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Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation IAEA Board of Governors, Statement by Director General Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, September 19, 2005Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors, by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Vienna, September 19, 2005, Excerpts on Iran and North Korea. Implementation of Safeguards in the Democratic
People´s Republic of Korea As I have stated before, the Secretariat remains ready to work with all parties towards a comprehensive settlement that would both address the security needs of the DPRK and provide assurance to the international community that all nuclear activities in the DPRK are exclusively for peaceful purposes. The news coming from Beijing this morning - after two years of complex negotiations - about an initial agreement at the six-party talks on the principles that should govern a comprehensive settlement, is encouraging. It is particularly welcome that the DPRK has expressed its commitment "to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and [to return], at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards." I note also that "the DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of light water reactor to the DPRK." A successfully negotiated settlement of this longstanding issue would be a significant accomplishment for international peace and security. I would also take this opportunity to underline the constructive role played by the People´s Republic of China throughout this negotiation process. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in
the Islamic Republic of Iran The objective of the Agency´s verification activities in Iran is to clarify all aspects of Iran´s past undeclared nuclear activities - with a view to assuring ourselves that all past activities have now been declared to the Agency, and that all nuclear material and activities in the country are under safeguards. The more thoroughly we are able to clarify all of Iran´s past nuclear activities, the more we will be in a position to understand and confirm the nature of the programme. Since October 2003, good progress has been made in terms of Iran´s corrections of past breaches and in terms of the Agency´s ability to verify certain aspects of Iran´s nuclear programme. As a result, some aspects of that programme - such as those related to uranium conversion, laser enrichment, fuel fabrication and heavy water - are now being followed up as routine safeguards implementation matters. Since November of last year, the Agency´s verification activities in Iran have been primarily focused on two questions related to Iran´s centrifuge enrichment activities. With respect to the first question, concerning the origin of low enriched uranium (LEU) and high enriched uranium (HEU) particle contamination found at various locations in Iran, we have made good progress, with the active cooperation of Pakistan. The results of our environmental sample analysis tend, on balance, to support Iran´s statements about the foreign origin of most of the observed HEU contamination. With respect to the second question, regarding the chronology of Iran´s centrifuge enrichment activities, some progress has been made since last November. However, this progress has been slow, and the Agency has made repeated requests for additional information. This additional information requires, inter alia: clarification of the 1987 and mid-1990s offers from the procurement network; access to the dual use equipment related to the Lavisan-Shian site; additional access to the Parchin site; and access to a number of additional individuals. The Agency´s successful verification of the scope and chronology of Iran´s centrifuge enrichment activities will also be essential to the resolution of the remaining LEU contamination issues. As the report makes clear, Iran continues to fulfil its obligations under the safeguards agreement and additional protocol by providing timely access to nuclear material, facilities and other locations. This is, however, a special verification case that requires additional transparency measures. Two decades of concealed activities have created a situation that makes it imperative for the Agency´s investigation to go beyond the confines of the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. This is a prerequisite for the Agency to be able to reconstruct the history and nature of all aspects of Iran´s past nuclear activities, and to compensate for the confidence deficit created. I therefore call on Iran to expand the transparency and confidence building measures it has already provided. By promptly responding to these Agency requests, Iran would well serve both its interests and those of the international community. Regarding the status of Iran´s voluntary suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, as the report indicates, Iran has since 8 August been conducting conversion activities at the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility, under Agency verification. Other aspects of Iran´s suspension remain intact. Application of IAEA Safeguards in the
Middle East The General Conference has also asked me to organize a forum on the relevance of the experience of other regions with existing nuclear-weapon-free zones - including confidence building and verification measures - for establishing such a zone in the region of the Middle East. Extensive consultations with concerned States of the region failed, however, to produce an agreement on an agenda for such a forum. Naturally, I remain ready to convene such a forum, if and when the concerned States are able to reach agreement on the agenda. Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org. © 2005 The Acronym Institute. |