The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The NPT Review Conference 2005: Acronym Special Coverage
Day 26: Spineless NPT Conference Papers Over Cracks and Ends
with a Whimper
May 27, 2005
Rebecca Johnson
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Delegates from 153 countries at the 2005 NPT Review Conference
failed to build on past agreements and adopt any kind of decisions
or recommendations for furthering progress in the vital security
issues of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. From start to
finish, this conference did little more than go through the
motions, and was one of the most shameful exhibitions of cynical
time-wasting seen outside the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.
Instead of utilising their four weeks and resources to tackle
the vital challenges and debate practical ideas for implementing
the treaty's commitments more effectively, the government
delegations tangled themselves in procedure, lost a lot of time,
and then, under the auspices of the "dignified, consultative and
patient" Conference President, Ambassador Sergio Duarte of Brazil
(as described by New Zealand), they gave up the pretence. On the
final day they agreed to a procedural document that numbered the
participants and meetings and indicated how they would cover the
financial costs; they made a few more speeches and went home.
The failure of the conference to adopt consensus agreements was
due to politics, especially the entrenched positions and
proliferation-promoting policies of a tiny number of influential
states, including the United States and Iran, as they pursued their
narrowly defined self interests and sought to keep open their
different nuclear options. At the expense of the security interests
of the vast majority, a few others facilitated or coasted behind.
They are no doubt delighted at this lowest common denominator
outcome because it temporarily protected them from international
criticism and action to encourage them to live up to their legal
and political obligations.
Even so, it should still have been possible to use the
conference to give a strong message about the importance of
preventing the use, acquisition and spread of nuclear weapons and
the nuclear materials used to make nuclear weapons. In failing to
address these issues seriously or send any kind of principled
message along those lines, the governments have betrayed the hopes,
aspirations and security interests of their citizens from around
the world, who have made clear again and again that they desire to
live free of the threat of nuclear weapons.
Among the speeches today - or what could be heard of them
through inadequate earphones tuned low with no volume switch, as
tourist groups constantly streamed through and over zealous
security guards hassled NGOs high in the fourth floor gallery -
only a few stood out: Canada, for saying many of the things that -
at the very least - should have been expected from the President;
Sierra Leone for acknowledging the "voice of the people", the
actual and "potential victims of nuclear weapons" and the
contributions from civil society; Malaysia and perhaps South
Africa, though not as strong as in the past; Cuba, the most recent
party to the NPT and impatiently determined in its calls for
nuclear disarmament; Iran, and of course the government of the
United States, for continuing to point the finger at others while
refusing to take responsibility for this proliferation mess
themselves. [If not on the UN website, the speeches are likely to
be found at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org].
Since this administration's officials are quick to accuse
critics of being anti-American, here is the pithy analysis of the
indisputably patriotic American Daryl Kimball of the
Washington-based Arms Control Association: "The arrogant and clumsy
U.S. strategy (which was the brainchild of former Under Secretary
of State John Bolton) has most certainly reinforced the view of the
majority of countries that the United States and the other
nuclear-weapon states do not intend to live up to their NPT-related
nuclear disarmament commitments. This not only scuttled the chance
that this conference might have supported useful U.S. proposals on
strengthening the nonproliferation elements of the treaty, but it
will in the long-run erode the willingness of other states to
fulfil their own treaty obligations, much less take strong action
to condemn the transgressions of North Korea and Iran."
The so-called 'final document' the conference delegates managed
to adopt did little more than list the participants and officials
of the conference and how many meetings they held. As for the
important issues they had all identified before and during the
conference - such as entry into force of the CTBT, nuclear
disarmament, the nuclear fuel cycle and strengthening safeguards
and the institutional powers of states parties - the governments
lacked the political will and backbone even to have an honest
debate about these issues, let alone adopt measures that would
strengthen the world's capacity to deal with them. While for most
of the conference it was clear that no-one had a positive strategy,
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this impotent impasse
was the desired outcome of at least some game plans. The question
why and the implications and consequences will have to wait for my
longer analysis, once I've had the chance to talk to a lot more
people.
Briefly, however, here are some obvious points:
- Nonproliferation is unsustainable without real and significant
progress in nuclear disarmament.
- The nuclear fuel cycle is a much bigger security problem than
recognised when the treaty entered into force in 1970, and will
have to be addressed.
- Good ideas and proposals just remain on paper unless they are
combined with effective strategies and game plans for how to
achieve them - in 1995 and 2000 there were not only good ideas, but
innovative, pragmatic strategies and active presidents willing to
use the rules and procedural tools to their maximum possibilities
in order to achieve useful, regime-building outcomes.
- The group system based on the Western Group and Others (WEOG),
Eastern European leftovers, and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is
outdated, severely dysfunctional and provides a refuge for
scoundrels and naysayers to hide within.
- Issue-based coalitions, groups or alliances should form and
stay together only when they can make a whole that is greater than
the sum of its parts, and if they have coherent strategies as well
as good positions. It's not unusual that political priorities and
personalities change over time; if the whole becomes less positive,
active and effective than the individual members would be on their
own or if they joined in other ad hoc alliances to achieve further
objectives, then it is time to recognise this and move on. A
dysfunctional coalition constrains its members rather than
empowering them.
- It is unwise to trust those who seek preferment, status or a
seat on the security council.
- Though there may be superficial similarities, there is a
telling difference in the style, objectives and effectiveness of
regime-builders and managers. In diplomacy, managers are very
likely to split differences and sacrifice principle to
expediency.
Finally, in view of the failure of the 2005 Review Conference,
the agreements obtained in the review conferences of 1995 and 2000
still stand as the legal and political benchmarks for measuring
progress and promoting compliance until the NPT can be fully
implemented in all its nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation
aspects. Lack of agreement to build substantively on these
commitments and undertakings may be disappointing, but the problems
of the 2005 conference neither invalidate nor undermine the
relevant obligations and undertakings previously agreed to. If
anything, the lack of consensus in 2005 for further disarmament
steps underscores the fact that the principles, measures and steps
adopted by consensus in past review conferences have not yet been
implemented, and more work must be done to ensure that they
are.
The lack of leadership and positive progress at the 2005 Review
Conference merely underscores the need for the rest of us to find
other ways to ensure that our security needs and interests are
taken seriously and fulfilled. During this month in the United
States there has been the interesting news that a growing number of
US mayors and local councils and authorities are choosing to
implement the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol in their
jurisdiction, despite the short-sighted obduracy of the Bush
administration, because the evidence in front of their own eyes
shows that climate change and global warming are a real problem and
that denials and fluffy words won't make the consequences of
climate change disappear.
The same is true of nuclear weapons: a real problem requiring
long-term solutions. The Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki led a
movement to the 2005 Review Conference that needs to be built on
and given the right kind of coherent strategy that will enable us
to get rid of nuclear weapons and threats for ever. The world's
mayors and governors, together with parliamentarians, elected
representatives at all levels, and civil society must not only make
up for the deficiencies of timid or corrupt governments, they must
create a strategic partnership between government and civil
society. Preventing the use, testing, development and spread of
nuclear weapons ranks with climate change as the major security
challenges of our time. We'd better prove ourselves to be up to
it!
Endnote and Thanks: I gather from the responses I have received
to these periodic NPT RevCon analyses, from media representatives,
politicians and NGOs around the world, that they have been helpful
in your work, and I am glad. I would not have been able to come to
New York and do this work at all were it not for the generosity and
continuing confidence of the Ploughshares Fund, which enabled me to
be here, and the Ford Foundation, which supported Acronym in
continuing to research the issues and publish Disarmament Diplomacy
over the past two years. I am immensely grateful to both. As a
result of Acronym's proposal for work in 2005 (including the NPT
and preventing the weaponisation of space) being rejected by
Rowntree's Trust in November, I was not able to use this
opportunity as in the past to give training and experience to the
next generation of analysts that the world so badly needs. Without
the additional resources, I have been covering the 2005 NPT Review
Conference on my own, which would have been impossible without the
collaboration, support and information exchange among a number of
NGOs at the Review Conference. They are too many to list, but I'd
particularly like to thank Felicity Hill of Uppsala and Brooklyn,
Rhianna Tyson and Suzi Snyder of Reaching Critical Will/WILPF, and
William Peden and the Greenpeace team in their smoky corner of the
Vienna Café in the UN's basement. Power to all your elbows,
and let's move past this depressing conference and on to the Real
Work.
27.5.05
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© 2005 The Acronym Institute.
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