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US Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte on Iran, January 31, 2008
Remarks by Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte U.S. Permanent
Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
United Nations Office in Vienna, Aspen Institute Berlin, Germany
January 31, 2008.
Iran's Nuclear Program: Necessary Steps to Build
Confidence
Ladies and gentlemen, I am pleased to be in Berlin at the Aspen
Institute where I know you are tackling important transatlantic
issues. Without a doubt, Iran's pursuit of dangerous nuclear
technologies and defiance of IAEA and UN Security Council
resolutions is one such issue. Both Berlin and Washington agree
that transatlantic cooperation is critical to confronting this
challenge and Berlin is one of our closest partners in this
quest.
Last week, after the EU3+3 agreed on the elements of a third
Security Council sanctions resolution, your Foreign Minister
reiterated the six nations' continued concern about Iran's nuclear
activities and nuclear programs. He emphasized that "we need to
work in unison and with determination, and we intend to do so to
avoid a situation where Iran provides nuclear arms for itself."
Today I'd like to exchange views on two important topics: The
first is how we must continue to work "in unison and with
determination" on Iran. The second is how countries true to their
nonproliferation commitments can make peaceful use of nuclear
technology while reducing the risk of proliferating weapons.
The Implications of the National Intelligence Estimate
Last month, the United States made public a summary of the key
judgments from the recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's
nuclear program and intentions. The first half of the first
sentence states: "We [the U.S. Intelligence Community] judge with
high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear
weapons program...."
A casual reader might be tempted to sigh with relief and move to
the next topic. But a serious reader will read the footnote and the
rest of the judgment and realize that the world has been right to
be worried about Iran's nuclear activities -- and that Iran's
behavior still poses a threat to international peace and
security.
I have carefully read the NIE and drawn three important
conclusions.
First, we have new evidence and are more confident
than ever that Iran until 2003 had a nuclear weapons program. The
program included work on nuclear weapons design, weaponization, and
covert uranium conversion and enrichment. Iran only
halted this work just over four years ago, when it found itself
under increasing international scrutiny and pressure.
This was no hobby or academic pursuit. This was a concerted,
covert program, conducted by military entities, under the direction
of Iran's senior leaders.
Even before the NIE's release, the IAEA had indications of
recent activities with a military nuclear dimension. Repeated
reports by Mohammed ElBaradei, the Director General, have asked
Iran to address work on an undeclared uranium conversion project,
high explosive testing, and the design of a missile re-entry
vehicle, as well as administrative connections between these
activities.
Second, Iran's leaders could choose to restart those
weapons-related activities. Let's recall recent
history.
In the fall of 2003, Iran was under increasing international
pressure. The IAEA had learned -- not from Iran's authorities but
from a dissident group -- that Iran was building facilities for
uranium conversion and enrichment at Esfahan and Natanz. It was
constructing a heavy water reactor well configured for producing
plutonium at Arak. The IAEA ultimately learned that Iran was doing
so in violation of its safeguards obligations and with the support
of the A.Q. Khan network.
The A.Q. Khan network was not a legitimate purveyor of civil
technologies. It was an illicit supplier of nuclear weapons
technology to countries like North Korea and Libya, before Libya
renounced its nuclear weapons program. Countries turned to Khan and
his associates if they wanted a bomb.
Under increasing pressure, Tehran publicly suspended
uranium-enrichment activities. We now know that Tehran also halted
the covert work on weapon design and weaponization in the same
timeframe.
Despite continued international pressure, Iran broke the IAEA
seals at Esfahan and then at Natanz and restarted
enrichment-related activities. It could also choose, now or later,
to restart work on weapons design and weaponization. Indeed, while
the Intelligence Community has high confidence that these
activities stopped in 2003, it has only moderate confidence that
they have not since restarted.
The Director General has twice warned us that the IAEA's
knowledge of Iran's current activities is diminishing. Thus there
is no certainty that the IAEA would know that Iran had restarted
nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities or covert
efforts toward uranium conversion and enrichment. This is a matter
of grave concern.
Third, Iran continues working to master uranium
enrichment, which could be readily applied to building a
bomb.
Producing fissile material -- whether highly-enriched uranium or
weapons-grade plutonium -- is the most time-consuming part of
building a nuclear weapon. The enrichment technology being mastered
at Natanz, or the advanced centrifuges being developed outside the
view of regular IAEA inspections, could be replicated at a covert
facility. In fact, just last year, in further violation of its
obligations to the IAEA, Iran started refusing to provide advance
information on new nuclear facilities.
Because producing fissile material is the most time-consuming
part of building a nuclear weapon, our Intelligence Community still
assesses that Iran could produce enough highly-enriched uranium for
a nuclear bomb sometime between 2010 and 2015.
Iran claims that it is developing an enrichment capability to
produce nuclear fuel for power reactors. But Iran has no power
reactors. The one reactor under construction, at Bushehr, is
receiving fuel from Russia, which has already delivered much of the
necessary fuel.
The U.S. Intelligence Community judges that Iran is deliberately
keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons -- and that its
ongoing enrichment program, now in violation of Security Council
resolutions, is part of maintaining that option.
In summary, the NIE tells us that:
• Iran, only a short time ago, was pursuing work on nuclear
weapon design and weaponization, as well as covert uranium
conversion and enrichment;
• Iran's leaders could choose to restart those activities,
and IAEA inspectors might not even know;
• the enrichment-related activities now declared to the
IAEA, but conducted in violation of IAEA and Security Council
requirements, are part of Iran's deliberate effort to keep open the
option to build nuclear weapons.
These conclusions have three important implications for policy
and our collective approach to confronting this challenge.
The Continued Need for Full Disclosure
First, Iran owes the IAEA a full disclosure of its
past nuclear activities.
A full disclosure of past activities is important for two
reasons. First, it will help clear up mistrust about Iran's past
activities. Second, it will put the IAEA in a better position to
understand Iran's current activities and monitor their compliance
with safeguards obligations.
It is troubling that Iran's leaders, including the Supreme
Leader, continue to deny past work toward nuclear weapons --
despite increasing evidence to the contrary. The leaders in Tehran
say they want to "close the file" on their country's nuclear
activities. But the file can only be closed if Iran's leaders come
clean, including by admitting and explaining their recent
weaponization activities and the involvement of Iran's
military.
Iran's continued cover-up of its past program, and its refusal
to allow the IAEA to verify its halt would be further indication,
as the NIE concludes, that Iran has not made the strategic decision
to abandon its nuclear weapons program and is actively keeping its
options open to build nuclear weapons.
Full disclosure is a true test of whether Iran is serious about
cooperation or just buying time.
Second, Iran must provide a full disclosure of its
current nuclear activities.
Dr. ElBaradei has repeatedly called on Iran's leaders to
implement the IAEA's Additional Protocol and other transparency
measures. The IAEA Board and the UN Security Council have made
similar calls. The Additional Protocol is already implemented by
countries around the world to give Agency inspectors additional
access and information to help them verify the peaceful nature of
nuclear activities.
Without the Additional Protocol and additional transparency
measures, the IAEA can no longer monitor the production of
centrifuges, watch for their diversion to covert locations, or look
for other undeclared activities.
Iran must also meet its obligation under its Safeguards
Agreement to provide early information on new nuclear facilities.
Iran has no right to develop nuclear facilities covertly, then
inform the IAEA only shortly before they go into operation.
Full disclosure of current activities is necessary to verify the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's activities. Full disclosure
is necessary to ensure that Iran's leaders do not restart the
covert weaponization activities that the NIE judges were halted
just over four years ago.
The Continued Requirement for Full Suspension
A third implication of the NIE is that it remains
imperative for Iran to suspend Iran's enrichment-related and other
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
Suspension remains imperative because producing fissile material is
the most time-consuming part of building a weapon. Suspension
remains imperative because of the NIE's judgment that Iran's effort
to master enrichment technology, not necessary for a civil program,
is part of its deliberate effort to keep open the option to develop
nuclear weapons. Suspension remains imperative because the IAEA
Board and the UN Security Council have lost confidence that the
nature of Iran's nuclear activities and the intentions of its
leadership are exclusively peaceful.
Some might argue that keeping open the option to develop nuclear
weapons is less dangerous than the pursuit of nuclear weapons. But
imagine a neighbor living in a house next to yours. Imagine that
this neighbor wants to dominate the community and interfere in your
household. Imagine that this neighbor pays and trains neighborhood
thugs. Imagine that this neighbor tries to sabotage efforts to end
local conflicts. Now imagine that neighbor, even when trying to
charm you, is stockpiling canisters of propane that could be used
to blow up your house. That is a dangerous neighbor.
A country that is defiant and dangerous can readily change the
option to develop nuclear weapons into actual nuclear weapons. And
even deliberately leaving open the option -- while continuing to
develop nuclear weapons-relevant technologies -- can spur other
countries to pursue similar capabilities, introducing new dangerous
instabilities in a region already wrought with violence.
Iran's "Work Plan" and its Slippery Deadlines
Earlier this month, Dr. ElBaradei went to Tehran to meet with
its highest officials. He went to urge them to provide a full
disclosure of the past and the present and to suspend their
enrichment-related activities. We supported him in this
endeavor.
Unfortunately, Iran's leaders did not. They did not provide the
transparency requested by Dr. ElBaradei. They did not agree to his
requests to implement the Additional Protocol or suspend
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
Instead, they provided some additional information on their
advanced centrifuge work and pushed past another deadline to
resolve outstanding issues. This fits past practice: Using
selective cooperation to try to delay international action.
In June of last year, Dr. ElBaradei and Dr. Larijani, who has
since been relieved of his nuclear responsibilities, agreed to
implement a "work plan" to resolve outstanding issues about Iran's
nuclear program. In September, Dr. ElBaradei called on Iran's
leaders to complete the work plan by November. They didn't. In
November, Dr. ElBaradei called on Iran's leaders to complete the
work plan by the end of December. They didn't. During this month's
visit to Tehran, Iran's leaders agreed to complete the work plan by
mid-February. Let's see if they do…
As Foreign Minister Steinmeier said last week, "we continue to
expect from Iran that… in the next few days and weeks Iran
is going to settle these outstanding issues in cooperation with the
IAEA in Vienna. Only if that is to be the case will it be possible
for Iran to regain the confidence lost over many years."
We support Dr. ElBaradei and his inspectors in trying to resolve
outstanding issues. We understand that their success depends
fundamentally on Iran's cooperation. But Iran's cooperation remains
incomplete, and it is increasingly hard to take seriously these
slippery deadlines. Many on the IAEA Board were worried from the
outset that the work plan was an effort by Iran to draw out
cooperation, to remove attention from illegal enrichment
activities, and to stave off further sanctions. Those worries seem
justified.
Continuing Our Dual-Track Strategy Toward Peaceful
Resolution
The EU3+3 Ministers met last week and agreed to reinforce our
dual-track strategy toward a peaceful resolution. That strategy
remains valid and imperative in light of Iran's continued efforts
to stall and delay cooperation while building an enrichment
capability.
The first track of the strategy is a
negotiating track. In June 2006, the Foreign Ministers of the six
countries made an important offer, one that would help Iran's
leaders to advance their stated desire for civil nuclear energy
while also addressing other economic and security concerns.
That offer, endorsed by the Security Council, would help Iran
attain what its leaders claim they want from their nuclear program:
international recognition; economic benefit; advanced technologies;
and a new source of electricity with a guaranteed supply of fuel
that would reserve more oil and gas for sale on the world
market.
The six-country offer remains on the table. Moreover, the
Security Council announced that all sanctions would be suspended if
Iran suspends enrichment-related activities and allows negotiations
between the six countries and Iran to begin. And Secretary Rice
announced that she would be prepared to join those negotiations,
anytime, anywhere.
The second track of the dual-track
strategy involves diplomatic pressure and targeted sanctions to
convince Iran's leaders to choose serious negotiation over
continued defiance.
The EU3+3 Ministers have reinforced that track by agreeing on
the elements of a third sanctions resolution, which are now under
consideration in New York. A third sanctions resolution is
necessary -- in fact, well overdue -- to convince Iran's leadership
to change course and comply with Security Council resolutions. In
addition, we welcome steps taken by countries across the world,
including in Europe, to strengthen implementation of existing
sanctions, to ensure that Iran is not abusing the world's financial
markets, and to bring other diplomatic and economic pressure to
bear.
The goal is not to penalize the Iranian people. The goal is to
change the strategic calculus of their leaders. If Iran's leaders
want respect, if Iran's leaders want security, if Iran's leaders
want civil nuclear power, they should consider the options before
them and choose negotiation and civil nuclear benefits over further
sanctions and isolation.
Iran's leaders should follow the example of other countries that
admitted and terminated illicit nuclear weapons programs:
• Romania, which in 1992 opened its facilities to IAEA
inspections and then destroyed equipment associated with a
Communist-era nuclear weapons program.
• South Africa, which in 1993 disclosed that it had
constructed then dismantled several nuclear weapons and then opened
its secret facilities to IAEA inspectors.
• Libya, which in 2003 terminated a nuclear weapons program
supplied by the A.Q. Khan network, allowing IAEA inspections and
the removal of documents, components, and dual-use machinery that
were part of its nuclear program.
All of those countries admitted their programs. All signed and
implemented the Additional Protocol. All stopped activities of
international concern. All are now in good standing with the IAEA
and the world community.
All of those countries are a model for Iran. But Iran's leaders
will only choose that model if they see an international community
that is united and determined and if they clearly understand that
the consequences for defiance are not in their interest.
In this week's State of the Union Address, President Bush
reiterated that Iran's activities remain dangerous and continue to
cause the United States and others concern. He reminded us that
Tehran is "developing ballistic missiles of increasing range, and
continues to develop its capability to enrich uranium, which could
be used to create a nuclear weapon." President Bush also repeated
his message to Iran's leaders: "Verifiably suspend your nuclear
enrichment, so negotiations can begin. And to rejoin the community
of nations, come clean about your nuclear intentions and past
actions, stop your oppression at home, cease your support for
terror abroad."
Peaceful Nuclear Pursuits with Reduced Proliferation Risks
Iran's leaders often argue that our diplomatic efforts disguise
a malicious effort to deprive them and other countries of their
legitimate rights. This is far from the case.
The United States recognizes that an increasing number of
countries -- from Europe to Asia, from the Middle East to Africa,
and in the Americas -- are looking to nuclear energy as a way to
preserve existing energy supplies, diversify energy sources, and
protect the environment. Many nations also look to nuclear
technologies for other peaceful benefits, whether combating the
tsetse fly in east Africa, managing clean water sources in the
desert, or treating the growing prevalence of cancer in the
developing world.
The United States encourages and supports these and many more
peaceful uses of nuclear energy provided NPT and IAEA obligations
are fully met, and international standards regulating safety,
nonproliferation, export controls, and physical security are
strictly followed. To that end, we are working with other Member
States to bring the many benefits of nuclear technology to all who
will use it responsibly.
Nuclear power reactors typically run on low enriched uranium.
Unfortunately, the same technology used for the enrichment of
uranium -- a necessary step in the production of the fuel that
powers many of the world's civilian nuclear reactors -- can also be
employed in the development of nuclear weapons.
Most countries that have nuclear power today do not produce
nuclear fuel. Indeed, building enrichment facilities is costly and
time-consuming -- not a sound economic choice for most. Advanced
countries with sophisticated nuclear programs, such as Sweden and
South Korea, enjoy the benefits of nuclear power without uranium
enrichment, as do 18 others. They rely on the commercial market,
which is diversified, reliable, and functions well. The commercial
market has proven to be a cost-effective way to support the
expansion of nuclear energy while reducing proliferation risks. By
supporting the commercial market, and by backing it with an assured
supply of nuclear fuel for all countries using nuclear technology
responsibly, we can reduce and even eliminate the need for
countries to develop expensive, potentially dangerous, and
unnecessary enrichment capabilities.
In June of last year, the Director General produced a report
describing a multilateral framework for supply assurances. This
framework can accommodate a variety of concepts, from
IAEA-administered supply arrangements, to actual "fuel banks" under
IAEA or national control. These arrangements would not interfere
with, but would serve only to back up existing commercial markets,
thereby providing an additional layer of security for
consumers.
The UK has been working with the URENCO partner countries and
others on a proposal involving the concept of enrichment bonds for
services at URENCO's existing facilities. Germany has put forward a
concept for a multilateral enrichment facility under IAEA auspices.
We welcome the initiative taken by your government in this area and
we look forward to discussing these and other proposals noted in
the Director General's report.
Russia has made a proposal that could be put in place even
earlier: the stockpiling under IAEA auspices of two reactor-loads
of low enriched uranium at an existing Russian enrichment facility
at Angarsk. Russia and the IAEA Secretariat are currently
negotiating arrangements to make low enriched uranium available to
the IAEA. The IAEA could provide this fuel to member states under
specified criteria. Depending on the details, we hope that such an
arrangement could be brought to the IAEA Board in the coming
months.
The United States stands ready to support this effort. Our
Department of Energy has begun down-blending 17 metric tons of
highly enriched uranium to commercial fuel for use in a low
enriched uranium reserve. The U.S. Congress plans to contribute to
the creation of an international fuel bank, and the Nuclear Threat
Initiative, a U.S.-based nongovernmental organization, has pledged
$50 million dollars to this effort.
None of these proposals is intended to disrupt the
well-functioning market. Participation would be a voluntary
decision on the part of sovereign governments. No country would be
denied its right to develop peaceful nuclear energy programs.
Instead, the goal is to provide a "viable alternative" to the
acquisition of sensitive technologies while still allowing
countries to meet growing energy needs.
U.S.-German Cooperation
I have come to Berlin to exchange views with you but also to
consult with your government. Our countries have a common interest
in close cooperation, whether in confronting the challenge posed by
Iran or promoting the responsible development of nuclear power.
Only through close cooperation and a unified strategy can we find
success.
Source: US Mission in Vienna, http://vienna.usmission.gov.
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