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The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The NPT Review Conference 2005: Acronym Special Coverage

Day 23: closed meetings and bracketed texts
May 24, 2005

Rebecca Johnson

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The NPT Review Conference moved into its endgame on May 24, Women's International Day for Disarmament. Prospects for a positively negotiated and agreed outcome are looking more remote than ever. The three main committees (MC) and their subsidiary bodies (SB) have been negotiating more or less for the past two days on texts generated by their chairs, and all are having serious difficulties that look likely to prevent agreement. Square brackets around disputed text are multiplying and MC.II finished its last designated session with much of its text bracketed.

Disagreements have also come down to the wire on attempts among the five nuclear weapon states (Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States) to agree a P-5 statement. On this, however, the brackets have been diminishing over the weeks since negotiations started (before the Review Conference opened), and it is understood that only two or three remain, including the CTBT, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and possibly still North Korea and/or withdrawal from the NPT. While a P-5 statement would be far too late to contribute constructively to the RevCon's conduct and outcome, there is a chance that - depending on what it says - an agreed P-5 declaration could still play a role in demonstrating the priorities for the nuclear weapon states (or at least where they are prepared to agree with each other). Though it is very late to influence the Review Conference, attempts to reach agreement have intensified, moving to a higher level of governmental authority than New York for the final push.

The president, Ambassador Sergio Duarte of Brazil, has called a plenary for tomorrow (Wednesday), ostensibly to consider what to do with the text from the committees. According to the work programme, MC II was to have finished its deliberations today, with one more session each for MC I and MC III tomorrow. But by Tuesday's end Egypt and Iran had objected to the adoption of MC II's bracketed text and had tied up the committee in legalistic knots so that the Chair, Ambassador László Molnár of Hungary, barely knew whether he could send the text forward or would have to ask for extra time. The stand-off must have sent shivers down the spines of the chairs of the other committees, with only one session each to go and many unresolved areas of disagreement in both the committees and especially their subsidiary bodies.

MC II deals with safeguards and its SB bears the same unwieldy title as in 2000: "regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East". In the 12 paragraphs of the most recent SB report available, there are sections about the 1995 Resolution and reporting on steps to fulfil it, a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East, safeguards and the additional protocol, India and Pakistan, welcoming Libya's deproliferation, and the traditional call on Israel to accede to the NPT. On North Korea, a placeholding sentence notes that states participating in the six-party talks will try to get consensus on a sentence.

The main issues of contention are a lengthy paragraph on Iran, which Iran wants to be deleted in its entirety, and a paragraph that calls for the taking of additional measures to induce Israel to accede to the NPT, including convening a standing committee and denial of transfers of technology and cooperation in the nuclear and research fields.

The paragraph on Iran states the current situation, including the IAEA assessment and diplomatic initiatives of the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany). It notes that Iran has signed the Additional Protocol but calls on it to ratify and fully implement it. It also calls on Iran to "respect the Paris Agreement and the relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors, in particular suspension of the enrichment-related and reprocessing activities." Reportedly, the disagreements have not really been about the wording per se, but because Iran objects to there being any paragraph at all that implies criticism or suggests noncompliance with any aspect of the safeguards agreements or treaty. Iran argues that it should not be singled out because it is complying with IAEA inspections and has signed the additional protocol. Square bracketed or not, this paragraph is the major reason for Iran's attempts to block transmittal of the report. We will have to wait to see how (or if) this question will be resolved.

The May 24 draft for MC I, chaired by Ambassador Sudjadnan of Indonesia, contains 8 principal paras that focus mainly on the article I and II obligations. It includes the sentence "The Conference calls upon the NWS to refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements, among themselves, with non-nuclar-weapon states and with states not party to the Treaty." There are also two paragraphs supporting the recommendations of the Report of the UN Secretary General on disarmament and nonproliferation education. There is also a second draft of a paper prepared by the chair of SB I, Tim Caughley of New Zealand, on practical disarmament steps under article VI. These 12 paragraphs seek to build on the decisions from 1995 and 2000, but some have complained they are not strong enough. For its part, the United States has reportedly earmarked many paragraphs for deletion.

A seven para chair's draft on security assurances was also discussed today. While most of the NWS seem able to accept it, the United States is reportedly hostile to some sections.

On Monday the news from MC III, chaired by Ambassador Elisabet Borsiin-Bonnier of Sweden, appeared more positive than the others, with text reportedly substantially agreed on a basic report (though one that had avoided most of the safety and security challenges raised during the Conference and in working papers). In addition, by lowering their sights to finding agreements that clarified the interpretation and expectations of article X on withdrawal from the Treaty and perhaps pointed some ways forward (without making any decisions or commitments on strengthening the treaty's institutional capacity or states parties' powers) it appeared that it might be possible to get agreement on the text from the subsidiary body, chaired by Alfredo Labbé of Chile. By the end of Tuesday, the prospects for agreement on a text from MC III and its subsidiary body seemed to have diminished, but there is one session still to go, so some are keeping their hopes up.

In addition, Egypt has submitted an informal paper (CRP.3) to MC III on universality of the NPT. While some traditional allies think that it does not go far enough, a number of Western parties have praised the paper as a genuine and thoughtful contribution to discussion. Several have also noted that Egypt has contributed substantially and meticulously in all the MCs and SBs, which appeared to have surprised those who accused Egypt of not wanting the Conference to get an agreed outcome. By the end of the day, however, there were questions about why Egypt had joined with Iran in blocking transmission of the report from MC.II and whether they would do the same in MC I and MC III on Wednesday.

Meanwhile, in Washington D.C....

While the Bush administration positions on the CTBT and attempts to walk back from US obligations under the NPT, as reinforced in consensus agreements and commitments undertaken in 1995 and 2000, have proved a major obstacle to attempts by other states parties to have a positive and constructive Review Conference to deal with the gamut of compliance and institutional challenges, the US Senate and House of Representatives have taken a bipartisan initiative calling on NPT states to insist on strict compliance with the NPT. Despite the general thrust of the recommendations below, which do not appear to take much responsibility for the spoiler role assumed by the United States itself in key areas, it is presumed that this resolution is not just directed at others, but intended to include compliance with US commitments, including treaties that have been painstakingly negotiated and entered into.

According to the Arms Control Association, on Tuesday, Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Chuck Hagel (R-NE) introduced a resolution in the US Senate calling on key states to reaffirm their support for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and to agree to additional steps to advance nonproliferation and disarmament goals and commitments. A similar resolution was introduced in the House of Representatives (H. Con. Res. 133) by Reps. Spratt (D-SC), Markey (D-MA), Tauscher (D-CA), Leach (R-IA), Shays (R-CT), and others.

As outlined in Sen. Feinstein's press release,

"The resolution introduced by Senators Feinstein and Hagel calls on parties to the 2005 Review Conference to:

  • Insist on strict compliance with the nonproliferation obligations of the Treaty and to undertake effective enforcement measures against states that are in violation of their treaty obligations;
  • Agree to establish more effective controls on sensitive technologies that can be used to produce materials for nuclear weapons;
  • Support the efforts of the United States and the European Union to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability;
  • Support the Six-Party talks that seek the verifiable disarmament of North Korea's nuclear weapons program;
  • Accelerate programs to safeguard and eliminate nuclear-weapons usable material to the highest standards to prevent access by terrorists or other states;
  • Agree that no state may withdraw from the Treaty and escape responsibility for prior violations of the treaty or retain access to controlled materials and equipment acquired for peaceful purposes; and,
  • Accelerate implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty-related disarmament obligations and commitments that would, in particular, reduce the world's stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade material."

Full text of the resolution is available at: http://www.capwiz.com/fconl/webreturn/?
url=http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.CON.RES.133:

24.5.05

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