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The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NPT PrepCom 2007

DAY 8: Practical suggestions from the disarmament debate

Rebecca Johnson

In the 'special time' allocated for consideration of practical nuclear disarmament steps and security assurances, the NPT PrepCom heard not only prepared statements but some "interactive debate" in which some delegations responded to each other's arguments or recommendations. Some even focussed their interventions on looking at short and medium-term steps that could be taken or recommended to the 2010 PrepCom. This summary is not exhaustive, but intended to indicate some of the priority disarmament themes to emerge from the debates and working papers. Though these were important issues for some states, they did not gain agreement from all. There was a high level of convergence on some issues, such as the importance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and less agreement on some of the others.

Increasing pressure for entry into force of the CTBT

Though prevented from formally addressing the NPT PrepCom by a past Bush administration objection, the CTBT Organisation (CTBTO) was very visible around the PrepCom. In the aftermath of the October 9, 2006 North Korean nuclear test, the CTBTO's comprehensive materials and demonstrations of its verification capabilities and institutional reach were particularly pertinent. They strengthened the arguments by a majority of the states about the importance of CTBT entry into force for national, regional and international security, and as an indispensable part of reinforcing the credibility and effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime.

There was very widespread support for redoubling efforts to bring the 10 remaining states necessary to enable the CTBT to enter into force. These ten are:
2 nuclear weapon states party to the NPT that have signed but not ratified (the United States and China);
3 countries which have not even signed, so need to be engaged to sign and ratify (India, North Korea and Pakistan);
1 (Israel), which has remained outside the NPT but signed the CTBT
4 non-nuclear-weapon NPT parties that have signed but not yet ratified the CTBT: Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia and Iran.

It was noted that new opportunities are coming to the fore to exert greater pressure on these 10 'hold-outs', that the next CTBT Article XIV conference will be in Vienna in September 2007, and that many states want efforts on entry into force to be accelerated through national, collective and multilateral action.

Fissban/Fissile Materials Treaty negotiations

Though there remain deep differences of view about whether verification is possible, essential or, indeed, dispensable with regard to the fissban (FMCT), all sides of the PrepCom called for negotiations on some form of fissile material treaty to get started in the CD.

Support for the P6 initiative for adopting a CD work programme

In relation to wanting fissban negotiations to get underway, many statements referred to efforts to break the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament. With the non-aligned and various other states also emphasising the importance of multilateral work on nuclear disarmament, prevention of an arms race in outer space and progress towards legally binding and non-discriminatory security assurances, many delegations publicly backed the 'P6' initiative to get work going in the Conference on Disarmament. The P6 initiative is shorthand for the work programme proposed by the six presidents of the CD in 2007, the ambassadors of South Africa, Sri Lanka, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Syria (known as the P6). The proposal (reproduced verbatim in Disarmament Diplomacy 84) would appoint four ambassadors as "Coordinators to preside over" negotiations on a fissile materials (for weapons) production ban (fissban) and "substantive discussions" on nuclear disarmament, prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), and negative security assurances (NSA) respectively. Some NPT delegations wanted the PrepCom to send a strong message to CD delegations to encourage them to adopt this work programme when the CD reconvenes in Geneva next week.

Security assurances

Security assurances from the nuclear weapon states (guarantees not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states) remain an issue of high priority for very many states. The non-aligned states in particular continue to lobby for legally binding security assurances to be an NPT (and CD) priority, and called for negotiations on a legally binding treaty or instrument that would guarantee the security of non-nuclear weapon states from being threatened or attacked by the nuclear weapon states. In light of concerns about changes in the nuclear policies and doctrines of some of the nuclear weapon states, and that these could increase insecurity and lower the threshold for nuclear weapon use, a number of Western countries also joined calls for security assurances to be taken more seriously, though generally stopping short of prioritising negotiations on a treaty.

Four of the NWS reiterated their adherence to UNSC Resolution 984 (1995), which contain conditional security assurances. (While NAM countries clearly regard these assurances as inadequate, a number of Western countries refer to these security assurances as "legally binding".) China went further, offering unconditional assurances to non-nuclear weapon states and calling for a treaty on the no first use of nuclear weapons. A few referred to the need for new approaches to positive as well as negative security assurances.

Follow-on to START

While many delegations welcomed that the US and Russia were continuing to reduce their strategic nuclear weapons under the START process and Moscow (SORT) Treaty bilateral, some put on the table the need for follow on steps, especially in light of the ending of START in 2009 (and SORT in 2012).

Non-strategic nuclear weapons

Concerns about tactical nuclear weapons have come from several quarters. Some have raised deep worries about the thousands of Russian tactical weapons still in deployment, noting that they increase vulnerability, insecurity and instability. Others have pointed at the 480 US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and raised concerns about the policy and practice of NATO's nuclear sharing. (See the article on this in Disarmament Diplomacy 84). Germany spoke for many when it said that at the very least the NPT states should be given an accountable report from the US and Russia on their implementation of the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives on non-strategic nuclear weapons, and urged consideration of further reductions.

Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and doctrines

There are clearly graver concerns about a "renaissance" of nuclear weapons (as one senior European diplomat put it), in which new missions and doctrines for use were being developed even as actual numbers were being reduced. Therefore more reference than previously has been made to the commitment in the 2000 Outcome to a "diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination". States put forward different kinds of recommendations, including calls for nuclear weapons to be de-alerted and binding commitments not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons first (which applies to conflicts between nuclear weapon possessors but also incorporates not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states).

Nuclear Weapons Convention

With the NGOs raising the feasibility and achievability of a Nuclear Weapon Convention (NWC) and providing blueprints and discussions, notably with launch of ICAN (the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons), this year saw Costa Rica and Malaysia jointly put down an updated text of a 'model Nuclear Weapons Convention' as a working paper of the NPT. Though more countries have begun to speak about the need for a nuclear weapon convention, for the time being the NAM are still more inclined to reiterate their long-held rhetoric about a timebound framework for nuclear disarmament, and the Western states are more likely to speak of specific steps or a step-by-step process.

Nuclear disarmament not dependent on total disarmament

France again sought to overturn (or reinterpret) the important decision of NPT parties in 2000 to explicitly delink nuclear disarmament from the broader objective of general and complete disarmament (GCD) but was soundly taken to task by several states from different regions, including New Zealand, South Africa and Brazil, who pointed out that work needed to be accelerated on both objectives, but that nuclear disarmament could not be made conditional on GCD (and, indeed, though both needed to be worked on in tandem, logically GCD could only be achieved after nuclear disarmament had been accomplished.

Strengthening and accountability in the review process

Brazil kicked off a discussion about increasing accountability and facilitating the evaluation of progress in nuclear disarmament by proposing that the Secretariat, "based on the information available" - which could comprise both the reports and information provided by the nuclear weapon states, and by civil society analysts - and "put together a comparative table of the measures undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States to comply with obligations under article VI. This would provide States Parties with the means for a better evaluation of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. Such a table, or comparative chart, could then be used at the NPT Review Conference in 2010." This seemed to catch the interest of many states, some of whom endorsed the idea in their own interventions.

Not unsurprisingly, in view of the 7-day deadlock over the agenda that nearly wrecked the PrepCom, there were also discussions of other ways to address the institutional deficits in the NPT, including development of a Bureau, a standing Secretariat, and annual decision-making meetings instead of 'PrepComs' that were limited to preparing for a review conference some years in the future. In addition, more in the corridors than in formal interventions, there has been some discussion of whether states parties could call on Rule 28 of the rules of procedure, which provides for the possibility of voting if consensus is unachievable. To begin with, it came as a surprise to some delegations that the NPT does not have a consensus rule like the Conference on Disarmament. But as it looked increasingly as if Iran would succeed in vetoing the agenda and thus the work of the PrepCom as a whole, some began to make a case for exercising the voting mechanism, at least to adopt procedural decisions deemed necessary for work to proceed and supported by a large majority.

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