The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NPT PrepCom 2007

Day 9: regional issues and nuclear energy - potted summaries

[Grateful thanks to Merav Datan and William Peden of Greenpeace for sharing their notes of the debate on the Middle East and to Felicity Hill of ICAN likewise for generously sharing her notes on the nuclear energy debate.]

Rebecca Johnson

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Regional Issues

In a very concentrated session that maximised the 3 hours allocated to it, NPT parties discussed regional issues, including the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. While the majority of states focussed most on the Middle East, with many concerns raised about Israel's nuclear weapons and Iran's nuclear programme and possible nuclear ambition, some - notably the United States, Japan and South Korea - also addressed the problems arising from North Korea's nuclear programme and nuclear test, and emphasised the importance of full implementation of the North Korea Denuclearization Agreement and that country's return to full compliance with the NPT.

First Indonesia on behalf of the NAM and then Oman on behalf of the League of Arab States opened the debate on the Middle East. The NAM echoed the call of almost all who spoke that they noted "with regret that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, extension of full-scope safeguards to all its nuclear facilities or establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East." Almost all (except the US) called, in one-way or another, for Israel's immediate accession without further delay to the NPT [as a non-nuclear weapon State] and to place all of its facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The NAM statement proposed the following steps, detailed in the working paper they have circulated:

1. The allocation of specific time at Preparatory Committee meetings of the 2010 Review Conference to review the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

2. The establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2010 Review Conference to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

3. The establishment of a Standing Committee composed of members of the Bureau of the 2010 Review Conference to follow up inter-sessionally on the implementation of the recommendations concerning the Middle East, in particular Israel's prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards and report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.

These and more were echoed by Oman, which emphasised that unversality of the treaty was "an important condition to achieving the NPT's effectiveness and credibility". The League of Arab States is particularly concerned at this matter because the Israeli military nuclear programme represents a threat to security in the Middle East and heightens tension in the region." After detailing efforts by Arab states to promote implementation of the 1995 Resolution, Oman concluded with 8 "practical steps to start real actions towards achieving the Resolution"; including adopting effective mechanisms to implement the Resolution, a subsidiary body within Main Committee II on this; a standing committee of members of the Bureau of the 2010 Review Conference "to follow up intersessionally the implementation of the recommendations concerning the Middle East...." convening of an international conference on establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East; a clear commitment from all the nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons or devices etc to Israel or to assist or contribute to Israel's nuclear programme; monitoring, reporting and follow-up of commitments on the issue; and circulation of these reports by the UN Secretariat.

There then followed the United States; China; Brazil; South Africa; Syria; Republic of Korea; Australia; Norway; Cuba; Japan; Russia; New Zealand; Canada; Indonesia; Algeria; Malaysia; Germany on behalf of the EU; Egypt; Jordan; UK; Mexico; Morocco; United Arab Emirates; Bahrain; Libya; Iraq; Chile; Philippines and Italy. Various individual Arab statements supported and reinforced these League recommendations.

Some pointed to "double standards" being applied in the region, i.e. punishing Iran whilst turning a blind eye or assisting Israel with its "illegal" nuclear programme. Several called for all NPT member States to cease all cooperation with Israel in the nuclear field until it fully complies with the 1995 resolution. Some also referred to Israeli Prime Minister Olmert's interview in December 2006, which they interpreted it as an admission that Israel has nuclear weapons.

Unsurprisingly, the United States placed more emphasis on Iran, reiterating its view of Iran's violations of its safeguards agreements. (US statements have generally not been distributed but are supposed to be on the US State Department website). However, the US said that it supports the objective of a "verifiable Middle East verifiably free of weapons of mass destruction" in the context of a stable, comprehensive regional peace. The US also encouraged all non-Parties to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states as soon as possible, and said it was "seeking to establish an environment of mutual respect and trust, by encouraging the three parties which have not joined the NPT to exercise nuclear restraint, and by insisting that NPT Parties comply with their NPT obligations."

The EU emphasised the need for political solutions and generally called on all states in the region to accede to any of the various WMD treaties that they had not yet done - i.e the CWC, BTWC as well as Israel [not specified] to the NPT: "The best solution to the problem of WMD proliferation is that countries should no longer feel they need them... the more secure countries feel, the more likely they are to abandon programmes: disarmament measures can lead to a virtuous circle just as weapons programmes can lead to an arms race."

Article IV - Nuclear Energy

The vast majority of statements extolled the virtues of Article IV and nuclear energy - provided it was used solely for peaceful purposes. Many, however, focussed on the necessity to ensure that peaceful nuclear programmes would not be turned into military nuclear programmes, with much discussion of multinational approaches to ensure the supply of low enriched uranium for nuclear fuel and to prevent (or restrict) new developments in uranium enrichment or plutonium separation.

There were, however, a few dissenters. Austria, whose Foreign Minister, Ursula Plassnick, had opened the Conference with a critical analysis of the problems of nuclear power, and Norway raised concerns about nuclear safety, and New Zealand gave a strong statement expressing its view that "nuclear power is not compatible with the concept of sustainable development, given the long term costs, both financial and ecological, of nuclear waste and the risk of nuclear proliferation". New Zealand also reminded states about liability with regard to nuclear programmes: "Having an effective liability regime in place to insure against harm to human health and the environment, as well as possible economic loss due to an accident or incident during the maritime transport of radioactive materials, is a key priority for New Zealand. This has particular significance to our region given the fragility of communities in the South Pacific that are heavily dependent on the environment for their economic livelihoods."

The NGOs had made criticisms of the US-India nuclear deal a major focus of their activities in Vienna, and concerns were taken up by several states. While some, such as Australia, welcomed the US-India deal because it "...expanded application of IAEA safeguards in India..." ; others were critical. Norway, for example, stated: "We recognise India's energy needs. We note recent efforts to bilateral co-operative arrangements. From our perspective it is important that such arrangements will not undermine our the NPT and global non-proliferation efforts, including the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards."

The United States responded, saying that the US-India deal would "strengthen the global non-proliferation regime… [and will help] constitute a dramatic change in moving India into closer conformity with international non-proliferation standards and practices…" The US insisted that its bilateral relations with both Pakistan and India "... continue in every respect to be consistent with our NPT obligations ..."

Article X

Most regarded that suspending the right to withdraw contained in Article X was not feasible or desirable, but a large number of interventions argued that the cost of withdrawal should be raised, so as to making leaving the NPT less attractive and deter states from withdrawing. Some NAM states, however, raised concerns that the right to withdraw was a sovereign right, in keeping with the UN charter and that if it were made subject to punitive measures or constraints, this would introduce another discrimination in the treaty against states parties. Especially for countries in regions that have states with or pursuing nuclear weapons outside the NPT, the right to withdraw must be preserved so as not to place NPT parties at a disadvantage vis-a-vis non parties or violators.

The treaty's withdrawal provision should be exercised only as a very solemn and last resort action. If any state withdraws then any nuclear technology or facilities that it has acquired under article IV for peaceful purposes must remain for peaceful purposes. Such nuclear materials or facilities in a withdrawing state should therefore either be closed down and certified as dismantled by the IAEA or they should remain subject to safeguards.

These are rushed summaries, because the conference is now awaiting the Chairs summary, due to be distributed shortly.

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© 2007 The Acronym Institute.