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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The NPT PrepCom 2003: Acronym Special Coverage

NPT PrepCom Second Interim Report May 4: Nuclear Disarmament

Rebecca Johnson

This is the second interim report after the first week of the Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in Geneva (April 28 to May 9, 2003). It covers the main debates and questions on nuclear disarmament from the General and Cluster 1 debates, relating particularly to Article VI and the relevant sections from the 1995 Principles and Objectives and the 2000 Review Conference Final Document (especially the 13 Steps). In particular, it provides an overview of the major points raised with respect to the Moscow Treaty (strategic offensive reductions, signed by Presidents Bush and Putin on May 24, 2002), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and non-strategic (including tactical) nuclear weapons (NSNW).

The broader reports from the nuclear weapon states, including Britain and France, will be summarised, together with issues not covered here, in a fuller report at the end of the PrepCom. Although Britain issued a further working paper on the verification studies being conducted under the auspices of its Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), whose representatives conducted a well-attended seminar on the subject for NPT delegates and observers, the reports and statements from the UK and France continue to evoke the steps they have undertaken between 1991 and 2000, which have already been fully covered in previous NPT meetings and reports. Since they appear to have little or nothing new to offer towards further progress towards the elimination of their arsenals, their statements and reports on these are not specifically covered in this interim report. Proposals and comments on security assurances will be covered in a future update. For background, including the text of the 13 Steps, see http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt.

Strongly encouraged by the PrepCom Chair, Ambassador László Molnár of Hungary, a few delegations reportedly began to ask questions of others, especially the nuclear weapon states, either as part of their national statements, or in response to some of the formal presentations. It is understood that there were some 44 statements, as well as additional interventions in the "cluster 1" debates. Rather than reflect all, which would be repetitive and cumbersome, even if it had been possible to obtain copies of all interventions in English or French, this summary aims to give a representative overview, focussing on a cross section of key statements. These include interventions from members of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden), who played a defining role on behalf of the non-nuclear weapon states in obtaining the 13 Steps, and of course the nuclear weapon states (Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States) as well as other statements or papers containing new or particularly interesting ideas, such as the paper from Austria, Mexico and Sweden on "Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons", which followed from previous interventions on this issue by Germany, Finland, and several institutes and non-governmental organisations.

The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) opened the general debate with a strong statement from New Zealand's Minister of Disarmament, Marian Hobbs, who noted that though there had been some positive developments (notably Cuba's accession and progress towards a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in Central Asia), trends on the debit side, particularly with regard to nuclear disarmament, were "dismal". Elaborating on this in cluster 1, New Zealand's Ambassador Tim Caughley expressed deep concern about "the risk of an arms race on earth and in outer space". On behalf of the NAC he noted that "the number of nuclear weapons, deployed or in storage, amounts to many thousands. Nuclear weapons continue to be part of security doctrines. There are disturbing references to new types of low yield nuclear weapons and plans related to new battlefield uses for those weapons."

By contrast, having devoted half his statement to proliferation challenges from North Korea and Iran, US Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf said that "disarmament continues, and in fact took a significant step forward with signing of the Moscow Treaty." This, he suggested, showed that the NPT was "dangerously out of balance".

The Moscow Treaty: Disarmament or Illusion?

Though acknowledging that the Moscow Treaty was a positive step in defining a new US-Russian relationship, the New Agenda questioned the treaty's contribution to disarmament, noting that it ignores non-operational warheads and contains no verification provisions. Referring to the 13 Steps, Caughley called for the application of the principles of irreversibility (step 5), increased transparency (step 9), and verification (steps 10 and 13) to be applied to all agreements, including the Moscow Treaty. Warning that "reductions in the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads are not a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons", the New Agenda in its opening statement called on the US and Russia to make the Moscow treaty "an irreversible and verifiable instrument on nuclear disarmament". China took the same line, arguing that "the reduction of nuclear weapons should be carried out in accordance with the principles of being effectively verifiable, irreversible and legally binding".

In an "information paper" on Article VI (May 1), the United States went into considerable detail about the Moscow Treaty, recalling UN General Assembly resolution 57/68 (November 22, 2002) which said that this "advanced the NPT commitment" of the US and Russia. Because the Moscow treaty reflected "a new era and strengthened US-Russian strategic partnership... it was not necessary to incorporate hundreds of pages of cumbersome rules and procedures into the treaty". After further clarifying its approach and the treaty, the US emphasised that "the absence of treaty constraints on warhead disposition allows the United States and Russia to proceed with warhead elimination in a manner that is unhindered by artificial requirements." The treaty's "flexibility" recognises the "fundamentally different stockpile maintenance practices" in which "Russia continues to produce new warheads while the United States currently has no capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons".

Russia regarded the Moscow Treaty as "a new major step forward in nuclear disarmament", glossing over the fact that President Putin had wanted the treaty to be irreversible and verifiable as well as legally binding. Another delegation prepared to raise questions about the Moscow Treaty, was Sweden, with questions that follow from the fact that the envisaged two-thirds reduction of operational warheads is legally required only to be fully implemented for one day, December 31, 2012. After thanking the US and Russia for reporting on their attempts to comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT, Ambassador Henrik Salander requested further information about the rate of removal from deployment and "which factors created the time constraint that ruled out earlier achievement of the projected deployment levels". Noting that irreversibility is not precluded (though also not provided for) by the Moscow Treaty, Salander questioned if the option of irreversible cuts was under bilateral or unilateral consideration, and asked about measures to provide "advance warning of redeployment after 2012". Brazil's Ambassador Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte stated categorically that "there should be no possibility of redeploying nuclear weapons currently in non-operational status, for this would render nuclear weapon reductions meaningless". Duarte reminded states that when the Brazilian Congress approved Brazil's accession to the NPT in the mid-1990s, it was on the understanding that there would be total elimination of nuclear weapons.

The US information paper (understood to have been read by a member of the US delegation) and an attached fact sheet gave details of the withdrawal and dismantlements under way, fissile material measures, cooperative threat reduction, nuclear weapons policy, and non-strategic nuclear weapons. The US agreed that the Moscow Treaty did not preclude the redeployment of strategic warheads removed from operational service, but said that it "has no plans to do so", "does not seek to rearm", and "has not manufactured a new nuclear weapon in more than a decade".

CTBT and nuclear testing

There is a fundamental link between the CTBT and the NPT, as enshrined in the NPT Preamble, the 1995 Principles and Objectives and the 13 Steps. By the opening of the NPT, 166 states had signed the CTBT and 98 had ratified, although only 31 of the 44 states listed as part of the entry-into-force requirement (under Article XIV of the CTBT) had ratified. Among the nuclear weapon states, Britain, France and Russia have ratified. More than six years after signing the treaty and ceasing to test, China continues to state (with diminishing credibility) that it is "committed to ratification at an early date". The US Senate rejected President Clinton's bill on ratification in October 1999, and the Bush administration has made clear that it opposes the CTBT and will not seek ratification, although it has promised to uphold its testing moratorium, first undertaken in October 1992 when the current president's father held the US presidency. In May 1998, India and Pakistan both conducted a series of nuclear tests. Though neither has yet signed or ratified the CTBT, both have declared moratoria on further testing, joining the NWS. North Korea is the third state among the 44 to have failed to sign the CTBT, and a few diplomats and NGOs have referred in private to the possibility that the DPRK may try to raise the stakes by testing a nuclear device during the next 12 months.

While it was troubling that several states forgot to mention the CTBT and others were rather perfunctory, there were many calls for the 13 remaining states whose ratification is essential for entry into force to do so, and for the moratoria on conducting nuclear tests to be upheld by all, pending entry into force. Cuba, whose accession to the NPT on November 4, 2002, makes it the newest party to the treaty, baldly noted that the United States was the only NPT member to openly oppose the CTBT. Ambassador Kuniko Inoguchi of Japan called the CTBT a "historic milestone" and said that it was "one of the major pillars of the NPT regime as well as a realistic and concrete instrument for the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world". Inoguchi referred to Japan's initiatives to encourage states to ratify and support the verification regime. She said it was her country's "sincere wish to see the United States review its position towards this treaty" and asked the delegation of China to provide information "on progress in its ratification process". The New Agenda Coalition expressed deep disappointment that the CTBT had still not entered into force "given its importance and the effort we have all invested in its conclusion". In echoing these views, the EU, and a few others, including Japan and South Korea, encouraged participation in the Third Conference on Facilitating the CTBT's Entry into Force in Vienna (September 3-5, 2003), which the EU noted would be chaired by Finland.

The nongovernmental organisations attending the NPT were not the only ones to raise concerns about developments in the US that could lead to its resumption of nuclear testing in order to develop new, low yield or deep penetrating nuclear weapons. Recognising that careful language can sometimes mask real intentions, Salander asked if statements from the US that it had "not identified any requirements for new nuclear weapons" meant "that there are no plans or designs for new nuclear weapons"?

For its part, the US told NPT parties that "while the United States will not pursue ratification of the CTBT we continue to support the current moratorium on nuclear testing. The United States has not conducted a nuclear explosive test since 1992." While neither seeking to justify nor, indeed, referring to the US withdrawal of its allocated financial contribution for the CTBT Organisation's work on on-site inspections, which has worried many NPT parties, the information paper continued: "We also support the establishment of the International Monitoring System for detecting nuclear tests." Addressing some of the concerns raised by states and NGOs, the US acknowledged: "Proposals exist to decrease the time that it would take to resume nuclear testing, were that ever to be necessary. But that fact says nothing about the likelihood of a nuclear test. Nor does it relate to the development of a new nuclear weapon. The current test readiness would be more than adequate for that purpose. For the foreseeable future, we believe that the stockpile stewardship program can ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile and that no nuclear tests will be required."

Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNW)

The New Agenda statement made particular mention of non-strategic - or tactical - nuclear weapons, identified as a specific problem for the first time in May 2000 (Step 9.iii of the 13 steps). Noting that the "comparative portability of non-strategic weapons and the ability to station them in close proximity to areas of conflict makes them more susceptible to use in combat or theft", the NAC argued that the possession of these weapons posed real risks and required collective attention. Going into more detail in the NAC intervention in the nuclear disarmament session, Caughley referred to "deeply worrying signs... that evolving security policies entail new designs and generations of low-yield non-strategic nuclear weapons to be used against mobile and deeply buried targets, and as a counter to conventional warfare", a point echoed strongly in statements from several others. Brazil, for example, was disturbed that "evolving security policies have confirmed the central role of nuclear weapons" and expressed alarm over "developments regarding new types of low yield nuclear weapons and plans related to new battlefield uses..."

The NAC called for further reductions of NSNW in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner; further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by these weapons; the formalising of existing bilateral arrangements into legally binding agreements (with specific reference to the Bush-Gorbachev Presidential Initiatives of 1991/92); the verified elimination of NSNW that have been removed from arsenals already; an undertaking not to increase the number or types of non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed; and the enhancement of security and physical protection measures for the transport and storage of NSNW, their components and related materials.

Sweden, on behalf also of Austria and Mexico, issued a further statement and working paper on non-strategic nuclear weapons, which elaborated on many of the New Agenda's arguments and drew support from a number of other states. Noting that there were between 7,000 and 20,000 NSNW, depending on definitions, the paper emphasised ways in which NSNW posed "great threats. Their portability, proximity to areas of conflict and high probability of pre-delegation in case of military conflict increase the risk of proliferation and of early, pre-emptive, unauthorised or accidental use. They can be more easily and frequently transported than strategic nuclear weapons. They could be appealing to terrorists due to their relatively small size and sometimes less sophisticated safety and security devices." Like others, the paper raised concern that tactical nuclear weapons were again becoming valued as "battlefield weapons" and that the CTBT could be threatened if they were not effectively addressed and prohibited, since "the development of new weapons probably would require the resumption of nuclear testing". Concerns were expressed that "the distinction between conventional weapons and non-strategic nuclear weapons is being erased, and, thus, that the threshold against the use of nuclear weapons is being lowered." Echoing many of the proposals in Caughley's statement on behalf of the NAC, the Swedish-Mexican-Austrian statement went on to specify that "certain types of non-strategic nuclear weapons could, as a first step, be prohibited and eliminated, including those that already have been removed from the arsenals of some nuclear weapons states. A ban could be suitable for nuclear mines, nuclear artillery shells, grenades, short-range ballistic missiles, nuclear anti-aircraft, and anti-missile weapons. Transparency mechanisms for the verification of the elimination of these weapons could be developed."

Aware that it would be put on the spot over non-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, Russia devoted a significant part of its opening statement to the subject. After stressing its support for the NPT "as a time-tested document", and noting that the 2000 Final Document should be the basis for the 2005 review of the treaty, since "the scope of measures it contains at multilateral, regional and other levels is, in essence, the program of joint efforts to further improve the NPT's effectiveness", Russia's statement appeared to downgrade or bypass the "unequivocal undertaking" it had agreed in 2000 "to accomplish the total elimination of its nuclear arsenal" (Step 6), preferring to refer to "the ultimate goal" of "complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to the conclusion of a treaty on comprehensive and complete disarmament..." Russia also argued that "it is impossible to consider the issues of tactical nuclear weapons separately from other kinds of armaments" and said that "elaboration of specific proposals to reduce and limit nuclear weapons should be accompanied by adoption of specific measures also to limit other types of weapons including non-nuclear, as well as by prohibition or limitation of activities with such weapons within the reach of each other's territories."

Such remarks compounded the concerns of a number of countries that the distinction between tactical and conventional weapons was becoming dangerously blurred. Referring to a Russian statement in favour of "a comprehensive consideration of issues of different kinds of weapons" Germany asked the Russian delegation to clarify what it meant and said that this "should not be taken as a pretext not to address specifically the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons". Sweden asked the US and Russia why they could not formalise agreements on NSNW and "emphasise their new partnership in a new era". Salander further called on Russia to give more information about the "specific security and physical protection measures for transport and storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons, their components and related materials, that you have undertaken in the last decade, and not least during the last few years when terrorist acquisition has been a particular concern".

Regrettably, as civil society representatives (NGOs and Press) were barred from hearing the debate on nuclear disarmament, I was unable to take notes on Russia's detailed written statement on Article VI, which was delivered in Russian and was not available in English or French at time of writing. I have therefore been unable to discover if Russia clarified or elaborated further on its position with regard to NSNW.

It is worth noting, however, that Russia's opening statement commented that "the removal of the tactical nuclear weapons... from Europe and elimination of respective infrastructure there would become an important practical step to ultimately overcome the remnants of the cold-war period." China also called on the NWS (meaning the US) to "withdraw and return home all the nuclear weapons deployed outside of their own territories".

Estimates vary about how many of US tactical nuclear weapons remain in Europe, but there are believed to be some 150-250 air-launched free-fall bombs in bases in seven NATO states: Belgium, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece and Turkey. These delegations did not respond to the challenges from Russia, China and some of the non-nuclear weapon states. Neither did they, in the spirit of transparency they evoke in other contexts, identify how many tactical nuclear weapons are actually deployed on their soil, or discuss a time-table for their removal and elimination, in accordance with other NPT undertakings agreed in 2000.

The United States pointed out that "NATO has considerably reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons". Through "unilateral action" it had reduced US NSNW by "nearly 90 percent" and "eliminated all but one of its nuclear delivery systems from Europe". NATO's nuclear-capable delivery aircraft, which used to be able to launch in minutes had had their "readiness time... lengthened to months". Noting that NSNW delivery systems were often dual use, the information paper said that the US had "looked at the prospect of formal arms control treaties on NSNW and concluded that such an approach was not possible". It was, however, committed to transparency, and said that the NATO-Russia Council was "discussing confidence-building measures related to NSNW" and that the issue had also been raised with Russia in the bilateral consultative group established at the 2002 Moscow Summit.

US Intentions: Concerns and Response

It has not been possible to cover all papers and issues related to nuclear disarmament in this interim report. Since there has been no movement towards agreement on a work programme in the Conference on Disarmament and hence no progress in getting negotiations underway on a fissile materials production ban (fissban/FMCT) statements lamenting this state of affairs merely echo, with increasing desperation and anger, the statements on these issues for the past several years, which have been well documented in my past reports and will be briefly summarised in Disarmament Diplomacy.

The overwhelming theme of this PrepCom, raised explicitly or obliquely by the vast majority of states and (with reams of detailed information) by many NGOs, is concern about the intentions and plans of the Bush administration, in light of the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, National Security Strategy, and various strident statements by administration officials and Republican representatives regarding nuclear weapons use, doctrine, and the need for new, more flexible nuclear weapons, raising the spectre of a resumption of nuclear testing, and the collapse of the CTBT and NPT regimes in the future.

In this regard, the US information paper on Article VI noted that "while the United States no longer supports all 13 steps, we unambiguously support Article VI and the goal of nuclear disarmament" [which] "can be achieved only through a step-by-step approach". The US argued that contrary to the view of many NPT parties, the new strategic posture would "reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons for deterrence through modernization of conventional forces, the addition of missile defenses, and other measures". Furthermore, "the Department of Defense has not identified any requirements for new nuclear weapons. We have not produced a nuclear warhead in over a decade. Certainly, cost and feasibility studies related to possible nuclear modernization are undertaken [but they] in no way represent a decision to proceed with development of a new warhead." The paper also stressed that "there has been no change in US nuclear declaratory policy and that the United States has not lowered the threshold for nuclear weapons use."

Endnote: I was very saddened to hear Ambassador Chris Westdal's announcement of the death of Gerald Shannon, who was Canada's ambassador to the CD when I first came to Geneva to work on the CTBT negotiations in 1994. I remember him as kind, helpful and considerate as I learned the ropes of CD reporting. Though with consummate diplomatic skill and finesse, Gerry Shannon managed to bring CD members to agreement in March 1995 on what has since been called the Shannon report and mandate on a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, the CD has failed ever since to make this agreed aspiration a reality.

Rebecca Johnson, May 4, 2003.

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