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Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation NATO Informal Defence Ministers' meeting, 7 - 8 February 2008
Press conference by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Informal meeting with non-NATO KFOR contributing nations, 7 February 2008JAAP DE HOOP SCHEFFER (NATO Secretary General): A very good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Let me indeed give you a short update on the first two meetings we have had today at this informal Defence Ministers' meeting. As you know, we began with a working lunch on NATO's operations and missions. Special attention, you will not be surprised, for Afghanistan. And Defence Ministers I think did what they usually do - take stock of how things are going on the ground, how we are doing in force generation, and what more needs to be done. Let me start by reading you the half of my newspaper I usually do not find on my doormat every morning, and that is that part of my newspaper which refers to the situation in Afghanistan in 2001 and the situation as we speak in 2008. and that is the situation where we see six million children go to school, one third of them girls; where we see 80 per cent, 82 per cent to be exact, of Afghans having access to health care; where we see the literacy rate going up enormously; where we see 4,000 kilometres of road being built, power stations being built; a democratically elected President, a Parliament, provincial councils. In other words, a country in 2001 which was basically in the Middle Ages after the horrible Taliban regime, among the worst human rights violators, is well on its way on reconstruction and development. Unfortunately, there are still people who want to spoil that process, ruin it, and those are the people NATO has to fight from time to time. But I resist the picture I sometimes read "On the brink of failing", "Afghanistan becoming a failed state again". It is simply not true. Yes indeed, I repeat, there are challenges. There is the narcotics problem. There are problems by spoilers in the south. Yes, there is a problem on the Afghani-Pakistani border. That is all true. But let us also realize what has happened and let us as the international community—I am not only referring to NATO here; I am referring to the other important players as well—let us try to understand what patience means. Patience with a capital P. That does mean in this world, where sound bites are taking six or seven seconds, and if it is more you have to do it again for a television camera, let us understand what patience means. We are well on our way. I am cautiously optimistic. The challenges remain. As far as force generation is concerned, we are not there yet. I do not deny that. But we have seen in the recent past new offers; new offers by Poland, Belgium coming in with F-16's and a training team. Other Allies might follow suit in providing forces for the volatile south. In other words, we are making progress, but you also know my mantra as a NATO Secretary General, that I want to see filled to the full 100 per cent what kind of forces we need and what the military advises that we should have. That is crystal clear. And we are not there yet and we have to do better. And that is what Ministers discuss and have discussed, preferably in private. That is what these meetings are for. We have a public part and we have a private part. But I can tell you on the basis of the meeting we had that all Allies without exception, and they are all there in Afghanistan, were of the opinion that we are there having entered a long-term commitment. Development and reconstruction takes a lot of time. That does not mean, it takes a generation one can say. This does not mean that we will be there militarily for a generation. I always say that we will be there for the foreseeable future. What we should do and what we also should do better than we do is train and equip the Afghan National Army (ANA)—that is key, that is crucial—through the so-called Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams, the famous OMLTs. We saw some nations coming forward. We have to fill the shortage of these OMLTs. So the picture leads me just to tell you that I am cautiously optimistic; that there are challenges, that indeed we need more forces; that Afghanistan means, and our presence in Afghanistan means, sharing responsibilities and also sharing risks. That is also I think something of importance; that flexibility is also an important word as far as Afghanistan is concerned. And finally, on Afghanistan, ladies and gentlemen, NATO does not own Afghanistan. We do not own that country. We are glad that the large majority, a huge majority of Afghans support our presence, huge majority. But we do not own it. The Afghan people own their own nation and it is up to the Afghan government to be responsible for the fight against corruption, to play their role in the fight against narcotics, to fight for and to see that law and order is there in the full sense of the word. That is their responsibility and the international community, the international community, NATO and the other players, are collectively taking their responsibility. NATO has an ISAF mandate, NATO has a responsibility for security and stability, but in many other fields NATO is not a major player. NATO can support, NATO can help, in counter-narcotics. NATO can help in many other fields, but NATO has its own ISAF-United Nations security mandated role. So this meeting is, as I see it, a stepping stone for the summit in Bucharest in the beginning of April and we go on and I will go on working and generating the forces we still need in Afghanistan. But we have seen, let me stress that once again, we have seen a very substantial increase. I think it is eighty-seven hundred, eight thousand seven hundred, over the past... JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman): Year. DE HOOP SCHEFFER: Year in Afghanistan. So you cannot say tha is a failure. That would be nonsense. We will work on Afghanistan to the Bucharest Summit. The second meeting as you know was a meeting with all the KFOR contributors, the NATO Allies, the non-NATO Allies who are participating, in KFOR in Kosovo. I think it was an important moment that we had this meeting here in Vilnius. Let me, for all the Lithuanians in the room, say how thrilled I am and how happy we are to be in Vilnius and how wonderfully and flawlessly our friends, our Lithuanian friends, have organized this meeting. I think they are doing and they have done a great job in doing this. The KFOR meeting was important because of the moment the meeting takes place here and I think the result of that meeting was that all the KFOR participants showed commitment for KFOR. For this very important role, for this very important mission, KFOR has to protect the majority and the minority alike, all Kosovar citizens without exception, and create a climate of security and stability in these difficult times in the region given the status process where NATO doesn't play a direct role as you all know. KFOR has its mandate. KFOR will work together with the Kosovo Police. KFOR will have to work together with UNMIK and UNMIK Police more specifically as the political process unfolds. I say again NATO has no direct role in that political process. So it was important that we had the non-NATO partners supporting KFOR with us this afternoon. You know what is going to follow. What is going to follow in a moment is a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission with the new Ukrainian Defence Minister Yekhanurov and tomorrow then we will have a second session. I will brief you on NATO's transformation, on the threats and challenges of the 21st century, and we will have of course a meeting, large meeting, on ISAF, on Afghanistan again, with the European Union, with the UN, with the World Bank, with all the non-NATO partners who are contributing to ISAF—it is a huge group, a coalition of almost 40 nations—to continue our discussion on Afghanistan. And last but certainly not least, we will end the day tomorrow with a working lunch with our Russian colleague Defence Minister Serdyukov. This was what I had to tell you at this very moment. I'm open for your questions. Thank you. APPATHURAI: There's two here. Here and there. Q: Chris Dickson for Agence Europe. Secretary General, you speak about the attitude of the Afghan people towards the NATO and ISAF troops over there. Do you have any more detailed information on that, perhaps facts, figures? I am aware that these things are difficult to measure, but do you have any of the details on that? DE HOOP SCHEFFER: I can simply refer to the many, many polls having been done over the past period. Most recently one in Berlin. That was a poll mentioned by Minister Jung, indicating that there is still huge support for the foreign military presence in Afghanistan. So I think without running too big a risk I can say, and I can reconfirm that what I said about the support by the Afghan people for the NATO presence in Afghanistan. APPATHURAI: If I may, Sec Gen, it is 80 per cent was what Minister Jung said, and all the polls are consistent at that 80 percent, just to provide the figure. DE HOOP SCHEFFER: Thank you, James, where would I be without you? APPATHURAI: Please, back there. Is there a microphone? Oh you have it. Oh okay, well, we will go here and then we will go out there. Q: The Canadian people who have paid per capita the highest price in blood are waiting or they are looking to this meeting and the meetings to follow to understand whether Canada will have to endure being the first country remove itself from Afghanistan or whether another scenario will prevail. What would your message be to the Canadian people today? DE HOOP SCHEFFER: Let me, before answering your question, say that I spoke extensively with your Prime Minister Harper, of course with Defence Minister MacKay, who is here today. My message—and I spoke to the Manley panel—my message to the Canadian people is that I do sincerely hope, of course, as Secretary General, you' will not be surprised, that Canada, doing such very important work in Kandahar I have been there fairly recently at the Canadian PRT, the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar, that Canada as a very important link in that coalition of almost 40 nations will be able to continue the important work in Afghanistan. I do know, of course, and I realize that the Canadian government, embracing the recommendations of the Manley panel, has said that more should be done for their support in Afghanistan. And I consider that, and I think the allies consider that as part of their homework. I consider that as part of my homework, as I told Prime Minister Harper, a few days ago, when I had him on the phone. And that homework is being done with the other homework, which is, as I said, look at the statement of requirements, we need the military advice, seeing that statement of requirements, the military requirements are for 100 per cent filled, and we will have to find a way, and I will be instrumental for that. That is why I get paid by the allies, I think, to see that we find the possibility for support in Canada. On the other hand I cannot, and I will not, and I should not, influence the debate, which is going to take place in the Canadian Parliament, if my understanding is correct, sometime towards the end of March. I will do my utmost. Q: Mark John from Reuters. Secretary General, a question on Kosovo. Is it the understanding of Ministers that the 1244 mandate provides the basis for any type of NATO intervention in Kosovo for security after independence, and can I ask also, was there discussion today of a possible NATO role in training a future Kosovo army? DE HOOP SCHEFFER: Answering your first question, as you might remember the NATO Foreign Ministers, when they met in Brussels last December, reached consensus on the important principle that the NATO position is that Resolution 1244 will be, and will stay the basis for the military presence in Kosovo, unless and until the Security Council might come to concluding another resolution. As we know, up till now that has not happened. In other words, I can answer the first part of your question, yes, 1244 is the basis and will remain the basis for the NATO presence, the presence of NATO KFOR in Kosovo. On your second question, that is basically of course related to my remarks that NATO does not have a leading role in the status process. We do know that at the moment that there is a status, a final status decision for Kosovo in plans which have been tabled before. There is a role for NATO. And there is a role for NATO, as you indicate, in assisting in the standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps, the KPC, and the setting of the KSF, a Kosovo Security Force. But my answer to you would be, let us look at these elements and things step-by-step. And given the fact that NATO is not seeking a leading role in the process. NATO will certainly have responsibilities after we have status for Kosovo. We do not yet have status for Kosovo so I would be a bit reticent to go into any further detail, but yes, there is a responsibility for NATO, definitely. Q: Thank you, sir. I am Thom Shanker with the New York Times. I wanted to ask about the Alliance strategy review on Afghanistan that you're directing, which is due by the meeting in Bucharest. What exactly does that strategy statement say? Will it in any way refocus or redefine the mission, and if not then what is the purpose of this undertaking? Thank you. DE HOOP SCHEFFER: What it will exactly say, in all honesty I have to say I don't know yet, because we are discussing basically two documents. One is, and that was a result of the Defence Minister's meeting in Noordwijk, in my home country, The Netherlands, in the fall of last year. What we are discussing between the ambassadors—and that needs, of course, a political blessing at a certain stage—is a document. I would not consider that document as a change of strategy, but it is a document on what we call a comprehensive political-military strategy—and I say political-military because I said NATO is not there all by itself; I mean, there are other important international organizations working there—to answer for ourselves a number of fundamental questions. To see if we can create benchmarks, answering the question how do we see NATO's presence and NATO's role in Afghanistan now, but also for a longer period. We do that, of course, do not forget that, and that's why I'm saying this is not a fundamental change of strategy, we do that no the basis of NATO's operational plan, our OPLAN, and we do that, last, but not least, on the basis of the Afghan Compact, signed by many, many nations and many international organizations. So it's not that we are going to throw away everything we have because our operational plan is valid. The Compact, by definition, is a valid document. That is what we are doing at the moment. I hope, I hope that on top of that the NATO Heads of State and Government in Bucharest in April, will also say something about Afghanistan publicly, because the document I've discussed up till now, in answering your question, is not a public document. But I hope there will also be a public document where the NATO Heads of State and Government can say something about Afghanistan. I've given you a number of the elements. What that something exactly is, of course, a matter for discussion in the NATO framework. APPATHURAI: The last question's up there. Q: Mr. Secretary General, Al Pessin from Voice of America. The comments you made about the Afghan government needing to address corruption and other issues, was that based on particular concerns? You made quite a strong statement. Was it based on concerns you heard today from the Ministers, and how important do you think those Afghan government actions are in helping you with your force generation? DE HOOP SCHEFFER: My answer to the first part of your question is negative. It is not based on concerns. It is based on what I said about each and others individual responsibility in Afghanistan. And NATO has a responsibility, the United Nations has an important responsibility, so has the European Union, so have the major donors, but first and foremost, it is their country. And if we talk about the rule of law, fighting corruption, and also to a certain extent, fighting narcotics, it is a responsibility of the Afghan government. I'm not saying this because I'm concerned. I'm saying this because I indicated the division of responsibility we have. Afghanistan is not the Balkans. There is no (inaudible) in Afghanistan. There is a sovereign government, with a democratically elected president. I respect President Karzai. A Parliament, as I said. What I was trying to indicate was that NATO does not quote/unquote own Afghanistan, and that you cannot look at NATO for everything and it's hugely complex. I say again, 2001 Taliban regime, ruined... a ruined nation, a failed state, a failed state, an exporter of terrorism. That is a hugely complex process, hugely complex, and we need patience, again, with a capital P. And in that complex process NATO, admittedly, plays a vital and very important role. But so do other actors and so does the Afghanistan government. But if you read concern between the lines, no. I say this because I would like to indicate that it is a collective responsibility, first and foremost also for the Afghanistan government. Q: And (inaudible) force generation? DE HOOP SCHEFFER: I do not see a direct relationship between these remarks and force generation. Force generation is important, will always be important. We have a force generation process in NATO. I think we should do better. I have indicated that I think I can be cautiously optimistic. I think we have seen a lot of results, but I am not going to tell you that we do not need more and in certain areas we should need do better. I mentioned the OMLTs, the training. I mentioned other elements. But this has no direct relationship with the force generation process as such. Source: NATO, www.nato.int. Press conference by Dr. Robert M. Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, 7 February 2008DR. ROBERT M. GATES (U.S. Secretary of Defense): Good evening. This afternoon I have had a productive series of meetings starting with our discussion at lunch about Alliance operations. We discussed our significant military successes during 2007. We also talked about progress on economic development, education, health care and more. We discussed the need to strengthen and better coordinate our civil governance and economic activities as an Alliance. In that session I emphasized that the deployment of U.S. marines to Afghanistan is a one-time measure intended to help prevent any surge of violence in the spring, and as I extended one brigade and sent another brigade of American forces last year at this time, to ensure that the spring offensive was NATO's offensive, we are doing that again. This deployment, like last year's demonstrates America's commitment to Afghanistan and to reinforcing the security gains we have achieved over the past year. I called on the other allies to make further commitments to the mission, to do what they could to meet unmet needs, as articulated by the commanders out there. And to consider other more creative ways that they may be able to contribute. Afghanistan was the main item on the luncheon agenda, but we also discussed the way ahead in Kosovo. KFOR remains a strong and vigilant force. And as we move towards settlement of final status issues the U.S. also stands ready to offer assistance to the European Union with its rule of law mission. Following the press conference, I will join the NATO-Ukraine Commission, where I will repeat what I just told Minister Yekhanurov a few minutes ago, that we commend Ukraine's ongoing defence reform efforts, and support their Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Meetings tomorrow will include sessions dealing with Alliance capabilities and our relationship with Russia. Missile defence will play a prominent part in each of these discussions as we considering building NATO capabilities. With that, I'd be happy to take a few questions. Q: Fox News. Mr. Secretary, you have spoken and asked for greater cooperation from other members of the Alliance regarding combat elements in Afghanistan. In your estimation what is the risk posed to the mission if all of the Alliance members do no't step up to the plate? Is it, as some have said, even—and this might sound extreme—even representing a failure of that mission, if all Alliance members do not step up? GATES: No, I don't think it is a failure. I think it would be a disappointment, but, you know, the truth is, a number of Alliance, members of the Alliance have stepped up. They are continuing their deployments, and I think that... I do not think that there is a crisis. I do not think that there is a risk of failure. I guess my view is that it represents potentially the opportunity to make further progress faster in Afghanistan if we had more forces there. I think we have done pretty well. The gains on the civil side, a lot of people gloss over. The fact is since we began this mission. Under the Taliban health care was available to about eight percent of the population. Now some kind of health care is available to 80 percent of the population. Under the Taliban a million children were going to school. Today seven million children are going to school, and two million of them are girls. Something like 14,000 kilometres of new road has been laid. So there have been a lot of achievements along the way here, and it just seems to me that if we redouble our effort at this point we can accelerate the progress that we are making. I do not think that the mission is in trouble. Q: (Inaudible) get involved. (Inaudible). GATES: Well most are involved in one way or another. What we are obviously interested in is more who will have no caveats on their forces and those who are willing to engage in the fight itself. Q: As you looked around the room today did you get the sense that Canada will get the 1,000 troops it is requesting, and if it does not and pulls out, what are the implications for the mission in Afghanistan? GATES: Well, I think it would certainly be a setback if Canada left. And in a way Canada has kind of caused the Alliance to face up to this differential between those like Canada and Australia, Britain, the Dutch, the Danes, who are fighting, and who have taken casualties, as opposed to some of those who are in less violent areas, and not at such risk. So I think that there is. I think people take the concerns expressed by the Canadians very seriously and my hope is that the need the Canadians have identified will be satisfied. Q: And just as a follow-up, General McNeill talked in the Washington Post about the U.S. taking over from ISAF in the south. Do you think that is realistic? Do you support that idea? GATES: I do not think that that is realistic any time soon. Q: How much of your discussions here are trying to persuade other countries to send more troops? How much of them are trying to persuade countries like Canada not to withdraw and other countries to step in so that Canada doesn't have the need to withdraw? GATES: Would you try that one on me again? Q: Sure. How much of the discussion is trying to find countries willing to send more troops? How much of it is trying to persuade countries from reducing the troops that they already have there? GATES: We really, you know, this is not a force generation conference, so I think that there was just a, you know, all of the people who spoke talked about the contribution that they are already making, and several of us talked about the need to meet the need that, how we needed to meet the requirements that the Canadians have placed. I can not recall really any conversation in terms of trying to persuade people not to reduce their commitment, because based on the comments that were being made around the table, it sounded to me like people recognized that they needed to be there for the long haul. So it was really more focused on how do we meet the unmet requirement for forces, rather than talking people out of drawing down soon. Yeah. Q: Brooks Tigner, Jane's Defence New. Common-sense would suggest that it doesn't matter how many troops you put in the south of Afghanistan, as long as you don't prevent the Taliban from escaping across the border with Pakistan. Otherwise they can resupply and they can regroup. It's been a problem for two or three years. We were told you did not discuss this issue today. Why not? And when are you and the other Ministers going to discuss this issue? Thank you. GATES: Well, we did not get into this was not a meeting at which either General McNeill or General Craddock briefs on the tactical situation or the military situation on the ground. I would say we have seen, in RC-East, a significant reduction in the number of people coming across the border for Pakistan, based on what General Rodriguez as told me. What you describe is a concern. It is a problem, and frankly I think that it is only been in the last few months, in my opinion, that Pakistan has come to realize that the situation along the border with Afghanistan on the Pakistani side, potentially represents a serious threat to the state of Pakistan itself. Al-Qaeda and some of the other insurgent groups there have threatened to kill the leadership of Pakistan. They have threatened to destabilize the country and the government. They are almost certainly responsible for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. So I think it is been a relatively recent development in Pakistan that they have seen the situation along the border as something significantly more consequential than a nuisance. And so my view is, my hope is, that we will begin to see the Pakistanis taking a more aggressive stand out there. Q: (inaudible) from Reuters. Mr. Secretary, if I could follow up on the earlier question about General McNeill's comments in an interview published today. You said you do not see American command in the south anytime soon. Can you elaborate a bit on that? Have you looked at this proposal? Have you considered seriously the idea of a change in structure which would give the U.S. the (inaudible) in the south and do you think it has any merit? GATES: I have thought about the command structures from the American standpoint. I have decided not to make any changes. And I think we have had a very good British commander. We now have a very good commander. I see absolutely no reason to change those arrangements. Q: Thank you very much. Avad von Flatern, Dutch Reform Daily. Your letter, especially to Berlin, has got quite a negative response from the political inspector in Berlin. Was that the intended affect, or a predicted affect, or was this a surprise that the response was so negative? GATES: Well, frankly, I think that this whole business about the things I have said and written has been overblown. First of all, in the interview that I gave to the Los Angeles Times what I was saying was that the Alliance as a whole had not exercised or trained for counter insurgency. I did not pick out a single country. Unfortunately what was juxtaposed in that article were quotes from other people about specific countries, including a couple about the United States. But the point is that my comments were addressed to the Alliance as a whole, not those who were fighting with us in the South. The letters. Q: I did not, excuse me, I did not refer to the interview. I did refer to the letter. GATES: No, I am going to talk about it. Just give me a second. The letters, I wrote a letter to every Minister of Defence in NATO. And I decided to do that after I had made the decision and announced the decision to send the 3,200 marines to Afghanistan. And what I asked each of them was we had to dig deep and find these additional troopers to send to Afghanistan and essentially all those letters did was ask them to look and see if they could dig deeper and come up with more troops as well. That's all there was to it. There were no demands. The letter was, I think, very matter-of-fact, and I think it was polite, so... I think, as I say, I think the whole thing has been overblown. Q: May I ask a question. Here, first row. GATES: I have got one back here. Q: Yeah, hi, Jim Neuger from Bloomberg. What indications did you get today that European allies will step up to fill holes in the south, which replaced the marines after their seven-month deployment? And did today's meeting leave you more concerned or less concerned that NATO may be evolving into a two-tiered Alliance, as you said yesterday? GATES: Well, as I indicated, this wasn't a force generation meeting. The allies talked about what they were doing. Some of them announced that they were thinking about increases. Some of them announced that they were going to deploy OMLTs. So I think I came away from the meeting I would say I came away from the meeting encouraged. I think everybody understands the nature of the problem. As I said, in my testimony yesterday, we're realistic, and I am going to say this at Racunda in a couple of days. We are realistic about politics here in Europe. My view is the governments here in Europe get it. They understand the importance of Afghanistan. But many of them are in minority governments, many of them are in coalitions, and they just are not able to do certain kinds of things. And we understand that. And so one of the things that we have been talking about is let us think a little more creatively, and if somebody can not send combat soldiers into a certain area, just because of the politics at home, then perhaps they could pay for helicopters or provide helicopters to somebody who could. So that there are different ways to try and resolve some of these problems. And I think we just need to be more creative about it, and I think there's some real opportunities there. Q: General McNeill spoke yesterday at the Pentagon and responded to a question about why the U.S. counter insurgency is so effective in the east. He spoke at length about the 15-month factor, and how you need a sufficient time on the ground in a rotation to really get acquainted with the landscape, with the principal people that you are going to have to be working with and against. We don not see that with some of the Alliance partners. We see shorter-term rotations. Six months is quite common. Do you have any thoughts on that? Do you agree with that assessment, that a longer rotation allows a counter insurgency to be more effective? GATES: I think that if you are addressing it as an intellectual matter, that a longer tour and greater familiarity does enhance your ability to carry out a counter insurgency. The other side of that coin is, the longer tours have a real wearing effect on the troops. Admiral Mullin talked about this in our congressional testimony yesterday. So there is a trade-off between the benefits of longer tours and the consequences for the soldiers and the marines of longer tours. So I mean, frankly, I would like to get back to 12-month tours as opposed to 15-month tours as quickly as possible. Q: Twelve might be the sweet spot between 15 and 6? GATES: Well, my guess is the troopers would think shorter than 12 would be the sweet spot. (Laughs). Q: Lithuanian Television. Poland has recently indicated it would welcome a NATO base, saying in particular that it would welcome the American presence there. Are you willing to meet that request? GATES: For a. Q: A NATO base with American soldiers in Poland? GATES: I do not know of any plans to do that. The only thing obviously that we have in mind in terms of an American facility in Poland would be the missile defence facility. Q: (Inaudible) please. Q: Bob Burns from Associated Press. Mr. Secretary, a Taliban group in Pakistan has announced that it reached a cease-fire deal with the Pakistani government. I am wondering what our thoughts on that sort of approach are given the history of those kinds of arrangements. This one was in South Waziristan. Are you aware of the arrangement? GATES: This is the first I have heard of it. I would say on the Afghan side of the border one of the things that we have all been talking about, and certainly President Karzai has been talking about, is in Afghanistan trying to identify Taliban who are potentially reconcilable, sort of along the lines of what happened in Anbar province in Iraq. And I think that there have been some very modest arrangements made with Taliban, but not very large numbers of people involved. So I think... as I say, this is the first I've heard of it, so I do not know whether it is a good idea or not. Last question. Q: (Inaudible) from Deutsche Welle, German Television. You have just elaborated a bit on creative ways the Alliance could find to cooperate better in Afghanistan. You said those countries who cannot send combat fighters might pay for countries who can, so will we have a two-tiered Alliance of payers and fighters in the future? Is that what you envision? GATES: Well, I wasn't thinking of paying as much as if they... if one country had helicopters that another country could use to loan those helicopters to another country. And maybe there are other kinds of facilities and capabilities that could be shared. Another possibility would be where there are countries like ourselves, and the others, that are static positions doing security, perhaps some of the others who do not want to be in, who cannot, by virtue of their caveats be in combat, perhaps they could do that static security job that would release others to go fight. Thank you all very much. Source: NATO, www.nato.int. Press conference by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer following the informal meeting of NATO Defence Ministers, 8 February 2008Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. Two meetings this morning as you know; a brief update on both. The first was with the non-NATO ISAF contributing nations. The United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank and last but not least, Afghan Defence Minister Wardak. A few key points to note I think. First of all I said it already yesterday: cautious optimism on the reconstruction and development front. When it comes to access to health care, infant mortality rates, education, women's rights, economic growth, things are getting steadily better for the Afghan people. The second element: clear agreement. We had such a meeting in the Netherlands in Noordwijk as you know a few months ago. By the way there will be another one at heads of state and government level in Bucharest. Clear agreement that we need more co-ordination and that includes the importance of naming as soon as possible a weighty individual to head-up the United Nations mission in Afghanistan. I repeat, that is an appointment to make for the Secretary General of the United Nations, because NATO does not call these meetings to start co-ordinating other international organizations. Not co-ordination of, but co-ordination with, and between the "of" and the "with" there is a lot of distance of course. But more co-ordination and the naming of the weighty individual. Third point: the need for more improvements in governance on the Afghan side with of course support from the international community in a host of areas. I think Defence Minister Wardak heard commitments by his ISAF colleagues to step up efforts to train and equip the Afghan security forces for which he is responsible. We all know that this is the future for Afghanistan and also the future for the mission, for our mission that is, and that is why nations must, I repeat again what I said yesterday, this is why nations must and will provide training teams to support the Afghan National Army (ANA). Let me stress again this must be a comprehensive effort. It is a NATO meeting, but NATO is only in the lead when it comes to security. United Nations, European Union, World Bank, the donors, and first and foremost the Afghans themselves, must take their full responsibilities with NATO support of course wherever we can, but NATO has a certain responsibility. All in all what I heard in that meeting was a unified international community, a determination to improve co-ordination between us in support of the priorities of the Afghan government of course, and a clear commitment that we are in this for the long haul. This is not a short term commitment and I think the Afghan people should not have a shimmer of a doubt about that. That was earlier this morning. We just completed - and that meeting took a bit longer than expected because there were many interventions - we just completed our second meeting at 26 with the NATO Defence Ministers to discuss NATO's ongoing transformation. Based on what I have heard today between now and the summit in Bucharest in early April, I hope we can make progress in a number of areas important to defending security in the 21st century. First point: cyber defence where NATO should have and is developing a substantial policy outlining the Alliance's role. That is of course a strong national role, a national responsibility, but this is outlining the Alliance's role in defending against these kind of attacks. Second point: missile defence where NATO continues to discuss how we take forward the tasking we got from our heads of state and government in Riga and what further we are going to discuss in the run-up to Bucharest taking into account the bilateral discussions going on between the United States of America and our Polish and Czech allies. And point number three: the NATO Response Force (NRF) where, as you know, we agreed on what we call the so-called graduated force option on an interim basis. Upcoming rotations of the NATO Response Force (NRF) will be on this model, but we have to continue to look at how to make sure the NATO Response Force (NRF) is useable in the real world because we do not have the luxury of parking it into a luxury garage ad infinitum. We have one more meeting left as you know - the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Unfortunately Minister Serdyukov has fallen ill, so we will have the meeting with his Deputy Colonel General Kolmakov. That is what I have to say as a brief report about this morning's meetings. Thank you. Questions and answersQ: Pravda Daily Newspaper, the Czech Republic. Mr. Secretary General can you specify issues that must be discussed before the U.S. missile defence system is integrated with the NATO system? What remains or what is left to be discussed? De Hoop Scheffer: What is left to be discussed is that we are working at a technical level to answer a number of technical questions, but we are also of course discussing this at the political level in answering the question how NATO responsibility for missile defence relates to the so-called U.S. third site. Well there again, as I said, bilateral discussions are going on between our American friends, your nation the Czech Republic and Poland. In the weeks we have until Bucharest we are preparing what I hope would be a decision in Bucharest. Not a final decision of course because many, many things will have to be worked out, but what the NATO responsibility on missile defence will be; how it will look like taking into account the U.S. system. That is what is on the agenda. Q: Ben Nimmo from the German Press Agency DPA. Secretary General on cyber defence was there any consensus today that a massive cyber attack on a NATO member should fall under Article 5 and can you outline the kind of concrete measures that NATO could take on the Alliance level on cyber defence? And briefly on energy security, did energy security get mentioned today? And in particular, did the latest Russian-Ukrainian dispute get mentioned? Thank you. De Hoop Scheffer: The Russian-Ukrainian dispute was not mentioned. Energy security is, as you know, one of the elements which is under discussion and we are in the process of developing NATO's added value. You will remember the Riga tasking, the protection of critical energy infrastructure and all that might imply, but here again with energy security, like with cyber defence, there is of course a national responsibility and that is why I am speaking about added value. On cyber defence it was discussed not in relationship by the way with Article 5. Article 5 was not mentioned. But on cyber defence itself, you start with a national responsibility and nations have a course a responsibility to protect themselves against cyber attacks, but here again NATO can offer first of all consultations; that is what NATO is for in the case of serious cyber attacks. NATO has expertise to provide to nations NATO has mobile teams, as we have used in the case that Estonia suffered a cyber attack not that long ago. So there is agreement on the concept as far as cyber defence is concerned. It is now a matter for further fine-tuning this concept. But I say once again cyber defence is a national responsibility like I said about energy security. Q: Chris Dickson from Agence Europe. Secretary General I am interested in the plans and responsibilities in Afghanistan concerning the police force. I am thinking of the report last week by the International Institute of Strategic Studies which singled out the police as something that was not progressing as fast as the Afghan National Army. What are the responsibilities of NATO in that area and what are the plans and measures? De Hoop Scheffer: The responsibilities of NATO are not many. You touched a fundamental point. I think I said yesterday NATO does not own Afghanistan. We have a responsibility on the basis of the ISAF mandate. In that mandate, we do consider training and equipping the Afghan National Army (ANA) as one of NATO's important responsibilities. NATO Allies do a lot in police training. The Germans do a lot in police training the north. I know that the Canadians are doing police training in Kandahar. But you're asking about NATO. NATO has no direct responsibility for training of the Afghan National Police. The European Union has started a police mission. I would hope that that could be broadened as time progresses because you say quite rightly, and I do agree with the IISS I think you mentioned analysis, on the police. We have to step up our efforts in NATO on the ANA. I think others have to step up their efforts on the training of the Afghan National Police (ANP), because both elements are important. But here again NATO does not own all these areas. The same goes for counter-narcotics. I saw comments yesterday also in newspapers the counter-narcotics strategy is not going well so NATO is not doing its job. No, that is not the point. That is not the point. Counter-narcotics is important, but you cannot bring everything on the plate of NATO because that's not what NATO is for. NATO should do its own job well and we are trying to do our utmost to come to that conclusion. So I take your point. ANP of great, great importance, not a direct NATO responsibility. We can have a supporting role, but not a direct and primary NATO responsibility. Q: Lithuanian News Agency. You told that Mr. Serdyukov arrived because he was ill. Don't you have any information and can you assure that this do not have any political implications that he did not arrive to Lithuania? Thank you. De Hoop Scheffer: I do not think that... people can fall ill you know. You and I too. I do not have any indication or impression that there is something behind Minister Serdyukov falling ill. So I have no problem. I regret that he cannot come because Russia is of course an important partner and the NRC is an important body in the NATO-Russia co-operation. But everybody can fall ill at a certain stage. Q: Mark John from Reuters. Secretary General the embedded training effort was heralded some time ago as a corner stone of the NATO strategy. Since then you have mentioned the shortfalls, quite serious shortfalls, on that. Is there at this stage a danger that the embedded training team strategy is simply failing and if that is the case, what can be done now to prevent it from failing? De Hoop Scheffer: No, it is definitely not failing because a lot has been done and a lot is going on and we have heard offers of new OMLTs. So we are making headway. We are making progress, but I am still not satisfied. But there is no question of failing of the strategy. It is very important indeed. Those OMLTs, as you know, they need flexibility, they need to be able to go with the KANDAC, with the Afghan battalion, where that Afghan battalion goes. So here again the word flexibility is of crucial importance. But we are still short of the number I would like to see, but the strategy is working well. There's no alternative for this by the way.
Source: NATO, www.nato.int. |