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IAEA Reports that Iran has not suspended its enrichment related
activities, August 31, 2006
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General,
IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2006/53, August 31, 2006.
Board of Governors
GOV/2006/53
Date: 31 August 2006
Restricted Distribution Original: English
For official use only
Item 8(c) of the provisional agenda
(GOV/2006/50)
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
1. On 8 June 2006, the Director General reported on the implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran)
(GOV/2006/38). This report covers developments since that date.
2. On 31 July 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution
1696 (2006), which, inter alia,
- called upon Iran without further delay to take the steps required
by the Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential
to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear
programme and to resolve outstanding questions;
- demanded, in this context, that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related
and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to
be verified by the Agency;
- underlined the necessity of the Agency continuing its work to clarify
all outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme;
- called upon Iran to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional
Protocol and to implement without delay all transparency measures as
the Agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations; and
- requested by 31 August a report from the Director General primarily
on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all
activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of
Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the Board and with
the above provisions of this resolution, to the Board of Governors and
in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration.
3. This report is being submitted to the Board and in parallel to the
Security Council.
A. Suspension of Enrichment Related Activities
4. Iran has continued the testing of P-1 centrifuges in the Pilot Fuel
Enrichment Plant (PFEP). Since 6 June 2006, centrifuges in the single
machine test stand and in the 10-machine and 20-machine cascades have
been run mostly under vacuum, but with the feeding of UF6 into
single machines of the 20-machine cascade for short periods of time. Between
6 and 8 June 2006, the 164-machine cascade was also tested with UF6.
Further testing of the 164-machine cascade with UF6 was carried
out between 23 June and 8 July 2006. During these tests, a total of approximately
6 kg of UF6 was fed into the machines and enriched to various
levels of U-235. The feeding of UF6 into the 164-machine cascade
was resumed on 24 August 2006.
5. In June 2006, Iran stated that it had achieved enrichment levels of
5% U-235 in a test run in the 164-machine cascade. Iran provided measurement
results from the on-line mass spectrometer to substantiate this statement.
The Agency collected environmental samples, the results of which are still
pending. Iran has refused the Agency access to operating records concerning
product and tail assays which the Agency requires to complete its auditing
activities. However, on 30 August 2006, Iran provided the Agency with
some information about product assays, which the Agency is currently assessing.
6. The installation of a second 164-machine cascade is proceeding. Iran
has informed the Agency that it expects to be able to run the cascade
under vacuum in September 2006. In August 2006, the Agency installed additional
cameras to monitor this cascade. The Agency has also proposed the implementation
of remote monitoring to compensate for the fact that measures normally
used for verification at operational enrichment facilities (e.g. limited
frequency unannounced access) are not feasible at PFEP. However, Iran
continues to decline to discuss the implementation of remote monitoring
at PFEP.
7. On 26 July 2006, design information verification (DIV) was carried
out at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, where construction was
ongoing. In the course of the inspectors' visit to Iran between 11 and
16 August 2006, Iran declined to provide the Agency with access to carry
out DIV at FEP, stating that the frequency of DIV activities was, in its
view, too high and that the Agency had performed 3 DIVs there in 2003,
3 DIVs in 2004, 15 DIVs in 2005 and 12 DIVs as of August 2006. Iran also
expressed concern about the frequency of DIV at PFEP, the Uranium Conversion
Facility (UCF) and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40). The Agency
explained that DIV was an ongoing and continuing process, and that it
is carried out during all construction, commissioning, operation and subsequent
phases of a facility to establish the safeguards measures to be implemented
and to ensure that there are no undeclared design features which would
permit the diversion of nuclear material. Between December 2003 and February
2006, the Agency, with the consent of Iran, also took advantage of DIV
activities to monitor Iran's suspension of enrichment activities. The
Agency explained that DIV also enables the Director General to fulfil
the reporting requirements set by the Board of Governors and the Security
Council. Between 26 and 30 August 2006, Iran allowed the Agency access
to carry out DIV at FEP and at the other facilities mentioned above.
B. Suspension of Reprocessing Activities
8. The Agency has been monitoring the use of hot cells at the Tehran
Research Reactor and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production
Facility, and the construction of hot cells at the IR-40, through inspections,
DIV and satellite imagery. There are no indications of ongoing reprocessing
activities in Iran.
C. Heavy Water Research Reactor
9. On 12 July and 30 August 2006, the Agency carried out DIV at the IR-40
reactor at Arak. Construction of the facility is continuing.
D. Outstanding Issues
10. As indicated in the Director General's report of April 2006 (GOV/2006/27,
para. 6), on 27 April 2006, the Agency received from Iran a letter in
which it was stated that "Iran is fully prepared to continue granting
the Agency's inspection in accordance with the Comprehensive Safeguards
provided that the Iran's nuclear dossier will remain, in full, in the
framework of the Agency and under its safeguards, the Islamic Republic
of Iran is prepared to resolve the remaining outstanding issues reflected
in [the Director General's] report GOV/2006/15 of 27 February 2006, in
accordance with the international laws and norms. In this regard, Iran
will provide a time table within next three weeks." No such timetable
has as yet been received.
D.1. Enrichment Programme
D.1.1. Contamination
11. There has been no further progress on the resolution of the contamination
issue (GOV/2006/27, paras 8-9). As mentioned in the Director General's
last report (GOV/2006/38, para. 4), given the difficulty of establishing
a definitive conclusion in connection with this long outstanding issue,
a full understanding of the scope and chronology of Iran's centrifuge
enrichment programme, as well as full implementation of the Additional
Protocol, are necessary for the Agency to be able to provide credible
assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities
in Iran. These are also essential for clarification of the source of the
uranium particle contamination found at the technical university, as discussed
in paragraph 24 below.
D.1.2. Acquisition of P-1 and P-2 Centrifuge Technology
12. The Agency has continued its investigation of the outstanding questions
related to Iran's P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes (GOV/2006/27, paras
10-14). However, Iran has not made any new information available to the
Agency.
13. As indicated in the Director General's last report, following public
statements made by high level Iranian officials that Iran was conducting
research on new types of centrifuges, the Agency wrote to Iran on 24 April
2006 seeking clarification of the scope and content of such research (GOV/2006/38,
para. 6). On 16 June 2006, the Agency received from Iran a letter stating,
inter alia, that Iran was studying different types of centrifuge machines,
and that this was "an ongoing and progressing R&D activity without
using nuclear materials."
D.2. Uranium Metal
14. The Agency is carrying out investigations on information and documentation
which may have been provided to Iran by foreign intermediaries (GOV/2006/27,
paras 15-16; GOV/2006/38, para. 7). To understand the full scope of the
offers made by the intermediaries to Iran, it is still necessary for the
Agency to have a copy of the 15-page document describing the procedures
for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal and the casting and
machining of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres (first
mentioned in GOV/2005/87, para. 6). Iran continued to decline the Agency's
request to have a copy of the document, but had agreed to allow the Agency
to review the document, to take notes from it and to keep it under seal
in Iran. In the course of a visit to Iran in mid-August 2006, Agency inspectors
continued their examination of the document. However, Iran informed the
inspectors that the taking of notes would not be permitted, and the notes
which had been taken thus far by the inspectors during that visit had
to be destroyed. The document remains under seal in Iran.
D.3. Plutonium Experiments
15. The Agency has continued to seek clarification from Iran about its
plutonium separation experiments (GOV/2006/38, paras 8-9). Since the Director
General's last report, the Agency has been able to evaluate the explanations
provided by Iran in June and examine the copy of the notebook kept by
the researcher responsible for the plutonium experiments, and has concluded
that they did not provide sufficient clarification of the outstanding
issues. In an effort to acquire further information about the irradiation
parameters, the Agency also met, on 11 July 2006, with a reactor operator
and the researcher, who also did not provide the data necessary to clarify
the issues. Iran has stated that no other relevant information is available.
16. In a letter dated 10 August 2006, the Agency informed Iran that,
given the information received from Iran to date, the Agency would not
be able to resolve the outstanding inconsistencies unless additional information
were made available by Iran.
17. The depleted uranium targets which had been irradiated in the course
of the plutonium experiments are stored in containers located at the Karaj
Waste Storage Facility (GOV/2005/67, para. 24). On 8 August 2005, the
Agency took environmental samples from one of those containers. The results
from their analysis, recently finalized by the Agency, indicate the presence
of high enriched uranium particles. On 15 August 2006, Iran was requested
to provide information about the source of the contamination and the past
use of the containers.
E. Other Implementation Issues
E.1. Uranium Conversion
18. Since the Director General's last report to the Board, the Agency
has completed its assessment of the results of the physical inventory
verification (PIV) of nuclear material at UCF carried out between 20 and
24 May 2006 (GOV/2006/38, para. 11). The Agency concluded that the physical
inventory as declared by Iran was consistent with the results of the PIV,
within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with similar
size conversion plants.
19. In April 2006, the movement of a 48X UF6 cylinder1
by the operator into and out of one of the withdrawal stations without
prior notification to the Agency resulted in a loss of continuity of knowledge
of nuclear material in the process. However, in light of the results of
the PIV, the Agency will continue to follow up on this question as a routine
part of its verification of the correctness and completeness of Iran's
declarations.
20. On 27 June 2006, Iran provided the Agency with the anticipated operational
programme for UCF, including details of the new conversion campaign involving
approximately 160 tonnes of uranium ore concentrate which was begun on
6 June 2006 and is expected to be completed by January 2007. As of 25
August 2006, approximately 26 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6
had been produced during this campaign. All UF6 produced at
UCF remains under Agency containment and surveillance. In a letter dated
18 July 2006, Iran informed the Agency of its intention to build at UCF
a "standby" process line for converting ammonium uranyl carbonate to UO2.
E.2. Other Matters
21. On 8 July 2006, DIV was carried out at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant
(FMP) at Esfahan. Iran informed the inspectors that full commissioning
of the FMP is scheduled for 2007. The civil engineering construction of
the facility is approximately 80% completed and equipment is being installed.
22. There are no new developments to report with respect to the other
implementation issues referred to in the previous report (GOV/2006/38,
para. 14; GOV/2006/27, paras 19 and 20).
23. Between the end of July 2006 and 29 August 2006, Iran declined to
provide one-year multiple entry visas to designated Agency inspectors
as agreed to by Iran in the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards
Agreement. On 30 August 2006, Iran provided such visas for two inspectors,
and on 31 August 2006 informed the Agency that "following the normal administration
process the multiple one year visa for remaining designated inspectors
will be issued by 10 September 2006".
F. Transparency Measures
24. Analysis of the environmental samples taken from equipment at a technical
university in January 2006, referred to in paragraph 25 of GOV/2006/27,
showed a small number of particles of natural and high enriched uranium.
This equipment had been shown to the Agency in connection with its investigation
into efforts made by the Physics Research Centre (PHRC) to acquire dual
use material and equipment (GOV/2006/27, paras 24-25).
25. Iran has not yet responded to the Agency's requests for clarification
concerning, and access to carry out environmental sampling of, other equipment
and materials related to the PHRC. Nor has Iran provided the Agency with
access to interview the other former Head of the PHRC. As noted in GOV/2006/38,
paragraph 17, the clarification and access sought by the Agency have taken
on added importance in light of the results of the environmental sampling
referred to in the previous paragraph.
26. The Agency has continued to follow up on information concerning studies
related to the so-called Green Salt Project, to high explosives testing
and to the design of a missile re-entry vehicle (GOV/2006/27, paras 27-29).
However, Iran has not expressed any readiness to discuss these topics
since the issuance of the Director General's report in February 2006 (GOV/2006/15,
paras 38-39).
G. Summary
27. Iran has been providing the Agency with access to nuclear material
and facilities, and has provided the required reports. Although Iran has
provided the Agency with some information concerning product assays at
PFEP, Iran continues to decline Agency access to certain operating records
at PFEP.
28. Iran has not addressed the long outstanding verification issues or
provided the necessary transparency to remove uncertainties associated
with some of its activities. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related
activities; nor has Iran acted in accordance with the provisions of the
Additional Protocol.
29. The Agency will continue to pursue its investigation of all remaining
outstanding issues relevant to Iran's nuclear activities. However, the
Agency remains unable to make further progress in its efforts to verify
the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations with a view to
confirming the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. The Director
General will continue to report as appropriate.
Notes
1 A standard 48X cylinder is capable of containing
up to 9.5 tonnes of UF6.
Full text of the report is available as a pdf file at: http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0609/iaeareport.pdf.
Source: Institute for Science and
International Security, http://www.isis-online.org.
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