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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The NPT PrepCom 2003: Acronym Special Coverage

Safeguards/Export Controls/NWFZs (Cluster 3: Articles III & VII)

Statement by Iran, May 6

'Statement by Mr. Shahrokh Shakeraian, Deputy Director, Department of Disarmament and International Security, Geneva, 6 May 2003'; Iranian Mission to the UN in Geneva, http://missions.itu.int/~missiran/NPT2003.htm.

1. The safeguards system of the IAEA is a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. According to Article III of the Treaty, each non-nuclear weapon state party undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under the NPT with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

2. Article III, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear weapon states to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be "in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty."

3. The IAEA safeguards system has registered a successful record during the past three decades in preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful use to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Accordingly, the NPT 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed that "IAEA safeguards provide assurances that states parties are complying with their undertakings under relevant safeguards agreements and assist States in demonstrating this compliance." Unsubstantiated allegations and restrictions would be a disservice to the goal of strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system.

4. The Final Document of the NPT 2000 Review Conference, while recognizing the IAEA as the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with its safeguards agreements, reflects the Conference's conviction that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in this regard. It also underlines that concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements should be directed, along with supporting evidence and information, to IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusion and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.

5. In the review process of the Treaty, the states parties should adopt concrete measures with the aim to ensure that the rights of all states parties under the provision of the Preamble and articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no state party is limited in the exercise of these rights in accordance with the Treaty on the basis of the allegations of non-compliance not verified by IAEA.

6. The application of unilaterally enforced export control regimes in contravention of the letter and the spirit of the Treaty has hampered the access of the developing countries to nuclear materials, equipment and technologies for peaceful purposes. The PrepCom and the NPT 2005 Review Conference should intensify their work in order to promote the implementation of the inalienable rights of all states parties, particularly the developing countries, to enjoy unrestricted access to nuclear materials, technologies, equipment and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes.

7. We stress on the importance of achieving the universality of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system which could reassure prevention of diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses. We reiterate that any international effort to strengthen the comprehensive safeguards would definitely be of much more effect if it considers the universality of the safeguards of the same importance and endeavors to achieve both together.

8. Israel is the only non-party to the NPT in the Middle East region and has not placed its nuclear facilities under the full-scope safeguards of the Agency. Unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and continuation of clandestine nuclear activities of Israel pose the most serious challenges to the peace and security of this region.

9. The states of the region of the Middle East are deeply concerned about Israel's access to nuclear material and technologies and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. We call for the total and complete prohibition of transfer of all related equipment, information, material, resources and devices and extension of assistance to states not party to the Treaty without exception in nuclear, scientific or technological fields enabling them to produce or develop nuclear weapons capability.

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