you listen to think-tankers around town who work on Korea, one of the things they observe is that it's difficult, one of the reasons it's -- there's several reasons why it's difficult to deal with, but on the U.S. side it's difficult to deal with because of splits in views on how to deal with the, between -- to say it very simply, I mean, between those who want to put a lot of pressure on it and those who want to do maybe pressure, plus engage. And I'm wondering how that looks to you. Has that, do you think that's been a stumbling block to dealing with this? SECRETARY POWELL: Let's test the proposition to see if it's accurate. There are think tanks all over the place, and there are experts all over the place, and there are those who spent a great deal of their recent career putting in place the Agreed Framework and have a certain commitment to the Agreed Framework. But the fact of the matter is that things had deteriorated before this Administration came in, but they didn't know it. The assumption was that the Agreed Framework had capped the North Koreans at one or two -- it didn't grow. And we never were sure, and we're not -- no one's ever seen these weapons. But the best Intelligence Estimate is that they probably have one or two. And they thought it was capped at that point. And it was capped. Yongbyon was capped and the plutonium weapons were capped. But what was unknown to the previous Administration, and what was unknown to us for the first year or so until the intelligence became absolutely clear was that the North Koreans were cheating and that they had started to develop enriched uranium techniques and technology and acquiring the wherewithal to move in that direction. So the Agreed Framework was not achieving, ultimately, its intended purpose. And when we saw that, we didn't shrink from that reality. We faced the North Koreans with it, and they acknowledged it. Now, they have said many things since then: "We didn't acknowledge it; we don't have it; yes, we do." We're quite confident that they were moving in the direction of enriched uranium. And it's not an ambiguous intelligence picture. And so what we decided to do was not to get ourselves trapped into a -- another direct negotiation with the North Koreans, where we're essentially trying to buy back something they're not supposed to have in the first place and find ourselves in that same position. And we reached out to North Korea's neighbors and said; "This is as much a problem for you as it is for us. In fact, perhaps, it's an even bigger problem. And therefore, we should work as partners in resolving this issue." And that's what we've been doing with the six party framework; we started at three and then went to six, as you know. People are saying, "Yeah, but it hasn't been solved yet." Well, the Agreed Framework didn't get solved in a year, either. It takes time. But what we have achieved is all six parties, to include the North Koreans, saying that our goal is a denuclearized peninsula, to include the North Koreans. The North Koreans, of course, have said that they have certain requirements and conditions with respect to their security, with respect to what they keep calling our hostile policy and with respect to what benefits they will receive from denuclearizing the peninsula and ending their program. What we have said is we can talk about all of that and we can provide answers for all of these issues and questions, but there has to be a complete denuclearization in a verifiable way that makes this problem go away, once and for all. And so far, notwithstanding the views of experts, we are keeping all six parties in this framework. And I think it was yesterday the North Koreans even indicated that they were willing to continue the discussions. And so we'll have to be patient. We will not change our policy. We will not get into a direct, bargain basement negotiation with the North Koreans because the other nations have as great a responsibility and equity as we do. And we'll see where this leads. Now, you started out by saying it is a situation that's deteriorated. The situation has changed, certainly. We are not sure what they have done with all of the rods at Yongbyon. The intelligence community cannot tell you whether or not there are more weapons or not. They are making assumptions and they are doing the best that they can, you know, with a country that does not exactly post this stuff on their website. So they're doing the best they can. But they really do not know, and cannot come to a definitive answer, and there's no reason they should be able to come to a definitive answer as to what exactly the North Koreans have done. And I don't know either. So we continue to say they have, probably, one to two. And they may have more as a result of breaking the seals open in Yongbyon. But I don't know, and I don't know how many more. The point I make to people I discuss this with and I've made to the North Koreans when I have spoken to their foreign minister is, "Fine. What does this do for you? We're not threatened. It's a threat to the region and it could be a threat to us ultimately, but what will you do with this?" Now, we're concerned that they might try to proliferate it and we're trying to persuade them that they have not gained either security or a better road into the future with this kind of program. And that's the message we will continue to give them and they either will or will not come to a similar conclusion, but that's up to them. Now, the other part of your question said was, "Well, you've got all these different points of view within the Administration: Those who want to put more pressure, those who want to put less pressure, those who want to negotiate, those who don't want to negotiate within the six party framework. It's all terribly interesting. All I know is what the President has decided. And he's the only one I'd listen to. And he's, he's decided this. He's decided it repeatedly over the last year that we would try to solve this diplomatically. No option is off the table. We do want pressure put on North Korea to solve the problem, and we're using diplomatic pressure and diplomatic encouragement. And so there are voices out in think-tank-land that make many statements about this, that and the other, and it's great fun to play the parlor game in Washington as to who's where. All I know is what the President has decided and whatever I am executing in the name of the President. MR. HIEBERT: Could I just, one brief -- SECRETARY POWELL: And I don't still find any of my senior colleagues in the Administration saying anything differently. MR. HIEBERT: Just to follow up briefly -- SECRETARY POWELL: It doesn't mean we don't have discussions about these matters. MR. HIEBERT: Aha. To follow up, one of the things that also people will note is that part of the reason that, a second part of why North Korea hasn't come around is because the pressure from -- Beijing and South Korea really don't want to put too much pressure on them, and the enticements from the U.S. offering that South Korea and China can do stuff, the carrot stuff, haven't been sweet enough. Do you think, I mean, they didn't come to the last round of talks. Do you think that -- when that was hoped for in October -- do you think that it's time for a new initiative to -- SECRETARY POWELL: We have a, we put a new initiative in. MR. HIEBERT: The one in June? SECRETARY POWELL: Yeah. I put down a new initiative. It was by Assistant Secretary Kelly who was well received by our partners. And it was seen as a responsible step toward the resolution of this issue. What we can't do is lean back and wait for the North Koreans to say, "Well, we don't like that one. Give us another one," or, "Put something else on the table." They have a long and well-understood history of negotiating. And as long as they think there is always something more coming, they will see if they can hold out for something more. Maybe they think there's going to be a change in Administration. I told the foreign minister in June I thought that he was probably -- he probably needs to come to the realization that: one, the President has told me to work all the way through the election; and then, we have another four years to work on this problem -- same President. He didn't smile, but all of his colleagues did. The fact of the matter is that, they know what's there. The Chinese and -- oh, excuse me, the South Koreans and the Japanese are prepared to provide some immediate, upfront assistance and support to the North Koreans. And we have made it clear for two years now that we are looking at a significant move with respect to North Korea, with respect to how we might be able to help them. But it's only going to be in the context of a complete removal, in a verifiable manner, of this capability, and only after steps have been taken in that direction that make it clear that they are serious and that there will be no way to get -- to go backwards. Then, they will find, that as the President has said that the United States stands ready to assist. The President very often talks about his concern about the welfare of the Korean people, the North Korean people. And when you see some of the things happening: the price of rice going up, other things that have been happening in North Korea, their industrial base not being used, there's a lack of power -- they can't do much until they solve their power problem. These problems are more pressing to them than any concerns they have about, should be more pressing to them -- I mean, not to put words in their mouth -- should be more pressing to them than concerns about the United States attacking and invading. The President has said, "We're not going to attack. We're not going to invade. We have no hostile intent towards you. We take no option off the table." But we're trying to solve this diplomatically, and I still think we can. Source: US Department of State, http://usinfo.state.gov. © 2003 The Acronym Institute. |