The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NPT PrepCom 2008

2008 NPT PrepCom adopts report but not Chair's factual and balanced Summary

May 9, 2008

By Rebecca Johnson

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The final session of the 2008 PrepCom for the NPT opened on Friday May 9th, with a minute of silence in remembrance of the end of the 1939-45 War in Europe. It closed just after noon after adopting its "technical" report (containing details about the meeting and the six organisational and funding decisions it took on Tuesday relating to the 2009 and 2010 meetings).

After the minute's silence, the PrepCom Chair, Ukraine's Ambassador in Vienna, Volodyrmyr Yelchenko, quietly remarked that this was not just a reminder of the appalling consequences of war, but a reminder of the responsibility to assure peace and security in the future, saying that the NPT and its review process have an important role and responsibility in contributing towards this. The final morning of the PrepCom was almost an anti-climax. No stand-offs or fireworks, though the US, Iran and Syria maintained their combative carping to the end. To the disappointment of many states and representatives of civil society, who had been impressed with the balance and accuracy of the Chair's very substantive factual summary, opposition from a few delegations meant that the Chair did not obtain consensus for annexing his summary to the report, as provided for in the review conference decisions taken in 2000. It will instead be issued as a Chair's working paper [http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/08chair.htm], as happened with the Chair's summary at last year's (2007) PrepCom.

Before the Chair turned to adoption of the PrepCom report, which was taken paragraph by paragraph, the UK Ambassador, John Duncan, read a joint statement from the P-5 Permanent Members of the UN Security Council - China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. [http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/08p5.htm]

Initiated by Russia and coordinated by the UK, the P-5 had been meeting throughout the PrepCom to try to come up with a joint text. Some may remember the useful role played by joint P-5 statements at the 1995 and 2000 review conferences and several of the PrepComs. However, if memory serves well, for the past eight years the differences between the nuclear weapon states made a joint text impossible. This time, though the dying embers of the Bush administration made some issues very difficult - resulting in omission of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), limiting what could be said on disarmament and overly skewing the focus towards compliance by non-nuclear weapon states - the P-5 succeeded in pulling together an 11-paragraph overview. They only just got in under the wire, reading the statement into the record just before the PrepCom adopted its report.

Chair's Factual Summary

In accordance with decisions taken in 1995 and revised in 2000, the Chair of the first and second PrepComs should "carry out consultations with the states parties to prepare the ground for the outcome of the sessions as well as their agenda" (para 6, "Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the NPT, Final Document adopted May 2000). "The consideration of the issues at each session of the Preparatory Committee should be factually summarized and its results transmitted in a report to the next session for further discussion." Ambassador Yelchenko quoted from these decisions and reminded delegations that the 2002 and 2003 PrepCom summaries had been annexed to the report; they were not negotiated, but delegations accepted them as the Chair's summaries and made their comments or reservations on the record after adopting the report, so that these were reflected in the summary records. Telling the conference that he had done his best to reflect truthfully and accurately the major points but it was not possible to include every proposal and every concern or statement, the Chair announced that "Following consultations I have become convinced that it will not be possible for my summary to be annexed to the report. I have therefore decided to turn it into a working paper of the conference."

Though few were surprised at this outcome, there was disappointment, since the majority of states that the Acronym Institute sounded out had been impressed with the summary when it was issued to delegations on Thursday afternoon. To careful readers without the baggage of national positions to protect and others to attack, the summary was an extremely comprehensive, fair and balanced reflection of the range and complexity of issues covered in the general and substantive debates since last Monday.

As can be seen from my hastily-written notes of the final statements made by several of the key delegations and groups (below), many expressed appreciation and gratitude to Ambassador Yelchenko for his calm, authoritative, considerate and open-minded conducting of the PrepCom and many also commended him for the summary, recognizing that it had to reflect more than thirty working papers - not to mention all the statements in the general, cluster and special time debates. The EU in its closing statement, for example, thanked Ambassador Yelchenko for preparing the factual summary, saying, "It reflects discussions that we had during this session and the working documents that were presented by states parties".

Indicative of the widespread appreciation received by the Chair, New Zealand's ambassador Don Mackay noted that the task of making the factual summary was "extraordinarily difficult, but also very worthwhile", pulling the many statements and papers "together in a thematic and analytical way". Of course, he noted, one can "find elements that one feels should not have been emphasized so much or elements that are missing, and of course there are things one disagrees with" - if that was the nature of the debate, then that needs to be reflected in the summary. New Zealand commended the Chair on his "very fair and balanced summary" and said that "what we particularly liked was that it contains and reflects a number of forward-looking proposals and recommendations for 2010, especially with regard to transparency and confidence-building and more structured reporting by the nuclear weapon states" expressing the hope that these would be developed further and contribute to a successful review conference in 2010.

In amongst the appreciations expressed by Slovenia on behalf of the EU, Indonesia on behalf of the NAM, Iran, Japan, Egypt, the UK on behalf of the Western Group, Nigeria, New Zealand, United States, China, Syria and a further riposte from Iran, there were of course criticisms, which I summarise below.

The Chair's summary comprised 63 paragraphs, covering the key treaty articles and most if not all of the major themes and concerns raised during the PrepCom. In some places the language built on the summary provided by the Chair of the 2007 PrepCom, Ambassador Yukiya Amano of Japan.

These covered: compliance and noncompliance; universality and calls to India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states and become party to the CTBT; nuclear disarmament, including reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear arsenals and concerns about modernization and replacement of nuclear weapons systems; preventing nuclear terrorism; concerns about nuclear doctrines and policies including the use of nuclear weapons; security assurances from the NWS that they would not threaten or use nuclear weapons against NNWS; CTBT and fissban.

There were sections on IAEA safeguards and the Additional Protocol; export controls; nuclear weapon free zones, especially the Middle East; concerns relating to the nuclear programmes of Iran, North Korea and reports of alleged clandestine nuclear activities by Syria, including collaboration with North Korea; nuclear energy rights under the treaty; concerns about nuclear fuel cycle safety, security and proliferation implications. Also included were proposals for comparative or standardized reporting and institutional approaches to strengthen accountability and implementation of the treaty; and questions relating to the exercise of the right to withdraw from the NPT and responses by NPT states parties.

The summary referred to "public and political momentum towards a world free of nuclear weapons", highlighted "the need for concrete and practical steps to achieve this goal" and emphasized that "multilateralism and mutually agreed solutions! were "the only sustainable method for dealing with the multiplicity of disarmament, non-proliferation and international security issues".

Since the draft report is posted on our website, and in view of the Acronym Institute's particular focus on disarmament - the major interest of readers that receive our publications and visit our website - I will here highlight only some elements, especially of interest to disarmament advocates. This does not impute less importance to other parts of the summary, but reflects the particular interest that the Acronym Institute's readers have in nuclear weapons and disarmament developments.

Paragraph 10 referred to the "slow pace of progress" in implementing the 13 practical steps. Para 11 summarised a view held by the 116-member group of NAM states parties to the NPT, who call for a time-bound framework for achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Para 12 recalled the ICJ advisory opinion and support for development of a nuclear weapon convention, as well as proposals for a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament at the 2010 review conference.

Paragraph 13 mentioned NATO and recorded the concerns voiced about "the increased role of nuclear weapons in some strategic and military doctrines, and the apparent lowering of the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons".

Paragraph 14 went beyond 2007, it's first part stating: "Concern and disappointment were voiced about plans of some nuclear weapon States to replace or modernize nuclear weapons and their means of delivery or platforms, and about the development of new types of nuclear weapons. In response to these concerns, France, the United Kingdom and the United States provided clarifications and explanations on their efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament."

The second part of this paragraph spoke of the need to foster "an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament" and also reflected the "considerable concern... expressed about nuclear cooperation of States parties with States not party to the NPT".

The need for de-alerting, de-targeting and reducing reliance on nuclear weapons was in para 15. While para 16 was mainly devoted to the NWS' reiteration of their commitments and actions on nuclear disarmament, it reflected also the concerns voiced "about apparent reinterpretations of nuclear disarmament obligations". Para 17 spoke of continuing strategic nuclear reductions, para 21 reflected the "strong support" that was expressed for the CTBT and urgency of entry into force.

Para 23 referred to development of ballistic missile defence systems drawing "concern as adversely affecting strategic stability and having negative consequences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation", as well as "the risk of a new arms race on earth and in outer space", including reference to the Russian-Chinese draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) tabled in the CD.

Non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) were highlighted in paragraph 24.

Para 25 addressed the need for fissban negotiations and covered the debate over stocks and verifiability.

Para 29 reflected the emphasis that a growing number of states have placed on disarmament education.

Paras 30 and 31 summarised the views on security assurances from the NWS to the NNWS.

P-5 Statement

Comprising 11 paragraphs, the P-5 statement was as significant for what it didn't say as for what the five NWS did manage to agree on. While the process of the P-5 seeking common ground amongst themselves is to be welcomed, to give a message of commitment and intent in the run-up to the 2010 Review Conference, they are still a long way away from acknowledging the depth and breadth of concerns felt by many of their citizens and expressed by many of the non-nuclear weapon states during the NPT PrepCom.

Where the Chair's summary referred to the NPT as the "essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament", for example, the P-5 statement called the NPT "the bedrock on which the international architecture to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons is built".

Where some emphasize the special responsibility of the NWS for promoting non-proliferation and reducing their nuclear arsenals, the P-5 statement emphasised that "we wish to address the proliferation challenges through Treaty-based multilateralism and through partnerships and relevant initiatives in which we all participate". The statement also attached "great importance to achieving the universality of the NPT and call on those countries remaining outside to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States".

Such expressions were noted and strongly welcomed in some of the closing interventions, not least since such a ringing endorsement of treaties and multilateralism would have been impossible to get the US to endorse in earlier years. Egypt particularly welcomed the restatement by the P-5 of their support for the 1995 NPT Resolution on the Middle East. The P-5 also noted that significant security challenges remain in the region.

Noting that the "NPT's central role in promoting security for all depends on concerted action by all States Party to ensure compliance and respond quickly and effectively to non-compliance", the P-5 then addressed the need for "strict compliance" by NNWS, with specific reference to Iran and North Korea.

In the paragraphs addressing disarmament, US opposition made it impossible for the P-5 to endorse the CTBT, but they did reaffirm determination to abide by their testing moratoria. Similarly, Chinese opposition and disagreements about wording reduced the P-5 to merely recognising the fissban as an element of implementing article VI, after which they urged the CD to get back to work.

They were happier promoting nuclear energy and article IV, safety and security of materials, "safe and secure regulatory infrastructures", and the development of "innovative nuclear energy systems", and stressed the necessity for the 2010 Review Conference to address multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.

Evaluating this statement one has to fall back on the reflection that the major significance lies not in what they have said, so much as the miracle that they managed to produce a joint statement at all. Building on this significant achievement, the next step is for future P-5 statements to include concrete steps that they themselves are willing and prepared to undertake, especially with regard to their nuclear disarmament obligations.

Final statements and conclusion of the PrepCom

Once the report was adopted, the PrepCom heard closing statements from Slovenia on behalf of the EU, Indonesia on behalf of the NAM, Iran, Japan, Egypt, the UK on behalf of the Western Group, Nigeria, New Zealand, United States, China, and Syria.

Many were fulsome in their praise for the Chair's conduct of the PrepCom, described as a success by many. China referred to the "peaceful atmosphere" and the EU to the "satisfactory conclusion". Many also lauded the Chair's leadership, described as "professional", "calm", "able and measured" and so on, in the various different closing speeches. Indonesia, for example, speaking on behalf of the NAM, thanked the Chair for his "dedication, hard work and the time he put into chairing the meeting" and also expressed gratitude to the Secretariat for their support to the Chair and to the member states. For Iran, Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh put on record his sincere gratitude for the Chair's efforts to consult and create a good atmosphere for the PrepCom deliberations.

In their different ways, most closing interventions also stressed the importance of preparing properly and engaging constructively to make the 2010 Review Conference the success that is necessary for the continued credibility and health of the NPT and nonproliferation regime.

Saying that he appreciated the Chair's efforts, Egypt complained that the summary only covered or described the issues raised rather than trying to move towards consensus, and expressed the hope that the next PrepCom would work towards a more "consensual approach". Egypt was glad that the P-5 statement had indicated the importance of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, saying that the support needed to be translated into concrete actions; but its statement seemed less enthusiastic about the Chair's summary in this regard.

Syria similarly devoted most of its intervention (see also below) to welcoming the P-5, saying that it clearly indicates their desire to implement the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East NWFZ and the necessity for universality of the NPT, "in other words a call to Israel to join the NPT".

For the NAM, Indonesia was encouraged by chair's willingness to engage states in the profound discussions about nonproliferation and disarmament issues, drew attention to NAM working papers and said that despite the divergence of views, the NAM remained committed to engage constructively and to leave no stone unturned to find a solution to obtain equitable peace and security.

Welcoming, what he called the "wise decision" of the Chair in turning his summary into a working paper, Algeria's ambassador endorsed the NAM view, and noted several positive aspects about the Chair's summary, highlighting particularly paragraph 12 that referred to a nuclear weapon convention, which he regarded as important. At the same time, however, Algeria considered the summary had not been completely balanced, especially with regard to the Middle East and disarmament.

Iran started by thanking the P5 for statement "because it shows the whole world that US, UK and France do not have will to resolve situation, and they distorted what happened in London". Making clear that he recognized the sincere efforts of the Chair, a fellow Vienna ambassador, and did not intend personal criticism, Iran's Ambassador Soltanieh argued that the "mistakes made in 2000" should be corrected, as any summary should be negotiated among states parties rather than being put together by an individual Chair. He then launched into a hectoring 15-point critique of what Iran considered was wrong, missing, misleading or inadequate in the Chair's summary.

These included (paraphrased from my hasty notes): that it missed statements by NNWS and NAM; that "states parties" was used inconsistently, sometimes indicating the views of all and sometimes only some states parties; that the nuclear disarmament pillar is weak, and comparing it with others there is imbalance in the text and it exaggerates the limited steps taken by some NWS; that the section on nonproliferation unfairly focusses on NNWS, and not on the NWS for their proliferation including deals with non-NPT parties; that the sections on article IV contain elements that unfairly restrict developing countries; that non-NPT measures and terrorism are highlighted [does this mean export controls or UNSCR 1540?]; that references to the CD highlight one side of the argument without a balance reflecting the views of others; that the text relating to safeguards reflected the views of a minority and not those of a large number of countries and were not [?] consistent with IAEA statute; something about misleading with respect to a legally binding instrument; that the discussion on article X in the summary was not consistent with the view of the larger number of statements; that some elements went beyond the NPT, e.g. references to missiles and the MTCR and HCoC; that the text relating to the sensitive issue of fuel cycle is in contradiction to the NPT and IAEA statutes; that in the context of the Middle East NWFZ references, the NAM's position on banning the transfer of technical assistance etc to Israel was overlooked; and, finally, that the paragraph on Iran has no logic and is absolutely irrelevant, and the PrepCom should not be used to take forward narrow political views of a few participants.

For the United States, Dr Christopher Ford likewise gave a long speech with fast delivery that even the interpreters had difficulty following. From my hurried notes, trying to catch the flavour of the speech, which veered from regret to indignation, from hectoring to sarcasm and ended on a positive note, congratulating the Chair for shepherding the second PrepCom to a constructive conclusion, and hoping that this would take states parties towards a successful review conference in 2010.

The speech began by noting that one should not rise hastily or without compelling reason to criticize such a summary. It is not a question of whether it contains material you disagree with, and it is unfair to criticize a Chair's summary if it faithfully records mistaken or confused points made, since they were made! However, the summary did not reflect the debates adequately in that it treats Iran more softly than last year - and last year's was unduly generous to Iran - and it reiterated Iranian responses at length. The Iran situation has grown worse since last year but this is not reflected in the summary, which makes it that much more regrettable that the summary soft peddles on the criticisms made of Iran. Also the summary is deficient in how it characterises the concerns raised by Syria's covert nuclear programme, and particularly that it failed to mention the most alarming aspect, i.e. Syria's involvement with North Korea - a country that pulled out of NPT to develop nuclear weapons and conducted a nuclear test... the Syrian ambassador should owe the Chair a personal debt of gratitude for leaving out the full criticisms and his country's involvement with the proliferator North Korea.

The US also considered that the summary had unfairly exaggerated criticisms against the US, and downplayed US actions on disarmament, while repeating downright fantasies, such as US providing nuclear weapons assistance to non-NPT states. The summary omits US assurances that it has not been engaging in nuclear weapon cooperation with Israel, and explanations about cooperation related only to reactor safety and the regulation of safeguarded facilities, and therefore in compliance with the NPT.

says more about this..... and comments that ad hominem criticism is often easier than thoughtful engagement...

Dr Ford objected most strongly to the use of the term "abrogation" in para 23, regarding US withdrawal from ABM Treaty, suggesting violation or scorn for the legal provisions. The US did go out of the treaty but without any violation - indeed the US was very careful to comply with the ABM T even as it was exercising its right to withdraw.

Despite all these objections, however, the US did not propose to copy Iran from last year and take the PrepCom hostage out of pique at how shabbily my country has been treated - after all, hostage taking is more a characteristic of Iran than US!!

Syria expressed thanks and gratitude to the Chair for his approach and efforts, and noted that at the beginning of the PrepCom the Syrian delegation had raised concerns that the US delegation was repeating its claims and allegations against Syria in order to disrupt the work of the PrepCom. These attempts impeded efforts to reach consensus and affected the positive atmosphere for discussion. Will not repeat here the concerns we've already raised about the outcome of mistaken US policies in our region, resulting in war, destruction and misery for the people, but notes that Syria's working paper (number 34) sets out its view of violations by the US of its NPT obligations, based on US sources and references. After commending the P-5 statement for its commitment to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, Syria reiterated thanks to the Chair and hoped that the third PrepCom in NY would enable wisdom and truth to prevail in the US delegation!

I'll give the final word to the Nigerian ambassador, who appreciated the factual summary and agreed with others that this provides good working material for the future of the treaty. He referred to an African proverb that "we should continue to watch and help one another because we belong to the same house". Congratulating the Chair and his Secretariat and "collaborators" on their hard work, he referred to another African saying about Monkeys concealing their sweat beneath the camouflage of their fur, and then concluded with a third very vivid African lesson on (it appeared) the importance of openness, honesty and speaking truth to friends, to the effect that if your roommate is eating raw insects during the day and you don't warn him, then he will cough at night and prevent you having a good sleep!!!

This serves as the last word from me on the 2008 PrepCom (until I write my more in-depth analysis which will be published in the next issue of Disarmament Diplomacy). Nigeria's engaging African saying comes close to civil society's maxim of speaking truth to power... a personal and political responsibility that each of us must exercise - whether representing governments, the United Nations, or civil society - or, indeed, only ourselves.

The Chair was warmly applauded as he closed the PrepCom, after thanking the Secretariat, staff, interpreters, civil society (for substantive proposals and interactions) and the delegates "for this great time we have all had here". There were chuckles when he remarked, "sometimes some of you tried to make me angry, but it is almost impossible to make me angry".

Despite some angry rhetoric and grand-standing, the 2008 PrepCom was more good-natured, constructive - and a lot more substantive - than was possible last year. Whether these positives can be carried forward to 2009 and help build a relevant, substantive and effective review conference in 2010 will be ardently hoped for, but will take some luck, greater mutual respect and much more work to bring about.

And finally ....

The Acronym Institute would like to add our gratitude and appreciation, especially to the Chair, Ambassador Yelchenko, and the Secretariat under the leadership of Tom Markram and Tim Caughley, who have been unfailingly helpful and courteous in facilitating the engagement of civil society, making statements and working papers available, and generally enabling us to do our jobs of disarmament education, analysis and advocacy with a minimum of hindrance and hassle. And thank you to the delegations that have shared briefings and insights, participated in, listened and/or spoken to NGO meetings, and shared their sandwiches or drinks when Geneva's cafes so often failed in their nutritional responsibilities by clearing shelves or closing ridiculously early (you know who you are). Thank You all!

Thanks also to the NGOs and students that participated, especially those dedicated and brilliant young people who have been highlighting the PrepCom and our work with their webcasts, available at: http://npt-webcast.info/

Thanks to the young women of WILPF and the excellent Reaching Critical Will team for producing News in Review, and for scanning and posting statements and documents as soon as they become available, increasing transparency and accountability. See http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

On the Acronym Institute website www.acronym.org.uk you will also find background and comparative analyses on the NPT meetings and issues going back to 1995.

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© 2008 The Acronym Institute.