Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Contested Language in Main Committee II (Safeguards and Nuclear
Weapon Free Zones
By Jenni Rissanen
Sixth NPT Review Conference, Briefing No 12, May 14, 2000
Main Committee II, chaired by Ambassador Adam Kobieracki
of Poland, concluded its work on the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons, safeguards and nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ) on
Friday. Despite intensive consultations, the Committee was unable
to agree on the full content of its report, including the report of
Subsidiary Body 2. The Committee therefore "took note" of the
report, which included both contested and uncontested language, and
forwarded it to the General Conference for further work. Ambassador
Abdallah Baali of Algeria, President of the Conference,
entrusted Ambassador Christopher Westdal of Canada, Chairman
of SB.2, to continue to hold consultations aimed at getting
consensus on regional issues, including the Middle East. This
briefing looks at the report of MC.II and discusses the outstanding
issues with regard to safeguards, export controls and NWFZ.
Twenty-eight of the 76 paragraphs of the report of MC.II contain
language yet to be agreed upon.
Safeguards
More than half of the working papers to MC.II offered ideas on
safeguards for the final documents of the Conference. The MC.II
report contains a substantial amount of language on the topic, both
agreed and disagreed. The report recognizes the IAEA safeguards as
the "fundamental pillar" of the non-proliferation regime, and the
IAEA as the authority responsible for verifying that States Parties
comply with their safeguards agreements and obligations under
Article III, paragraph 1 of the NPT. It notes that 28 States
Parties have concluded their agreements since 1995 but expresses
concern that there are still 51 countries that have not brought
them into force and urges them to do so as soon as possible. South
Africa's recognition that many of these countries are without
nuclear facilities and its call for assistance in completing the
safeguards agreements is reflected in the text. The Conference
'fully endorses' the strengthening measures of the Model Additional
Protocol and the INFCIRC/540 and encourages States Parties to
conclude additional protocols as soon as possible.
Among the contested text is a paragraph that reaffirms the 1995
Principles and Objectives decision (paragraph 12) to require
full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding
commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons as a condition for the
supply of nuclear materials and equipment. China, which
expressed reservations about the decisions but did not break
consensus on it in 1995, reportedly now wants to do away with the
principle. It is understood that China feels that since the Treaty
itself speaks of 'safeguards' and not 'full-scope safeguards' the
Treaty text 'overrides' the language of the 1995 Principles and
Objectives. A number of countries objected strongly to the proposed
deletion of the text, leaving the issue to be resolved by the
General Conference. In a related event, according to ITAR-TASS (7
May), Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed a decree
on changes in the presidential ordinance of March 27, 1992 "On
Control Over Exports of Nuclear Material, Equipment and
Technologies from the Russian Federation" that reportedly allows it
to export nuclear materials, equipment and technologies to
countries that "do not have nuclear armaments and have not put
their activity under control of the [IAEA], but only in exceptional
cases and on a number of conditions." It remains to be seen what
effect this Russian legislative modification will have on the
principle of full-scope safeguards, as wanted by the majority of
NPT Parties. South Africa had suggested in its working paper
that also the re-transfer of the material and equipment be subject
to the same requirements, but this is not reflected in the
report.
Also contested is the forward-looking proposal by a like-minded
group of Western states (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark,
Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Sweden)
known as the G-10. The G-10 have proposed that the next Review
Conference should consider the establishment of an additional
protocol as an element of full-scope safeguards and thus, under the
1995 Principles and Objectives decision, also as a requirement for
the supply of nuclear material and equipment. In light of the
above-mentioned reluctance by China to support the 1995 decision,
this proposal is likely to face resistance.
There was also difficulty in agreeing on safeguards with regard
to the nuclear weapon states (NWS). Among the contested
language is text that calls for the wider application of safeguards
under the voluntary agreements by the NWS, as well as the
invitation to keep the scope of their additional protocols "under
review". Another question under debate, which hinges on the
difference between "as soon as practicable" (preferred by the NWS)
and 'as soon as possible' (preferred by some NNWS), is the language
relating to the call that the NWS should place their fissile
material considered as excess to their "defence needs" under IAEA
or other verification. France's argument that the resulting
verification costs should be shared and should come out of the
IAEA's regular budget because "cuts in nuclear armaments serve the
common interest" have not gone down well among many NNWS.
Brazil, for example, argued that the verification costs
should be borne by the possessors of such material - the nuclear
weapon states.
Among the contentious issues is also the question of
Iraq, which insists with the backing of some other Arab
states that it is in compliance with its safeguards obligations and
objects to references to UN Security Council resolutions calling
its relationship with the Council "a purely political matter" and
not relevant in the context of the NPT. The funding of the IAEA's
safeguards mandate was another unresolved matter. Western
countries, in particular, want the Conference to recognize the
increase in the IAEA's verification activities and the financial
constraints associated with such responsibilities, where as
NAM countries have drawn attention to the funding of the
IAEA's technical cooperation activities. Both are calling for more
adequate funding to be made available. Some States have also argued
that the NWS have special responsibility to ensure that the
necessary needs are met.
Export Controls
Export controls have been heavily debated and were worked on in
parallel closed consultations last week. While, much has been left
for the General Conference to resolve, in particular with respect
to the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the
Committee affirmed that "nothing in this Treaty shall be
interpreted as affecting the inalienable right…to develop,
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes without discrimination and in conformity with…this
Treaty."
However, perceptions on how ensure non-proliferation without
hampering this 'inalienable right' still differ. The differences in
approach were demonstrated in the MC.II working papers on export
controls, tabled by the G-10 and by Iran, and the
inability to agree on export-control-related language in the MC.II
report. One area of disagreement is whether the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) has made a strong enough effort to increase
transparency, as called for in the 1995 Principles and Objectives:
e.g. will the Conference be able to take "note" of the two
international seminars organized by the NSG to advance this goal?
Western states feel that the Group has taken considerable
steps towards transparency but many NAM states argue that
not enough has been done and that the Group remains non-transparent
and selective in its membership. The G-10's working paper seeks to
have the Conference recognize the role of existing national export
control mechanisms in the prevention of proliferation and
underlined that they are intended to provide confidence for
cooperation in peaceful uses. They want the Conference to recognize
that the coordination of national policies can contribute towards
non-proliferation and note the Zangger Committee in this context.
Furthermore, States Parties are invited to adopt the understandings
of the Committee.
The EU joined the G-10 in encouraging further efforts and
dialogue to increase export control transparency. In contrast, Iran
asked States Parties to "note with concern" that unilaterally
enforced export controls have "hampered" the developing countries'
access to nuclear materials, equipment and technology for peaceful
purposes. Iran, joined by many from the floor, wants multilateral
negotiations on effective transfer guidelines and, pending the
negotiations, the NSG to take practical steps to practise greater
transparency in its proceedings and decision-making process and to
allow all interested Parties to take part in them. Austria
replied to the criticisms, saying that the Zangger Committee's
mandate derived from Article III of the NPT, and arguing that the
Committee's understandings have been public since 1974.
Furthermore, it reminded the critics that each country has a
national responsibility with respect to its exports. Egypt
said that as long as the arrangements were limited in participation
and transparency and the NNWS outside the arrangements could not
take part in the decision-making process, they could not feel
confident that their concerns were taken into account.
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
Many States referred to the importance of NWFZ in their general
debate and MC.II statements. Belarus, China, EU, Mongolia,
and the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, put in working papers
on this to MC.II. By the end of the deliberations of MC.II, much of
the language in the report on NWFZ was agreed, but there were a
couple of regional sticking points. The final language of the
Conference will reaffirm that the establishment of nuclear weapons
free zones enhances regional and global security, welcome and
support the steps taken in concluding nuclear weapons free zones
since 1995, and support the establishment of new areas.
In this context, support is expressed for the "intention and
commitment" of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan to establish a NWFZ in Central Asia. Many statements
made at the general debate and MC.II backed its establishment,
including China, which said it had actively supported efforts
toward the zone. The EU attached importance to the Central Asian
NWFZ in particular saying that it "especially" welcomed the
progress made towards its establishment. Japan pointed out
that the treaty would be the first NWFZ in the northern hemisphere
and encouraged the process to be completed soon. The five countries
tabled together a working paper asking the Conference to recognise
and welcome the steps they have taken towards a draft treaty and
expressing their firm commitment to conclude the process.
Mongolia's nuclear-weapon free status and the Joint Declaration
of the Korean Peninsula are also welcomed in the report. Most of
Mongolia's proposed language was incorporated in the report with
the exception of the reference to security assurances. With regard
to existing NWFZ, the Conference will stress the importance of the
Treaties' signature and ratification, including their protocols by
the NWS, and recognize that countries party to NWFZ treaties can
acquire security assurances through the treaties. Thailand
urged the NWS to ratify the protocols to the Bangkok Treaty. The
Committee agreed that the Conference "takes note…that
consultations with the States Parties to the Treaty of Bangkok have
been accelerated, paving a way for adherence by the five nuclear
weapon States to the Protocol to that Treaty".
The contentious paragraphs of the report centre on the
establishment of NWFZ in the Middle East and Central and Eastern
Europe. Belarus tabled a working paper on its "national
position" regarding its initiative to establish a nuclear weapon
free space in Central and Eastern Europe. Belarus stated that it
did not intend to reopen the debate on the issue but "rather to
demonstrate its vision of advancing a nuclear-weapon-free-world."
While recognizing that the establishment of NWFZs should be guided
by the UN Disarmament Commission's 1999 report "Establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free-zones on the basis of arrangements freely
arrived at among the States concerned", Belarus defends its right
to propose the space's establishment and hopes that consultations
could be arranged among states in the region to discuss the
objective. Regardless of Belarus' intention not to invite debate on
the issue at the Conference, Poland, referring to Belarus'
statement at the general debate, said it was surprised that Belarus
had brought up the topic and emphasized that 'if indeed the
proposal concerned all the region's states', then their views
should also be reflected in it. Poland reminded Belarus of the
number of countries that had voted against the resolution on the
topic at the General Assembly, including the EU. Given the
far-apart views on the issue, the text currently in the MC.II
report, welcoming the establishment of a nuclear weapon free space
in Central and Eastern Europe, it is unlikely that the reference to
it will stay unchanged in the final document, if it is to remain
there at all.
During the NPT Rebecca Johnson and Jenni Rissanen can be
contacted at mobile phone 917 302 2822 and fax 212 935
7690.
© 2001 The Acronym Institute.
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