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The Nuclear Non-Proliferation TreatyNPT PrepCom 20082008 NPT PrepCom gets going smoothlyReport of Day 1: April 28, 2008Rebecca Johnson Back to the main page on the NPT The second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting for the 2010 Review Conference of the states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) opened smoothly in Geneva on April 28. The Chair of this 2008 PrepCom, Ambassador Volodymyr Yelchenko of Ukraine, was able to open on the basis of the agenda adopted so painfully and after difficult delays by the 2007 PrepCom. He emphasized his desire to devote maximum time to substantive debates, and introduced an indicative timetable for the two-week meeting which would make this possible:
The UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Sergio Duarte (who, as Brazil's ambassador, was President of the ill-fated 2005 NPT Review Conference), opened with a brief but comprehensive overview of the current state of play in the nonproliferation regime. He underlined that the purpose of this second session of the PrepCom "is to lay a solid foundation for the vital third PrepCom session... to establish some common ground on substantive issues and to resolve key procedural and administrative issues, including agreement on an agenda, before the opening of the 2010 Review Conference. He also made particular - and unusually public - mention of a just-averted crisis in funding due to late payment by some states parties, saying that "without financing, there is no review process, and this would only be a step toward having no treaty". He concluded with a reference to Voltaire, a French philosophy who lived for many years in and near Geneva, and exhorted governments and civil society to cultivate the NPT garden - "Its future is very much in your hands". The General Debate opened with the Republic of Korea, and then heard from (in order of delivery) Russia, Slovenia on behalf of the European Union (EU), Canada, China, Australia, New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), Chile and Indonesia on behalf of the Group of Non-aligned states parties to the NPT (NAM), which comprises over 100 non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Iran, which will give its formal statement on Tuesday April 29, objected to criticisms made in several of the statements and insisted on a right to reply. Syria kicked off the afternoon's speeches, to be followed by Egypt, Turkey, France, Algeria, Congo, Brazil, United States, Japan, IAEA, and Cuba, with rights of reply requested by Slovenia (EU) and Syria. The Chair circulated 3 organizational draft decisions for consideration by the meeting and, if possible, to be taken later. One decision would nominate the provisional Secretary-General of the 2010 review conference, to allow work to be effectively coordinated in advance (though the appointment would be formally confirmed by the conference itself). In view of the financial crisis mentioned by Duarte, the other two decisions concerned the payment of outstanding dues and a financial report to provide transparency and accountability with regard to this. Below is just a brief taster of issues raised in the first day. Apologies to those delegations not mentioned, as not all statements were available, some repeated points made by others and more detail will be provided once the cluster debates get going. GENERAL DEBATENuclear disarmament All the nuclear weapon states (NWS) were due to make opening statements on the first day, but as some were very long, the UK statement got bumped to Tuesday, along with more from NNWS. Many statements underscored support for the CTBT, with the EU referring to "a new momentum" towards that important treaty's entry into force. Though there were exhortations to negotiate a fissile materials cut-off (FMCT) or ban - on the negotiating agenda since 1995 but stymied as part of over a decade of paralysis in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) - these appeared less enthusiastic (or perhaps more despairing) than the kind of strong endorsement accorded to the CTBT. Indeed the fissban mentions tended to be placed more in the context of getting the CD working than for its intrinsic merits for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. Opposition to new or modernized weapons or missions While almost all the statements welcomed further reductions in nuclear arsenals, it was notable that several also raised specific concerns about vertical proliferation, most notably modernisation of nuclear arsenals and continued reliance on nuclear deterrence. Ambassador Don Mackay of New Zealand said the seven-member NAC (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden) "remains seriously concerned that intentions to modernise other nuclear forces seem to persist" and underscored that "states should not develop new nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons with new military capabilities or for new missions, nor replace nor modernise their nuclear weapon systems, as any such action would contradict the spirit of the disarmament and nonproliferation obligations of the treaty." Apparently with regard to recent statements from the UK and France, the NAC added, "some nuclear weapon states have recently continued to advocate the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, thereby reinforcing the perception that nuclear weapons will continue to remain a strategic component of national security. The consistent attempt to treat nuclear weapons as a unique security enhancer perpetuates the mistaken perception that nuclear weapons are an essential component of a modern military force, and provides greater prominence and status to these weapons at a time when the international community repeatedly discourages their presence and calls for their total elimination." New Zealand said the NAC would be building on the seven areas requiring "urgent attention": universality; nuclear doctrines; reductions in nuclear forces; security assurances; nuclear weapon free zones; negotiation of a treaty on fissile material; and a prohibition on the testing of nuclear weapons [entry into force of the CTBT]. The 100-plus members of the NAM likewise stated: "It is most unfortunate that the NWS and those remaining outside the NPT continue to develop and modernize their nuclear arsenals, imperilling regional and international peace and security, in particular in the Middle East.... The recent developments in this regard illustrate a trend of vertical proliferation and non-compliance by NWS towards their commitments under Article VI of the NPT. In addition to the adoption of destabilizing new nuclear postures and the modernization and development of new types of nuclear weapons, we received with concern a recent announcement made by a NWS [France] on the addition of a new nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine to its nuclear arsenals. This is indeed a great setback. We must call for an end to this regression [by] rejecting nuclear deterrence and placing a ban on all forms of nuclear weapon testing with view to their total elimination." The NAM then reiterated their long-held position that "the Review Conference should call for developing a specific timeframe for the implementation of Article VI and a mechanism to verify the compliance of NWS and their obligations." From 4 nuclear weapon states Russia devoted the first part of its statement to nuclear energy issues before discussing its nuclear weapons reductions and emerging efforts with the United States to ensure continuing strategic reductions to follow on from START and SORT that would be "predictable, transparent, irreversible and accountable". Russia referred positively to the Sochi declaration following debates between Presidents Putin and Bush, but castigated "hasty deployment" of ballistic missile defences (BMD), and noted that offensive and defensive armaments are "intrinsically intertwined". It gave strong support to the CTBT and reaffirmed support for the FMCT. On security assurances, Russia appeared to give with one hand, advocating "a global agreement", but then took it away again by saying that such an agreement on excluding the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would have to "take into account cases stipulated in defence doctrines" of the NWS. In Russia's view, the "complete elimination of nuclear arms can only be achieved through a gradual, phased movement towards the ultimate objective on the basis of equality and a comprehensive approach, with the participation of all nuclear weapon states, in conditions of sustained strategic stability and wit full respect for the principle of equal security for all states." The statement, delivered by Ambassador Anatoly Antonov, underlined that Russia did not question the "inalienable right" to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but supported cooperation such as its own "International Uranium Enrichment Centre" at Angarsk, to ensure the supply of nuclear fuel that could not be diverted for weapons. It also emphasised the need to "counter the nuclear terrorist threat in an efficient and timely manner" and endorsed various conventions on terrorism and physical protection of materials measures as well as UNSCR 1540. Russia wanted to find "ways to bring the states that are not legally bound by the NPT under the treaty regime, including through improving national systems of accounting, verification and physical protection of nuclear materials, as well as export controls." China reiterated its view that the larger nuclear weapon states have a "special responsibility" to reduce arsenals and called for "a holistic approach to address both the symptoms and the root causes" of proliferation. Emphasizing dialogue and negotiation, Ambassador Cheng Jingye reiterated China's long-held policy of "no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances" and called on all the NWS to "undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states". Saying that the 2000 "13 Practical Steps" were "still relevant today", China advocated that "we should reaffirm those steps that are still valid and put forward new proposals reflecting the consensus of all sides". Though it has failed to ratify the CTBT more than 10 years after signing that treaty, China continues to say that it "actively supports early entry into force" of the CTBT. France gave a long disquisition on many aspects of the NPT, with heavy emphasis on "two grave proliferation crises in Iran and North Korea" and on giving support for nuclear energy as long as it is clearly for civilian purposes. Ambassador Jean-François Dobelle reiterated many of the arguments and pledges made by President Nicolas Sarkozy in Cherbourg, March 21, including reducing the airborne nuclear weapons by one-third, putting France's combined nuclear forces below a ceiling of 300, and underlining that France has no additional warheads tucked away apart from those declared to be "in the operational stockpile". Inviting international experts to witness the dismantlement of France's former production facilities for military fissile materials, Dobelle reiterated the eight-point plan put forward by President Sarkozy, including among the familiar endorsements of the CTBT, FMCT, Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation (HCoC), the innovative proposal for dismantlement of all the nuclear test sites. In a subtle reminder of its position relating nuclear disarmament to general and complete disarmament, the statement spoke of "parallel mobilisation on all other areas of disarmament". The United States rejected any claims that the NWS have "backtracked" on their NPT commitments to disarmament and referred to US "exemplary progress", claiming that the numbers speak for themselves. In a combative statement that focussed on both compliance (by others) and its own record on disarmament, Dr Christopher Ford pointed out that the US has dismantled 3 out of every 4 nuclear weapons and brought its total arsenal to the levels of the 1950s, reduced its tactical nuclear weapons by 90 percent, reduced materials and building a new plant to convert weapons materials into reactor fuel and so on. With regard to FMCT, the US hoped CD would find consensus around CD/1840 to start work on negotiating this. Arguing that the US "story of disarmament progress is not just about numbers", Ford referred to the new triad in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, which reduced reliance on nuclear weapons by improving other means to accomplish strategic deterrence. He commended to the PrepCom the "ambitious work plan" the US outlined in 2007 for 2010, and stressed that the US remains firmly committed to the disarmament goals and preamble of NPT and is creating the "conceptual and infrastructural foundations for meeting the shared goal of a future world that is not merely free of nuclear weapons, but than can remain so because would-be proliferators are unlikely to win significant strategic benefits by 'breaking out' of a disarmament regime". Concerns about Iran and North Korea Many of the statements, especially from Western countries and groupings, raised concerns about Iran's nuclear programme. The US and EU, for example, referenced the recent adoption on the UN Security Council's third resolution on Iran (UNSCR 1803), which the EU referred to as a "sanctions resolution". The EU deplored "Iran's continued failure to comply with the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors' requirements", while noting progress on the IAEA-Iran work plan. The EU is "committed to an early negotiated solution" with a dual track approach - implementation of the SC resolutions and recognition of "Iran's right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its NPT obligations". China referred to a meeting of the EU3+3 in Shanghai two weeks ago, which had "an in-depth exchange of views on a package proposal for resuming negotiations", and called for "creative approaches... flexibility and ... diplomatic efforts" to reach a long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Before the morning session could break for lunch, Iran requested a "right to reply". Pointing out that the EU contained two NWS and a number of NATO members that relied on the US nuclear umbrella, Iran questioned EU sincerity and regretted that the EU had addressed its peaceful nuclear energy programme in what it called "a lengthy and exaggerated manner while saying not a word about the actual major problem in the Middle East", which Iran said was Israel's nuclear arsenal. Iran then underscored that it was determined to benefit from its inalienable rights under the NPT. Slovenia later exercised its right to reply on behalf of the EU in order to underline the EU's position. Though North Korea's nuclear programme, and especially its conducting of a nuclear test in October 2006 were described by many as (in Japan's words) a "grave challenge", by and large the statements emphasised the positive progress towards denuclearising the DPRK's nuclear weapon programme. The US referred to "important initial steps toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula". China went further, arguing that the "process of denuclearization of the Peninsula has produced substantive results. Progress has been made in disablement of relevant nuclear facilities, aid to DPRK and improvement between relevant countries." The EU called on DPRK to comply fully with UNSC resolutions 1695 and 1718, and underlined the important of the "full disablement and dismantlement" of North Korea's nuclear weapons programme in a "complete, verifiable and irreversible manner". South Korea referred to North Korea's "misuse of Article X (on withdrawal)", calling it "high time to consider an effective and collective response mechanism to withdrawal from the NPT". Similarly Japan gave advance notice of its working paper on NPT withdrawal, hoping that agreements would be developed for 2010. Questions re nuclear collaboration between North Korea and Syria A few countries publicly raised their worries about recent reports of DPRK-Syrian collaboration relating to nuclear weapon collaboration in violation of the NPT. Canada set the ball rolling and called on these two countries to clarify what occurred as soon as possible. The US baldly said, "one can only be ashamed... that North Korea collaborated with a state party to the NPT... to construct a nuclear reactor in that country, a reactor not intended for peaceful purposes and which was developed covertly and in violation of the very procedures designed to reassure the world of the peaceful intent of nuclear activities." At the end of the day, Syria exercised its right of reply, saying it regretted Canada's "misleading allegations of nuclear activities" in Syria, which it called a "falsification of the facts... totally undocumented and untrue". Noting that these allegations had also been taken up by France and Japan, Syria blamed the US administration and said it believed that the purpose of such allegations was to influence the Six Party negotiations on North Korea. It called on the US to "be wise enough to stop creating further crises in the Middle East, which is already suffering a lot due to the confusion and mistakes of US policy", and suggested that if Canada really wanted to contribute to peace it would call on Israel to join the NPT and dismantle its nuclear weapons and facilities. Safeguards and support for IAEA Many statements expressed support for the IAEA and emphasised the importance of all NPT states concluding both their comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and the Additional Protocol. Some, such as the EU, called for universal implementation of CSA and the Additional Protocol, Russia referred to making the Additional Protocol a "universally accepted standard" to verify NPT compliance while others, including South Korea, called for universalisation. These could just be linguistic differences, but may also signal nuanced but significant differences of perspective. There seems to be a growing view that, in the words of South Korea, the Additional Protocol should be declared "the standard of IAEA safeguards and a condition of nuclear supply". The EU similarly called for "the universal adoption and implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols" and underscored that the Additional Protocol is an "essential means of verifying" fulfilment of states' obligations under article III. The IAEA responded with a comprehensive statement explaining the current status and take-up of the CSA and Additional Protocol and the Agency's work with various countries, most notably DPRK and Iran. Nuclear Energy By comparison with a few years ago, when concerns about nuclear safety and security were paramount, a growing number of statements at this PrepCom have underlined what they see as the benefits of nuclear energy with references to the nuclear renaissance and many more pledges of support for the NPT's Article IV "inalienable right". That said, many also noted that this right was not absolute but had to be in conformity with articles I, II and III. Concerns about US-India nuclear deal There were some references to concerns about the implications of the US-India nuclear deal. These included the NAM statement, which (without naming names) noted, "The recent developments in particular the nuclear cooperation agreement signed by a NWS with a non-party to the NPT is a matter of great concern..." This was rather significant and a notably strong expression of opposition from NAM members in the NPT despite the fact that India still plays a prominent role in the NAM as a whole. It appears that the US-India deal and India's nuclear ambitions clash with traditional NAM concerns about disarmament, Israel, universalisation of the treaty and the need to prevent the legitimation of nuclear programmes outside the NPT. Military spending Several spoke of the need to address disarmament in context, which for some at least included curbing military spending. Disarmament Education Japan spearheaded support for disarmament education, which the NAC and others also gave positive reference to. Most if not all statements can be obtained from the website of Reaching Critical Will at www.reachingcriticalwill.org. See also the NPT webcast being produced by a group of dedicated young people attending the conference at npt-webcast.info. © 2008 The Acronym Institute. |