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Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation House of Commons Defence Committee Recommendations on Trident replacement, June 30, 2006House of Commons Defence Committee Report, The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, eighth report of Session 2005-06, HC 986, June 30, 2006. On June 30, 2006, the House of Commons Defence Committee
published the report on the first stage of its inquiry into the
future of the UK's nuclear weapons. Conclusions and Recommendations
are reproduced below. The full report is available at:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/ Dr Rebecca Johnson was one of a number of witnesses, who were
invited to give oral evidence to the Committee. Her written
submission is available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/ The next stage of the Committee's inquiry will focus on the maintenance of onshore infrastructure and the domestic UK skills base and the linkage between the Government's Defence Industrial Strategy and the decision on retention, replacement, or abolition of the UK's Trident system. Conclusions and Recommendations1. We welcome the Government's promise of a full and open debate in Parliament, and in the country at large, on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. We are surprised and disappointed that the Ministry of Defence has refused to participate in our inquiry. We believe that a genuine and meaningful debate is only possible with the active participation of the MoD. We call upon the MoD to engage fully in our forthcoming inquiries into the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. We hope the MoD will make a substantive response to this report and that it will address openly the issues we have raised. (Paragraph 12) 2. The UK's strategic nuclear arsenal is small in comparison with the other established nuclear powers. (Paragraph 45) 3. In considering the future of the strategic nuclear deterrent, the UK will need to examine whether the concept of nuclear deterrence remains useful in the current strategic environment and in the context of the existing and emerging threats to the security of the country. We will have to consider whether those states and non-state actors posing such threats can, in reality, be deterred from instigating acts of aggression by either existing or new approaches to nuclear deterrence. We will also have to consider how the UK's nuclear capability should be adjusted to meet new strategic realities. Trident was developed during the final decade of the Cold War, and was designed to counter the threat posed by the size and technical capabilities of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal: we need to consider whether the form of the UK's current nuclear deterrent is best suited to today's and tomorrow's strategic challenges. (Paragraph 55) 4. We believe that it is essential that, before making any decisions on the future of the strategic nuclear deterrent, the MoD should explain its understanding of the purpose and continuing relevance of nuclear deterrence now and over the lifetime of any potential Trident successor system. (Paragraph 56) 5. Before any decisions on the future of the deterrent are made, it will be important to consider whether the possession of nuclear weapons enhances the UK's international influence and status and whether this contributes to the justification for retention of a strategic nuclear capability. (Paragraph 57) 6. It is clear that there is a difference of views and no clear consensus that international influence is, of itself, a reason to retain the strategic nuclear deterrent. We recommend that the MoD make clear whether the Government believes the possession of a nuclear deterrent is an important contributor to the UK's international influence. (Paragraph 65) 7. The public debate over the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent should address:
8. It is important to distinguish between two different types of independence: independence of acquisition and independence of operation. We heard that independence of acquisition is what the French have opted for at a significantly higher cost to the defence budget. Independence of operation is an alternative concept of independence and it is this which the UK has opted for at a lower price. (Paragraph 80) 9. We call upon the MoD to clarify the technical dependencies of the UK's Trident system upon the United States and to respond to the argument that the UK's nuclear deterrent is not truly independent. In weighing the importance of maintaining independence, attention needs to be paid to the differing concepts of independence adopted by the UK and France. (Paragraph 84) 10. The public debate about the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent must take into account:
11. The most pressing threat currently facing the UK is that of international terrorism. Witnesses to our inquiry overwhelmingly argued that the strategic nuclear deterrent could serve no useful or practical purpose in countering this kind of threat. (Paragraph 88) 12. Witnesses to our inquiry did not believe that the UK currently faced a direct or impending military threat from any of the established nuclear weapons states, including Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, or, of course, from France or the United States. (Paragraph 95) 13. There are difficulties inherent in anticipating future threats to the security of the UK. It is not possible to predict accurately the nature of the future strategic international environment and to identify with any certainty the threats the UK is likely to face. (Paragraph 96) 14. We call upon the MoD to consider publicly the threats the UK faces today and how those threats may evolve in the future. Such a threat assessment will shape any decision on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. We accept that future threats are unknowable, but, clearly, a world in which nuclear proliferation had taken hold would create deep uncertainties in international relations. For this reason, the UK may wish to retain a strategic nuclear capability as a guard against the unknown. If the MoD believes in the value of the nuclear deterrent as an insurance policy, rather than in response to any specific threat, we believe it is important to say clearly that is the reason for needing the deterrent. (Paragraph 103) 15. The Government has stated that decisions on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent will be required during the course of the current Parliament. To date, it has offered no explanation of the nature of those decisions. If there is to be a meaningful debate on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent, the public should know what decisions will be required, when they must be taken and implemented, and what factors are driving consideration of the issue now. (Paragraph 104) 16. A fundamental political decision needs to be made on whether or not the UK should retain a strategic nuclear deterrent. There is no clear point at which this decision has to be made and there is a risk that - by taking a series of decisions to keep options open - we could find that we have in practice taken the decision to keep the deterrent. Conversely, if we do not keep those options open, we could find we are left without a deterrent. In our view, the UK should make a clear decision on whether to retain the strategic nuclear deterrent. It is important that a decision of this magnitude is not taken by default. It should be made only after a full public debate. It must not be made by the Government in secret. (Paragraph 106) 17. A service life extension programme would allow the UK to postpone decisions on whether to replace Trident until around 2010, on the basis that a service life extension programme would add an additional five years to the existing system and that procurement of a Trident replacement would take approximately 14 years. By this time, it is possible that the strategic environment might be clearer. But it is likely to be an expensive process. Such an expensive option should not be used only as a means of deferring a decision on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. (Paragraph 110) 18. It is important that the Government continue to invest in the UK infrastructure and skills base until a decision on whether to retain or abolish the nuclear deterrent is made. Unless this investment is forthcoming, the Government is likely to find that its options will be constrained and that certain choices for the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent will no longer be available. (Paragraph 115) 19. Given the new investment at Aldermaston, and the widespread expectation that a new warhead will not be required until well into the 2020s, the timelines for manufacturing a replacement warhead is not a key driver of the current debate. (Paragraph 121) 20. Since the Trident II D5 missile will be in service in the United States until 2042, this component of the system is not a key driver of the current debate. (Paragraph 124) 21. The platform is generally regarded as the crucial factor driving the current debate on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. (Paragraph 126) 22. If the MoD believes that the UK should retain the Continuous-at-Sea Deterrent cycle, it must either extend the life of the Vanguard-class submarine or procure a new platform to be in service by 2020. In the light of the reduced threat we currently face, an alternative possibility would be to retain a deterrent, but not continuously at sea. (Paragraph 130) 23. We believe that the maintenance of onshore infrastructure and the domestic UK skills base is an issue of paramount importance in considering the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent. We have decided that this will be the focus of the next in our series of inquiries into the future of the strategic nuclear deterrent. In that inquiry we will also address the linkage between the Government's Defence Industrial Strategy and the decision on retention, replacement, or abolition of the UK's Trident system. (Paragraph 138) Source: UK Parliament, http://www.parliament.uk. © 2006 The Acronym Institute. |