Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

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The NPT PrepCom 2003: Acronym Special Coverage

I. Statements in the General Debate

'To Create A Global System Of Countering New Challenges And Threats': Statement by Russia, April 28

Statement by the delegation of the Russian Federation, April 28; Reaching Critical Will website, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

The twenty-first century has been marked with new trends and at the same time new challenges in the development of international relations. We are convinced that countering these challenges is possible only through the consolidated efforts of the world community. As we see it, a new democratic world order should be built in such a way that would guarantee the harmonious combination of different approaches and of not always coinciding interests of states for the sake of preserving and strengthening comprehensive strategic stability in order to create a new multi-component system of security. The unilateral use of military force in circumvention of the UN Charter may result in undermining the system of international security and encourage individual countries to possess WMD.

Russia favours the further strengthening and development of the international legal basis for strategic stability and international security. We proceed from the understanding that political and diplomatic methods for resolving issues of non-proliferation and disarmament have been far from exhausted and can be engaged [in] with greater usefulness. Strengthening the international regime of nuclear weapons and non-proliferation and its foundation - the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - has been and is one of the most effective directions of our joint activity in order to achieve the said objective. ...

The world community has practically come to a consensus regarding the scope of new threats and challenges. The problem of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, together with the problem of terrorism, are among the top items within that scope. They are the ones that represent by themselves the greatest and real danger now.

The Russian Federation confirms its position of principle in support of the efforts undertaken by the international community - including the UN, Conference on Disarmament and IAEA - to fight terrorism and proliferation. Now it is important to unite efforts to create a global system of countering new challenges and threats, including also the ones in [the] nuclear sphere. The proposed new measures should not "compete" with traditional disarmament and non-proliferation aspects of security. On the contrary, they are called upon to make them more comprehensive and give them a new, quality dimension.

In this connection we underline the importance of making universal the principles, approved at the G8 Kananaskis Summit, to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from gaining access to weapons or materials of mass destruction. We stand for an enlargement of the number of countries committed to the said principles.

We believe that recommendations to further strengthen the NPT should become the main result of our joint work to prepare for the 2005 Conference. ... We consider the Final Document of the [2000 Review] Conference as a real future programme of multilateral, regional and other measures that contains benchmarks for negotiations on [a] step-by-step and consensus basis under strict observance of [the] interests of security of all the NPT parties under conditions of stability and predictability... [I]t should be implemented entirely and not selectively.

The task of ensuring universality of the NPT remains of principal importance. ... In this connection we would like to underscore the accession to the Treaty by Cuba on November 4, 2002...

It is with regret that we learned about the DPRK decision to withdraw from the NPT. This step undermines the efforts of the international community to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and can bring negative consequences on the regional as well as the global scale... Russia is still of the opinion that the return of the DPRK to the nuclear non-proliferation regime is necessary and possible. At the same time, we think it is necessary to provide the DPRK with guarantees of security, sovereignty, as well as to restart humanitarian and economic programmes which had been in place on the Korean peninsular. We call again for the political and diplomatic settlement of the crisis through negotiations. Russia will support any format which would facilitate the achievement of this objective.

We would like to draw the attention of the audience to the initiative of [the] President of Russia, Vladimir V. Putin, put forward at the Millennium Summit to develop proliferant-resistant nuclear technologies. The work is [being] actively carried out in the IAEA to put it in place (INPRO project). The first phase of this international project has been successfully implemented. We call upon all the states parties to the NPT to join the INPRO in full scale. ...

For Russia, the issues of nuclear arms reduction are a priority. Our country not only declares its commitment - as the ultimate goal - to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and to the conclusion of a treaty on comprehensive and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, but also take steps in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. ...

The period of reduction of strategic offensive weapons foreseen under the START I Treaty ended in December 2001. According to the Treaty, the parties committed themselves to reduce the number of their strategic delivery systems seven years after its entry into force to 1,600 units, and the warheads accounted with them down to the level of 6,000 units to each of the parties. Russia completely and ahead of schedule fulfilled its obligations under the above-mentioned reduction provisions and by the deadline date of December 5, 2001 had actually lowered the number of its deployed strategic delivery systems (ICBM, SLBM, and strategic bombers) down to 1,136 units, and the number of warheads accounted with them down to 5,518 units. ...

We have ratified the START II Treaty. it is not the fault of Russia that it has not come into force.

The conclusion of the Moscow Summit in May 2002 between Russia and the United States of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty has become a major step forward in nuclear disarmament. This document legally fixes the agreement on mutual reduction of an aggregate number of strategic warheads down to 1,700-2,200 units by each of the parties by December 31, 2012 - that means that it foresees the reduction approximately by two-thirds in comparison to the level established under the START I Treaty. At the same time, the START I Treaty will stay in force till December 5, 2009, and by agreement between the parties it can be prolonged further. So, at least up to the end of the year 2009 the strategic offensive potentials of Russia and the ISA will be under double mutually-reinforcing limitations by the two treaties. Provisions for its further enrichment, strengthening and evolution have been put into the new treaty and [the] specially-created Bilateral Commission on its implementation will focus on them. At present, the work to complete the process of the new Treaty is underway. ...

Russia proceeds from the understanding that it is impossible to consider the issue of tactical nuclear weapons separately from other kinds of armaments. This is the reason why the well-known unilateral Russian initiatives in the sphere of disarmament in 1991-1992 are of a comprehensive nature and, besides, the TNW touch upon other important issues which essentially influence strategic stability.

An essential argument in favour of the comprehensive consideration of issues of different kinds of weapons is that, for example, subdivision of nuclear weapons into strategic and tactical is very conditional, and that is vividly testified by an analysis of combat characteristics of the TNW, as well as by the transformation of the role of such weapons depending upon location of the deployment. On our part, we believe that removal of the tactical nuclear weapons, for example, from Europe, and elimination of respective infrastructure there, would become an important practical step to ultimately overcome the remnants of the Cold war period. ...

Naturally, the elaboration of specific proposals to reduce and limit nuclear weapons should also be accompanied by adoption of specific measures also to limit other types of weapons, including non-nuclear, as well as by prohibition or limitation of activities with such weapons within the reach of each other's territories.

Russia still attaches an exclusive importance to an unconditional implementation of negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states that nuclear-weapon states provided in 1995. This provision is fixed in the military doctrine of the Russian Federation.

The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is an important measure of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We express our hope that [the] CTBT - which, as many are aware, has long ago been ratified by Russia - will be joined by all nations whose ratification is of principal importance for entry-into-force of the Treaty.

We positively assess the process of creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions... The international community has accumulated a great experience in matters of establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It testifies to the fact that when the process of institutionalising the zones follows the principles and parameters which have become common practice - when it does not contradict international law - then NWFZs receive recognition and receptive assurances. And vice versa, non-observance of these conditions makes the process of recognition of a zone more difficult, as...happened to the NWFZ in South East Asia. We express our hope that the dialogue between the SEA countries and nuclear powers will, in the final analysis, allow them to resolve the outstanding difficulties.

The work on the draft treaty on [a] nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia is about to be completed. At the same time, efforts to create such a zone in the Middle East skid, and that fact cannot but cause concern... We are also convinced that the process of post-war settlement in the Middle East, and Iraq in particular, should be brought hack into [an] international legal framework based on already available mechanisms accountable to the UN Security Council. That would also facilitate the solution of the tasks connected with the strengthening of the WMD non-proliferation regime in the region.

We express our concern regarding the stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament. At the same time, we confirm our position regarding the earliest start within the CD framework of negotiations on [a] non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We would also like to note that prevention of an arms race in outer space is also of importance in the NPT context. ...

In our opinion, under present conditions broad international cooperation in the sphere of peaceful use of nuclear energy is a potent and effective way of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime at the global as well as regional levels. In our view, [the] basic directions of activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee (ZC) facilitate resolution of these two interconnected tasks. We actively support the line of activities carried out by these multilateral mechanisms to be more open in the work with non-member countries. We believe that there are some reserves to be exploited in this work. We are in favour of constructive interaction and intensive dialogue with all the countries, including non-parties to the NPT, first of all with the objective of establishing and improving national systems of export control. ...

During the previous period we continued to improve our national system of export control. We made more specific practically all the control lists. Changes have been introduced into legal acts, which regulate the procedure of foreign economic activities regarding the goods under control. First of all, the scope of foreign economic operations which are subject to licensing was made broader. Besides, export operations with goods subject to control their transfer to foreign entities in the territory of Russia is also subject to issuing licenses. Moreover, now the export control covers also the transfer of technologies in the so-called "intangible" form - through electronic means of communication, in the process of teaching, presentations at scientific conferences, symposia and other events with foreign participation. It is explained by the necessity to close the above-said channels for the leakage of "sensitive" information abroad. At the same time, the procedure to obtain permits has been significantly simplified and time-periods for consideration of applications of exporters have been reduced.

The work to establish internal programmes of export control at enterprises and in organisations is in progress. The mechanisms for identification survey of products are being improved. Criminal and administrative responsibility for violation of established procedure for the execution of foreign economic operations with the goods that are subject to export control has been made stricter.

Russia actively supports the IAEA... We highly appreciate the efforts of the Agency to develop and introduce the concept of integrated safeguards. We also take note of the greater number of states which [have] signed...Additional Protocols... We support the IAEA programme to combat possible uses of nuclear terrorism and [the] new trilateral Russia-US-IAEA initiative regarding safe treatment of radioactive sources.

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© 2003 The Acronym Institute.