Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NPT Preparatory Committee, April 8 - 19, 2002

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Opening Statements, April 8

New Agenda: Ambassador Mahmoud Mubarak (Egypt)

I have the honour to take the floor on behalf of the delegations of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden. In their Ministerial Communiqué of October 8, 2001, our Foreign Ministers reaffirmed their determination to pursue the New Agenda Initiative with continued vigor. In this connection, this First Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2005 NPT Review Conference marks the beginning of the new NPT review cycle. It represents a first important opportunity for the State Parties to the NPT to review the operation of the Treaty since the adoption by consensus of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

We expect during this review cycle to assess progress on nuclear disarmament, to take stock of developments that have occurred since the 2000 Review Conference as well as to consider further measures to be taken in pursuit of our joint initiative to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world.

In our view, the First session of the Preparatory Committee should deal with the procedural issues necessary to take its work forward, but it must also deal with matters of substance as was decided in the 1995 and 2000 outcomes. It should substantively focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament.

In this regard, we wish to express our disappointment that the expectations of progress which resulted from the 2000 NPT Review Conference have, to date, not been met. There have been few advances in the implementation of the thirteen steps agreed to at that Conference.

We remain concerned that the commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and defense doctrines has yet to materialize. This lack of progress is inconsistent with the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to achieve the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, we are deeply concerned about emerging approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons as a part of new security strategies.

Moreover, there is no sign of efforts involving all of the five nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, there are worrying signs of the development of new generations of nuclear weapons.

We reaffirm that multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances must be given by the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. Pending the conclusion of such negotiations, the nuclear-weapon States should fully respect their existing commitments in this regard.

As an interim concrete measure conducive to nuclear disarmament, all nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves to a policy of no first-use of nuclear weapons.

While deployment reduction, and reduction of operational status of nuclear weapons, give a positive signal, it cannot be a substitute for irreversible cuts and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Formalization by nuclear-weapon States of their unilateral declarations in a legally binding agreement, including provisions ensuring transparency, verification and irreversibility, is essential.

There is concern that the notification of withdrawal by one of the State parties to the treaty on the limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems (ABM), the additional element of uncertainty it brings and its impact on strategic stability as an important factor contributing to end facilitating nuclear disarmament, will have negative consequences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It could also have grave consequences for the future of global security and create an apparent rationale for action based solely on unilateral concerns. Any action, including development of missile defense systems, which could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, is of concern to the international community. We are concerned about the risk of a new arms race on earth and in outer space.

We reiterate that each article of the NPT is binding on the respective States parties at all times and in all circumstances. It is imperative that all States parties be held fully accountable with respect to the strict compliance of their obligations under the Treaty.

Although implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's (CTBT) international monitoring system has proceeded, the CTBT has not yet entered into force. In this regard, we underline the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications to achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT without delay and without conditions. In the interim, it is necessary to uphold and maintain the moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of the CTBT. The strict observance of the CTBT's purposes, objectives and provisions is imperative.

We are concerned by the continued retention of the nuclear-weapons option by those three States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and have not acceded to the NPT, as well as their failure to renounce that option. The international community must redouble its efforts to achieve universal adherence to the NPT and to be vigilant against any steps that would undermine its determination to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In another vein, we reaffirm that any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security.

We remain determined to pursue, with continued vigour, the full and effective implementation of the substantial agreements reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. That outcome provides the requisite blueprint to achieve nuclear disarmament.

Source: BASIC, http://www.basicint.org.

© 2002 The Acronym Institute.