NATO and Nuclear Weapons
Back to the NATO page
Defence Select Committee Report on the Future of NATO
During the past year, the Defence Select Committee of the House of Commons
has conducted an enquiry into the future of NATO. The major focus of this
report has been on NATO's continuing mission in Afghanistan, and on relations
between NATO and the EU in future European security architecture.
While MPs agreed that the Alliance should agree a new Strategic Concept
at the 60th Anniversary Summit, likely to be held in Washington DC in
2009 they did not address the negative influence of nuclear weapons in
NATO defence strategy or the need for NATO to reinvigorate its support
for arms control and disarmament as a vital component of European security.
The Acronym Institute submitted evidence to the enquiry on these essential
questions. This evidence concluded that:
52. NATO is facing some serious and difficult debates over the next
three years. Alliance solidarity has been slowly eroding since the disappearance
of the Soviet Union, and the task for NATO leaders is to rebuild that
solidarity and reshape the Alliance to face new missions dictated by
the transformed post cold war, post 9/11 strategic and security environment.
NATO must find a way to succeed in bringing stability to Afghanistan,
and successfully extracting itself from a more stable Kosovo, while
using these experiences to craft a new Strategic Concept based on the
security needs of the 21st century on which all members can agree. This
task is difficult, but not impossible.
53. The Committee should recommend that Her Majesty's Government,
as part of its commitment to non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament,
should initiate negotiation of a new Strategic Concept for NATO, including
the termination of all nuclear elements in joint strategy and doctrine,
and emphasizing arms control and non-proliferation as the only long-term
mechanisms for reducing and eliminating WMD threats.
The full evidence submitted by Acronym can be read at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/
cmselect/cmdfence/111/111we04.htm
The Full text of the Report can be read online at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/
cmselect/cmdfence/111/11102.htm , or accessed as a .pdf at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/
cmselect/cmdfence/111/111.pdf.
The summary of committee's report states that:
NATO's achievements over the past sixty years in ensuring the stability
and prosperity of Europe are remarkable. But the NATO Summit at Bucharest
in April 2008 takes place at a time when the Alliance's reputation and
credibility are being questioned in relation to Afghanistan. NATO's
command of the multinational International Security Assistance Forces
(ISAF) mission has become a key test of the Alliance's capacity to adjust
to the demands of today's security environment. Bringing stability to
Afghanistan, and creating the conditions in which reconstruction and
development can occur, is, and must remain, at the top of NATO's agenda.
It requires a sustained long-term military and financial commitment
by all members of the Alliance. While failure in Afghanistan would not
herald the demise of NATO, it would deal a severe blow to allied unity
and prompt the United States to question the Alliance's continuing utility.
NATO must succeed in Afghanistan, but it faces major challenges in generating
sufficient numbers of forces without restrictions upon their use. Reaching
new agreements on a more equitable sharing of the burden of operations,
along with a clearer definition of success in Afghanistan, will be key
tests of the Bucharest Summit.
Afghanistan, however, must not be allowed to dominate the Bucharest
agenda. NATO faces far broader questions about its role and relevance
in the 21st century, the answers to which will, ultimately, decide the
future of the Alliance. If the public in Europe and North America do
not understand what NATO is for, their support for the Alliance will
inevitably decline. NATO should launch a far-reaching review of its
Strategic Concept at Bucharest, defining its future role and purpose.
This should be adopted at its 60th anniversary summit next year.
Given the global nature of the threats facing the Allies, there is
no alternative to NATO playing a global role. Its willingness to act
to counter threats to its members wherever they arise is fundamental
to the Alliance's continuing relevance. If NATO limits itself to a regional
role, it risks becoming marginalised. NATO's willingness to fulfil a
global role is critical to the continued support of the United States.
Without US support, NATO has no future. But US support depends on NATO
becoming more capable, deployable and flexible, and on the European
allies contributing more.
Achieving new commitments to deliver improvements in capabilities will
be another key test of the success of the Bucharest Summit. NATO has
shortfalls across a range of specific military capabilities. These compromise
its ability to mount and sustain the expeditionary operations which
underpin the Alliance's new role. This issue must be tackled as a matter
of the highest priority. On this, it is important that Bucharest delivers
meaningful agreement.
The creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) represents a significant
achievement and promises to enhance the Alliance's capabilities. But
its funding mechanism is inadequate and acts as a disincentive for the
deployment of the Force. The "costs lie where they fall" arrangement
for funding the NRF should be abandoned and the Force should be financed
out of NATO Common Funding. The contribution of Allied Command Transformation
(ACT) to improving Alliance capabilities is unclear. Reports that ACT
has been diverted from long-term capability planning by the operational
demands of Afghanistan are a matter of concern.
The biggest shortfall in NATO's capabilities, however, is a lack of
political will. This is most manifest in the large and growing gap in
defence spending between the United States and the European members
of NATO. Europe does not spend anywhere near enough on defence. NATO's
informal defence expenditure target of 2% GDP by each member of the
Alliance has proved a failure and there is no detectable appetite in
Europe for increasing spending on defence. In addition to the 2% target
the Alliance should establish detailed capability targets and timeframes.
We are concerned that an Alliance containing such large disparities
in defence spending will prove unsustainable in the long-term.
The Bucharest Summit is an opportunity to welcome new members to the
Alliance. The Summit will be a key test of NATO's commitment to maintain
its open door policy on enlargement. NATO should continue to remain
open to accepting new members to the Alliance. If a country meets NATO's
performance-based entry criteria, it should be permitted to join. However,
new members should bring with them the capacity to add to NATO's capabilities
and a willingness to do so. They cannot only be consumers of security;
they must also contribute to the common defence. Nor must NATO membership
be treated as a means of gaining entry to the European Union.
The relationship between NATO and the EU is plagued by mistrust and
characterised by unhealthy competition, and remains hostage to the damaging
dispute between Cyprus and Turkey. Improving communication and coordination
between NATO and the EU is essential. At Bucharest, NATO should make
firm commitments to expand the strategic dialogue with the EU and identify
a series of small-scale and pragmatic initiatives which can foster greater
cooperation and trust. Above all, NATO and the EU must avoid duplication
of efforts and resources. The Lisbon Treaty has the capacity to enhance
the EU's role in defence but it is vital it does nothing to undermine
NATO's role as the cornerstone of European defence.
We regard NATO as an indispensable Alliance. It has served us well
for over half a century and still does. At the Bucharest Summit, the
NATO allies have an opportunity to demonstrate powerfully the relevance
of the Alliance in the 21st century; it is essential they do so. This
effort must start with a renewed commitment to success in Afghanistan.
It is likely that the NATO Bucharest Summit will initiate the process
leading to the adoption of a new Strategic Concept. It will be essential
that NATO governments pay more careful attention to their policies and
strategy concerning nuclear weapons, arms control and disarmament than
did the Defence Select Committee.
Martin Butcher
Back to the Top of the Page
© 2008 The Acronym Institute.
|
