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Disarmament Documentation

E3 Proposal to Iran, August 5, 2005

Full text of the E3 (France, Germany and United Kingdom) proposal for a Framework for a long-term agreement between the E3 and Iran is available at:

http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0508/EU050808.pdf.

Iran's response condemning the proposal as an "insult on the Iranian nation" is available below.

Excerpts from the Proposal

The Proposal covers Political and Security Co-operation, including non-proliferation, terrorism, regional security and combating drug trafficking; a section on Long Term Support for Iran's Civil Nuclear Programme; and a section on Economic and Technological Cooperation including Energy cooperation, trade and investment, WTO accession, export controls, etc. The proposal includes recommendations that the E3/EU and Iran would:

affirm that a final agreement on long-term arrangements providing objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes would lead immediately to a higher state of relations based on a process of collaboration in different areas;
the United Kingdom and France would be prepared to reaffirm to Iran the unilateral security assurances given on 6 April 1995, and referred to in United Nations Security Council Resolution 984 (1995).
reaffirm their commitment to abide by security and nonproliferation treaties to which they are party, and recall the need for more consistent monitoring, effective implementation and, where necessary, firmer enforcement of such treaties;
stress the importance of universal adherence to and full implementation of and compliance with disarmament and nonproliferation treaties and of the full implementation of the IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols; work towards the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty; where it has not already been done, conclude an Additional Protocol; become party to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; and subscribe to the Hague International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation;
reaffirm their commitment to the objective of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, biological and chemical, and their means of delivery, consistent with the resolution on the Middle-East adopted at the 1995 NPT review and extension conference, United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.
confirm that the prevention of proliferation of WMD should not hamper international co-operation for peaceful purposes, in accordance with the relevant international obligations, while underlining that the goal of peaceful utilisation must not be used as a cover for proliferation.

The E3/EU recognise Iran's rights under Article IV of the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy without discrimination in conformity with its obligations under the NPT.

The E3/EU recognise Iran's right to develop a civil nuclear power generation programme to reduce its dependence on oil and gas and to choose the most appropriate mix of energy sources to meet its needs as it perceives them, consistent with its international obligations.
The E3/EU therefore declare, within the context of an overall agreement and a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements, their willingness to support Iran to develop a safe, economically viable and proliferation-proof civil nuclear power generation and research programme that conforms with its energy needs.
The E3/EU fully support long-term co-operation in the civil nuclear field between Iran and Russia.

Within the context of an overall agreement, co-operation between the E3/EU and Iran in the civil nuclear field would move forward within the following framework:

Iran would have access to the international nuclear technologies market where contracts are awarded on the basis of open competitive tendering, recognising the right of companies to determine their own commercial strategies and choices;
co-operation would be conditional on Iran's full implementation of its relevant international obligations and commitments, including the long-term arrangements agreed between the E3/EU and Iran, resolution by the IAEA of all questions raised under Iran's Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and continued cooperation with the IAEA;
under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and based on respective national, European and international norms, the E3/EU and Iran are obliged to implement export controls. The E3 would commit themselves to implementing these controls in a nondiscriminatory way, bearing in mind the new context that would be created by the confidence building measures and commitments undertaken by Iran under an overall agreement.

In line with these principles, and in the context of an overall agreement and growing confidence between the E3/EU and Iran, the E3 would support the development of Iran's civil nuclear programme in the following areas:

in the field of civil nuclear research through implementation of the E3/EU's offer of an expert mission to help identify the requirement for a research reactor in Iran and how best to meet that requirement. The E3/EU would ensure Iran faced no discriminatory obstacles to filling the requirements jointly identified; and
in other fields of peaceful use of nuclear energy, excluding fuelcycle related activity, the E3/EU would commit themselves not to impede participation in open competitive tendering.

Fuel Assurances

The E3/EU recognise that Iran should have sustained access to nuclear fuel for the Light Water Reactors forming Iran's civil nuclear industry. These arrangements are currently provided for through bilateral agreements and contracts with states/companies with which it is engaged in nuclear co-operation. The E3/EU note that under the Iran/Russia agreement on nuclear co-operation, Russia has committed itself formally to supplying nuclear fuel for the life-time of Russian-built reactors in Iran. But the E3/EU stand ready to explore additional ideas in this context.
In order to provide Iran with additional assurances that external supplies of fuel could be relied upon in the long term, the E3/EU would propose to develop with Iran a framework which would provide such assurance, without prejudicing any future multilateral arrangements developed under IAEA auspices.

Confidence Building

As Iran will have an assured supply of fuel over the coming years, it will be able to provide the confidence needed by making a binding commitment not to pursue fuel cycle activities other than the construction and operation of light water power and research reactors.
As an essential element of this mechanism for international confidence building, Iran would undertake to:
a. make a legally binding commitment not to withdraw from the NPT and to keep all Iranian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards under all circumstances;

b. ratify its Additional Protocol, in accordance with its existing commitment, by the end of 2005;

c. in the meantime, fully implement the Additional Protocol pending its ratification and to co-operate proactively and in a transparent manner with the IAEA to solve all outstanding issues pursuant to the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol including by allowing IAEA inspectors to visit any site or interview any person they deem relevant to their monitoring of nuclear activity in Iran; and

d. agree arrangements for the supply of fresh fuel from outside Iran and commit to returning all spent fuel elements of Iranian reactors to the original supplier immediately after the minimum cooling down period necessary for transportation.
In line with IAEA Board Resolutions, the E3/EU would also expect Iran to stop construction of its Heavy Water Research Reactor at Arak, which gives rise to proliferation concerns. The E3/EU repeat their existing offer to send an expert mission to Iran to help identify research requirements and the most suitable type of equipment to meet those requirements.

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Response of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Framework Agreement proposed by EU3/EU

The proposal presented by the E3/EU on August 5, 2005 is a clear violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, the NPT, Tehran Statement and the Paris Agreement of November 15, 2004.

The proposal self-righteously assumes rights and licenses for the E3 which clearly go beyond or even contravene international law and assumes obligations for Iran which have no place in law or practice.

The proposal incorporates to a series of one sided and self serving extra-legal demands from Iran, ranging from accepting infringements on its sovereignty to relinquishing its inalienable rights.

It seeks to intimidate Iran into accepting intrusive and illegal inspections which go well beyond the Safeguards Agreement or the Additional Protocol as well as the provisions of the IAEA Statute and its mandate;
It asks Iran to abandon most of its peaceful nuclear program;
It also seeks to establish a subjective, discriminatory and baseless set of criteria for Iranian nuclear program.
Such criteria would effectively dismantle most of Iran's peaceful nuclear infrastructure;
Criteria that if applied globally, would only monopolize the nuclear industry for the Nuclear Weapon States.

The proposal - in spite of its size - has absolutely no firm guarantees or commitments and does not even incorporate meaningful or serious offers of cooperation to Iran.

It amounts to an elongated but substantively shortened and self-serving revised version of an offer proposed by E3 and rejected by Iran prior to the Paris Agreement in October 2004 in Vienna.
In the area of security, the proposal does not go beyond repeating UN Charter principles and previously made general commitments.
The proposal even attempts to make E3's commitment to those general principles of international law optional, partial and conditional.
In the area of technology cooperation it fails to include even an indication - let along guarantees - of the E3/EU's readiness to abandon or ease its violations of international law and the NPT with regard to Iran's access to technology. For instance, while under the NPT, the E3 is obliged to facilitate Iran's access to technology, the proposal makes a conditional and ambiguous offer 'not to impede'.
In the area of economic cooperation, it only includes a conditional recital of already existing commitments and arrangements.

The proposal not only violates the Paris Agreement, but in fact makes a mockery of that agreement.

The proposal never even mentions the terms 'objective guarantees', 'firm guarantees' or 'firm commitments', thereby indicating the total departure of its authors from the foundations of the Paris Agreement;
The proposal equates 'objective guarantees' with termination of Iran's hard gained peaceful nuclear program.
At the same time, it equates 'firm guarantees and firm commitments' with vague, conditional, and partial restatements of existing obligations.

In sum, the proposal is extremely long on demands from Iran and absurdly short on offers to Iran and it shows the lack of any attempt to even create a semblance of a balance. It amounts to an insult on the Iranian nation, for which the E3 must apologize.

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