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US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on NATO and Afghanistan,
February 10, 2007
Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy,
February 10, 2007.
Thank you, Horst.
Distinguished ministers, Parliamentarians, representatives of the
United States Congress - ladies and gentlemen.
I would like to thank Horst for inviting me to speak at this
venerable forum to offer some thoughts on our transatlantic
partnership. It's gratifying to see so many people who I've worked
with on these security issues going back many years.
Speaking of issues going back many years, as an old Cold Warrior,
one of yesterday's speeches almost filled me with nostalgia
for a less complex time.
Almost.
Many of you have backgrounds in diplomacy or politics. I have,
like your second speaker yesterday, a starkly different background
- a career in the spy business. And, I guess, old spies have a
habit of blunt speaking.
However, I have been to re-education camp, spending four
and half years as a university president and dealing with faculty.
And, as more than a few university presidents have learned in
recent years, when it comes to faculty it is either "be nice" or
"be gone."
The real world we inhabit is different and a much more complex
world than that of 20 or 30 years ago. We all face many common
problems and challenges that must be addressed in partnership with
other countries, including Russia.
For this reason, I have this week accepted the invitation of both
President Putin and Minister of Defense Ivanov to visit Russia.
One Cold War was quite enough.
The world has dramatically changed since May 1989, when Horst
Teltschik and I sat out on the patio of the "Chancellor's Bungalow"
in Bonn with Chancellor Kohl and my colleague Larry Eagleburger. At
that time, the allies were trying to come together on the issue of
reducing conventional forces in Europe. The way I remember that
particular meeting, however, was that the tough part wasn't
addressing the military balance of power in Europe, it was seeing
to it that there were enough cakes and pastries on hand for both
the Chancellor and the Deputy Secretary of State.
It is certainly good to be in Munich following the NATO
ministerial in Seville. I should say that this trip has been quite
a different experience than my so-called fact-finding excursion
last month to Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia.
The one fact, above all, that became clear from that venture is
that I am too old to visit seven countries in five days. However, I
have now learned here in Munich that I am still too young to sit
still for seven hours.
As many of you know, the security of this continent has been of
interest to me for much of my academic and professional life - for
more than 40 years in fact. This was true when I was a Ph.D.
candidate in Russian and Soviet history, through my career at CIA,
as well as during service on the National Security Council under
four presidents.
For many of those years, I worked hand in hand with colleagues
from Western European governments to help coordinate our actions
and responses in the latter half of the Cold War. Many of those
colleagues are here this morning.
I had a ringside seat for an extraordinary run of events from the
1975 Helsinki conference to the liberation of Central and Eastern
Europe a decade and a half later.
During that struggle, there were times of confrontation between
the superpowers. Relations among the allies were not without their
stresses and strains, either. But our Atlantic partnership was
strong enough to allow us to surmount the difficulties and make the
right choices at the right times. For example, the decision to
deploy cruise and Pershing missiles to counter the Soviet Union's
new weapons in the late 1970s, was politically difficult for many
allies.
But ultimately, the courage and leadership of statesmen and
stateswomen on both sides of the Atlantic, and the actual
deployment of the missiles early in the 1980s, helped set the stage
for deep reductions in nuclear arms and the end of the Cold
War.
Looking back, it seems clear that totalitarianism was defeated as
much by ideas the West championed - then as now - as by ICBMs,
tanks, and warships that the West deployed. Our most effective
weapon, then and now, has been Europe's and North America's shared
belief in political and economic freedom, religious toleration,
human rights, representative government, and the rule of law. These
values kept our side united, and inspired those on the other side -
in Wenceslas Square, in Gdansk, behind the wall in Berlin, and in
so many other places around the world - to defeat communism from
within.
At the end, the peoples of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union simply stood up, shrugged off their chains, and re-claimed a
future based on these same ideas.
I believe these shared values and shared interests endure, as do
our shared responsibilities to come to their defense. Today, they
are under threat by another virulent ideological adversary and are
confronted by a range of other looming geopolitical challenges.
This strategic environment has challenged the mission and identity
of the Atlantic Alliance - an institution and an arrangement that,
in my view, is the political and military expression of a deeper
bond between Europe and North America.
Many of these questions are not new. I recall spending countless
hours beginning in 1989 on the future of the Alliance and how it
would need to change in order to remain vital and relevant after
the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.
The question that still confronts us today is how a partnership
originally formed to defend fixed borders should adapt to an era of
unconventional and global threats.
The European continent, of course, has been confronting the threat
of terrorism for decades. I don't have to remind the citizens of
Munich of this - the very city where, in 1972, the world witnessed
the kidnapping and massacre of Olympic athletes not too far from
where we sit today.
But the challenge posed by violent extremism today is unlike
anything the West has faced in many generations. In many ways it is
grounded in profound alienation from the foundations of the modern
world - religious toleration, freedom of expression and equality
for women.
As we have seen, many of these extremist networks are homegrown,
and can take root in the restless and alienated immigrant
populations of Europe.
The dark talent of the extremists today is, as President Bush
said, to combine "new technologies and old hatreds." Their ability
to tap into global communications systems turns modern advances
against us and turns local conflicts into problems potentially of
much wider concern. The interest they have shown in weapons of mass
destruction is real and needs to be taken seriously.
We have learned that from a distant and isolated place, from any
failed or extremist state - such as Afghanistan during the 1990s -
these networks can plan and launch far-reaching and devastating
attacks on free and civilized nations.
No fewer than 18 terrorist organizations, many linked with al
Qaeda, have pulled off bloody attacks throughout the world - in the
United States, Spain, the United Kingdom, India, Algeria, Somalia,
Russia, Pakistan, Jordan, Egypt, Indonesia, Tunisia, Morocco and in
others as well.
Those attacks - and other threats that have since emerged -
revealed even more starkly the need to reorient the Atlantic
Alliance to be able to export security beyond the borders of
NATO.
Although created to oppose Soviet communism, NATO's guiding
principle was a broad and deep one from the very start: to build a
defensive alliance against any threat to the security and interests
of the transatlantic community for generations to come.
And today we see that an Alliance that never fired a shot in the
Cold War now conducts six missions on three continents. It has
created new mechanisms for action on the international stage. It
has been through profound changes and will undergo more in the
future.
We see this in NATO's truly historic mission in Afghanistan, where
Alliance forces have engaged in significant ground combat for the
first time, in complex operations across difficult terrain, in a
theater many long miles from Western Europe.
Last year in Afghanistan, the Taliban paid the price for testing
the fighting mettle of NATO forces, as troops from the United
Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, Australia, Romania, Estonia and
Denmark - along with our Afghan allies - prevailed in often fierce
combat in Kandahar province.
In fact, as the NATO allies just discussed in Seville, if we take
the necessary steps now, the offensive in Afghanistan this spring
will be our offensive - one that will inflict a powerful setback on
the enemy of an elected people supported by the overwhelming
majority of the Afghan people.
Going forward, it is vitally important that the success
Afghanistan has achieved not be allowed to slip away through
neglect or lack of political will or resolve.
All allies agree we need a comprehensive strategy - combining a
muscular military effort with effective support for governance,
economic development, and counternarcotics.
But now we have to back up those promises with money and with
forces. An Alliance consisting of the world's most prosperous
industrialized nations, with over two million people in uniform -
not even counting the American military - should be able to
generate the manpower and materiel needed to get the job done in
Afghanistan - a mission in which there is virtually no dispute over
its justness, necessity, or international legitimacy. Our failure
to do so would be a mark of shame.
What has emerged in Afghanistan is a test of our ability to
overcome a challenge of enormous consequence to our shared values
and interests. In today's strategic environment, there are
potentially others:
- The fault lines of sectarian conflict and jihadist movements
radiating outward from the Middle East and Central Asia;
- An Iran with hegemonic ambitions seeking nuclear weapons;
and
- The struggle over the future of Iraq, with enormous
implications for our common interests in the Middle East - and
beyond.
Looking eastward, China is a country at a strategic crossroads. All
of us seek a constructive relationship with China, but we also
wonder about the strategic choices China may make. We note with
concern their recent test of an anti-satellite weapon.
Russia is a partner in endeavors. But we wonder, too, about some
Russian policies that seem to work against international stability,
such as its arms transfers and its temptation to use energy
resources for political coercion. And as the NATO Secretary General
said yesterday, Russia need not fear law-based democracies on its
borders.
In this strategic environment, the Alliance must be willing to
alter long-standing habits, assumptions and arrangements. Much
progress has been made, to be sure. After almost 15 years away from
government, I have been deeply impressed by the new expeditionary
capabilities and institutional reforms NATO has undertaken. The
missile defense discussion the United States is having with Poland,
the Czech Republic, the U.K, and Denmark to protect our homelands
is another promising development.
And, at the Riga Summit, our allied leaders agreed to strengthen
our security relationships with like-minded nations in other parts
of the globe - such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea.
But in addition to pursuing new missions, capabilities and
partnerships, the members of this alliance must, individually and
collectively, be willing to commit the necessary resources as well
- not just in Afghanistan, but across the board.
The benchmark of spending 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product on
defense, for example, is a commitment agreed to by each
member. Such an investment is necessary to meet our collective
obligations to ensure that when we stand together in battle -
whether in Afghanistan or elsewhere - the quality, quantity and
sophistication of our equipment and our capabilities are at an
appropriate level.
And yet, at this time, only six of NATO's 26 members have met the
GDP standard.
Over the years, people have tried to put the nations of Europe and
the Alliance into different categories:
- The "free world" versus "those behind the Iron Curtain;"
- "North" versus "South;"
- "East" versus "West;"
- I am even told that some have even spoken in terms of "old"
Europe versus "new."
All of these characterizations - all of these characterizations,
belong to the past. The distinction I would draw is a very
practical one - a "realist's" view: It is between Alliance members
who do all they can to fulfill collective commitments, and those
who do not.
NATO is not a "paper membership," or a "social club," or a "talk
shop." It is a military alliance - one with very serious
real world obligations.
It is a sad reality today, as through all human history, there are
those who seek through violence and crimes against the innocent to
dominate others. Another sad reality is that, when all is said and
done, they understand and bow not to reason nor to negotiation, but
only to superior force. This is perhaps politically incorrect, and
perhaps an old intelligence officer being too blunt. But it is
reality.
And it is the power, the political and military power of 26
democracies of NATO - the most potent alliance in the history of
the world - that is the shield behind which the ideas and values we
share are spreading around the globe.
In short, meeting our commitment to one another and to those we
strive to help - from the Balkans to Afghanistan and beyond - is
critical to our success and theirs.
Looking back, the Cold War was an epic struggle that incurred epic
costs. I believe we all agree that incurring those costs was
preferable to the alternatives: catastrophic conflict or
totalitarian domination. The range of challenges and threats we
face today will also test our willingness to meet our commitments
to spend the money and take the risks - indeed, to fully embrace
our shared responsibility to protect our shared interests and
values.
There cannot be any doubt: The world needs a vibrant and muscular
transatlantic alliance. The cooperation between our countries must
continue and it must deepen. We will need to work hard at it. And
we are working hard together in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, and,
many of us, in Iraq.
As we face these challenges as rich and powerful democracies, it
is worth recalling the words of a leader of a fledgling and weak
alliance of disparate provinces with:
- Disrupted economies;
- Differing issues and goals;
- Diverse allegiances;
- Mutual suspicion;
- An army comprised of soldiers often with parochial loyalties,
and lacking in equipment and training; and
- With but one strong ally.
George Washington reminded his countrymen - and us - that
"Perseverance and spirit have done wonders in all ages." These
should be our watchwords going forward: "Perseverance" and
"spirit." And, I should add - "unity." Thank you very much. I look
forward to your questions.
Source: Munich Conference on Security Policy, http://www.securityconference.de/
© 2007 The Acronym Institute.
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