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US Fact Sheet on Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, January 13, 2005

United States Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

The following fact sheet on U.S. efforts to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction was compiled from U.S. government sources:

Our national strategy to combat WMD is based on three pillars. We will pursue robust counterproliferation policies and capabilities to deter and defend against the use of these weapons. We will strengthen nonproliferation measures to prevent states and terrorists from acquiring WMD. We will increase our preparations to respond effectively to any use of WMD against us or our friends and allies. To succeed, we must use new technologies, strengthen our intelligence capabilities, work even more closely with allies, and establish new partnerships with other key states, including former adversaries.

--President George W. Bush December 11, 2002

WHAT THE UNITED STATES IS DOING ABOUT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)

The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

President Bush's National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), issued in December 2002, has three principal pillars:

1) Counterproliferation to combat WMD use

2) Strengthened nonproliferation to combat WMD proliferation

3) Consequence management to respond to WMD use

As part of COUNTERPROLIFERATION, the United States seeks to

- Enhance the capabilities of U.S. military, intelligence, technical and law enforcement communities to interdict the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and terrorist organizations;

- Deter the use of WMD against the United States, U.S. forces abroad, and friends and allies; and

- Develop robust active and passive defenses and mitigation measures to enable U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies to accomplish their missions, and to assist friends and allies when WMD are used.

As part of NONPROLIFERATION, the United States

- Pursues active nonproliferation diplomacy, seeking to dissuade supplier states from cooperating with proliferant states and to induce proliferant states to end their WMD and missile programs;

- Supports and seeks to improve the effectiveness of existing nonproliferation and arms control regimes;

- Pursues a wide range of nonproliferation and threat reduction cooperation programs, including the Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) program, designed to address the proliferation threat stemming from the large quantities of Soviet-legacy WMD and missile-related expertise and materials;

- Seeks to discourage the worldwide accumulation of separated plutonium, to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium and to work in collaboration with international partners to develop recycling and fuel treatment technologies that are more proliferation-resistant; and

- Strives to ensure U.S. export controls further nonproliferation and other national security goals, while removing unnecessary barriers in the global marketplace.

As part of WMD CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT, the United States seeks to work with friends and allies to develop their own emergency preparedness and consequence management capabilities.

An unclassified version of the strategy is available at http://www.state.gov/t/np/wmd/

G8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation

Announced June 9, 2004, at the Sea Island Summit, the Action Plan on Nonproliferation adopted by the Group of Eight nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia) seeks to reinforce the global nonproliferation regime by helping and encouraging states to implement effectively their obligations under the multilateral treaty regimes, especially by building law-enforcement capacity and establishing effective export controls.

The action plan is available at http://www.g8usa.gov/d_060904d.htm

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Announced by President Bush in Krakow, Poland, in May 2003, PSI is a broad international partnership of countries which, using their own laws and resources, coordinate their actions to halt shipments of dangerous technologies to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern -- at sea, in the air and on land. The PSI is intended to reinforce, not replace, other nonproliferation mechanisms. The original participants - Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States - have been joined by Russia, Canada, Norway and Singapore, while more than 60 other countries have voiced support. For a fact sheet on the initiative's principles, see http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm

President Bush proposed in February 2004 that participants in the PSI and other willing nations expand their focus and use Interpol and other mechanisms for law enforcement cooperation to take additional actions to pursue proliferators and end their operations.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540

In response to President Bush's call to action at the U.N. General Assembly in September 2003, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 on April 28, 2004. UNSC 1540 requires states to refrain from providing support to non-state actors attempting to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use chemical, biological or nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. It requires states to adopt and enforce effective laws prohibiting nonstate actors from pursuing weapons of mass destruction. It also requires states to take and enforce effective domestic measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related material development and maintainence of physical protection measures, border controls, and national export and transshipment controls.

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

Launched by G8 Leaders at the June 2002 Kananaskis Summit, the Global Partnership aims to prevent terrorists and the states that support them from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction. Its geographic focus was originally on Russia but has expanded to include the other former Soviet states. President Bush in February 2004 proposed expanding the partnership’s scope of action to include reducing and securing dangerous materials elsewhere in the world.

Thirteen additional countries have joined the G8 countries and the European Union in the Global Partnership, so that the following European countries are now participating: United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Sweden, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, and Ireland. The G8 is working to extend formal recognition to former Soviet states as Global Partnership recipients.

The United States pledged $10 billion at the Kananaskis Summit, or half of the $20 billion target.

The G8 Consolidated Report of Global Partnership Projects (June 2004) is available at http://www.g8usa.gov/pdfs/GPConsolidatedReportofGPProjectsJune2004.pdf

U.S. Global Partnership funding for projects in FSU states are averaging $1 billion annually and involve the full range of U.S. nonproliferation and threat-reduction cooperative activities, including:

- Destroying strategic delivery vehicles and chemical weapons;

- Disposing of and reducing the risk of theft or loss of nuclear weapons-usable and radioactive materials;

- Securing pathogens; and

- Developing alternative employment programs for former weapons scientists.

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

Originally sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn (Democrat of Georgia) and Richard Lugar (Republican of Indiana) as an amendment to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty Implementation Act, Congress formally established the Competitive Threat Reduction (CTR) program in December 1991 as the "Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act." It was later renamed the "Cooperative Threat Reduction Program" in 1993 legislation, and has been allocated over $4.4 billion through annual defense appropriations since 1991. Assistance has been provided to the former Soviet republics (primarily Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus). The CTR program is implemented through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), a part of the U.S. Department of Defense.

Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress FY05:

- CTR Funding FY04: $448.6 million

- CTR Funding FY05: $409.2 million

BIODEFENSE AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

President Bush's “Biodefense for the 21st Century�

Released in an unclassified version on April 28, 2004, "Biodefense for the 21st Century" specifies roles and responsibilities and integrates the programs and efforts of various communities -- national security, medical, public health, intelligence, diplomatic, agricultural and law enforcement -- into a sustained and focused national effort against biological weapons threats.

The fiscal 2004 appropriations combined Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) biodefense preparedness spending totaled $5.2 billion (including the BioShield proposal).

The President's BioShield initiative will provide $5.6 billion over the next 10 years to purchase new vaccines and treatments, creating a more stable and assured source of funding.

Biodefense research funding at the National Institutes of Health increased from $53 million in FY 2001 to $1.6 billion in FY 2004. NIH is also supporting the genomic sequencing of all bacteria considered to be bioterror threats, as well as at least one strain of every potential viral and protozoan bioterror pathogen.

“Biodefense for the 21st Centuryâ€? is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/20040430.htmlÂ

BioIndustry Initiative (BII)

The U.S. Department of State BioIndustry Initiative (BII) is a nonproliferation program authorized in the Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for FY 2002 (Public Law 107-117). BII focuses on two objectives:

- The reconfiguration of former Soviet biological weapons production facilities, their technology and expertise for peaceful uses.

- The engagement of Soviet Biological and Chemical Weapons scientists in collaborative research and development projects to accelerate drug and vaccine development for highly infectious diseases.

The United States Department of Defense spent $54.2 million in FY04 funding projects in form Soviet states to, for example, dismantle excess bioweapon capacity, upgrade security at biolab institutes and create mobile epidemiological response teams.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

DOD spent $200.3 million in FY04 for such projects as the Shchuch'ye chemical weapons destruction facility and the demilitarization of former nerve agent weapons production facilities in Kazakhstan and Russia.

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

DESTROYING STRATEGIC MISSILES, BOMBERS, MISSILE SILOS

The Defense Department funds projects in Russia to eliminate liquid and solid propellants from ICBMs, ICBM silos, and mobile launchers; in Ukraine to eliminate SS-24 missile motors, nuclear-capable bombers, non-fueled ICBMs, and nuclear air-to-surface missiles; in Kazakhstan to eliminate strategic weapons infrastructure such as airfields and warhead storage sites.

NUCLEAR SAFETY IN FORMER SOVIET STATES

In FY04, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent $399 million, the Defense Department $160.3 million, and DOE/State $31.2 million for such projects as nuclear reactor safety, nuclear weapons storage and transportation, and the elimination of weapons-grade plutonium production.

RETURNING WEAPONS-USABLE URANIUM FROM OTHER COUNTRIES TO UNITED STATES, RUSSIA

DOE has two programs to return highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to either the United States or Russia. The U.S. fuel acceptance program includes HEU exported by the United States to research reactors in 34 countries, 11 of which have returned all of their HEU as of November 2004. Under the Russian fuel-return program, DOE assists in the return of Russian-origin HEU from 14 countries to Russia.

DOE plans to complete the return of HEU to Russia by 2009 at cost of about $100 million.

For a recent (November 2004) assessment of these programs by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) see http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0557.pdf

STRENGTHENING THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)

President Bush has proposed strengthening the IAEA by making the signing of the IAEA Additional Protocol a condition for countries seeking equipment for their civilian nuclear programs, by creating a special committee on safeguards and verification, and by disqualifying any state under investigation for proliferation violations from serving on the IAEA Board of Governors or on the new special committee.

EMPLOYMENT OF FORMER WEAPONS SCIENTISTS

The State Department spent $61.8 million in FY04 for such projects as the Science Centers program, which funds civilian research by former Soviet weapons scientists, and the Biological/Chemical Redirection program, which funds opportunities for former Soviet BW and CW scientists.

DOE spent $39.8 million in FY04 to fund the Russian Transition Initiatives program. This program engages WMD experts in cooperative projects involving the 10 major DOE/NNSA National Laboratories and U.S. industry, creating alternative non-weapons work for former Soviet WMD experts.

EXPORT CONTROL AND BORDER SECURITY FOR FORMER SOVIET STATES

The State Department funded $34.4 million in export control and border security projects in FY04. Examples include funding automated export control systems to better handle biological, chemical, and radiological materials; funding training and equipment to boost export control systems and border control capabilities.

The Defense Department provided over $40 million in equipment, logistics and training to improve security of borders and improve ability to investigate WMD theft cases.

Source: US State Department, Washington File, http://usinfo.state.gov.

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