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NATO Press Briefing on Missile Defence, April 19, 2007

Press briefing conference by the NATO Spokesman, James Appathurai after the reinforced meetings of the North Atlantic Council and the NATO-Russia Council discussing missile defence, NATO HQ, Brussels, April 19, 2007 .

JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman): Ladies and gentlemen let me thank you for coming. We don't normally do press events here in Luns, but you are the first participants in a press conference in the new and improved NATO press theatre and I have to say it is very much improved for those of you who have been here in the past. So welcome. I have to say it's the first time I've really seen it like this and it looks great.

Let me take this opportunity to brief you on the discussions that have taken place this morning and look forward to the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council. This morning we held a Reinforced North Atlantic Council meeting. Reinforced means with experts brought from capitals, either at the political level and/or technical experts as well. So we were graced with the presence of many political directors from many NATO capitals as well. It was I think the first discussion of missile defence at this level within NATO.

The briefing began with two presentations by NATO staff - Assistant Secretaries General - on the current state of play within the Alliance on missile defence. You know that missile defence is a long-standing issue within NATO. There has been work going on for many years on missile defence along three tracks. There is a fact sheet which we have made available to you on missile defence. But in essence, the Theatre Missile Defence project that has been taking place within NATO itself which was formally launched in 2005, should by 2010/2011 deliver NATO a deployable missile defence capability for troops in the field that will have an initial operating capability, as I say, 2010/2011, and then a full operational capability about four or five years afterwards.

We have also had launched in 2004, delivered in 2006, a feasibility study to see… to address the feasibility of missile defence for Europe. That, of course, included a threat assessment. That agreed document, consensus document, concluded that there was a threat to Europe of missiles and that it was technically feasible to develop a defence for Europe. The paper did not however make any judgements on the political desirability of that, only on the technical feasibility.

The third track of missile defence work within NATO - as I say it is long-standing - has been within the NATO-Russia Council to improve inter-operability between NATO and Russian theatre missile defence capabilities for protecting forces. That work has been going on ever since it was launched.

Today the discussions then moved to briefings by in principle the United States. General Obering, who is the head of the U.S. Missile Defence Agency and of course Ambassador Adelman, who is Under Secretary of Defence, updated their colleagues around the table on current U.S. discussions and the implications of those discussions for European and Euro-Atlantic security. In essence, they brought us up to date; they brought Allies up to date on their discussions with the Russian Federation. They also put up on a screen very clearly what they consider to be the threat faced by the Euro-Atlantic community of ballistic missiles; both their proliferation and the advances in technology in those countries that are developing missiles.

They also showed very clearly I have to say with quite interesting graphics, three models of coverage. One is the kind of coverage against ballistic missile attack that is currently provided by the existing U.S. system. Second, what kind of protection would be provided if and when the discussions with the Czech Republic and Poland result in the placement of a radar and interceptor site within Europe? And third, how that coverage could further be complemented by a possible NATO system that could be in a sense bolted onto the U.S. plan or proposed U.S. system. This was then complemented by immediately briefings by Poland and the Czech Republic on their own view of the discussions that are underway.

A few points to summarize and then I'm happy to take your questions. First, all Allies absolutely welcomed the discussions that took place today. There was general agreement that NATO is and must remain the primary forum for discussions of trans-Atlantic security issues and missile defence very much falls into that context.

Second, there was an agreement that there is a threat to Europe of missiles. Many nations called it a growing threat, but certainly agreement there was a threat.

Third, that missile defence should be looked at in the context of the principle of indivisibility of security. That was repeated I believe by almost every, if not every, delegation around the table. The principle of indivisibility of security must apply to the Alliance and to Euro-Atlantic security also in the context of missile defence.

Third, a clear desire to see U.S. discussions on their own missile defence plans with Poland and the Czech Republic and NATO's missile defence initiatives in a complementary way. Allies wish these to be seen in a complimentary way.

Next point. That there should be, is, and will continue to be full transparency, not only within the Alliance, but with the Russian Federation. You all know there have been extensive briefings by the United States to the Russian Federation; extensive discussions with the Russian Federation by the United States; over a dozen I believe and certainly we have had three - three? - discussions in the NATO-Russia Council and of course we'll have another one later this afternoon - oh sorry, third one is today, thank you - with the Russian Federation on missile defence and of course we will have another opportunity in Oslo at the end of next week.

There was a sentiment that missile defence… that the missile defence proposals that are currently under discussion cannot pose any threat to Russia's capabilities, nor change the strategic balance in Europe in any way. Neither the location nor the number of interceptors can pose a threat to Russian. That was a shared sentiment around the table. Clearly more discussion with the Russian Federation is necessary and it will take place to clear away any misconceptions and build trust through mutual information sharing.

I think those were the key points except to say this. In essence, today's meetings were about information sharing (that includes the meetings that will take place this afternoon), about transparency; they were not for decisions. Oh yes and that was the final point - and all of the Allies look forward to Oslo and in other words the Foreign Ministers meeting that will take place at the end of next week, Thursday and Friday in Oslo. A NATO meeting which will of course address missile defence, but also a meeting with Minister Lavrov and the NATO-Russia Council where missile defence will, I am quite sure, be a prominent item of discussion.

I think that's all I have to say. I'm happy to take your questions. Please.

Q: James thank you. Jonathan Marcus, BBC. These sorts of statements that the NATO and the U.S. efforts must be seen as complimentary and so on are obviously all well and good, but what you actually have is a tri-lateral American effort (U.S., Poland, Czech Republic) which has already begun to negotiate the mechanics of how such a system might be installed and so on, and you have a NATO effort which, as you say, has not got beyond the feasibility study stage. Is the Alliance happy that the Americans and these two other Allies should go ahead with this program in the vanguard or is your sense that the Alliance would much prefer that what emerges from all of this is effectively a NATO missile defence shield in Europe, rather than simply an American one to which something else might be bolted on in an indeterminate time frame.

APPATHURAI: Thank you for the question. I think the first principle to remember is that bilateral defence relations amongst Allies takes place every day and are fully complementary to overall Alliance security. I can give you one example. My own country Canada has extensive, extremely profound bilateral defence relations with the United States, which NATO does not interfere in, but it will of course complement Alliance security. So that principle of having bilateral defence relations within the Alliance is something that is tried and tested and certainly NATO supports it fully.

Second, NATO has no intention as an Alliance certainly, of interfering in the bilateral discussions that the United States is undertaking with Poland and also with the Czech Republic. These are, as you quite rightly point out, bilateral. That being said, since the feasibility study was launched in 2004 and the feasibility study focused not on theatre missile defence but on broader missile defence, the U.S. discussions with Poland and the Czech Republic are a new element and that is precisely why in Riga when the heads of state and government met in November of last year, they tasked assigned the Alliance to look again in a political sense at missile defence. And this will have to take into account the new development and the new development is U.S. discussions of what they call the third site. So it is a relevant factor.

Finally however I would suggest and the Secretary General has suggested, so I'm on relatively safe ground, that the way in which one might envision a complementarity between a NATO system and the U.S. proposals would more be along the lines of a U.S. system which provides coverage for much, but not quite all of Europe, and the NATO ALTBMD Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence system that would be, as I say, bolted on, attached to it, to provide coverage against shorter range threats in those areas where the U.S. wider system would not necessarily reach and in fact could not reach and I think that's a very important point to make.

This is not a question of the United States' system being selectively applied to one area, but leaving out for reasons of preference parts of South East Europe. No, the U.S. system, as it is designed for technical capabilities, even with the Polish and Czech interceptor sites and radars, could not provide coverage against threats coming from clearly areas of sensitivity. That is why there is a logic to possibly exploring bolting on this theatre missile defence system of NATO's which, by the way just to finish, is not only approved under development, there is a test bed already approved and it will deliver according to the timelines that we have just seen - on time, 2010/2011. So this is not a hypothetical system. It is a real one.

Q: James you've referred to the coverage of much of Europe leaving out bits of South East Europe indirectly. How explicit was Obering and his colleagues in the presentation when they talked about these three stages? How explicit were they in saying that the second phase would cover almost all of NATO Allies in Europe? How explicit were they in saying that Greece, Italy, and even more so Turkey, would be covered the bolt-on mechanism you're talking about?

And if I may, you talk about there's a logic to the possibility of exploring bolt-on. Is that as strong a support as we can expect from the Secretary General today? Logic to the possibility of exploring or is he going to actually say something? Thanks.

APPATHURAI: Thanks. I thought I'd said something, but apparently not and we'll leave it to him. I don't know what he's going to say, but hopefully he will say something. In terms of being explicit, the U.S. demonstration today was as explicit as it gets. They were using in essence the software that they use, their battle management software. They just sped it up, but otherwise it was exactly what they use. It was very explicit. It is not for me to discuss what areas are in or out, but I invited you to address that question to the United States.

Q: James when you talk about the… the Americans have talked about the possibility of cooperating with the Russians on this. Did they go into what sort of form that co-operation would take in today's meeting? And secondly, where do we stand now with the report that was tasked, which was audited at Riga? When is that going to be presented and how is that going to be presented?

APPATHURAI: Thank you. The U.S. was very explicit on the proposals that it has made to the Russian Federation on co-operation. Under Secretary of Defence…. hmm? It is defence yes. John Rood. State, Under Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of State… okay, well I should have prepared myself. Thank you. John Rood. His name is John Rood. I'm not quite sure… he has just returned from Moscow and indeed went into great detail on the extent of co-operation that the United States is willing to enter into with the United States. This builds on the conversation that Presidents Bush and Putin had recently. I can tell you without going into detail, because that's of course something you have to address with the United States, that it is a step forward beyond what the United States has offered to the Russian Federation in the past. It is very substantive, it is very broad and it is deep. So I think it is worthwhile exploring with them how much they have offered. They have offered extensive co-operation with the Russian Federation and I think this is an extension of a long-standing U.S. desire to be as transparent and as co-operative with the Russian Federation as possible.

Q: James you said that no decisions came out of this meeting. Are you expecting any decisions at Oslo? Or what's going to happen in Oslo in fact is the question? Second of all, how is the meeting with the Russians this afternoon different from the two previous at least Obering briefings of the Russians? And then who were the ASG's? Was it Colston and Flowry(?) and the Pole and Czech who…?

APPATHURAI: Well I don't think I'm going to go into the names of the representatives, but let's just say they were very high-ranking political figures from both countries. As to how the discussion will be different this afternoon, let's ask that question to the Secretary General. I do expect the Russian Federation to come with an extensive briefing of their own of their perspective and concerns about the U.S. proposal. But also I am quite sure they will want to discuss how we can go forward with NATO-Russia co-operation on theatre missile defence.

In Oslo… Oslo is not a meeting where any NATO decisions will be taken. This in an informal meeting. But it will be a very high level political discussion I think that will focus more than we have seen in the past on missile defence. But no one should expect concrete decisions to come out of that meeting.

Sorry to come back to your question Paul. I'm sorry. The heads of state and government in late November gave direction that Allies should take forward the discussion. As you know, following NATO carefully, that kind of generic or general statement has to be translated into very precise parameters and that's exactly what's happening now in committees to define exactly what that parameters are of the discussion that will have to include, have no doubt, taking into account the new element which I mentioned before which is the U.S. proposals. But they are still working away defining exactly what this discussion will cover.

Q: James you said there is a missile track to Europe (inaudible). From where that is coming from? Is part of the world (inaudible) countries? Has to be some specification.

APPATHURAI: Well I'm not going to discuss what was in the feasibility study. The feasibility study is a confidential document, but you will not be surprised to know that the word Iran did indeed come up as a possible threat, including proliferation. Iran was named as one of the countries that could potentially pose a missile threat to Europe and to the Euro-Atlantic community.

Q: Je peux demander en français, la question. En français.

APPATHURAI: Oui, oui, s'il-vous-plaît. Très bon Canadien.

Q: Pour le programme nucléaire, le programme de missiles nucléaires, de missiles anti-missile des États-Unis, on a annoncé que le but était pour... contre l'Iran pour les missiles qui viennent de l'Iran. Mais ce programme vous savez mieux que moi était organisé, le programme des États-Unis était bien organisé avant les activités des missiles des Iraniens. Est-ce que vous avez une réponse?

APPATHURAI: Pardon, quelles activités des...?

Q: Les activités de missiles de l'Iran étaient après l'organisation des programmes des États-Unis pour anti-missiles.

APPATHURAI: Je ne suis pas le porte-parole des États-Unis. Alors, je ne vais pas évidemment m'exprimer à ce sujet. Ceci dit, la question de la prolifération des missiles qui comprend aussi la Corée du Nord par exemple, c'est un problème qui date d'assez longtemps. En 1976, il y avait neuf pays qui avaient des missiles. Il y a maintenant plus que vingt. Alors, c'est un problème qui date... un problème qui date d'assez longtemps.

Q: Hello I'm Andrew Etman from EU Observer. I wonder if there was any discussion… of a discussion about the U.S. missile shield within EU foreign and security policy structures today?

APPATHURAI: No.

Q: Marc John from Reuters. Just back to the question on exploring the logic of the bolt-on option. Did anybody at the meeting actual speak in favour of starting work and doing that right now or did it remain purely as a hypothetical possibility?

APPATHURAI: Hypothetical is a strong word, but because neither the U.S. nor the NATO systems - U.S. in discussion with Poland and the Czech Republic - I mean that aspect of it or the NATO Theatre Missile Defence system which right now is at the test bed level, neither of them have of course become particularly concrete. That being said, there was clearly, as I say, a strong sentiment. So that was in no way hypothetical that there should be complimentarily between the two efforts. That being the U.S. effort and the NATO effort. So it did not go into, as you might have hinted, for example, a tasking to integrate these two systems. That's not the point. This was a discussion of interest or concern and certainly the Allies are concerned to ensure that various tracks are complimentary.

APPATHURAI: Vas-y, tu es là.

Q: Bon, j'en profite alors. Je voulais poser une question complémentaire à celle de mon camarade de Reuter. Parce que la façon que tu as dit que le système américain couvrirait une grande partie de l'Europe et que le système de l'OTAN spécifique à l'OTAN couvrirait les Turcs, les Bulgares -- enfin, tu ne l'as pas dit ça, bien sûr -- et d'autres pays du sud-est, semblait prouver quand même qu'il y avait un accord politique même s'il n'y a pas eu de tasking. C'est-à-dire qu'en fait tout est déjà réglé, donc qu'est-ce qu'il reste à discuter?

APPATHURAI: Déjà, ce n'était pas une réunion pour prendre des décisions politiques ni d'accords politiques. C'était pour faire du information sharing alors échanger des points de vue. Et je vous donne aujourd'hui le goût des discussions. Et il y avait évidemment ce goût entre les Alliés que... la complémentarité des deux initiatives est primordiale. Quand je parlais de cette idée de boucher... non, je ne pense pas que c'est bon mot... d'attacher un système potentiel Otanienne au système potentiel américain, ça c'était le sentiment du Secretaire général que j'ai répété. Je n'ai pas entendu de l'opposition, pas du tout autour de la table aujourd'hui. Mais c'est le Secrétaire Général qui a déjà proposé ça comme idée qu'on pourrait considérer.

Q: James I think you said that Poland the Czech Republic made contributions. Did they in fact confirm their participation in the U.S. system and were there any other contributions from other countries which might house installations? I'm thinking particularly U.K.

APPATHURAI: Poland and the Czech Republic certainly addressed the discussions that they are having with the United States. I don't believe that the discussions that they have just entered into have reached any kind of conclusion and certainly it would be up to them to announce it and not me. But I believe that those discussions have only just begun, rather than reached any kind of conclusion. So nothing is signed and sealed.

Of course other countries have their own internal discussions about whether or not they wish to participate in any possible U.S…. or discussions bilateral with the U.S., but that was not raised at this meeting.

Q: James you told us what the parties agreed upon. Were there any questions, critical remarks, on the U.S. proposals by member states, without naming them obviously? And the other question is on this study which is to be published in June is it again a more technical feasibility study or does it include what was in the conclusions from Riga the more political aspects of the missile defence? Will that be included in this new study?

APPATHURAI: First there were no critical comments on the U.S. system. However, there was a strong and shared belief that as we go forward on the missile defence issue we must preserve, as I have said it before, A the principle and the reality of the indivisibility of security amongst Allies, amongst the Euro-Atlantic community. And second, that we have to ensure the maximum possible transparency, A, of course between Allies that we do every day here, but very much with the Russian Federation. These were not criticisms, but concerns. I might add they are concerns shared absolutely by the United States as well. So there was no division amongst Allies about these concerns.

Second, let me be clear. There is no study due to be delivered in June. We are now at the stage of defining the parameters of how the discussion will go forward to update what… or to build on the feasibility study. I invite you to look at the Riga communiqué which gives you the exact language of what they were tasked to do. Now they are trying to work out what exactly that means and how to have that discussion. So that's where we are at this point and you should certainly not expect any study or conclusions to be drawn by June. I simply don't expect that.

Q: Mr. Solana… as you've been saying that perhaps… you should open the discussion inside EU about the issue because it concerns two member states which are also members here. But the question is will NATO be ready to help EU develop this (inaudible)… because I mean technically you cannot separate or cut (inaudible) into two organizations.

And secondly, in that scenario, is it because the old arrangement between NATO and the EU whenever a security question comes up it's up to first NATO to pick-up the issue first? It's an old arrangement… (inaudible) both organizations a chance (inaudible) … existence.

APPATHURAI: Thank you. First, to answer the second question first. The reason that NATO is the natural forum to have this discussion is first and foremost because it's a trans-Atlantic security issue. The United States is a primary player in this. It only makes sense to have this discussion first and foremost within NATO. There's an inherent logic. If the EU wishes to have that discussion that is of course absolutely for the EU to decide and not for me either to decide or to comment on. But I think that's where we stand. I don't whether the EU will have that discussion. If they choose to, it is fully within their… not that I'm aware of, no.

Q: James you were talking a lot about the two systems; the American system or American-Polish-Czech system, and the NATO system, should or would complement each other. I just wonder how much was there debate in detail about these issues? How these different systems can work together under the terms of command structure, decision making, did the Americans brief on that or were there questions asked by other member states?

APPATHURAI: The discussions did not go into command and control for example. The demonstration that the United States offered to its Allies did show, as I pointed out, what would be covered with and without a complimentary NATO system, as I say, bolted on to a U.S. possible system. But certainly the United States made it very clear and I think all the Allies would see this as only logical if we were to go down that path. That the issues of deconfliction and co-operation would have to be taken into account. Indeed that only makes sense. Bolting on means you ensure that there is a seamless link between the two systems to ensure that they work effectively together. We are talking about decision times. A… sorry, we're talking about incident times from launch to interception of missiles, particularly in the short range which is where the NATO system would be most relevant in minutes. And in the case of multiple launches, you would have to take into account missiles that would be going short-range, medium-range, long-range, potentially where you're still talking about minutes. So seamless visibility, integration of different systems would have to be absolutely essential and that was quite clear in the briefings that the United States gave today.

Q: I will try to put a good one then. I would just like you to be very clear on would you say that the meeting today means that the other NATO members now actually did say to the U.S. you can go ahead with this missile defence? We think its okay with… of course that you share information with us, with Russia, et cetera. And my second question, could you after the meeting today say if there is a sort of sentimental agreement or understanding that NATO itself will also start to develop a missile defence to do a supplement to the U.S. defence?

APPATHURAI: Thank you. First the U.S. wasn't seeking NATO's permission, nor were Poland and the Czech Republic seeking NATO's permission. Nor was NATO trying to, as I have said, repeatedly, trying to intervene in the bilateral discussions that the United States and its Allies in Europe are taking. This was an opportunity for Allies to share views. You heard, as I said, general agreement on the principle of indivisibility of security A. B, that there is a threat, including to Europe, from the proliferation of missiles and a number of other issues which I've already raised.

Second point, there is already as you know full consensus within NATO on proceeding with missile defence, theatre missile defence, theatre missile defence cooperation with the Russians and to take forward on a discussion on broader missile defence. I have said I think twice now that the idea of potentially bolting on a NATO system to a U.S. system was something that's been certainly put forward publicly by the Secretary General. What Allies did agree on was that there should be complimentarity between the two potential systems if and as they go forward.

I think that's as far as I can go from this discussion. Thank you very much.

Source: NATO, http://www.nato.int.

© 2007 The Acronym Institute.