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Fissile Material talks (Fissban)

FMT: Breakthrough At Last at the CD

By Rebecca Johnson, September 1998

Conference on Disarmament: 1998 Round-up Summary

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) closed on 9 September after adopting its report to the United Nations General Assembly. There was obvious relief that this year (unlike last) the CD would be able to report establishing committees to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile materials and to discuss negative security assurances. At the same time, there were frustrations and disappointments: frustration, that the CD report failed even to mention the Indian and Pakistan tests, which have dominated plenary sessions after May; and disappointment that one member blocked the anticipated decision to admit five new members.

Fissban committee agreed

Just weeks before closing, the CD managed to establish a committee to start negotiations on a fissile material treaty (FMT)(1), chaired by Ambassador Mark Moher of Canada. Although he served for only three weeks and many delegations wanted the CD to make the commitment to reconvene the negotiations under 'Chairman Moher' in 1999, no decision on this was possible. To enable negotiations to get started, long-standing conflicts over stockpiles and the purpose of the measure in relation to non-proliferation and/or nuclear disarmament, which had delayed the start of the negotiations, were postponed rather than resolved. All signs point to long and arduous negotiations over several years, but at least the CD feels that it will be at work once more.

Statements, July to September

The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan continued to take up considerable time in the plenaries, with mentions from many participants and continuing justifications, arguments, and policy updates from Pakistan and India themselves. At the plenary on 30 July (2), Pakistan announced its willingness to let fissile materials negotiations get started in the CD, which several delegations, including France, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United States, Austria and Australia welcomed. The latter two countries focused the best part of their statements on the need to start FMT negotiations. Algeria gave a general statement that introduced a two-pronged action-proposal on fissile materials and nuclear disarmament (CD/1545).

The 6 August plenary was mainly taken up with attempting to reach a decision on starting FMT negotiations. Italy gave a general statement on nuclear issues, backing FMT negotiations and the Belgian proposal for the establishment of a CD forum to exchange information and facilitate dialogue between the nuclear and non-nuclear countries; and Bangladesh spoke forcefully of the need for early action on FMT, characterising it as a "step both intellectually and procedurally towards nuclear disarmament" (3). The 11 August plenary was devoted to the decision to establish the committee to negotiate an FMT, and the numerous reactions and views relating to this (see below)(4).

The 20 August plenary was addressed by Poland, who made a general statement welcoming the FMT decision. Mark Moher responded to his appointment as Chair of the FMT negotiations, promising to be a fair and neutral Chair, sensitive to CD members and the committee, not withstanding Canada's own strong national positions. There ensued some discussion initiated by Egypt and backed by South Africa, concerning what to call the fissban committee, convened under agenda item 1 to negotiate the fissile materials ban. In essence, they objected to use of the shorthand 'FMCT committee', as it appeared to prejudge the scope, despite assurances from the UK President, Ambassador Ian Soutar, that the informal shorthand was not intended to do so. (5)

The Year in Brief

The South Asian nuclear crisis had the paradoxical consequence of making India and Pakistan more amenable to US-orchestrated diplomatic pressure aimed at getting negotiations underway on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. The breakthrough came at the 802nd plenary, on 11 August, when the CD agreed to establish an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1 to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons on the basis of the March 1995 Shannon Report. The presidential gavel, wielded by Dr Mykola Maimeskul of Ukraine, might have come down "faster than Clint Eastwood" (6), but the decision itself was a long time in the making, requiring intensive and high level negotiations to find a formula and persuade not only India and Pakistan, but also Israel, Egypt and one or two others to accept the majority will for negotiations to get underway. It took a further week before the CD could appoint the committee's first Chair, Ambassador Mark Moher of Canada.

Adopting the Annual Report

The annual report of the CD summarised the decisions and appointments. Under the section entitled 'Substantive work of the Conference during its 1998 session' the report recalled the various resolutions from the 52nd United Nations General Assembly (adopted in December 1997) and listed the various statements and documents which had been officially published by the CD over the year, sometimes at the specific request of certain States.

Fissile Material Treaty

The agreement adopted by the CD on 11 August 1998 consisted of a decision linked with a Presidential statement, as follows:

DECISION on the establishment of an ad hoc committee under item 1 of the agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" (7)

The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" an ad hoc committee which shall negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The Ad Hoc Committee shall present a report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1998 session.

STATEMENT made by President following the adoption of decision CD/1547 on the establishment of an ad hoc committee under item 1 of the agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" (8)

In connection with the decision we have just taken I should like, in my capacity as President of the Conference to state that the adoption of this decision is without prejudice to any further decisions on the establishment of further subsidiary bodies under agenda item 1 which may result from the provisions of paragraph 1 of decision CD/1501, and that the Presidency will continue to pursue intensive consultations and to seek the views of the members of the Conference on appropriate methods and approaches for dealing with agenda item 1, entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament', taking into consideration all proposals and views in this respect."

Background on FMT

After many years in which a handful of States opposed the resolution, the United Nations General Assembly reached consensus on a resolution on the 'Prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices' in December 1993 (48/75L). Previous UN resolutions had referred to the 'production and stockpiling' of fissile materials, but to gain consensus the 1993 resolution omitted reference to stockpiles. In 1994 and 1995, CD members considered the issue and decided on a mandate according to which the CD would negotiate the measure. Until recently the proposed measure has been called a fissile material 'cut-off' treaty (FMCT), implying a ban solely on future production or the conceptually wider 'fissban' abbreviation. Objecting to the predetermined and narrow scope implied in the name 'cut-off', Pakistan on 11 August suggested the name 'Fissile Material Treaty' (FMT). On the basis that this term does not prejudge the scope and the question of existing stockpiles, Disarmament Diplomacy has decided to adopt this form in referring to the measure under negotiation.

In March 1995, just before the NPT Review and Extension Conference, the CD adopted a report agreeing to establish an ad hoc Committee to negotiate the proposed fissile materials ban. This report (CD/1299) is often called the 'Shannon Report', after the Canadian Ambassador Gerald Shannon who was appointed Special Coordinator by the CD. Several delegations, particularly Pakistan, Iran, Egypt and Algeria had pushed hard for the mandate to include existing stocks (the product of past production). The nuclear weapon states and India rejected attempts to address stocks, arguing that the UN resolution was for a ban only on future production, i.e. a cut-off. In view of these fundamentally different demands and perspectives, Shannon's report established the committee with a core negotiating mandate based on the text of the 1993 UN resolution, but with an understanding that other issues, including past production, could be raised in the context of the negotiations. Shannon's clever drafting, which fudged the stocks disagreement, was sufficient to obtain consensus in March 1995, but after the NPT Conference, it became impossible to convene the actual committee and start negotiations.

From 1995 until now, the FMT issue has been blocked for two main causes: stocks and linkage with nuclear disarmament. Led by India, a number of non-aligned countries had been linking the commencement of FMT negotiations to concurrent negotiations on a time-table for nuclear disarmament, which the P-5 refused to take seriously. The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May paradoxically opened up new opportunities to shift the political logjam. Under pressure to make concessions, India indicated that it would no longer insist on the linkage between a cut-off treaty with timebound nuclear disarmament. Subsequently, after high level meetings with Strobe Talbott, XX the United States, Pakistan announced to the CD on 30 July that it would agree to the establishment of a negotiating committee on the basis of the Shannon report. Pakistan's concession catalysed action in the CD.

The support of Egypt and other non-aligned States was achieved by establishing the committee under item 1 of the CD agenda, i.e. the item dealing with nuclear disarmament. The United States, which had long opposed proposals for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, agreed to this for the specific purpose of negotiating the fissile materials cut-off. So that the establishment of this Committee would not be used as an excuse to do nothing more on agenda item 1, it was deemed necessary to include an understanding, in the form of a Presidential statement, that establishing the committee to negotiate the FMT would not exclude setting up other committees or subsidiary bodies to address other issues relating to nuclear disarmament if consensus was ever obtained.

Canada proposed a sentence to ensure that "both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament objectives will be taken into consideration by the ad hoc Committee and in negotiations". It appears that this dual-purpose emphasis was intended both to prevent the one-sided pressure from those of the nuclear-weapon States who have been insisting that the measure is only about non-proliferation, and also to prevent others from claiming that since the committee is under the agenda item dealing with cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament, it has nothing to do with non-proliferation. The latter concern relates to two different tactics that some delegations feared might be employed: i) that having solely a nuclear disarmament designation could be used to push for stocks to be covered in the treaty scope; and ii) that India may want to use the FMT as a backdoor mechanism to overwrite the basis of the non-proliferation regime as underpinned by the NPT, and have itself acknowledged as a nuclear weapon state.

Though the majority of the G-21 group of non-aligned States (apart from India) backed the Canadian concept and the Western group agreed that they could support the Presidential statement with Canada's sentence (or without it), in the end the sentence was dropped. In addition to India's opposition, China and Russia reportedly disliked the sentence because they feared it might be used in the negotiations as a broad form of injunction -- or at least authorisation -- for addressing certain issues.

The CD decision was further delayed as Israel, which had not participated in the March 1995 decision (9), needed more time to take its decision 'at the highest level'. Israel is reportedly concerned that even the narrowest form of FMT may undermine its policy of deterrence based on nuclear ambiguity and result in pressure to reveal the quantities of fissile materials it has produced and to allow intrusive inspections at the Dimona facility in the Negev Desert. Following intense consultations with the United States, Israel decided to concur with the decision to commence the talks, but not necessarily to go along with the provisions or outcome of the negotiations. In his statement to the CD after the decision, Lamdan said that Israel did not object to this agreement to negotiate, but "reserved its position on the substance of the issues involved" (10).

It took the CD more than a week to appoint Ambassador Mark Moher of Canada as its first Chair. Although many delegations want Canada to carry on through next year, the CD was only able to appoint him to the end of the 1998 CD session (citing rules of procedure), so it is possible that there will have to be another tug of war when the CD resumes in January 1999. Egypt then raised questions about what the new ad hoc committee should be called. The NWS and allies had begun referring to it as the 'FMCT Committee'. Pointing out that the committee was convened under agenda item 1 (cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament), Egypt wants this to be part of the title, which is a mouthful.

Two serious political issues underlie these rather arcane debates about titles: i) what to call the committee -- should the name associate with nuclear disarmament, thereby overcoming the US allergy and making it possible to cite a precedent for the future, or refer only to the ban on fissile materials production? and ii) what to call the negotiations -- FMCT, emphasising cut-off, or the new acronym FMT, which does not prejudge the scope, although there is the danger that having been proposed by Pakistan it could become associated with the 'stocks or nothing' position.

FMT Annual Report

The report of the 'Agenda Item 1 committee on banning fissile material production', (11) chaired by Mark Moher of Canada listed various CD documents on the issue, but since the committee had been established so late in the year, Moher only managed two meetings and a series of consultations "as a first step towards substantive negotiations".

FMT: Recent CD Statements

Following the decision to start negotiating the FMT, there were many statements supporting or clarifying the decision, including from the G-21 Group of Non-Aligned States (read by Algeria), Britain, China, France, Russia, United States, India, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Iran, Syria, South Africa, Canada, Morocco, Australia, Austria, Japan, Germany, Netherlands, Bulgaria, Cuba. (12)

The P-5 all welcomed the decision, emphasising the Shannon mandate. Russia (Vasily Siderov) especially said it would have to apply to all nuclear-capable states and have effective and cost-effective verification. A number of statements recognised that the negotiations would be complex and arduous, while some gave their different interpretations regarding stocks and the relation with nuclear disarmament.

The G-21 statement emphasised that it should constitute a nuclear disarmament measure and not just a non-proliferation measure, and be "an integral step leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons". The G-21 also reiterated its hope that the Presidential consultations will lead to setting up "an appropriate subsidiary body" to deal with nuclear disarmament. Due to reported Indian opposition, the G-21 statement made no mention of stockpiles.

India (Savitri Kunadi) underlined its view that stocks should not be addressed by emphasising its support for UN resolution 48/75L. Pakistan (Munir Akram) referred to the long held understanding that the measure encompassed stocks, and said that Pakistan wanted a real ban on fissile materials for weapons, refused to endorse the loose abbreviation FMCT and warned that it would not agree to freezing unequal stockpiles.

Canada (Mark Moher) regretted the loss of its sentence relating the FMT both to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, saying that this dual purpose concept was important because it dealt with "much larger issues and challenges". Canada called for an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile materials and also said that while it recognised that direct negotiations on stocks would probably be outside the purview of the FMT, it was critical to the credibility of the measure that stocks be dealt with "appropriately".

The non-aligned states (with the exception of India) all reinforced their understanding that stocks should be addressed, with especial emphasis given by Egypt and other Middle East States. Egypt (Mounir Zahran), for example, said that it was imperative that all stocks of weapons usable fissile materials would have to be declared and be subject to inspection and inventory under international supervision and control and said that the IAEA's resources should be updated so that all fissile materials capable of being used in nuclear weapons could be placed under an updated, comprehensive safeguard mechanism. South Africa (Peter Goosen) said the FMT should be an "integral measure of both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation". While recognising the difficulties surrounding stocks, South Africa intended to raise the stockpiles issue, as provided for in the Shannon report, and... "seek the most appropriate ways of dealing with the matter." Now that the start of negotiations on the FMT have been agreed, South Africa posed the question "What about nuclear disarmament?" and argued for "a subsidiary body" in the CD "where we can deliberate on the nuclear disarmament issue." Japan (Akira Hayashi) also said that the CD should seek to identify next appropriate multilateral steps which could be undertaken on nuclear disarmament.

Notes and References

1. An indicator of deeper challenges, the CD has been unable to find convenient and accepted abbreviations for referring to the ad hoc committee or the treaty under discussion. With the four other NPT-nuclear weapon States, and India and Israel, the United States wants only a halt to future production, so coined the term fissile material 'cut-off' treaty, with the acronym 'FMCT'. This is widely used, but not acceptable to a growing number of delegations. Pakistan, which has consistently argued that existing stockpiles (past production) need to be addressed, proposed the acronym FMT instead, standing for 'fissile material treaty'. This term is gaining adherents, and on the basis that it does not necessarily prejudge the question of scope, will be used here. If, because of its origins, it comes to be regarded as meaning 'stocks or nothing', Disarmament Diplomacy will revert to the neutral abbreviation 'fissban', which we have used until now.

2. CD/PV.800

3. CD/PV.801

4. CD/PV.802

5. CD/PV.804

6. Robert Grey, Ambassador of the United States, 11 August, CD/PV.802

7. CD/1547, 12 August 1998, adopted at the 802nd plenary, 11 August, 1998.

8. CD/1548, 12 August 1998, made by the President at the 802nd plenary, 11 August, 1998.

9. Israel was not at that time a member of the CD.

10. CD/PV.802

11. CD/1555

12. These statements are almost all contained in CD/PV.802

Source: 'Geneva Update No. 42', by Rebecca Johnson, in Disarmament Diplomacy No. 29 (August/September 1998)

CD Appoints FMT Chair

Update by Rebecca Johnson, Executive Director, The Acronym Institute

Geneva, 20 August 1998

The 804th plenary of the CD, held on 20 August 1998, decided to appoint Mark Moher, Ambassador of Canada, as the first Chair of the ad hoc committee which was established last week to begin negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons. Although many delegations want Canada to carry on through 1999, the CD was only able to appoint him to the end of this year (citing rules of procedure), so it is possible that there will have to be another tug of war when the CD resumes in January 1999.

What's in a name?

Some delegations have raised questions about what the new ad hoc committee should be called. There are two serious political issues underlying the rather arcane debates about titles:

i) what to call the committee -- should the name associate with nuclear disarmament, thereby overcoming the US allergy and making it possible to cite a precedent for the future, or refer only to the ban on fissile materials production? and

ii) what to call the negotiations -- FMCT, the acronym for 'fissile material cut-off treaty', emphasising a ban only on future production, or the new acronym FMT, standing for Fissile Material Treaty, which was introduced by Pakistan in order not to prejudge the scope? FMT is gaining currency among a number of states, elbowing out the user friendly term 'fissban', intended to perform the same role -- but diplomats cannot do without their acronyms!

CD at last decides to start FMCT negotiations

Update by Rebecca Johnson, Executive Director, The Acronym Institute

Geneva, 11 August 1998

On 11 August, 1998, the 802nd plenary of the Conference on Disarmament at long last agreed to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons (FMCT/fissban). The gavel, wielded by the CD President, Dr Mykola Maimeskul of Ukraine, came down on the decision after more than a week of intensive negotiations. The decision was accompanied by a Presidential statement, which Maimeskul read into the record immediately following the decision.

The text of the decision (CD/1547) is as follows:

"DRAFT DECISION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AD HOC COMMITTEE UNDER ITEM 1 OF THE AGENDA ENTITLED 'CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT'

The Ad Hoc Committee shall present a report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1998 session."

The text of the Presidential Statement (CD/1548) is as follows:

"In connection with the decision we have just taken I should like, in my capacity as President of the Conference to state that the adoption of this decision is without prejudice to any further decisions on the establishment of further subsidiary bodies under agenda item 1 which may result from the provisions of paragraph 1 of decision CD/1501, and that the Presidency will continue to pursue intensive consultations and to seek the views of the members of the Conference on appropriate methods and approaches for dealing with agenda item 1, entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament', taking into consideration all proposals and views in this respect."

BACKGROUND

In March 1995, just before the NPT Review and Extension Conference, the CD adopted a report agreeing to establish an ad hoc Committee to negotiate the proposed fissile materials ban. This report (CD/1299) is often called the 'Shannon Report', after the Canadian Ambassador Gerald Shannon who was appointed Special Coordinator by the CD. Several delegations, particularly Pakistan, Iran, Egypt and Algeria had pushed hard for the mandate to include existing stocks (the product of past production). The nuclear weapon states and India rejected attempts to address stocks, arguing that the UN resolution was for a ban only on future production, i.e. a cut-off. In view of these fundamentally different demands and perspectives, Shannon's report established the committee with a core negotiating mandate based on the text of the 1993 UN resolution, but with an understanding that other issues, including past production, could be raised in the context of the negotiations. Shannon's fudging of the stocks disagreement was sufficient to obtain consensus in March 1995, but after the NPT Conference, it became impossible to convene the actual committee and start negotiations.

From 1995 until now, the fissban issue has been blocked for two main causes: stocks and linkage with nuclear disarmament. Led by India, a number of non-aligned countries had been linking the commencement of fissban negotiations to concurrent negotiations on a time-table for nuclear disarmament, which the P-5 refused to take seriously. The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May paradoxically opened up new opportunities. Under pressure to make concessions, India indicated that it would no longer insist on the linkage between a cut-off treaty with timebound nuclear disarmament. Subsequently, after high level meetings with the United States, Pakistan announced to the CD on 30 July that it would agree to the establishment of a negotiating committee on the basis of the Shannon report. Pakistan's concession catalysed action in the CD.

The support of Egypt and other non-aligned States was achieved by establishing the committee under item 1 of the CD agenda, i.e. the item dealing with nuclear disarmament. The United States, which had long opposed proposals for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, agreed to this for the specific purpose of negotiating the fissile materials ban. So that the establishment of this Committee would not be used as an excuse to do nothing more on agenda item 1, it was deemed necessary to include an understanding, in the form of a Presidential statement, that establishing the fissban committee would not exclude setting up other committees or subsidiary bodies to address other issues relating to nuclear disarmament if consensus was ever obtained.

Canada proposed a sentence to ensure that "both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament objectives will be taken into consideration by the ad hoc Committee and in negotiations". It appears that this dual-purpose emphasis was intended both to prevent the one-sided pressure from those of the nuclear-weapon States who have been insisting that the measure is only about non-proliferation, and also to prevent others from claiming that since the committee is under the agenda item dealing with cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament, it has nothing to do with non-proliferation. The latter concern relates to two different tactics that some delegations feared might be employed: i) that having solely a nuclear disarmament designation could be used to push for stocks to be covered in the treaty scope; and ii) that India may want to use the FMCT as a backdoor mechanism to overwrite the basis of the non-proliferation regime underpinned by the NPT and have itself acknowledged as a nuclear weapon state.

Though the G-21 (apart from India) backed the Canadian concept and the Western group agreed that they could support the Presidential statement with Canada's sentence (or without it), in the end the sentence was dropped. In addition to India's opposition, China and Russia reportedly disliked the sentence because they feared it might be used in the negotiations as a broad form of injunction -- or at least authorisation -- for addressing certain issues. At time of writing, the nuclear weapon states are united in wanting a restricted form of FMCT, excluding stocks. In this they are joined by India and Israel. Pakistan, Egypt and a number of Middle Eastern countries want stocks to be included, arguing that a cut-off would otherwise only freeze (and appear to legitimise) the nuclear stockpiles of eight countries.

The CD decision was delayed from 6 August because the Israeli delegation was not yet in a position to agree. The Ambassador for Israel, Yosef Lamdan, said that this was an issue which would affect Israel's national security and would have to be decided at the highest level. Israel is reportedly concerned that an FMCT would undermine its policy of deterrence based on nuclear ambiguity and result in pressure to reveal the quantities of fissile materials it has produced. Israel's worries also relate to likely demands for greater transparency and for inspections at the Dimona facility in the Negev Desert, since likely verification of an FMCT would include inspections and monitoring at facilities capable of enriching uranium and separating plutonium. Following intense consultations with the United States, Israel decided to concur with the decision to commence the talks, but not necessarily to go along with the provisions or outcome of the negotiations. In his statement to the CD after the decision, Lamdan said that Israel did not object to this agreement to negotiate, but "reserved its position on the substance" of the issues to be negotiated.

CD STATEMENTS AFTER THE DECISION

The decision was followed by 22 statements, including from the G-21 Group of Non-Aligned States (read by Algeria), Britain, China, France, Russia, United States, India, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Iran, Syria, South Africa, Canada and Japan. Some statements clarified positions with regard to nuclear disarmament or the scope of the treaty, while several just added their voices of support to the decision or to the positions expressed by others.

The nuclear weapon states all welcomed the decision, emphasising the Shannon mandate. China and Russia also stressed the difficulties ahead, joining Pakistan in predicting that the negotiations would be complex, lengthy and arduous. Russia (Vasily Siderov) stressed that the treaty would have to apply to all nuclear-capable states and have effective and cost-effective verification.

The G-21 group of non-aligned States made a statement which emphasised that the treaty should constitute a nuclear disarmament measure and not just a non-proliferation measure, and be "an integral step leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons". The G-21 also reiterated its hope that the Presidential consultations will lead to setting up "an appropriate subsidiary body" to deal with nuclear disarmament. Due to opposition from India, the G-21 statement made no mention of stockpiles.

Savitri Kunadi underlined India's view that stocks should not be addressed by emphasising her country's support for UN resolution 48/75L and the Shannon mandate, without reference to the wider context of Shannon's report. Munir Akram used the opportunity to restate the baseline from which Pakistan would negotiate. He referred to a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT), saying that Pakistan wanted a real ban on fissile materials for weapons and could not therefore endorse the "loose abbreviation FMCT" or to any agreement which merely froze unequal stockpiles.

Mark Moher regretted the loss of Canada's sentence on the dual objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Canada argued that its rationale that the FMCT should deal with these two dimensions of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation dated back to the measure's original concept, and that it was important because it dealt with "much larger issues and challenges". Canada called for an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile materials and also said that while it recognised that direct negotiations on stocks would probably be outside the purview of the FMCT, it was critical to the credibility of the measure that stocks be dealt with "appropriately".

The non-aligned states (with the exception of India) all reinforced their understanding that stocks should be addressed, with especial emphasis given by Egypt and other Middle East States. For Egypt, Mounir Zahran said that it was imperative that all stocks of weapons usable fissile materials would have to be declared and be subject to inspection and inventory under international supervision and control. Egypt also advocated improving the IAEA's resources so that all fissile materials capable of being used in nuclear weapons could be placed under an updated, comprehensive safeguard mechanism. South Africa (Peter Goosen) said the treaty should be an "integral measure of both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation". While recognising the difficulties surrounding stocks, South Africa intended to raise the stockpiles issue, as provided for in the Shannon report, and to "seek the most appropriate ways of dealing with the matter." Now that the start of negotiations on the fissban have been agreed, South Africa posed the question "What about nuclear disarmament?" and argued for "a subsidiary body" in the CD "where we can deliberate on the nuclear disarmament issue." Japan (Akira Hayashi) also said that the CD should seek to identify next appropriate multilateral steps which could be undertaken on nuclear disarmament.

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