Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NPT Preparatory Committee, April 8 - 19, 2002

Back to the main NPT page

Statements and Documents

US Information Paper on Article VI, April 11

The NPT review process is important to ensure the continued vitality of the Treaty. This process was enhanced by the "strengthened review" decision at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the parties agreed to implement the 1995 decision by having the first two meetings of the Preparatory Committee "consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality." a. way to pursue this is through the fullest possible exchange of information among parties on implementation of the Treaty.

Transparency by the nuclear-weapon states about their nuclear weapons programs is important. Indeed, we believe that transparency by all NPT parties is one of the primary means by which the NPT can be sustained and strengthened.

Transforming Deterrence/Reducing Reliance on Nuclear Weapons

The end of the Cold War led to dramatic reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia. The nuclear arms race has ended. The United States and Russia are pursuing a radical transformation of their relationship with significant consequences for the goals of Article VI. In a joint statement last November, Presidents Bush and Putin affirmed that their countries had embarked on a new relationship, that the legacy of the Cold War had been overcome, and they were moving to replace mutual assured destruction with mutual cooperation.

The United States has concluded that the new security environment requires a different approach. The path we now follow is consistent with one that many NPT non-nuclear-weapon states have long advocated. The transformation of our relationship with Russia is being accompanied by a transformation of US military forces and a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.

The new US defense strategy increases the role of advanced conventional forces, missile defenses, intelligence capabilities and the defense infrastructure. This approach is designed to provide the President with a broad array of options to address a wide range of contingencies. It will increase the nuclear threshold by giving US Presidents additional non-nuclear options and defenses to deter an enemy attack.

Adopting this new approach requires no changes in current policy, doctrine, and strategy regarding the use of nuclear weapons. US nuclear forces are not targeted on any state on a day-to-day basis. There has been no change in US negative security assurances policy toward NPT non-nuclear-weapon states.

The United States and its NATO allies over the past decade have adapted NATO's defense posture to the new security environment. NATO has radically reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons. Its strategy is no longer dominated by the possibility of nuclear escalation, and the circumstances in which NATO might have to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons are considered to be extremely remote. NATO has ceased to maintain standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans, and its nuclear forces no longer target any country. NATO has taken a number of steps to reduce the number and readiness of its dual-capable aircraft; readiness of these aircraft is now measured in weeks and months compared to minutes and hours as in the past. US reliance on the forward deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons has been dramatically curtailed.

Reductions in Nuclear Forces

There have been dramatic reductions in nuclear forces since the end of the Cold War. The United States has dismantled over 13,000 nuclear weapons since 1988.

In December 2001, the final ceilings of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) came into effect, and they were met. When START was signed in 1991, the United States and Russia each had more than 10,000 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. They have cut their arsenals to a level less than 6,000 deployed warheads each and all strategic weapons on the territories of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have been removed or eliminated.

This downward trend in nuclear reductions will continue. Last November, President Bush declared that "the current levels of our nuclear forces do not reflect today's strategic realities." He announced that the United States will reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads over the next decade. President Putin has said that Russia will reciprocate. The United States has also stated there will be increased transparency and predictability in the reduction process, and that START's verification procedures will remain in effect.

The United States and Russia have been discussing how to incorporate their mutual commitment to reductions in a written understanding. The United States is prepared to negotiate a legally binding instrument that would codify the deep reductions in operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. President Bush has said that he looks forward to having such a document to sign when he visits Russia in May.

The US plan for significant reductions is a unilateral policy. It will proceed independently of a written agreement with Russia. Indeed the United States has already made decisions that will lead to a first phase of reductions of approximately 1,300 strategic warheads below the START level, as counted in that Treaty. These reductions will result from the retirement of the ICBM Peacekeeper force, the removal of four Trident ballistic missile submarines from the strategic service, and the elimination of the B-l's nuclear capability. Secretary of State Powell aptly summarized the goal of the Administration when he said on March 12, 2002 during Congressional testimony that the approach is "to continue driving down the number of nuclear weapons."

Following initiatives by former President Bush in 1991/1992, NATO has reduced its non-strategic nuclear weapons by more than 85 per cent, most of which have been dismantled. All nuclear weapons were removed from ground forces and naval surface ships. Gravity bombs were reduced by more than 50 percent. Worldwide the United States has eliminated all nuclear weapons from surface ships, including terminating the nuclear role for its carrier-based dual capable aircraft. In sum, the Army, Marine Corps, and surface and air components of the Navy have been denuclearized.

The United States has joined its NATO allies in affirming that arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. NATO has pledged to promote further arms reductions, transparency and confidence-building. The United States and its NATO partners continue to pursue nuclear-related confidence and security building measures with Russia. NATO has supported a near-term focus in these discussions on nuclear weapons safety and security issues.

Other Measures Related to Nuclear Weapons

President Bush is committed to cooperation with Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union to reduce the threat from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The United States has allocated $6.5 billion for all nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance to former Soviet states since 1992, with about $1 billion requested for FY 2003. These programs have helped to rid nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. They also have assisted in the elimination of strategic offensive delivery vehicles and enhanced the safety and security of nuclear materials and nuclear weapons.

The United States is not developing new nuclear weapons. President Bush has not directed the US Departments of Defense or Energy to undertake such action. The United States has not produced new nuclear warheads in a decade. While the Bush Administration has no plans to pursue ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it continues to observe the moratorium on nuclear explosive testing and has no plans to resume such testing. Secretary of State Powell and Secretary of Energy Abraham recently confirmed these policies in Congressional testimony. We also encourage other states to honor this moratorium. The US stockpile stewardship program is designed to provide the tools necessary to ensure safety, security, and reliability without nuclear explosive testing. We also continue to participate in and fund activities related to establishment of the international monitoring system to detect nuclear explosive testing.

The United States has effective measures in place to protect against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. We do not believe that a general "de-alerting" of all nuclear forces contributes to stability. However, substantial de-alerting of US heavy bombers and NATO dual-capable aircraft has taken place.

We are working with Russia on implementation of the Memorandum of Agreement to establish a joint center for the exchange of data from early warning systems and the notification of missile launches. The purpose of the center is to minimize the risk of a missile launch caused by false warning. The United States and Russia also meet regularly under a bilateral agreement to exchange information on the safety and security of nuclear weapons. This agreement has fostered cooperation on a wide range of non-sensitive projects such as joint research on technologies to improve the security of warhead dismantlement.

Fissile Material from Military Stockpiles

The United States supports efforts to halt the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and to dispose of fissile material removed from military programs in a manner that renders it unusable for nuclear weapons. Moreover, these activities are being carried out with maximum possible transparency including the application of IAEA safeguards where practicable. We also encourage the application of strong protective measures to existing stocks of weapons-grade fissile material.

The United States has not produced fissile material for nuclear weapons for many years. Implementation is proceeding on the 1997 US-Russian Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement that codifies a halt in the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons and the shutdown of both nations' military plutonium production reactors. The United States also supports the negotiation of a multilateral treaty at the Conference on Disarmament that would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

The Bush Administration has reaffirmed US support for efforts to dispose of fissile material removed from military programs. To date, US and Russian commitments total more than 700 tons of such material. The vast majority of this excess material is subject to transparency measures pursuant to US-Russian negotiated arrangements.

In January, the US Secretary of Energy announced that we will move ahead with implementation of the 2000 US-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement. This Agreement calls for each country to dispose of 34 tons of excess plutonium. The United States will convert its plutonium into fuel for use in reactors, a process that is expected to cost $3.8 billion over 20 years. We are pursuing broad international support for financing a similar disposition program in Russia.

The United States continues to support implementation of the 1993 agreement to convert roughly 500 tons of excess Russian weapons-grade uranium to non-weapons grade reactor fuel for sale to US utilities. Through the first eight years of this agreement, 141 tons of Russian weapon-grade uranium were rendered unusable for nuclear weapons and transferred to the United States for peaceful applications. The United States is also converting its own excess stocks of weapon-grade uranium. A total of 174 tons has been identified. Fourteen tons were converted in 1998 and 50 more tons are being transferred to the US Enrichment Corporation through FY 2002 for conversion to peaceful uses.

All of this work represents progress toward nuclear disarmament. Disposing of excess defense fissile material and imposing a permanent ban on the production of new fissile material for nuclear weapons would ensure that neither the United States nor Russia would be able to rebuild their nuclear weapon stockpiles to previously high levels. The quantities of excess fissile material that are being removed from the military stockpiles of the United States and slated for disposition to date could otherwise have been used to manufacture well over 30,000 nuclear weapons.

The Bush Administration has decided to expand programs that assist states of the former Soviet Union in the protection, control, and accounting of nuclear material. These programs help to upgrade security at sites that have weapon-grade nuclear material. By the end of 2001, rapid upgrades were completed on more than 20 tons of this material and at 38 of the 95 total sites. Since these programs began, the US Department of Energy has authorized the expenditure of $882 million on fissile material security in the states of the former Soviet Union, with $233 million requested for FY 2003.

The US Department of Defense funds a Fissile Material Storage Facility at Mayak, Russia, which will be completed and commence storage operations in 2003. The Storage Facility will store up to 50 tons of weapon-origin plutonium and up to 200 tons of weapon-origin highly enriched uranium. This material represents the equivalent of approximately 13,000 nuclear weapons. We are negotiating a separate, bilateral US monitoring regime for this facility. This regime is designed to provide confidence that the fissile material at the Storage Facility is derived from the destruction of nuclear weapons; is stored in a safe, secure and ecologically sound manner; and will never be reused in nuclear weapons.

These efforts contribute significantly to nuclear nonproliferation, including by helping to prevent the theft of nuclear material by terrorists or others who would use the material to coerce or to cause death and destruction.

The Bush Administration is working with Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to develop practical measures concerning IAEA verification of weapon-grade material. This effort focuses on two tracks - one that looks at technical approaches to verifying material without revealing classified information, and one that considers the types of agreements that would be necessary to codify states commitments.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

All NPT parties have obligations under Article VI. Each Party has a responsibility to create an international environment conducive to further progress on nuclear disarmament and to work toward the goal of general and complete disarmament. Important steps that can contribute to these goals include limiting conventional weapons, working to reduce regional tensions, utilizing confidence-building measures, achieving universal adherence to and full compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and effectively curtailing terrorism capable of mass murder. The United States is engaged on these issues and it is not possible here to summarize all relevant activities. However, given the growing risk of the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, we offer a brief summary of US policies in this area.

The United States is a strong proponent of the CWC, which provides several useful tools to combat chemical warfare programs. At the end of April, the CWC will mark five years since its entry into force. It is still a young treaty. It will remain viable over the long run only if the parties take a strong stand against possible violations and utilize the provisions of the Convention to ensure maximum transparency and compliance. The United States has used the bilateral consultative provision of Article IX to address our questions and compliance concerns and believes the CWC provisions on challenge inspection can be instrumental in achieving the goals of the Convention. The United States is continuing to destroy its chemical weapon stockpiles as required under the CWC. We have met our obligation to destroy 20% of our stockpile by April 29, 2002, and we are well on our way to meeting the 45% destruction required by April 29, 2004. Moreover, we hope to accelerate the cooperative project to construct a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia.

The United States has also proposed ways the international community can strengthen barriers against the acquisition of biological weapons and thereby strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. Our initiatives are well known and will not be repeated here. They represent a serious approach to a serious threat. We hope all nations will join us in forging a new and effective approach to combat the scourge of biological weapons.

The terrorist attacks on the United States last September are a searing reminder of the willingness of terrorists to slaughter thousands of innocent people. The threat of these groups acquiring weapons of mass destruction is real. This chilling prospect is one of the many reasons why the United States has joined with a wide and diverse international coalition to fight this threat. All responsible states must intensify both national and multilateral efforts to control equipment, material and technology that can be used to manufacture weapons of mass destruction.

Conclusion

President Bush has made it very clear that his Administration will pursue policies that reflect today's world. We have put behind us the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine of the Cold War. We have adopted a strategic framework that includes cuts in operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons to levels that have not been seen in more than thirty years. This framework reverses dependence on MAD by reducing reliance on nuclear weapons. We are pursuing cooperation with many countries to reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction and to secure and dispose of materials that can be used in their manufacture. Since September 11th we have pursued these efforts with a new sense of urgency.

Nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved in a vacuum. The global security environment is crucial. No country has devoted more time, effort and money to promoting security through nuclear disarmament than the United States. We intend to continue. This will not be done quickly or easily. To reduce the nuclear legacy of the Cold War in both the United States and Russia we will need to continue to spend billions of dollars. There should be no doubt about our determination to do so. There should also be no doubt that we will continue to work patiently and constructively with others to make progress toward the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament goals of the NPT.

The facts set forth above demonstrate unequivocally that the United States is honoring its obligations under Article VI of the NPT.

Source: BASIC, http://www.basicint.org.

© 2002 The Acronym Institute.