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US Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte on Iran, February 7, 2007
'Iran's Nuclear Ambitions: Confronting a Common Security
Challenge', On-the-record remarks by Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office in
Vienna and the International Atomic Energy Agency, German United
National Association, Bavarian Chapter, Amerika Haus, Munich,
Germany.
The United States and Europe face a common security challenge,
one we must address both through the United Nations and through our
own robust diplomacy. This is the challenge posed by the nuclear
ambitions of Iran -- a country whose leaders blatantly defy their
international obligations; a country whose shadow spreads
ominously across the Middle East. We have a common interest in
preventing Iran's shadow from taking the shape of a nuclear
cloud.
Today I would like to explain:
- Why Iran's nuclear activities concern the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
- Why the nuclear ambitions of Iran's leaders challenge our common
security.
- How the United States and Europe must deploy a full range of
non-military measures to confront this security challenge.
Iran's Failure to Cooperate with the IAEA
Mohammad ElBaradei, the Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, has submitted report after report on Iran's
nuclear program. Last November's report, like previous reports,
highlighted Iran's failure to open its full range of nuclear
activities to Agency scrutiny and to meet the Agency's specific
requests for information, sampling, and access to facilities and
individuals. Iran has limited where inspectors can go and denied
entry to a large number, including ones with specific expertise on
Iran's nuclear program. Iran has declined interviews with key
individuals. Iran has refused Agency requests to upgrade
monitoring capabilities.
By refusing full cooperation, Iran has failed to answer troubling
questions. Let me give three examples:
- First, Iran has failed to satisfy IAEA concerns about ties to
the A.Q. Khan network. This illicit trafficking network was not a
purveyor of peaceful technology. Rather it was the most sinister
of black markets, selling nuclear weapons technology -- from
blueprints to manufacturing equipment -- to countries like North
Korea and Libya when it was seeking nuclear weapons.
- Second, Iran has failed to meet the IAEA's request to turn over
a document from the A.Q. Khan network on machining uranium metal
into hemispheres. The IAEA reports that such a document is only
relevant to fabricating components for nuclear weapons. Iranian
authorities refused to hand over even a copy of this document.
Instead, they confiscated and destroyed an IAEA inspector's notes
on its contents.
- Third, Iran has failed to explain apparent connections between
undeclared uranium conversion activities, the testing of high
explosives -- a critical element of any nuclear weapon program --
and the design of a missile warhead. These apparent connections,
together with other ties to Iran's military, suggest what the
Director General has called a "military-nuclear dimension" to
Iran's nuclear program.
Last weekend, Iran took five IAEA ambassadors on a tour of a
nuclear facility at Esfahan. With due respect to my colleagues,
IAEA ambassadors are diplomats not technical experts. And two of
the ambassadors, from Cuba and Sudan, are closely aligned with
Iran. This was a publicity stunt -- not a serious show of
openness.
Rather than inviting ambassadors, Iran should be inviting
inspectors, and giving them access to all facilities, individuals,
and information required by the IAEA. Rather than showcasing
noncompliance, Iran should be suspending activities of concern.
Such serious steps are the real ways to regain international
confidence.
On February 21, the Director General is due to provide another
report to the IAEA Board and UN Security Council. Unless Iran's
leaders choose serious steps over publicity stunts, the Director
General will likely have to repeat what he reported last November:
That after three years of intensive verification, the IAEA remains
unable to certify the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear
activities.
Iran's Two Paths to the Bomb
The main technical hurdle between a leadership bent on acquiring
nuclear weapons and assembly of those weapons is acquisition of
fissile material: highly-enriched uranium or plutonium. Iran is
developing the capability to produce both.
At a pilot plant in Natanz, Iran is working to master the
technology to enrich uranium and preparing to start large-scale
operations.
Natanz is not a normal commercial enterprise. Until revealed to
the world by Iranian dissidents, Iran's authorities tried to
disguise it as an agricultural research center. The large,
underground enrichment halls were hidden from overhead
observation. The entrance to these underground halls and their
power supply were cleverly masked. The blueprints for the
centrifuges being installed there were procured illicitly through
the A.Q. Kahn network.
Once the complex at Natanz was exposed to the world, Iran's
leaders claimed it was needed to enrich uranium for nuclear power
reactors. But Iran has no nuclear power reactors. The one power
reactor under construction at Bushehr will receive fuel from
Russia. And Iran has yet to present a credible program for any
follow-on reactors.
Seventeen countries with nuclear power purchase their fuel on the
international market rather than making the expensive and
unnecessary investment in uranium enrichment. Iran could do the
same, especially now that Germany with the UK and France have
offered legally-binding assurances of fuel supply. Instead, Iran
is defiantly pushing ahead with uranium enrichment.
We are currently in the middle of Iran's national holiday, called
the "Ten Days of Dawn," which culminates on February 11, the
anniversary of the 1979 revolution. Iranian authorities have told
the world to expect a major nuclear announcement at this time.
Most analysts suspect it will involve the first steps toward
large-scale uranium enrichment in the underground halls at Natanz.
In fact, Mohammed ElBaradei has confirmed that Iranian technicians
are moving ahead rapidly toward installing a 3,000-centrifuge
capability.
Three thousand centrifuges, once operating successfully, could
produce enough highly-enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon in less
than a year. Alternatively, and perhaps more worrisome, successful
operation of these centrifuges could help Iran develop and hide a
covert enrichment capability at a location unknown to the IAEA.
The Iranian ambassador to the IAEA hinted at this strongly in a
recent meeting with developing countries. He told them that
centrifuges could be operated in an area as small as an apartment
-- and that Iran is a very big country.
Meanwhile, near the city of Arak, Iran has inaugurated a heavy
water production plant and is building a 40-megawatt heavy water
reactor. Iran claims that the heavy water reactor at Arak will be
used to produce medical isotopes. Experts dismiss this claim.
Light water reactors, not heavy water reactors, are the global
standard for medical isotope production. Moreover, an existing
research reactor in Tehran is already underutilized for this
purpose.
What worries the UN and the IAEA are that heavy water reactors are
well suited to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. In fact, a
40-megawatt reactor, like the one Iran is building at Arak, could
produce enough plutonium for one or more nuclear weapons a year.
Because of this concern, county after country has turned down
Iran's request for assistance in building the heavy water reactor
at Arak. In November, the IAEA Board refused to approve
Iran's request for assistance in building the reactor.
Because of the serious concerns about Iran's nuclear activities,
the UN Security Council has required that Iran suspend all
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research
and development, as well as work on heavy water-related
projects.
Iran's leaders, unfortunately, have failed to comply with these
Security Council requirements. They now seem determined to take
steps toward large-scale enrichment. Thus, on February 21, the
Director General will likely report that Iran is in even deeper
violation of its international obligations.
The Threat Posed by Iran's Nuclear
Ambitions
Iran's nuclear activities are not consistent with a program that
is peaceful, and more and more countries are convinced it is not.
More and more governments have come to the same conclusion: That
Iran's nuclear program -- with its history of secrecy and
violations, its ties to the A.Q. Kahn network, its connections to
Iran's military -- is actually a cover for developing nuclear
weapons.
The pursuit of nuclear weapons by the leadership in Tehran
threatens Iran's neighbors and threatens the wider world
community. In the Middle East, Iran's influence is rising. The
fall of the Taliban and Saddam, increased revenues from the high
price of oil, the electoral victory of Hamas, and the perceived
success of Hezbollah in attacking Israel all extend Iran's
shadow.
Iran's shadow is falling over the Gulf states, which fear Iran's
increasing influence and are concerned about worsening tensions
between Shia and Sunni Islam.
Iran's shadow is falling over Middle East peace. Iran is the one
country that opposes the vision of two states -- Palestine and
Israel -- living side-by-side, in peace and security. Instead, it
has called for one of those states to be wiped off the map, and it
has provided training and arms to extremist elements in Lebanon and
the Palestinian territories.
And Iran's shadow is falling over Iraq, where Tehran supports
violent extremist and sectarianism calculated to thwart efforts
toward national reconciliation. Iran, with Syria, is allowing
terrorists and insurgents to use its territory to move in and out
of Iraq and is helping to train and arms militants who are killing
coalition forces and innocent civilians.
Iran's growing influence coincides with a generational change in
Tehran's leadership. President Ahmadinejad's administration,
staffed largely by second-generation hard-liners imbued with
revolutionary ideology and deeply distrustful of the West, is using
more assertive and offensive tactics to spread Iran's influence.
Under the Ahmadinejad government, Iran is enhancing its ability to
project military power, primarily through ballistic missiles and
naval power, to deter potential adversaries and dominate the
Gulf.
Imagine those same leaders armed with nuclear weapons.
A nuclear-armed Iran could embolden its leaders to advance their
ambitions even more aggressively across the Middle East. Even
without detonating a single nuclear weapon, the mere possession of
an atomic arsenal could encourage Iran's leaders to employ their
conventional forces and step up terrorism to advance their regional
ambitions.
At a time when we badly need Middle East peace, a nuclear-armed
Iran could pose an even greater threat to the entire peace
process. Indeed, a nuclear-armed Iran would pose an existential
threat to the very existence of one party to the process: the
democratic state of Israel.
A nuclear-armed Iran could cause neighboring countries to
re-evaluate their nonproliferation commitments. This could spark a
nuclear arms race in one of the world's most volatile regions.
This could destroy the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a
cornerstone of international peace and security.
This frightening scenario poses a clear threat to our common
security. It necessitates common action, both through the United
Nations and by the US and EU in concert.
A Path to Peace
Our goal is to stop the nuclear arming of Iran through diplomacy
that is resolute, sustained, and global. We have worked with
Europe, Russia, China, and other like-minded countries
to present Iran's leaders with a clear choice. The negative
choice is for Iran's leaders to maintain their present course,
ignoring international concerns and their international
obligations.
The positive choice, the constructive choice, the choice that
would most benefit the Iranian people, is for Iran's leaders to
cooperate and to take credible steps to assure the world that their
nuclear activities are solely peaceful. This must start by Iran
meeting IAEA and Security Council requirements to suspend
activities related to uranium enrichment and plutonium production.
Iran suspending these dangerous activities would allow negotiations
to begin on a package of incentives offered last June by six
Foreign Ministers from Europe, Russia, China, and the United
States.
The package offers substantial economic, political, and
technological opportunities for Iran. In the nuclear field, these
include:
- reaffirmation of Iran's right to nuclear energy in conformity
with its international obligations;
- support for building new light-water reactors, using
state-of-the-art technology;
- participation in a joint uranium enrichment venture in Russia;
and
- legally-binding assurances of fuel supply for future
reactors.
The package also opens the prospect for political dialogue and
economic cooperation beyond the nuclear field.
To show our full commitment to diplomacy, the United States
offered to join in the negotiations, but only if Iran suspends the
activities of concern.
Reinforcing Diplomacy
Unfortunately, Iran's leaders have spurned this six-country offer
and ignored the requirements of the Security Council. Thus in
December, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1737 and backed
diplomacy with an initial set of Chapter VII sanctions.
Let me be frank: From the U.S. perspective, the Security Council
took too long and produced too little. Nevertheless, the new
resolution is significant for three reasons.
- First, after many months of hard work, the resolution was
adopted unanimously. Russia and China voted affirmatively.
"Non-Aligned" countries like Congo, Ghana, Peru, and Tanzania voted
"yes." So did Qatar, the Council's Arab member.
- Second, the resolution places Iran among the small number of
countries under Chapter VII sanctions. Iran's leaders, have
further isolated themselves and the Islamic Republic
from the international community. They have put their country in
the same class as North Korea and Sudan -- certainly not a place of
envy.
- Third, this initial set of sanctions are limited -- but real.
They target equipment, training, and technology, including dual-use
equipment. They target specific civil and defense entities
involved in Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. They
target specific individuals like General Safavi, commander of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and an active proponent of Iran's
nuclear program.
While President Ahmadinejad dismissed the resolution, the
imposition of sanctions, and the prospect of more, have sparked an
open debate in Iran about the wisdom of the leadership's policies.
Prior to Resolution 1737, Iranian commentators questioned Iran's
nuclear policies only obliquely and sporadically. Since Resolution
1737 and President Ahmadinejad's poor showing in local elections,
even Iran's most widely-read newspaper has published an article
criticizing the President for subjecting Iran to Security Council
action.
Resolution 1737 asks the IAEA Director General to report in sixty
days -- by February 21 -- on Iran's cooperation and compliance. In
the meantime, and until Iran's leaders meet the Council's
requirements, the world community must take three courses of
action.
- First, UN member states must take immediate action to implement
the initial sanctions imposed by Resolution 1737.
- Second, the UN Security Council must stand ready to consider
additional measures once it receives the Director General's
report.
- Third, like-minded countries must impose a full range of
non-military measures to reinforce the pressure on Iran's
leadership to comply with the resolution.
In fact, pressure is already mounting. Even before adoption of
Resolution 1737, governments, companies, and the market were
imposing "de facto sanctions" penalizing Iran's government for its
bad behavior and bad economics. Europeans banks have been limiting
their transactions with Iran. Multinational corporations have been
holding back investments. Countries have limited investment in
Iran's oil field development.
These "de facto" sanctions are having economic and political
effect. Iran's government is heavily dependent on oil exports --
and Iran's oil exports are heavily dependent on international
investment. Iran's oil minister recently admitted that it was
increasingly difficult to find foreign partners. In the meantime,
inflation and unemployment remain double digit, despite promises by
President Ahmadinejad to improve the standard of living.
This has reinforced those in Iran questioning the government's
policies. In a remarkable step, 150 of 290 members of Iran's
parliament recently signed a letter blaming President Ahmadinejad
for high unemployment and inflation. This letter constitutes the
first step required for parliament to remove the president from
office.
We welcome the swift action by the European Union to implement
Resolution 1737. We also welcome that the European Union is going
beyond Resolution 1737 in two areas: first, by banning completely
any travel by the 12 designated individuals; second, by banning
completely any trade in the designated equipment and technology,
even for items with non-nuclear uses.
But, faced by the defiance of Iran's leadership, the European
Union and European countries can do more -- and should do more --
to bolster our common diplomacy. Why, for example, are European
governments using export credits to subsidize exports to Iran?
Why, for example, are European governments not taking more measures
to discourage investment and financial transactions?
Iran's nuclear ambitions pose a clear security challenge. To head
off this threat, Europe should be using the full range of
non-military measures at its disposal. This non-military campaign
should direct political, economic, communications, and other
non-military pressure at Iran's leadership and those who can
influence them.
A non-military campaign, if serious and sustained, and supported
by other like-minded countries, has the potential to succeed
against a regime that has failed to deliver on its economic
promises, that needs foreign investment to sustain government
revenue, and that faces increasing opposition at home.
Getting Iran's Leaders to Make the Right
Choice
Iran's leaders have a choice. They can continue to move to
large-scale enrichment, as Iran's president has defiantly
proclaimed. Or Iran's leaders can celebrate their country's
nuclear achievements during the "Ten Days of Dawn" -- then suspend
those of international concern. This would allow the Security
Council to suspend further action and Iran to pursue a negotiated
outcome, one that would provide peaceful benefits and address
global concerns.
We hope that Iran's leaders will make the right choice. We hope
that they will listen to those in Iran calling for a review of
nuclear policy. But Iran's leaders seem impervious to diplomatic
demarche and limited Security Council action. They jail
dissidents, rather than listen to their advice.
To succeed in face of this defiance, diplomacy must be resolute
and global. The United States and Europe must be united and back
our diplomacy with a full-fledge non-military campaign aimed at
convincing Iran's leadership to give up their dangerous nuclear
pursuits.
Source: US Mission in Vienna, http://vienna.usmission.gov/.
© 2007 The Acronym Institute.
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