The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The NPT Review Conference 2005: Acronym Special Coverage

"Decisions, resolution and outcomes": Frustration as agenda is thwarted
NPT Review Conference entering week 2 (May 9)

Rebecca Johnson

Back to the main page on the NPT

The failure of the NPT Review Conference to adopt an agenda has now become critical. Since the disputed part of the agenda governs the allocation of items to the three main committees (disarmament, safeguards and nuclear energy), substantive work on these issues was not able to get underway last Wednesday, as originally planned, in parallel with the general debate. The problem came to a head on Friday when Egypt, traditionally a major player at NPT meetings, rejected the President's draft agenda and statement of understanding. Though lack of an agenda places the conference in jeopardy, dire predictions of derailment are premature. Intensive discussions over the weekend between the President, Ambassador Sergio Duarte, and the main protagonists, including the United States, Egypt and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), will continue to try to agree an agenda. If that remains elusive when the general debate reopens on Tuesday, there are several diplomatic ways in which lack of agreement on an agenda might be temporarily bypassed in order to get debates underway on the vital issues of nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament and security.

This update provides a brief analysis of the conflict over the agenda, followed by a comparative synopsis of general views on the NPT and its successes and challenges from the P-5, EU, NAM, New Agenda Coalition (NAC) and Egyptian statements given so far. Already a number of working papers and reports have been posted on the UN website at http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/. Since these and further statements to the committees will provide greater detail on the specific positions and proposals relating to issues such as nuclear disarmament, safeguards, energy and safety, I will cover these issues more substantially once (if) the committee debates get underway. Due to the UN's commemoration of the end of WWII in Europe, only informal meetings will take place on Monday, with the General Debate not resuming until Tuesday May 10.

Agenda impasse

Despite consulting assiduously with the major delegations and capitals for months before the RevCon opened, Duarte was unable to resolve the problems that blocked agreement on the agenda at the 2004 PrepCom. He continued his consultations during the first week, trying out various formulae to bridge the gap between those (principally the United States) who wanted to erase references to the important agreements adopted by consensus by NPT States Parties in 2000, and those who resisted such rewriting of history, such as Egypt. The issue had been further complicated during the 2004 PrepCom, when the US linked any reference to past agreements to explicit text on subsequent developments, to which Iran objected. Though few supported Iran on this, the US linkage was clearly meant to underscore its focus on noncompliance, though not solely directed at Iran. The fact is that under the standard RevCon agendas adopted for more than a decade, it has been considered possible and legitimate to raise a range of relevant developments. In the past these have included new nuclear weapons and programme developments by certain states viewed with concern by others, compliance, safeguards developments, safety concerns, and treaties and resolutions relevant to the NPT's subject matter. It would be inconceivable for the NPT RevCon not to include such recent challenges as North Korea's announced withdrawal, Iran's safeguards failures, proliferation-sensitive technologies in the nuclear fuel cycle, the A.Q. Khan blackmarket, opposition to the CTBT that currently impedes its entry into force, UN Security Council resolution 1540 and the increased perception of a threat of nuclear terrorism. But this is not what disagreement over the agenda is about.

Though the US-sponsored linkage prevented agreement on the agenda in 2004, the current impasse is less obvious, and does not put Iran in the spotlight. Duarte thought he had obtained acceptance for a pared down 'chapeau' (lead-in sentence) to paragraph 16 of the agenda on "Review of the operation of the Treaty" that does not mention any previous review conference by date, together with a 32-word statement from the Presidency meant to provide reassurance that the review would be conducted "in the light of the decisions and the resolution of previous conferences" and "allow for discussion of any issue raised by States Parties". However, when it came to decision-time, Egypt objected that unless there was specific reference to "taking into account" the "outcomes" as well as the decisions and resolution of previous conferences, the agenda could not be accepted.

To those outside the airless halls of treaty diplomacy, it might seem ludicrous to hold up the work of a conference for such a seemingly small linguistic amendment. In context, however, language is code and the codes contain potential access, legitimacy or denial for issues of substance. While it could seem obvious that if the Review Conference adopted its final document by consensus in 2000 this can be characterised as a 'decision', some states are nervous that if they accepted the narrowed-down language, they could facilitate the efforts of the United States and some of the other nuclear weapon powers to walk away from the undertakings agreed in 2000, since only in 1995 were the adopted agreements explicitly titled Decision 1 on strengthening the review process, Decision 2 on principles and objectives, and Decision 3 on extension, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East.

On Friday, Ambassador Duarte expressed deep disappointment that his pragmatic proposal had been rejected and announced that he would continue with his consultations, appealing to all states to assist in finding a solution in a "spirit of understanding". States on both sides of the fissure moved quickly to spin their explanations of the deadlock. A number of Western diplomats castigated Egypt, accusing it of 'fronting' for Iran. This is too simplistic, as Egypt is as concerned about Iranian nuclear developments as many other NPT parties, particularly in the Middle East. It should be recalled that the NPT parties would have smoothly agreed the draft 2005 agenda in 2004 if the United States had not refused to accept the simple addition of a reference to the 2000 Review Conference agreements to the agenda that had been adopted in 2000, as was widely expected. Once the can was opened, other worms crawled out to complicate the issue. Though the Western states want to portray Egypt as having breached a supposed agreement, and there certainly seems to be confusion about why the President was given to believe that his proposal would be accepted, a number of other delegations have painted a more complex picture of the underlying disagreements.

It transpires that many states are angry that US power and intransigence have succeeded in deleting mention of the 2000 agreements, and they strongly suspect that most if not all the other nuclear powers are happy that this has occurred. Opinion is divided, however, between those who believe that the priority is to get on with the substantive work, and who are thus willing to hold their noses and agree the current draft agenda as characterised by the President's statement of understanding, and those who fear that if they don't ensure the right context for reviewing the treaty now they will be thwarted later, especially when they try to hold the weapon states accountable for inadequate progress in implementing the 13 paragraphs on nuclear disarmament agreed in 2000. More worryingly, a significant number of delegates, especially among the 100-plus members of the non-aligned movement (NAM), have quietly indicated that Egypt had their support but that they couldn't give it openly. Alluding to pressure and chequebook diplomacy, a number said that though they wanted past NPT commitments and agreements to be fully honoured and implemented, the NPT wasn't important enough in national political terms to risk US displeasure and possible reprisals if they were seen to oppose Washington's agenda at this conference. Given the worldwide importance of preventing nuclear weapons proliferation and use, this perception is deeply troubling, and might explain why the seats of so many poorer countries remain empty, in contrast to the general debates in 1995 and 2000, where active participation was much higher.

For its part, the US delegation must also contend with problems of authority and decisionmaking of its own. The delegation head, Stephen Rademaker, has an experienced team of diplomats, experts and officials from Washington, Geneva and Vienna, but their ability to be more constructive or flexible may be hampered by recent delays affecting the post-election transition in responsibilities, particularly the heavily contested confirmation of John Bolton for US Ambassador to the United Nations and his designated successor Bob Josephs as Undersecretary for arms control at the State Department. With Bolton's future in the balance, any more constructive approaches with regard to NPT-related strategies or decisionmaking are likely to be extremely cautious unless Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice takes a stronger role, which appears unlikely at present.

Comparing key states and groupings

The following comparison is of the opening remarks made by the P-5 nuclear weapon states, EU, NAM and NAC. Egypt, a member of the NAM and NAC, is included here because of the weight accorded in past NPT meetings to its role, geostrategic concerns and national perspective, as well as its position as coordinator of the League of Arab States. As excerpts given in my earlier briefings demonstrate, this choice for comparative purposes does not imply that these were the only important or the most interesting contributions. They were chosen to offer an initial overview of approaches and issues highlighted across a widely representative and influential spectrum. It should be noted that many additional national statements were made by members of the EU, NAM and NAC, who framed their positions by endorsing the relevant group positions focussed on here.

Approaches to the NPT and Objectives for the Conference

United States: NPT "is a key legal barrier against the spread of nuclear weapons and material related to the production of such weapons"; "fundamentally a treaty for mutual security... the security of all member states depends on unstinting adherence to the Treaty's nonproliferation norms by all other parties"; "Strict compliance with nonproliferation obligations is essential to regional stability, to forestalling nuclear arms races, and to preventing resources needed for economic development from being squandered in a destabilizing and economically unproductive pursuit of weapons". The NPT is a "critical tool in the global struggle against proliferation. The United States remains committed to universal adherence to the NPT, and we hope that countries still outside will join the Treaty, which they can do only as non-nuclear weapon states. However, we must remain mindful that the Treaty will not continue to advance our security in the future if we do not successfully confront the current proliferation challenges... This Conference offers us the opportunity to expand our understanding of these critical challenges and to seek common ground on ways to respond. In the interest of world peace and security, let us work together to preserve and strengthen the NPT."

Russia: NPT is "one of the most important pillars of international security and stability... the most representative international agreement in the security sphere... helps to fulfil the task of minimising the risks of nuclear conflicts". Russia looks forward "to a constructive and substantive review of the Treaty in all its aspects, in particular of the five year period that has elapsed since the last conference" in 2000. In addition, an opening statement from President Putin was read which hoped that decisions would be reached to "help produce specific measures aimed at strengthening [the NPT's] efficiency."

China: "History and today's reality have proven the NPT's indispensable value and function. It has played an important role in preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons, diminishing nuclear peril as well as maintaining international peace and security. Despite challenges to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and global security and arms control, the NPT still stands as the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, a decisive factor safeguarding world peace and stability and a successful model in solving security concerns through multilateral approaches." China has already tabled several working papers with specific proposals and recommendations for the conference to consider.

The remaining two NPT-defined nuclear weapon states, France and the UK, endorsed the EU statement, given by the Luxembourg presidency. The EU recalled the NPT's preamble about the devastation of nuclear war, and called the NPT "an irreplaceable, legally binding instrument for maintaining and reinforcing international peace, security and stability... the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament under article VI, as well as an important element in the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." Overall perspective and objectives also contained in the 43-paragraph EU Common Position on the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

In addition, France stressed its view that "Since our last Review Conference, profound changes have taken place in the world. In 2000, we were drawing the final conclusions from the end of the Cold War. A decade of unprecedented advances in all disarmament-related fields was coming to a close." France built on the EU prioritisation of five threats: "terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime". France argued that "In the face of these dangers our principal safeguard remains the recourse by the community of States to determined action and effective multilateralism while respecting the law". France identified as its 5 key objectives for the conference: an effective verification system; strengthening the multilateral system to address cases of non-proliferation; greater State accountability for transfers of nuclear items; facilitation of access to non-sensitive nuclear items for States that respect their commitments; and holding a debate on the issue of withdrawal from the NPT. France concluded by quoting the UN Secretary-General's opening statement to the NPT Conference, "International regimes do not fail because of one breach... They fail when many breaches pile one on top of the other, to the point where the gap between promise and performance becomes unbridgeable."

For the UK, "changing threats, and challenges [to the NPT]... have served only to underline its importance and therefore our support"; we "recognise the need for balanced implementation of the Treaty and we support progress in all its areas"; nonproliferation and disarmament are inter-linked in achieving the Treaty's goals. But the relationship between the two processes is neither simple nor mechanistic... we believe that progress in non-proliferation is important in its own right..." Saying that the "challenge is to acknowledge and to underscore by our actions that all of us have responsibilities as well as entitlements under the Treaty", the UK indicated that it supported the suspension of nuclear fuel cycle cooperation with states that violated their nonproliferation and safeguards obligations, that it wanted the RevCon to decide on action to resolve existing cases of such violation by states parties, and that it should "address withdrawal... and work together to prevent future abuses of the Treaty so as to ensure that nuclear energy can continue..." The UK said it wanted "the Treaty's objectives to be sustained and their implementation strengthened for the security of all", and looked "forward to negotiation and agreement of a strong Final Document at the conclusion of this Conference."

NAM (represented by Malaysia): "the NPT is a key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. The NPT seeks to ensure a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and... the non-nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty. The indefinite extension of the NPT does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear weapons arsenals. If we, the States Parties, want to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we must also be prepared to accept that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons." Malaysia also stressed: "The NPT is at [a] crossroads, with its future uncertain... The lack of balance in the implementation of the NPT threatens to unravel the NPT regime, a critical component of the global disarmament framework." The NAM statement did not mention by name North Korea, Iran, Libya or the Khan network and said that it would be guided in its approach to the NPT conference by the Millennium Summit, and decisions taken at the XIII Conference of NAM Heads of State or Government (Kuala Lumpur, February 2003) and the XIV NAM Ministerial Conference (Durban, August 2004). These "affirmed that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of dealing with the multiplicity of disarmament and international security issues. The NPT review process provides for that multilateral approach. We must take full advantage of it at this Review Conference."

NAC (represented by New Zealand): Recalling that "the NPT was concluded amongst fears of a nuclear Armageddon" the NAC statement also quoted the preamble on nuclear devastation and danger and continued: "The NPT is the essential bedrock within our global security regime. The three pillars of the NPT - non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses - have been indispensable in attracting its near universal membership. Indeed, without each one of those pillars there would not have been a treaty. The New Agenda Coalition continues to press for a world security order where nuclear weapons would have no role, as envisaged in the NPT." After providing its assessment of the successes and challenges of the regime, the NAC concluded, "When we highlight current realities, we do so because in foregoing the development of such weapons we have a right to do so. Indeed, given the horrendous devastation of which these armaments are capable, we have a duty to do so."

Egypt: "The accurate and balanced implementation of the treaty provisions requires a proper balance in the implementation of its various pillars, as well as equality in the fulfilment of obligations and rights of the States parties to the treaty, in a manner that lives up to the aspirations of our peoples for peace, security and stability and fulfils its objective of achieving security for all parties." "It is not possible from now on, to measure the credibility of the Non Proliferation Regime in the [Middle East] region, without real progress towards the accession of Israel as a non-nuclear weapon state to the NPT." Egypt emphasised the "centrality of the 13 practical steps" and that "the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT achieved a substantial milestone in our course towards nuclear disarmament, essentially the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament and the 13 practical steps necessary to implement article VI of the Treaty." Egypt emphasised compliance but gave it a different spin from the United States: "The crux of compliance, the litmus test of fulfilment so to speak, is implementation of all obligations by all states parties whether nuclear weapon states or non-nuclear weapon states, as well as a genuine balance in monitoring compliance with the Treaty and in addressing cases of noncompliance... progress in implementing the 13 steps should be the foremost criterion in reviewing progress in the implementation of the Treaty and assessing compliance with its provisions by the nuclear weapon states, as well as the determining factor with regard to acceptance by the states parties of any further obligations under the NPT. Whereas the IAEA is the final arbiter in the case of compliance with article III, assessing compliance with articles I & II compels us during this conference to review the policies and doctrines of some military alliances, such as 'nuclear sharing' in order to determine whether they conform with the obligations of states under the NPT or not. Such a review must take place in tandem with any other allegations regarding noncompliance; otherwise we would fail to fulfil the standards of fairness and equality of rights and obligations for all states parties, standards which must continue to be the bedrock for credibility of this Treaty."

Recent nonproliferation successes

USA highlighted: the "Libyan decision to abandon its clandestine nuclear weapons program, a program aided by the A. Q. Khan network... Libya has joined other states, including South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, that have wisely concluded that their security interests are best served by turning away from nuclear weapons and coming into full compliance with the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. This demonstrates that, in a world of strong nonproliferation norms, it is never too late to make the decision to become a fully compliant NPT state." In addition to enumerating its own steps, particularly the Moscow Treaty, the US took credit for "success in designing new tools outside of the NPT that complement the Treaty. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is one such important new tool. First proposed by President Bush in Krakow, Poland on May 31, 2003, over 60 nations have now associated themselves with this effort against the international outlaws that traffic in deadly materials. We are pleased that the PSI was endorsed by Security Council Resolution 1540 and by the Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and we reaffirm our determination not to shrink from using this important new tool."

Russia also listed its own actions, along with: accession by Cuba and Timor Leste to the NPT; progress in developing the IAEA safeguards system through the Additional Protocol; and near-agreement on a NWFZ in Central Asia. Saying that "New challenges call for new solutions", Russia appreciated the support given to its suggestions that were incorporated into UNSC Res. 1540 and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Terrorism. Russia also made positive reference to the G-8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation.

China: "encouraging factors"... relaxation of some regional tensions; better regional and international cooperation for dealing with regional and global challenges; "Factors favourable for maintaining peace and preventing war are growing and the development in international security situation is in general peace-oriented".

EU, including France and Britain: welcomed the accession by Cuba and Timor Leste; completion of NWFZ in Latin America and Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco); end to the arms race, Moscow Treaty and "considerable reductions of arsenals of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons and their means of delivery"; shut down and dismantlement of "many facilities" for producing fissile materials for weapons; the inclusion of an anti-terrorist clause in each of the export control regimes, and efforts in other fora such as the G-8, UNSC 1540 and the conclusion of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Terrorism. The EU welcomed that "Libya has brought its nuclear weapons programme to the attention of the IAEA..." and dismantled it, as well as signing the CTBT and Additional Protocol. Of particular importance, the adoption by heads of State and government of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in December 2003 - "integral to this strategy is our conviction that a multilateralist approach to international security, including disarmament and nonproliferation provides the best way to maintain peace and stability... multilateralism is based in particular on the principle of shared commitments and obligations contained in legally binding instruments and on the fulfilment of obligations under multilateral agreements."

In addition to the positives characterised by the EU, both the EU and France stressed unilateral actions they have undertaken. France also highlighted PSI and "other ongoing processes such as the revision of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material".

The NAM recognised "a number of recent efforts aimed at strengthening the nonproliferation regime. But it must be recognized that any effort to stem proliferation should be transparent and open to participation by all States." The NAM also welcomed the convening and outcome of the recent Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones held in Mexico City from April 26-28, 2005.

The NAC commended: "reductions in non-strategic and strategic nuclear arsenals over the last decade, that three of the nuclear-weapon States have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, one nuclear-weapon State has taken all its nuclear weapons off high-alert and another has closed down all of its fissile material production facilities. Towards the practical end of disarmament, collective efforts are being made by the nuclear-weapon States and others to secure the vast amounts of nuclear material that remain worldwide." The NAC also applauded the increasing effectiveness of the IAEA and Libya's abandonment of nuclear weapon ambitions, and the Mexican-hosted conference on NWFZs.

Challenges to the treaty regime

USA: "Today, the Treaty is facing the most serious challenge in its history due to instances of noncompliance" by states, notably North Korea and Iran, and by non-state actors: "By secretly pursuing reprocessing and enrichment capabilities in order to produce nuclear weapons, North Korea violated both its safeguards obligations and its nonproliferation obligations under the NPT before announcing its intention to withdraw from the Treaty in 2003. In recent months, it has claimed to possess nuclear weapons. For almost two decades Iran has conducted a clandestine nuclear weapons program, aided by the illicit network of A. Q. Khan. After two and a half years of investigation by the IAEA and adoption of no fewer than seven decisions by the IAEA Board of Governors calling on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA in resolving outstanding issues with its nuclear program, many questions remain unanswered. Even today, Iran persists in not cooperating fully. Iran has made clear its determination to retain the nuclear infrastructure it secretly built in violation of its NPT safeguards obligations, and is continuing to develop its nuclear capabilities around the margins of the suspension it agreed to last November, for example, by continuing construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak, along with supporting infrastructure." The US characterised two categories of "problematic non-state actors": blackmarket traders like the A.Q. Khan network; and terrorist organisations.

Russia: lack of entry into force of the CTBT; slow uptake of the IAEA Additional Protocol; deadlock in the CD impeding negotiations relating to disarmament; proliferation-sensitive technologies and energy development patterns; 'breaches', 'noncompliance' and 'technical failures'; nuclear blackmarket activities. With regard to North Korea's announced withdrawal, Russia is "convinced that this situation can be resolved through political and diplomatic means". On Iran, "we call for current negotiations and consultations to provide such decisions with regard to Iran's nuclear programme that would meet the country's legitimate energy needs on the one hand and dispel doubts as to the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities on the other."

China raised concerns about "uncertain, unstable and unpredictable factors affecting international security [which] are increasing... [and] increasing non-traditional threats intertwined with traditional threats constitute new challenges for international security. Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) become increasingly prominent. The emerging regional nuclear issues as well as the exposure of [a] nuclear smuggling network have overshadowed international nonproliferation efforts. It is no less disturbing that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty... regarded as a 'cornerstone of strategic stability' by the international community, was discarded; outer space is facing the danger of weaponisation; the prospect of enter-into-force of the CTBT is diluted; international arms control and disarmament is at a stalemate; the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has long been paralyzed, making it impossible to start negotiations on issues such as the fissile material cut-off treaty(FMCT) and the prevention of arms race in outer space." China also listed further "negative developments, including sticking to the Cold War mentality, pursuing unilateralism, advocating pre-emptive strategy, listing other countries as targets of nuclear strike and lowering the threshold of using nuclear weapons, researching and developing new types of nuclear weapons for specific purposes, add new destabilizing factors to international security."

The EU highlighted the following: the delay in CTBT entry into force, despite its impressive number of signatories and ratifiers; 106 NPT parties have not yet put into force the Additional Protocol; the continuing urgency and importance of "preventing terrorists from acquiring or developing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and their means of delivery, as well as radiological dispersal devices"; "illicit trade in highly sensitive nuclear equipment and technology" - in this regard the EU welcomed efforts to dismantle illicit trafficking and procurement networks, with specific reference to "Pakistan, Malaysia, South Africa, the United Arab Emirates" but no mention of Britain, Germany or other European countries whose nationals and nationally-registered companies have also been implicated in the A.Q. Khan network. The EU was concerned about increases in "conflict potential at a regional level"; "deeply concerned that some non-nuclear weapon states parties to the treaty do not always comply with their nonproliferation obligations". It deplored DPRK's announced withdrawal and mentioned its "firm resolve to contribute to the search for a peaceful solution, through negotiations" and said the EU was "united in determination not to allow Iran to obtain military nuclear capabilities".

NAM: "We all have concerns about nuclear nonproliferation, both vertical and horizontal. We all have fears about nuclear terrorism; we fear for the possibility of individuals or groups and other non-State actors getting their hands on nuclear explosive devices and using them for terrorist activities. We all continue to have nightmares for so long as there is the continued existence of nuclear weapons, and humanity has called for their total elimination. At the same time, we want to preserve the inherent right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology including energy. This NPT Review Conference should rightly serve to take care of our concerns, allay our fears and reduce our nightmares."

NAC: "we have yet to realise the NPT's preambular injunction on 'the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery'... according to the latest estimates the number of existing nuclear warheads today amount to upwards of 30,000... almost as high as the estimated number of warheads that existed when the Treaty entered into force in 1970... Even today's stocks of fissile material are enough to produce thousands more nuclear warheads. We continue to be far from the implementation of the 'programme of action' towards implementation of Article VI contained in the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament agreed in 1995 and the 'practical steps for... systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI' agreed in the year 2000. The CTBT has not yet entered into force, negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material have not begun, a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament has not been established, the majority of weapons reductions are not irreversible, transparent, or verifiable, and the role of nuclear weapons in security policies has not been diminished - to give but a few examples of the lack of implementation of the 1995 and 2000 agreements." North Korea and Iran are mentioned in relation to efforts to resolve those challenges, and the NAC notes that "in spite of recent positive efforts, tensions remain high in the Middle East Region". Concern is also expressed about the "possibility that terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons, and by activities such as those of the A.Q. Khan network."

Egypt highlighted noncompliance, proliferation in the Middle East and especially Israel's nuclear programme. In particular, "we cannot afford to undermine our stated objective of universality of the Treaty by continuing to condone the cooperation between some NPT parties and nonparties while calling for further restrictions on the rights of states parties... The two past review conferences have paid special attention to the Middle East, as a result of the delicate security situation in the region, and its negative repercussions on the credibility of the treaty, as long as Israel remains outside it... The 2000 review conference reiterated fairly and firmly the importance of the accession of Israel to the NPT as a non nuclear weapon state and to place all of its nuclear facilities under full scope IAEA Safeguards, as a step towards the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East, and achieving the universal adherence to the treaty in the region. Egypt also provided a different perspective from many on the issue of safeguards, including the Model Additional Protocol: "it is essential that we consider carefully whether it is logical or even feasible to reward the laxity in implementation of obligations under one of the treaty's pillars, namely nuclear disarmament, with the imposition of additional obligations under the other pillars of the treaty including the safeguards regime. In doing so, we would be deceiving ourselves into a false belief that we are actually correcting the structural imbalance that now exists among the three pillars."

7.5.05

Back to the Top of the Page

© 2005 The Acronym Institute.