Text Only | Disarmament Diplomacy | Disarmament Documentation | ACRONYM Reports

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The NPT PrepCom 2003: Acronym Special Coverage

I. Statements in the General Debate

'The Test Of The NPT's Effectiveness Is Not Our Ability To Hold Meetings': Statement by South Africa, April 28

Statement by Mr. Peter Goosen, Chief Director, Peace and Security, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa, April 28; Reaching Critical Will website, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

... We meet at the halfway stage to the 2005 Review Conference and should be in a position to gauge what progress is being made in the implementation of the decisions taken in 2000. Of particular importance in this process will be the reports that are to be submitted to this Preparatory Committee meeting, particularly on the issue of nuclear disarmament. A further point of emphasis that should begin receiving greater attention is the task that was given to the PrepCom by the 2000 Review Conference to address the important issue of security assurances, and to make recommendations on this to the Review Conference. We should also now be in a position to begin gauging how the further strengthening of the review process, which was agreed in 2000, is working and whether we should not begin applying our minds on how the process can be further improved.

What we should definitely also attempt to ensure is that this PrepCom avoids the "non-interaction" between delegations that characterised the PrepCom's last meeting. Substantive contributions and proposals have been prepared, and will be presented, by many delegations from all parts of the political spectrum represented here. If these contributions are only heard and then ignored, we are undermining the very essence of the strengthened review process as it was conceived, and agreed to, in 1995. ...

It is South Africa's belief that while substantial progress was achieved at the 2000 Review Conference in reaching an agreed framework for the implementation of the NPT, the states parties cannot and must not approach the period following the Review Conference with an attitude of "business as usual". The states parties must work seriously to give credence to the undertakings that we made in the Treaty and to the consensus agreements that we have negotiated on the necessary steps to implement the Treaty. It would be a mistake for the states parties to hold on to the limited number of positive developments that we have witnessed over the past year and to come to this Preparatory Committee to continue talking past one another. The test of the NPT's effectiveness is not our ability to hold meetings, but rather to implement our Treaty and agreements, and to continue to work effectively for the achievement of all of the NPT's objectives. ...

It is questionable whether the present strengthened review, as agreed to in 2000, is having the desired outcome and effect that was envisaged. While it was conceded that every PrepCom was not a mini-Review Conference and that we had struggled to make substantive recommendations through the 1997, '98 and '99 PrepComs, the present format does not appear to have remedied that situation. The previous strengthened review process suffered from a lack of determination that prevented it from making substantive recommendations due to a "business as usual" or "procedural rather than substantive" approach, which was being forced upon it. The current review process has, however, to date demonstrated an inability to provide for substantive interaction between the states parties. The outcome of the first PrepCom in the 2000-2005 phase has again underlined the fact that states parties were not utilising the strengthened PrepCom effectively. The lack of interaction that we are referring to applied both to (a) the consideration of the reports that had been submitted on the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and on the agreements that had been achieved at the 2000 Review Conference as well as to (b) the substantive contributions and proposals that were being made. It consequently may be time to have a re-look at the strengthened review process decided upon at 2000 with a view to making all the PrepComs relevant steps in the build-up to Review Conferences.

To this end, the South African delegation will be submitting a working paper proposing language that can be considered in a further attempt to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of the Treaty's review process. In the period since the PrepCom last met, the states parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) have concluded their Review Conference. At that meeting, the BWC states parties agreed to a decision that we believe the NPT states parties should take note of, and which we should study to see whether it can be applied in our own strengthened review process.

The BWC decision included an element that is not apparent in the NPT process, namely, the ability to undertake substantive work. The inclusion of such an element in the NPT process would be fully consistent with the decision that was taken at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. That decision determined that the Review Conference is, inter alia, tasked to identify 'the means' through which further progress should be sought in the future and 'what' might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty. The proposal that is being made would be for consideration and decision at the 2005 Review Conference. While having submitted the working paper at this PrepCom, it is not the intention of the South African delegation to pursue the issue at this meeting. We would request that delegations consider the content of the paper on the basis that our next PrepCom meeting in 2004 may consider making recommendations on the issue to the Review Conference and on the basis that the Review Conference itself will be looking at the strengthened review process as it did in 1995 and 2000. ...

While the last year has not been one of the more auspicious in the NPT's history, we should not only focus on the down side. We should also focus on signals and opportunities that have been identified in this period.

South Africa took serious note of the debate in and around the UN Security Council that surrounded the situation in Iraq. One of the points that was of particular note in that debate was the focus on weapons of mass destruction, which include nuclear weapons. The strong statements that were repeatedly made about the threat that is posed by weapons of mass destruction, about the need to eliminate this threat, about the need to destroy these weapons by many of the members of the international community and about the legitimacy of their possession, including by the nuclear-weapon states, were statements that South Africa supported. It was of particular note that these statements focussed on the horrendous consequences of the possession, proliferation and use, or threat of use, of these weapons. ...

It is our belief that the NPT states parties must now move decisively to pursue the sentiments and commitments that were contained in these statements. It is our belief that given this now universal condemnation of the possession, proliferation and possible use of weapons of mass destruction, we should move even more decisively to implement the unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament that all of the states parties committed themselves to in 2000 and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As the NPT states parties have recognised on many occasions, the only real guarantee against the use of any weapons of mass destruction anywhere, including nuclear weapons, is their complete elimination and the assurance that they will never be used or produced again.

While nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction may be inanimate objects, and while it may be the inherent capacity that humankind has to choose between good and bad or between good and evil that would lead to the use of these weapons as instruments of war, mass destruction and terror, the fact remains that we do not have the capacity to change human nature. The capacity that lies within the purview of us - as the states parties to the NPT - is to focus on the weapons and to work for their elimination in order that they will not be available to visit horrendous consequences on innocent masses of people, no matter what the nature is of the persons who may have wanted to use them. It is our task, in accordance with the unequivocal undertaking that was agreed upon for nuclear disarmament, to work for the elimination of these weapons and not for us to rely on the fickleness of the nature of humankind.

Back to the Top of the Page