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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Back to NPT Statements & Documents

The NPT PrepCom 2003: Acronym Special Coverage

I. Statements in the General Debate

'The Responsibility Of The NWS To Lead By Example Is Greater Than Ever': New Agenda Statement, April 28

New Agenda Statement made on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden and New Zealand by the Honourable Marian Hobbs, Minister of Disarmament of New Zealand, April 28; Reaching Critical Will website, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

2. ... [W]e look forward to building on the outcome of the first PrepCom, and its Factual Summary. Mr. Chairman, the first sentence of that Summary notes that states parties reaffirmed that the NPT is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. That commitment should also be seen as a core principle of disarmament and non-proliferation, with a view to maintaining universal norms and expanding their scope. We owe it to future generations to honour the obligations laid out in the NPT Treaty.

3. Since the New York session last year there have been some positive developments and also deeply troubling trends for the NPT regime. On the profit side of the ledger we welcome the decision of Cuba to become a state party to both the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty. We recognize also the endeavours of the five Central Asian states to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region, as well as those efforts undertaken within the League of Arab States with the aim of establishing a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction.

4. On the debit side of the ledger, however, trends have been dismal. Deeply unsettling events in the Middle East and Asia surely must serve as a spur to our efforts to fully implement the NPT regime and to underscore emphatically the significance for global stability of compliance with international obligations as well as the universality of the treaty. In this connection, we renew our support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. We note that all states of the region with the exception of Israel are states parties to the NPT and call upon Israel to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place all of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

5. We also remain concerned at heightened tensions in the Asian region. In this connection, we renew our support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Central Asia and South Asia, and we call on India and Pakistan to pull back from their aspirations to nuclear weapons and to accede to the Treaty without condition.

6. Of particular concern has been the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the NPT and also its declared intention to restart the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, without IAEA safeguards. Leaving aside the circumstances that led to these decisions, the implications are grave and affect us all. Like the rest of the international community, the New Agenda supports dialogue over confrontation. We hope for an early, peaceful resolution of the situation, leading to the DPRK's return to full compliance with the Treaty's terms and we call on the DPRK to reconsider its decisions.

7. A development over the past year that we take note of is the Moscow Treaty. We acknowledge that the Treaty is a positive step in defining the new relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation. We question, however, whether the legacy of the Cold War has really been left behind since the number of weapons on each side still amounts to thousands. And we question the Treaty's contribution to nuclear disarmament. The Treaty does not contain verification provisions and it ignores non-operational warheads. Reductions in the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads are not a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. We call on the United States and the Russian Federation to make the Treaty of Moscow an irreversible and verifiable instrument of nuclear disarmament.

8. In general, the New Agenda Coalition's concerns arise on several levels:

  • at the level of international security, we believe that the responsibility of the NWS to lead by example is greater than ever. The fact that evolving security policies and defence doctrines continue to be based on the possession of nuclear weapons, indeed entailing possibly new designs and generations of such weapons as a counter to conventional warfare, can only further destabilise the global security environment and the NPT regime;
  • at the level of implementation and fulfilment of the NPT, the nuclear-weapon states must show strong leadership by fulfilling the obligations of the Treaty and their undertakings at the Review Conference in 2000. This is a vital step in order to preserve the credibility and sustainability of the NPT. We need constructive implementation of the 13 steps - the blueprint for achieving nuclear disarmament - not lip-service to them; and
  • at the level of this PrepCom, our sense is that this meeting has an acute responsibility to demonstrate to all states, whether or not they are party to the NPT, that the NPT regime remains the central element of international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts and that it is backed by a comprehensive and effective review process.

9. Immediately following the adoption of the report at the first PrepCom, the New Agenda Coalition made a short statement, which contained these points:

  • the 1995 and 2000 Review Conference commitments constitute undertakings bonding on all states parties from which there can be no going back;
  • given the purposes of the first two sessions of the current review cycle, greater interaction will be required at this second PrepCom to accomplish the objectives of the strengthened review process and to consider principles, objectives and ways as was mandated by the Review Conference;
  • regular reporting will complement such interaction.

10. To these ends, the New Agenda Coalition will expand our efforts at this PrepCom. ... We will be putting forward concrete ideas to promote the agenda for nuclear disarmament and will be active on the issues of security assurances and tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, we will be promoting an interactive review process, especially through discussion of the contents of reports on the implementation of the NPT, particularly Article VI of the Treaty.

11. ... The focus of international arms control and disarmament efforts has traditionally been on strategic nuclear weapons. Non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons have been neglected. The New Agenda considers that the reduction and elimination of non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons in a transparent and irreversible manner constitutes an essential element in the framework if a complete nuclear disarmament process. The possession of non-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons poses real risks, which, we believe, require our collective attention for a number of reasons. For instance, the comparative portability of non-strategic weapons and the ability to station them in close proximity to areas of conflict makes them more susceptible to use in combat or theft.

12. We recall that at the 200 Review Conference it was agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon states to the non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT would strengthen the NPT regime. That Conference called upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations on security assurances at the 2005 Review Conference. In this context, we will present a working paper at this PrepCom as well as a Draft Instrument on the Prohibition of the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons Against Non-Nuclear-Weapons States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Pending the conclusion of the negotiations, the nuclear-weapon states should fully respect their existing commitments in this regard.

13. Efforts were made in the first PrepCom to stimulate discussion, e.g. through the NAC position paper, the German proposal on non-strategic weapons, and the Canadian proposal on elaborating the reporting format. However, these were only partially successful in sparking interaction on the floor of the Conference. At this session, we will be seeking a more intensive debate, focussed mainly on the level of fulfilment of step number 12 on regular reporting and we hope that states parties will comment upon the substantive contributions - the reports and the working papers - submitted at the first, and during this, PrepCom.

14. We reaffirm to delegations our attachment to such principles and elements as transparency and accountability, irreversibility, the bringing into force of the CTBT, diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies, overcoming the unacceptable paralysis of the Conference on Disarmament - the failure to establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament and to resume negotiations banning the production of fissile material - and universality of the NPT. ...

16. A powerful symbol for demonstrating to the international public is the reach - and potential reach - of nuclear-weapon-free zones over the landmasses of the globe. There has been progress in the further development of nuclear-weapon-free zones in some regions, and, in particular, the movement towards freeing the Southern Hemisphere and the adjacent areas from such weapons. Following Cuba's accession to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the denuclearised regime in Latin America and the Caribbean is now complete. The ratification of the Treaties of Rarotonga, Bangkok, and Pelindaba by all states in the region, and all concerned states, remains a matter of great importance. We should work together to encourage all relevant states that have not yet done so to sign on to the protocols of the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.

17. We believe that the recent international debate in the United Nations Security Council, including statements made by its Permanent members, on weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, underlined international concern about the legitimacy, possession and possible use of such weapons. These statements should provide further impetus to international efforts to de-legitimise all nuclear weapons and to hasten international efforts towards nuclear disarmament. These statements moreover underline our basic belief that the only real guarantee against the use of any weapons of mass destruction anywhere, including nuclear weapons, is their complete elimination and the assurance that they will never be used or produced again.

18. Mr. Chairman, let me reiterate that the NPT process is the opportunity for states parties to work together to address the threats posed by nuclear weapons. Multilateralism is the collective will of all countries to act together, and while that will can be undermined by those who choose not to fulfil their non-proliferation obligations, it can equally be undermined by those under an obligation to disarm and to demonstrate leadership and progress and yet fail to do so, and by those states that continue to remain outside the NPT. ...

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