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US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried testimony on Missile Defence, May 3, 2007

Testimony of Daniel Fried Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Europe and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade May 3, 2007.

Do the United States and Europe Need a Missile Defense System?

Chairman Wexler, Chairman Sherman, Ranking Member Gallegly, Ranking Member Royce, members of the Subcommittees, thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you again. Today, I will speak about our missile defense plans for Europe, focusing on the regional issues, while Assistant Secretary John Rood will focus on the more technical and performance issues related to missile defense.

I will start by asserting that the strategic context we face today is radically different than that prevailing during the Cold War. We face the possibility that some of the world's most threatening and unstable regimes can develop and deploy lethal nuclear arsenals and the ballistic missiles to deliver them to Europe and even the United States.

In the Cold War, classic deterrence theory held that near-absolute vulnerability and reliable retaliatory capability - so-called Mutual Assured Destruction - provided security stability. Others, especially in the 1980s during the debate over President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, argued that defenses were in fact a better answer to the strategic nuclear challenge of the time. That debate was never settled; my point is that this debate is no longer relevant and should not be carried forward to the early 21st century. We face threats of a different kind and need different answers unencumbered by heated arguments of the past.

The missile and nuclear threat from Iran is developing. That country already possesses hundreds of medium range Shahab-3 and short-range ballistic missiles. Iran is developing follow-on medium range systems that will be capable of reaching targets in southeast Europe. Iran has expressed its intent to develop space launch vehicles (SLVs), which is cause for some concern given the similarities between SLV technology and that found in longer-range ballistic missiles. The Intelligence Community estimates that Iran could develop long-range missiles capable of reaching all of Europe and the United States by 2015 if it chooses to do so.

Iran's worrying development of a threatening capability is matched by threatening rhetoric, including direct threats to Europe. As an example, let me offer recent remarks by Iranian President Ahmadinejad made last October 20 in Tehran. Referring to possible war between Israel and the Palestinians, he stated, "We have advised the Europeans that the Americans are far away, but you are the neighbors of the nations in the region. We inform you that the nations are like an ocean that is welling up, and if a storm begins, the dimensions will not stay limited to Palestine, and you may get hurt."

There may be other threats that develop in the region of the Middle East or elsewhere. As Defense Secretary Gates told European Allies and the Russians last week, we must think twenty years ahead, and consider the threats we may face.

Diplomatic efforts may help reduce these threats and even prevent some of them from arising altogether. We hope for the best and indeed are engaged in intensive diplomacy with our European allies and Russia intended to change Iran's current nuclear development plans. We may succeed, and this is the best course. But we may not succeed.

We have in any event a responsibility to defend the American people and our allies. In this context, limited missile defense makes sense. It does not substitute for deterrence, but in a situation where we may face smaller threats from countries more radical and potentially more dangerous than was the Soviet Union, it allows for a wider, more flexible range of options to respond to a potential attack should deterrence fail.

Let me stress that the system we are contemplating is nowhere as ambitious as was the missile defense plans of the Cold War. It is limited, fitting the threats we may face. And the new strategic environment is not hypothetical, but emerging in our time. The importance of defenses and multiple options was evident last summer when we activated our fledgling defense system for the first time in response to the North Korean missile launch preparations.

Developing a missile defense system does not mean that the United States is abandoning an emphasis on non-proliferation. Indeed, putting a missile defense system in place could help our non-proliferation efforts as effective defenses reduce incentives for states to acquire missiles in the first place.

The missile defense system that we are proposing to place in Europe - in cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic - would provide an extra layer of protection against possible missile attacks not only to the United States, but also to NATO allies and other European friends. The goal is to field a system that is capable of enhancing protection of the United States that also has the benefit of protecting Europe.

Transatlantic security is indivisible. As we learned the hard way in the 20th century, if Europe is not secure, the United States is not secure. We cannot have U.S. security decoupled from that of our NATO allies. We cannot take a unilateral or isolationist approach to security. We need a common level of protection from threats for the United States and for our European allies.

The threat is real, and the system we are proposing is practical. Testing has demonstrated that the limited missile defense system we are proposing works. Since 2001, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has had 27 successful hit-to-kill intercepts out of 35 attempts. And 15 of the last 16 flight tests have been successful.

The proposed system calls for fielding 10 interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar facility in the Czech Republic. These would be for purely defensive purposes - to counter missile threats from the Middle East, particularly Iran. They have no offensive capability. Indeed, the ballistic missile defense interceptors carry no explosive warheads of any type, but rely instead on their kinetic energy to collide with and destroy incoming warheads. Moreover, the silos constructed for the deployment of defensive interceptors are substantially smaller than those used for our offensive missiles. We have no plans to modify these silos in the future, and any conversion would require extensive modifications, thus precluding the possibility of covertly converting the interceptor silos for use by offensive missiles.

We have made a formal offer to begin negotiations with both Poland and the Czech Republic. They have accepted our offer; Assistant Secretary Rood will lead the first round of negotiations, which are scheduled to begin in late May. Basing these missile defense assets in Europe presents the United States with an opportunity to deepen our strategic relationships with Poland and the Czech Republic. Mutually agreeing to deploy a limited capability on the territory of two important NATO Allies would extend defensive coverage to their populations and territory, and to most of Europe as a whole.

We have consulted intensively with the Poles and Czechs on these issues; Secretary Gates was in Poland last week and I accompanied him. The Poles and Czechs will have questions about the system, and we will have answers. The Poles and Czechs will want to make sure that their national security is increased as a result of any deployment that takes place. We look forward to discussing with both these allies the nature of current and potential threats to their security from any quarter and how we can address them together.

I said earlier that we did not believe in unilateral security. Indeed, we have on multiple occasions over several years consulted and cooperated with our Allies and friends on missile defenses within both NATO and the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). President Bush made it a priority to offer to extend coverage to our friends and Allies and deployed forces. We have also been working on theater missile defenses within NATO and the NRC for some time now and have made progress.

NATO's work on missile defense has focused on three activities: the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program, technical work to support decisions on possible missile defense for the protection of NATO territory and population centers, and cooperation with Russia on Theater Missile Defense (TMD).

In 2005, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the ALTBMD program, a NATO-funded Command and Control structure integrating sensors and missile defense interceptors which will be provided by member nations. This system is focused on the protection of NATO deployed forces against ballistic missiles with a range of up to 3,000 km (shorter-to-medium range missile defense). NATO plans to an initial capability to defend its forces by 2010; a fully operational system capable of protecting areas against missiles up to 3,000 km is planned for the 2015-2016 timeframe.

NATO has also begun to explore options to protect the Alliance against the full range of ballistic missile threats, including long-range missiles. At the 2006 Riga Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government noted the conclusions of the Missile Defense Feasibility Study, which found that missile defense for NATO territory is technically feasible within the assumptions and limitations of the study. Now that the U.S. is proposing a long-range missile defense system in Europe, NATO is assessing how the U.S. plan could work with NATO missile defense.

We have had three senior-level NATO and NRC discussions on U.S. missile defense plans in Europe within the past six months. Our most recent discussions were on April 19 in Brussels and last week in Oslo at the level of Foreign Ministers, where I accompanied Secretary Rice.

A great deal has been said and written about Russia's reaction to our plans. As we have stated publicly and privately, the system poses no threat to Russian security. The interceptors do not have the capability to be used against Russia's strategic forces. Moreover, ten defensive missiles would be of no use against Russia's hundreds of missiles and thousands of nuclear warheads. The Russians know this.

We have consulted with Russia on this issue on numerous occasions and at very high levels, starting last year. We have recently intensified our consultations with Russia, and President Bush offered to President Putin U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense.

Two weeks ago my colleague Assistant Secretary of State John Rood and DoD Deputy Assistant Secretary Brian Green traveled to Moscow and offered Russia a detailed proposal for such cooperation. He can explain this to you in more detail. In Moscow last week, Secretary Gates expanded on this proposal, and made clear to the Russian leadership that we were prepared to address their concerns about our program and plans.

Although Russia remains wary of U.S. missile defense plans, I believe that we have made significant progress within NATO and the NRC in explaining the security rationale for the system, its technical capabilities, what it can do against Iranian capability in particular, and what it cannot do against the Russian arsenal.

Our most recent consultations have been well received. After the April 19 NRC meeting, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told reporters that "there is a shared threat perception" and that "Allies agree that a threat from ballistic missiles exists." He also stated that, "There is a shared desire that any U.S. system should be complementary to any NATO missile defense system." The missile defense assets we propose to deploy in Europe have been designed to be complementary to any future NATO ballistic missile defense system. We welcome NATO cooperation in missile defense, particularly in addressing the short-range threats that Europe faces from the Middle East.

At last week's meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Oslo there was near unanimity in support of missile defense from our NATO allies. Minister after Minister acknowledged that a genuine problem exists, a genuine security threat that missile defense is designed to address. Allies support further NATO work on the subject and supported our offers to cooperate with the Russians. During his press statement on April 26, Secretary-General de Hoop Scheffer noted that U.S. missile defense plans do not upset the strategic balance of Europe. He stated, "It is clear that there is a full understanding between the allies that the plans in the framework of the third site cannot, and will not, and do not upset the strategic balance in Europe. There was a lot of support for the wide-ranging United States proposals vis-à-vis our Russia partners for closer cooperation on missile defence." De Hoop Scheffer also publicly stated that U.S. offers of missile defense cooperation to the Russians were "very forward leaning and open."

I said earlier that security is indivisible. The location of the proposed defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic is optimal for covering the most Alliance territory possible. We are currently working with NATO to explore how a U.S. long-range missile defense system could work with NATO missile defense systems.

The U.S. proposed system is designed to counter long-range threats from the Middle East and would be able to protect all NATO countries facing such threat. However, some Allied countries could still face threats from shorter and medium-ranged missiles. For these countries to be protected, they would require short- and medium-range missile defense systems. These systems are more mobile than the system we are proposing to build in Europe and can be deployed relatively quickly if a need should arise.

Again, U.S. and NATO efforts are complementary and could work together to form a more effective defense for Europe. We would be able to link NATO systems with the ones we plan to deploy in order to ensure interoperability. We have raised this idea of cooperation with NATO and hope that the alliance will agree to it.

In sum, we have made progress with our European allies, with NATO, and potentially with Russia about our proposed missile defense system in Europe. NATO agrees that the threat of ballistic missiles is real and is currently debating its next steps on missile defense. Discussions with Russia continue; we have proposed various opportunities for cooperation on missile defense and are awaiting their considered response. We believe that a missile defense system in Europe would greatly increase the overall security of Europe.

Thank you for your attention. I appreciate the opportunity to be here and I look forward to your questions.

Source: US Department of State, http://usinfo.state.gov.

© 2007 The Acronym Institute.