The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NPT PrepCom 2008

2008 NPT PrepCom: Debates over, plus safeguards summary

May 7, 2008

Rebecca Johnson

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By midday today (May 7), the NPT PrepCom in Geneva had finished hearing statements and attempting to have interactive debate on nuclear energy (cluster 3) and “other provisions of the Treaty”, a session which most states used for discussing Article X on withdrawal from the treaty. The Chair has announced that he will issue his draft “factual summary” on Thursday, with a view to adopting this (if possible) and the PrepCom report on Friday.

A number of states, including Australia, Canada, Japan, Slovenia on behalf of the European Union, Indonesia, the United States, Cuba and Iran spoke in the debate on withdrawal (Article X). Since I have not yet managed to get hold of all the statements, I will not be able to do a fuller summary and analysis of this debate until later.

Briefly, however: No-one was calling for the treaty to be amended but two basic approaches emerged over what to do. Broadly, these can be characterised as:

• “Article X aint broke so doesn’t need fixing – withdrawal from a treaty is a sovereign right” – the position taken by Indonesia, Cuba, Iran and a couple others I didn’t catch
• “Withdrawal from a treaty remains a sovereign right, but cannot be legitimately exercised if a state is in violation or being investigated for possible noncompliance, unless and until it satisfies the IAEA and international community that it is in full compliance prior to withdrawal” - the position of the EU, US, Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea...

Within each perspective, there are then differences of view about how to respond. The EU called for the legal requirements and implications of withdrawal to be “clarified” but the 27 countries couldn’t agree on what approach this should take. Indonesia argued that an emergency meeting of NPT states parties should be convened. Several others, including South Korea, agreed, but go further than Indonesia in suggesting the kinds of responses and measures the NPT parties might decide in order to persuade a country not to withdraw or ensure that a withdrawing country cannot benefit from nuclear equipment and materials aquired for peaceful purposes under Article IV. Japan also identified some specific ways in which the international community might seek return of sensitive technologies, materials and facilities, though – as Indonesia pointed out – who decides and how would this be effected. Lacking the text of some of the statements, that gives a taste. A fuller summary of this and other debates will be provided in due time, not least in the Acronym Institute’s in depth analysis of the PrepCom, which will be published in the next Disarmament Diplomacy.

Cluster 2 – Safeguards

The following summary is written by Tristan Price, a doctoral student at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, who is interning with the Acronym Institute during this NPT PrepCom.

In total there were 55 statements delivered in the Cluster 2 debates that took place on May 2 and 5 at the 2008 NPT PrepCom in Geneva. The Principal components of Cluster 2 are the issues of safeguarding the civilian nuclear facilities of the non-nuclear weapon states and the rights of all states parties of the NPT to the benefits of the peaceful application of nuclear technologies. These issues relate primarily to Articles III and IV of the Treaty and preambular paragraphs V, VI and VII. The debate involved some strongly-worded exchanges over accusations of non-compliance, the resurfacing of disagreements over IAEA safeguards and export controls, and the role of UN Security Council resolutions and other mechanisms for dealing with proliferation, compliance and counterproliferation.

Non-Compliance

Allegations of non-compliance with Article III of the NPT were prominent in the Cluster 2 debate. The UK, USA, France, Turkey, Canada and Australia amongst others reiterated their concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme. The Republic of Korea, Japan and Australia were amongst those states expressing continued concern over the suspected detonation of a nuclear device by the DPRK in 2006, with Australia again expressing its anxiety over the US intelligence reports of collaboration between the DPRK and Syria.

In relation to the six party talks over the DPRK’s nuclear programme, Australia welcomed “the progress made over the past twelve months, including the shutdown and substantial disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities”. There was general agreement that the Six Party Talks was the appropriate forum to bring the DPRK back into the NPT regime. Echoing concerns raised over withdrawal under Article X of the NPT, in the UK’s statement to the Cluster 2 debate the UK declared that it did not consider the DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT as valid.

Australia expressed anxiety over “United States information… pointing to North Korean Assistance to Syria in building a nuclear reactor which was not declared to the IAEA”. The US claimed that in not declaring the reactor Syria was in violation of the NPT. Indonesia asked why the US had waited until seven months after Israel’s attack on the Syrian reactor to release its video evidence, and whether it had provided the IAEA with any intelligence beforehand. Indonesia declared the Israeli attack as “unacceptable” and claimed it had “undermined the NPT Regime”.

Iran accused Australia of supplying nuclear materials to Israel, an allegation that was firmly denied by the Australian Ambassador in a right of reply.

In relation to Iran’s suspected nuclear programme a particularly contentious issue surrounded a paragraph of the UK’s statement to the Cluster 2 debate regarding a very recent development: “On Friday [May 2] the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the Vice Foreign Minister of China – the so called E3 + 3 or the 5 +1 group – met in London to talk about the next steps in their approach to what they called “the grave problem” posed by Iran’s nuclear programme. They made it clear that the six countries are united in a shared belief that the threat posed to stability from Iran’s enrichment programme is very serious and is one they want to address directly”.

In a right of reply the Ambassador for the Russian Federation denied that any political statement was made during the 3 + 3 talks regarding the severity of the threat, and claimed that the UK foreign minister had been authorised by the group to make a concluding statement that covered only technical issues that had been agreed. China then invoked its right of reply to endorse the comments of the Russian Federation and similarly distance itself from the UK statement.

The IAEA: Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements and the Additional Protocol

In the IAEA’s address to the Cluster 2 debate Mr Tariq Rauf, speaking on behalf of the Agency, noted that the outcomes of the three previous review conferences had recognised the importance of the work of the IAEA as “indispensable… in the implementation of the Treaty to create an environment conducive to nuclear confidence, cooperation, and disarmament”. The IAEA also noted that the comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA), the adoption of which is mandatory for all state parties to the NPT under Article III of the NPT, had now been signed by 150 states. The remaining 30 states in the NPT that had yet to either sign or complete a CSA were urged to do so at the earliest opportunity.

The IAEA also stressed the importance of the Additional Protocol in combating proliferation. The Additional Protocol is a more comprehensive set of verification tools and powers, better able to seek out and detect undeclared nuclear facilities and activities. It was devised in the mid 1990s following the discovery that prior to the 1990-91 Gulf War Iraq had been operating a clandestine nuclear weapons programme under the nose of the IAEA. In its statement to the Cluster 2 debate the IAEA described the additional protocol as “a key step in the evolution of the IAEA safeguards system”.

Four of the nuclear weapon states – the UK, US, France and Russia – expressed strong support for the Additional Protocol in their Cluster 2 statements, advocating for its introduction as the “standard minimum” safeguards measure. The Russian Federation stated that it “believe[d] that the 2010 NPT Review Conference could adopt a relevant recommendation”. The joint statement of the EU also declared the Additional Protocol as the “verification standard” and pronounced it “an essential means of testifying the fulfilment of states parties obligations under Article III of the NPT.” Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Turkey and Norway took the same position. Japan submitted a working paper on “Strengthening the IAEA safeguards system and the universal application of the additional protocol” (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.7).

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in their statement, whilst not directly critical of the Additional Protocol, said that it was important to “make a distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence building measures”. In its individual statement South Africa described the additional protocol as “an indispensable instrument” in cases where countries had advanced dual-use technologies, but indicated that developing states without such facilities should not be burdened. Thailand took a similar position.

Iran’s statement appeared the most openly hostile to the Additional Protocol. Syria, Egypt and Cuba joined Iran in arguing that the priority should be extending the CSA to those states that operated nuclear facilities outside safeguards altogether, with Israel the clear focus of their remarks. Iran declared that as “Israel has not concluded Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement and has not put its nuclear material and facilities under the [IAEA’s] safeguard, any recommendations which call for additional legal obligations on parties to NPT will not be justified thus shall be rejected”. In the course of the cluster 2 debates a large number of states urged Israel to accede to the NPT at the earliest opportunity, with some identifying this as a crucial step towards creating a zone free of nuclear weapons or WMD in the Middle East.

Nuclear Export Controls

The two main export controls groups that were the subject of the Cluster 2 debate were the Zangger Committee, also known as the nuclear exporters committee, and the nuclear suppliers group (NSG). A number of developing NNWS of the non-aligned movement have voiced criticisms over the operation of the Zannger Committee and the NSG, accusing them of working as a cartel and restricting their rights to the peaceful application of nuclear technologies as enshrined in Article IV of the NPT. These arguments were prominent in the debate, and in many respects mirrored those on the additional protocol. Egypt argued that suppliers had attempted to “redefine the safeguards system”, and that in doing so had added “unnecessary challenges to the credibility of the NPT Regime including that of comprehensive safeguards”. They were joined by Iran, who described export controls policies of the US, France and the UK as “institutionalised nuclear apartheid”, with Syria, Egypt and Cuba taking similar positions.

The five NWS, the EU, Japan, Norway, Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Turkey supported the export control groups in their statements, with a number of these states calling for the adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol as a condition of the supply of nuclear materials from the NSG.

Other Non-Proliferation Measures

A number of statements, including the EU, Russia, Turkey, the UK, the US, China and Norway highlighted the role of UNSCR 1540 and the more recent UNSCR 1810, which extends the mandate of 1540, in preventing terrorists from acquiring all forms of WMD. Norway remarked that UNSCR 1540 “serves our collective security” and that it was “important that all NPT states parties implement this resolution”.

The Netherlands emphasised the role of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR) and the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation in preventing the proliferation of WMD delivery vehicles (HCoC). Turkey and the Netherlands explicitly endorsed the US-led proliferation security initiative (PSI). Also mentioned were the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

The Russian Federation pointed to its work on the creation of proliferation resistant nuclear technologies. In relation to this Russia declared “the development of such systems is a key element of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), launched by the agency in 2000 and initiated by Russia.”

The Vienna Group of Ten, coordinated by Australia, submitted a working paper on the peaceful uses of atomic energy that emphasises measures to make the Additional Protocol the safeguards standard, addresses issues of technical cooperation, as well the issue of providing increased funding to the IAEA (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.16). Iran submitted a working paper on compensation for states that had had their Article IV rights violated, in order to “establish a balance between security concerns and the socio-economic requirements for development, especially for developing countries” (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.6).

As always, statements, working papers, documents and news of NGO meetings during the PrepCom are available from Reaching Critical Will at www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

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