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The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NPT PrepCom 2007

DAY 7: Agenda adopted, NPT PrepCom gets to work, May 9, 2007

Rebecca Johnson

When the NPT PrepCom was called to order at 11.15 on Tuesday morning (May 8), the Chair Ambassador Yukiya Amano of Japan, again put his proposed agenda to the meeting and asked for consensus. Ambassador Ali Soltanieh of Iran then launched into a hectoring speech that began like a justification for rejecting the Chair's agenda together with the understanding proposed by South Africa (see below) but suddenly changed into apparent acceptance, as Soltanieh announced that "in a display of goodwill and flexibility" he had "the honour to announce that the Iranian government can accept South Africa's decision as a footnote on the first page of the agenda referring back to an asterisk appearing at the end of item 6 on the agenda."

If this sounds like a diplomatic convolution far removed from the real world nuclear problems that the NPT is supposed to address, it is. But it paved the way for adoption of the agenda of the first PrepCom of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and so comes as an immense relief to the members of governments and civil society that had gathered day after day in Vienna in moods of gathering gloom and despondency.

With adoption of the agenda, the conference finally got underway, and now has three days to cram the wealth of statements and working papers into the remaining time. There is much to discuss.

Drama as Iran makes its "last flexibility"

Tuesday morning was 'showdown' time. Having waited all day Monday for the Iranian delegation to get instructions from Tehran on whether it could accept the agenda when linked with a written understanding referring to compliance with all articles of the treaty, as South Africa had proposed on Friday, delegations gathered anxiously on Tuesday.

Iran kept almost everyone guessing until the last minute. The first 'news' was that the Iranian delegation had been instructed to reject again, but there were clearly further consultations taking place. When the PrepCom Chair, Ambassador Amano, again put the agenda to the meeting and asked if he had consensus, no-one was surprised when Soltanieh took the floor.

In ringing tones, he began " In the name of God, the Compassionate and the Merciful..." One could feel the whole room bracing. The first half of the speech contained a diatribe against the Chair, complaints about consensus, "double standards" and "disinformation to the media". Several minutes in, as many expected Soltanieh to propose again that Amano should amend the draft agenda or table instead the 2002 text, he changed tack. After noting that the representations to the delegation from "many colleagues" and the "concerns and options raised by our colleagues and civil society" had been transmitted to Tehran and taken very seriously, Soltanieh flourished his announcement that Iran would accept the deal - with a small tightening of the link between the 'understanding' and the agenda text.

The Chair seemed momentarily stunned. Because Iran had not accepted the South African package exactly as proposed, he seemed about to interpret this speech as another rejection, and so asked Soltanieh "May I take it that you cannot accept the proposal of South Africa as it stands?" There was (what seemed like) a long silence. Then Soltanieh reitered "I can accept South Africa's proposal as a footnote". To the relief of many, Ambassador Abdul Minty, architect of South Africa's proposal, took the floor to clarify: "Iran can accept this language but would like an asterisk linked directly to the agenda". Minty's explanation was taken to be a strong indication that the PrepCom should accept Iran's face-saving compromise. There followed short statements from Algeria, Cuba, Venezuela, Malaysia, Syria and Indonesia, which congratulated Iran on showing much-needed "flexibility" and called for the agenda to be agreed on this basis. Everyone else stayed silent, neither welcoming nor objecting.

Amano then clarified the position and put the slightly amended package to the Meeting. No-one spoke against. The gavel came down, and the agenda was finally adopted. A ripple of applause circulated through the hall.

After adoption of the agenda, Amano responded to Iran's accusations and complaints against him personally. With quiet dignity he read out a list of the dates and occasions from December 22, 2006 onwards, when he had consulted with the non-aligned group, including Iran, in Geneva, New York and Vienna. Though present, he said, Iran did not on any of these occasions state that it had objections to the draft agenda and indicative timetable or request a one-to-one bilateral consultation with the Chair.

Backstory:

On Monday April 30, the Chair of the PrepCom, Ambassador Yukiya Amano, proposed an agenda with the following description of work (item 6): Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of the 1975, 1985, 2000, and 2005 Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty, and thereby considering approaches and measures to realize its purpose, reaffirming the need for full compliance with the Treaty.

Clumsily worded it may appear to those not versed in diplomatese, but it was crafted to avoid the impasse that had bedevilled the 2005 Review Conference. The 2005 conference had suffered almost 3 weeks of deadlock over the agenda and work programme, because the US started manouvring in 2004 (supported - tacitly at least - by some other nuclear powers) to negate substantive decisions and outcomes of the review conferences of 1995 and 2000, resulting in an agenda that Egypt (supported by a silent majority) had refused to accept. Amano's agenda restored the references to 1995 and 2000, but at US insistence added in references to 2005, other developments and the need for full compliance. Tehran objected, focussing particularly on the reference to compliance, which it saw as targeted against Iran. Iran wanted reference to compliance to specify "with all articles of the Treaty", mainly because Iran is citing compliance with Article IV (on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes) as justifying its uranium enrichment programme, and argues that attempts to constrain its "right" to the full nuclear fuel cycle constitutes a violation of Article IV.

Eventually, late on Friday, South Africa's Ambassador Abdul Minty proposed that the meeting should adopt the Chair's agenda together with the following decision: "The meeting decides that it understands the reference in the agenda to 'reaffirming the need for full compliance with the Treaty' to mean that it will consider compliance with all the provisions of the Treaty".

Summary of Soltanieh's speech, May 8 (from my contemporaneous notes, so not exact)

We knew this was going to be a formal speech when Soltanieh opened with an evocation of the Compassionate and Merciful God. He said Iran shared the PrepCom's "distress" that the delegations had not been able to share their views and could not make statements in the cluster debates, as originally scheduled. "In all frankness... my delegation did not expect such a stalemate at the conference." Arguing that "an artificial distinction between subtance and procedure is being made, so my delegation is accused of wrangling about procedural issues" Soltanieh said "if delegations are so sure the agenda is just procedure, then why are they so concerned about just two words? So let's accept that the agenda is substantive."

After acknowledging that the Chair, Ambassador Amano, had made "tremendous efforts", Soltanieh then launched into a pointed attack on the "inflexibility shown by the Chair", accusing Amano of not consulting properly or paying attention to Iran's objections. Acknowledging that it was "evident the disarmament machinery has been paralysed by the rule of consensus", Soltanieh claimed Iran would be ready to start voting, and then negated this offer by complaining: "but if some believe in the rule of consensus... if consensus is the rule of the game then it is inappropriate to single out my delegation at the meeting [while] others [presumably the US] opted to take a silent position and have concealed themselves behind the Chair..." In particular, Soltanieh appeared to argue, the Chair had protected the opposition to the 2002 agenda [widely understood to be the US and possibly France or Russia] and also, "we've not received a clear answer for who objected to inclusion of a few words". Soltanieh then argued that the formulation of the agenda should not be closed to consultations: "take it or leave it is not a rule of the game". He suggested that the stalemate need not have occurred "if the Chair had given a chance to our proposed amendments instead of sticking rigidly to his own text."

Finally the breakthrough: pointedly noting that the representations to the delegation from "many colleagues" and the "concerns and options raised by our colleagues and civil society" had been transmitted to Tehran and taken very seriously, Soltanieh concluded his statement by offering to accept the South Africa deal, providing the PrepCom agreed to strengthen the link between the 'understanding' and the agenda text.

Speculation

Everyone at the PrepCom, it seems, has their own interpretations of this breakthrough. Most credit South Africa for proposing the fix and Minty's quick-wittedness in responding positively to Iran's concession, even though it embodied a change. Other NAM countries also played their part, conveying to Iran (in some cases at the highest levels) that they were losing patience, had little or no support for its objections to the agenda, and did not want the meeting to be destroyed or the NPT weakened. Some also credit the Chair for holding his nerve and the Western delegations for knowing when to keep quiet. It appears that the decision to offer a conditional acceptance was poised on a knife edge, and could have gone the other way, in which case we would still be waiting for an agenda.

Iran did not inform either the Chair or other NPT states (except, possibly, Cuba, Syria and Venezuela, who have generally acted as its chief supporters). Some think that Iran had calculated that someone would object, allowing it to turn the tables on the Western group (or Chair). So did Iran intend its eleventh hour offer to result in adoption of the agenda, or was it banking on one of the assembled delegates raising an objection - or at least requesting an adjournment to consult? We will probably never know.

First substantive session on Nuclear Disarmament - a selection of excerpts from statements

So the PrepCom got underway, accelerated by the request from the Chair to maximise the available time by condensing presentations to less than five minutes (a great improvement in terms of focus and clarity).

The first session heard interventions from the nuclear weapon states about their weapons reductions and intentions (available at www.reachingcriticalwill.org). Calls for real nuclear disarmament came fast and strong. Almost all the interventions spoke of the importance of the CTBT and of getting negotiations on a fissile materials ban underway in the Conference on Disarmament. Differing levels of appreciation and assessment were given of the efforts by the NWS to comply with their obligations under Article VI; while welcoming nuclear arms reductions accomplished so far, a large number of statements expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of nuclear disarmament, and many raised concerns about the counterproductive steps taken by some NWS to modernise arsenals or find new justifications for retaining or using nuclear weapons. While most presentations alluded to the UK decision to renew the Trident nuclear weapon system only obliquely, as they criticised modernisation and further developments, South Africa explicitly expressed its disappointment with the UK decision. [Note, this does not purport to be a fully representative selection, as not all statements were distributed and I did not hear everything, but it is included to give a snapshot of the issues raised in some of the interventions.]

The New Agenda states, collectively and individually, made some of the strongest nuclear disarmament speeches, but there were effective interventions from all sides of the floor, making up for lost time.

Ambassador Paul Kavanagh (Ireland) said that the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zeland, South Africa and Sweden) was "concerned at the emergence in recent years of new military doctrines emphasising the importance of nuclear weapons not only to defence but also to the offensive capabilities of States. Plans to modernize nuclear forces have reinforced these doctrines. Moreover, certain policies have broadened the scope of potential use of nuclear weapons, for example as a preventive measure or in retaliation against the use of other WMD. We believe that if the nuclear weapon states continue to treat nuclear weapons as a security enhancer, there is real danger that other states will start pondering whether they should do the same." The NAC criticised keeping nuclear weapons on high alert, which "only serves to exacerbate the danger posed bythe existence of these weapons". In addition "States should not develop new nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons with new military capabilities or for new missions, or undertake the replacement or modernisation of their nuclear weapon systems, which runs counter to the agreement reached at the 2000 Review Conference on a diminishing role for nuclear weapons and on the unequivocal undertaking to eliminate these weapons." The NAC statement strongly supported entry into force of the CTBT and called on the CD to negotiate a verifiable fissban. negotiations to beraised issues of universality, security assurances and the need to "diminish the perceived utility of these weapons, and thus their desirability".

For the Non-Aligned Movement, Ambassador Triyono Wibowo (Indonesia) underscored the ICJ conclusion regarding the legal obligation to pursue in good faith and bring nuclear disarmament negotiations to conclusion, and reiterated the call for the NWS to demonstrate their "full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking... to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals... through an accelerated process of negotiations and through the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear weapon free world as agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference." The NAM reiterated its long-held position to have a nuclear disarmament committee in the CD and "negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame" and said that this, "including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should commence without delay". The NAM also wanted substantive work in the CD on preventing an arms race in outer space, and raised concerns that "the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons."

Abdul Minty for South Africa was even more explicit, publicly stating that it was "disappointed to learn about the decision of the UK on [renewing] Trident". Referring to the NPT as "the legal commitment" for the elimination of nuclear weapons, Minty spoke of the "core bargain" struck in the NPT, "that the overwhelming majority of States have entered into legally-binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of the corresponding legally-binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the bases of the corresponding legally-binding commitments by the nuclear weapon States to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament." Noting that "as long as some countries have nuclear weapons, there will be others who will also aspire to possess them", he argued that South Africa abandoned the nuclear weapons option because "it is obvious that the only absolute guarantee against the use of such weapons is their complete elimination and the assurance that they will never be produced again." South Africa referred to concerns that after the end of the cold war, "several NWS now speak about their actual use and in pursuit of this objective new nuclear weapons are being planned and old ones are being modernised."

Austria also underscored the importance of the CTBT and appealed to the "Annex II" states who need to ratify (and in three cases sign) the CTBT before it can enter into force "to finally take this decisive step forward". It also condemned recent developments from the nuclear weapon states, saying: "All plans to modernise, to undertake research to produce a 'new generation' of nuclear weapons are diametrically in opposition to Article 6 of the NPT and the commitments undertaken in 2000."

By contrast, Australia welcomed any scraps thrown by the weapon states, including Britain's recent decision not to eliminate its nuclear arsenal of 200 nuclear warheads (equivalent to more than 1,600 Hiroshima bombs), but instead to reduce it by just 40 warheads over the next 14 years and then to upgrade the remaining 160 warheads (1,280 Hiroshimas) and acquire a fleet of further nuclear submarines and US Trident missiles. Australia supports the CTBT and fissban, but holds that "the burden of responsibility for nuclear disarmament is not the nuclear weapon states' alone".

The EU gave strong priority to the CTBT, but in a consensus statement from a Union that comprises two nuclear weapon states, 19 NATO members and 2 members of the NAC, little else of real significance could be said on nuclear disarmament. As part of its WMD Strategy, "the EU will promote a stable international and regional environment and address the root causes of instability".

Like Japan, New Zealand strongly endorsed disarmament education and the CTBT. New Zealand specifically called for "the full implementation of Article VI commitments" as well as "greater transparency and confidence-building with respect to both the current status of nuclear arsenals and on disarmament efforts towards their destruction". Referring to "scientific engineering advances in support of nuclear disarmament efforts", Ambassador Don McKay commended the "useful technical work" conducted by the UK into verification for nuclear disarmament [between 2000 and 2005] and asked "whether there are any plans to integrate this work into the current review cycle".

Costa Rica made a strong statement in favour of a nuclear weapon convention, commending the model Convention developed by civil society a decade ago, which Costa Rica has tabled as an NPT working paper.

Castigating those who appear to think that the elimination of nuclear weapons is "simply a Utopian dream", Indonesia called nuclear disarmament "possible, achievable and realistic" and called on the NWS to "exercise leadership" in "an intensive coordinated work... required to turn the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons into a joint effort".

For Iran, Hamid Baidi-Nejad endorsed the NAM statement and called for nuclear disarmament by the NWS and emphasised the right of NNWS to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes "without discrimination or hindrance". He called the 2005 review conference "a sad, sad setback" and said "the 13 steps are still the benchmarks... we should not let these hopes fade again." Since 2000, "developments in nuclear disarmament have not been promising. The continued development and deployment of thousands of nuclear warheads are still threatening international peace and security. .. reductions in SORT are far below international expectations and the Moscow Treaty does not contain a verification mechanism" or "take into account the principles of nuclear transparency, diminishing the role of nuclear weapons and irreversibility, as committed to in 2000." Iran's statement argued against vertical proliferation and nuclear sharing between weapon states and their (non-nuclear weapon) allies, and said that "the US Nuclear Posture Review and UK's Trident project provide for new nuclear doctrines, and it is an urgent task to alleviate the concerns of the NNWS by considering a prohibition of nuclear weapons and their delivery system". Iran supported a timebound framework for nuclear disarmament and a nuclear weapons convention and the convening of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament in the CD.

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