Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NPT Preparatory Committee, April 8 - 19, 2002

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Low Key NPT Meeting masks deep disagreements over Treaty implementation especially on Nuclear Disarmament

From Rebecca Johnson in New York, April 19, 2002

The NPT PrepCom in New York concluded on Friday, April 19th, after adopting a procedural document containing arrangements for organising future PrepComs in Geneva (2003) and New York (2004) and the next Review Conference (New York 2005). The Chair, Henrik Salander of Sweden, annexed his "Chair's factual summary" of the meeting, which had been presented to delegations the night before. The short, 7 page summary identified the major issues raised at the meeting and delegates widely agreed that it gave what a large number of states characterised as a "balanced" account of the views expressed in the PrepCom on a range of substantive questions, including highly contentious issues such as implementation of the nuclear disarmament commitments in the Treaty, the nuclear programmes of India, Israel and Pakistan and associated regional security concerns, lack of compliance by Iraq and North Korea and so on.

When giving delegations the summary the previous evening, Salander had made clear that he took responsibility for the summary's characterisation of the meeting's substance and that it would not therefore be opened for negotiation or amended.

After adopting the PrepCom report with the summary attached, several delegations took the floor to commend Salander for his balanced approach to a very difficult task. The United States, for example, commended his "dedication and sense of fairplay", while Russia said the summary was "balanced and well weighted and objectively does paint the picture of the debate here on the whole".

Not surprisingly, indeed (as the UK ambassador David Broucher commented "almost inevitable in an exercise of this sort", several countries expressed a few reservations and wanted to emphasise that the document was the Chiar's personal summary, not a negotiated agreement.

The Chair's draft summary is shown in its entirety below so that you can judge for yourselves. Below is a very quick summary of some significant reservations, taken from notes not verbatim papers.

Iraq kicked off by expressing its "extreme reservation" about the paragraph addressing its noncompliance with the NPT. The US, France and Britain echoed each other in complaining of a lack of balance in that nuclear disarmament was given greater prominence than nuclear safeguards, proliferation or energy and that "states parties" and the passive voice in the summary should not be taken to mean all those present. Russia didn't like being lumped in with other nuclear states in criticisms about compliance with their obligations, and the UK and France felt their progress in nuclear arms reductions had not been sufficiently reflected. In one way or another all the NWS addressed the question of reporting, saying they would provide information but that the "specifics, format and frequency" [in China's words] should be left to the determination of the individual states parties.

For their part, the non-aligned countries and the New Agenda Coalition and others expressed warm appreciation to Salander for his success. They, however, wanted to express disappointment that there was not greater interaction between the states parties in exploring and working together on the principles and objectives and also ways to achieve full implementation of the NPT, as stressed in 1995 and again in 2000. They reiterated that the treaty and its consensus commitments constituted real undertakings, and there could be no going back, and suggestions were made for intersessional work to improve the accountability and responsiveness of the review process to deal with the treaty's important subject matter.

The United States had the longest list of reservations. On the Administration's behalf, Ambassador Norman Wulf said they were pleased that the effects of September 11th had been reflected and that IAEA safeguards, the additional protocol, so-called peaceful uses of nuclear energy and so on had been recognised, but complained that IAEA safeguards had received only as much attention as disarmament education (1 paragraph) and that there was no balance in the representation of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament concerns or between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation concerns.

The US said it opposed the idea of a legally binding treaty in which the nuclear states would pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states (known as negative security assurances). The US disliked the summary's implication that the legal effect of the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT was linked with the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the same time and opposed any new mechanisms for dealing with this issue. The US was also "disappointed" at the reference and characterisation of the decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and development of missile defence systems (the summary identified concerns that these could lead to a new arms race, including in outer space, and negatively affect strategic stability and international security). The US also objected to the reflection of concerns about the possible development of new nuclear weapons, telling delegates "not to confuse media reports with US policies". The US criticised the naming of individual countries (referring to the reference to Israel in the sections on the Middle East) but then went on to regret the inclusion of Iraq's assertion of its compliance when it was clearly in violation. [On this, the UK also underlined that IAEA inspections do not substitute for UN inspections under the relevant UN security council resolutions relating to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.]

Having overcome deadlock in its first week over opposition by the United States and France to inclusion of reporting requirements in the work programme, this first PrepCom for the 2005 Review Conference appeared to conclude rather smoothly. In fact, the apparently low key statements and debates masked a mounting degree of frustration about policy developments in key nuclear weapon states that are inconsistent with the NPT and consensus agreements undertaken as part of the Treaty's review process in 1995 and 2000. The frustration, expressed in the corridors of the UN, but seldom in the PrepCom itself, at times fuelled angry comments about having been cheated by nuclear weapon state promises in 1995 and 2000, while others expressed concern that if states began to view the NPT review process as futile they would lose confidence in the wider non-proliferation and disarmament regimes that underpin international security.

A more detailed report and analysis of the NPT PrepCom will be posted on the website and published in Disarmament Diplomacy as soon as feasible.

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Chair's factual summary

18 April 2002

Source: British American Security Information Council (BASIC), http://www.basicint.org.

"States parties reaffirmed the NPT is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. In the current international climate, where security and stability continue to be challenged, both globally and regionally, by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery, preserving and strengthening the NPT is vital to peace and security.

States parties stressed their commitment to the effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty, the decisions and the resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conferences and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, adopted by consensus.

States parties further stressed that continued support to achieve universality of the Treaty was essential. They called on the four States remaining outside the Treaty - Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan - to accede unconditionally to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those three States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Concern was expressed about the ongoing development of nuclear weapons and missile programs in different regions, including those of States not parties to the Treaty.

It was stressed that the best way to strengthen the non-proliferation regime was through full compliance by all States parties with the provisions of the Treaty.

It was generally felt that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 have given an even greater sense of urgency to the common efforts of all States in the field of disarmament and nonproliferation. The view was held that further strengthening and reinforcing the non-proliferation regime was imperative to prevent the use of nuclear materials and technologies for criminal/terrorist purposes. The enhancement of the non-proliferation regimes covering all weapons of mass destruction, including efforts by the IAEA, was considered to be the most important integral part of combating terrorism.

There was emphasis on multilateralism as a core principle in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation with a view to maintaining and strengthening universal norms and enlarging their scope. Strong support was expressed for the enforcement of existing multilateral treaties. The need to seek treaties and other international agreements that meet today's threats to peace and stability was underlined.

The view was expressed that the Treaty should be seen in its larger context of coherent commitments and credible progress toward nuclear disarmament. Without the fulfillment of Article Vl over time, the Treaty, in which non-proliferation and disarmament are mutually interdependent and reinforcing, will lose its true value.

The importance of increased transparency with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament was stressed. It was emphasized that accountability and transparency of nuclear disarmament measures by all States parties remained the main criteria with which to evaluate the Treaty's operation.

States parties remained committed to implementing article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Disappointment was expressed in the progress made in implementing the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", as agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. It was also noted that the goal of nuclear disarmament can best be achieved through a series of balanced, incremental and reinforcing steps.

The nuclear-weapon States informed the States parties of their respective measures taken in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, for example reductions of nuclear weapons arsenals, reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, and that new nuclear weapons are not being developed.

Concern and uncertainty was expressed about existing nuclear arsenals, new approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons, and possible development of new generations of nuclear weapons.

Strong support was expressed for the CTBT, as reflected in the Final Declaration adopted at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT held on 11-13 November 2001 . The importance and urgency of the early entry into force of the CTBT was underscored. States which have not ratified the Treaty, especially those remaining 13 States whose ratification is necessary, and in particular those two remaining nuclear-weapon States whose ratification is a prerequisite, for its entry-into-force, were urged to do so without delay. States reaffirmed the importance of maintaining a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. States parties noted the progress made by the CTBTO PrepCom in establishing the international monitoring system.

Concern was expressed that the decision by the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, and the development of missile defense systems, could lead to a new arms race, including in outer space, and negatively affect strategic stability and international security. Hope was expressed that the US-Russia bilateral negotiations to create a new strategic framework will further promote international stability.

States parties welcomed the announcement in December 2001 that the United States and the Russian Federation had completed reductions in their nuclear arsenals required under START I. They further welcomed the continuing US-Russia bilateral negotiations on strategic nuclear arms reductions, and many expressed the hope that such efforts would result in a legally binding instrument with provisions ensuring irreversibility, verification and transparency.

The importance of further reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process, was emphasized. There were calls for the formalization of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992 on reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons. It was stressed that non-strategic weapons must be further reduced in a verifiable and irreversible manner. Negotiations should begin on further reductions of these weapons as soon as possible.

States parties expressed regret at the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference was urged to agree on a programme of work. States that have not yet done so were called upon to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The importance of arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes, under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes was stressed.

Several States parties endorsed the work being carried out under the Trilateral Initiative - involving the IAEA, the Russian Federation and the United States - in developing techniques and methodologies for placing excess nuclear materials from dismantled weapons permanently under IAEA safeguards. States parties were informed that the United States had already placed some of its fissile material under IAEA safeguards and that both the United States and the Russian Federation were working to develop practical measures for the monitoring and inspection of fissile material, including verification by the IAEA. Some States parties also noted the IAEA's safeguards experience in verifying nuclear materials and expressed the view that the IAEA could play an important role in verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.

The view was held that the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free world should be accompanied by the pursuit of other effective arms control agreements at a global and also particularly at a regional level.

States parties recalled that regular reports should be submitted by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI as outlined in paragraph 15, subparagraph 12 of the 2000 Final Document. It was stressed that such reporting would promote increased confidence in the overall NPT regime through transparency. Views with regard to the scope and format of such reporting differed. Some States parties suggested that such reports should be submitted, particularly by the nuclear-weapon States, at each session of the Preparatory Committee, and should include detailed and comprehensive information, e.g. in a standardized format. Several States parties expressed interest in open-ended informal consultations on reporting to prepare proposals for consideration for subsequent sessions of the Preparatory Committee. Other States parties advocated that the specifics of reporting, the format and frequency of reports, should be left to the determination of individual States parties.

States parties recalled the 2000 Final Document and the request that all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, report through the UN Secretariat to the President of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

Support was expressed for the concept of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States in the regions concerned. The contribution of such zones to enhancing global and regional peace and security, including the cause of global nuclear non-proliferation, was emphasized. It was noted that the number of States covered by the NWFZs has now exceeded 100. The establishment of NWFZs created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba was considered as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. The importance of the entry into force of the existing NWFZ treaties was stressed. Efforts aimed at establishing new NWFZs in different regions of the world were welcomed. It was also stressed that assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zones should be provided by the nuclear-weapon States. Support was expressed for the efforts among the Central Asian countries to establish a NWFZ in their region. States parties noted that no progress had been achieved in the establishment of NWFZs in the Middle East, South Asia and other regions.

On the issue of universality, States parties reaffirmed the importance of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recognized that the resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved. The resolution is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the NPT was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. States parties reiterated their support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. States parties noted that all States of the region of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, are States parties to the NPT. States Parties called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Some States parties affirmed the importance of establishing a mechanism within the NPT review process to promote the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

States parties expressed concern at the increased tension in South Asia and the continuing retention of nuclear weapons programmes and options by India and Pakistan. States parties urged both States to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. States parties noted that both States have declared moratoriums on further testing and their willingness to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear testing by signing and ratifying the CTBT. States parties called upon both States to sign the CTBT. States parties noted the willingness expressed by both States to participate in negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Pending the conclusion of a legal instrument, States parties urged both States to commit to a moratorium on the production of such fissile material. The importance of the full implementation by both States of Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) was emphasized.

The importance of full compliance by all States parties with the provisions of the NPT was stressed. States parties remained concerned that the IAEA continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the DPRK. The DPRK was urged to come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. States parties expressed concern over the lack of implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

States parties noted that since the cessation of the IAEA inspections in Iraq in December 1998, the Agency has not been in a position to provide any assurance of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). Many States parties expressed grave concern and called for the full implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, including UNSC resolution 1284, and for the re-establishment of an effective disarmament, ongoing monitoring and verification regime in Iraq, and hoped that UN inspectors will be able as soon as possible to resume their work in Iraq. Iraq reiterated that it is in full compliance with its Treaty obligations and maintained that the IAEA successfully carried out inspections in 2000, 2001 and 2002 pursuant to Iraq's safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

It was recalled that both the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 NPT Review Conference underscored the importance of security assurances. It was emphasized that negative security assurances, a key basis of the 1995 extension decision, remained essential and should be reaffirmed. Many States parties reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States parties should be effectively assured by nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Reaffirmations were expressed of commitments under UNSC resolution 984 (1995). Many States parties stressed that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. Some States parties were of the view that this could take the form of an additional protocol to the Treaty, without prejudice to the legally-binding security assurances already given by the five nuclear-weapon States in the framework of the treaties regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones. Pending the conclusion of such negotiations, the nuclear-weapon States were called upon to honour their commitments under the respective UNSC resolutions. Concern was expressed that recent developments might undermine commitments taken under the respective UNSC resolutions. A view was held that the issue of security assurances was linked with fulfillment of the Treaty obligations. Several States parties, including one nuclear-weapon State, emphasized the importance of a no-first use policy.

Education on disarmament and non-proliferation was considered important to strengthening disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations. In this connection, the ongoing work of the group of governmental experts which is expected to submit its report for consideration by the 57th session of the General Assembly later this fall was commended.

States parties recognized that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and commended the important work of the IAEA in implementing the safeguards system to verify compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty.

States parties welcomed the efforts of the IAEA in strengthening safeguards and the Agency's completion of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards. The importance of the Model Additional Protocol was underlined. Some drew attention to the fact that States parties must have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in place for the IAEA to be able to provide an assurance of both non-diversion of declared material and the absence of undeclared activities or material. The goal of universality was stressed. States that have not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA were called upon to do so without delay. Many States parties called on those who have not yet signed or ratified the Additional Protocol to do so as soon as possible.

It was reiterated that export controls are a key element of the non-proliferation regime under the NPT. The important work of the existing export control regimes was noted, in particular their function in guiding States parties in setting up their national export control policies. The importance of transparency in export controls was widely recognized. It was reaffirmed that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Many States parties noted both the importance of combating nuclear terrorism and the many instruments available for doing this, including the physical protection of nuclear material and export controls. The IAEA's action plan on the prevention of nuclear terrorism was widely noted and supported. The Agency's work in support of States' efforts to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material was also commended.

States parties called for the strengthening of the physical protection of nuclear material, inter alia through a well-defined amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Many States parties called on States, that have not yet done so, to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Support was expressed for the IAEA's International Physical Protection Service (IPPAS).

The importance of strengthening nuclear safety, radiation protection, safety of radioactive waste management and the safe transport of radioactive materials was stressed. The IAEA's efforts in the promotion of safety in all its aspects were welcomed. States parties that have not yet acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, as well as the Joint Convention of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of the Radioactive Waste Management, were encouraged to do so.

States parties emphasized that transportation of radioactive material, including maritime transportation, should be carried out in a safe and secure manner in strict conformity with international standards established by the relevant international organizations such as the IAEA and the IMO. Some States parties called for effective liability arrangements, prior notification and consultation. Some States parties noted the conclusions on safety in the IAEA General Conference resolution GC (45) RES/10. The holding of an IAEA conference on safe transport of radioactive materials in July 2003 was welcomed by many.

States parties reiterated their strong support for Article IV of the Treaty, which provides a framework for cooperation and confidence for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this context, States parties expressed wide support for the Technical Cooperation activities of the IAEA. It was underlined that Technical Cooperation plays an important role in further developing the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including human health, pest eradication, food and agriculture, and the environment. The importance of aligning Technical Cooperation programs with development goals and needs of the country concerned was emphasized. Several States parties stressed the importance of providing the Agency with adequate resources for these activities."

© 2002 The Acronym Institute.