Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Reports and Representation
By Rebecca Johnson

At an open plenary from which the public was yet again almost excluded due to confusion amongst the security guards at the United Nations, the President of the Sixth NPT Review Conference, Abdallah Baali of Algeria, accepted the draft reports from the three main committees on nuclear disarmament (MC.I), safeguards and nuclear weapon free zones (MC.II) and the non-military uses of nuclear energy (MC.III). None had been fully agreed. Baali forwarded the reports of Main Committees II and III to the drafting committee, chaired by André Erdös of Hungary, which has been given the task of getting them in shape by Thursday. Clive Pearson of New Zealand and Christopher Westdal of Canada, Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies on practical nuclear disarmament and regional issues, respectively, have been retained by the President to continue their consultations and identify areas where consensus is obtainable. In requesting Pearson and Westdal to report back by Tuesday, Baali reminded the Conference that it was entering the final week, which "will require that we intensify our efforts... [and] move away from well known positions towards greater concurrence... to develop consensus on the outstanding issues".

Baali, who will be attending unrelated meetings in London over the weekend, is expected to convene a group of "representative countries" to work on the forward-looking elements that the Conference is committed by the 1995 decisions to producing. It is not clear yet whether these 'President's consultations' will work on the nuclear disarmament component of the report as well. Egypt and Mexico sought clarification of what was meant by "representative informal consultations", asking if they would be open to all states parties, and saying that the New Agenda delegations wanted them to be transparent. Baali confirmed that the consultations would not be open, but that he intended to ensure that groups such as the NAC would be represented. He said that there would be regional representation, with a responsibility on the participating states to report back to their respective groups.

As observers speculate on what may be the 'down to the wire' issues, various groups of like-minded (and also oppositional) states have been meeting informally to work out strategies in the hope of obtaining a positive and meaningful outcome for the NPT Review, including seeking agreement from the nuclear weapon states for some practical steps to take the disarmament agenda forward. Negotiations between the United States, Egypt, and some Middle Eastern delegations have reportedly become bogged down, after a comparatively constructive start.

There is also a growing feeling that the diplomatic desire for a smooth, trouble-free conference has overshadowed the political necessity to address core problems that could lead to a reinvigoration of nuclear doctrines and a new, qualitative nuclear arms race, such as the South Asian nuclear rivalry, US missile defence plans, and hardening attitudes among the nuclear policy-makers in China and Russia. There is speculation that some countries may push to take votes on resolutions rather than submit to lowest common-denominator language on key issues in a consensus final document.

France, though perceived by many as the most outspoken opponent of the New Agenda initiative and nuclear disarmament approaches, is not as hard line as it may appear. For the French government, the steps it has already taken, particularly in closing down the Pacific test site and the plutonium and uranium production facilities at Pierrelatte and Marcoule, represented a significant shift in nuclear policy and emphasis. Such actions were not without their critics among the nuclear, military and right wing political elites at home. As part of building the political will to commit to further steps, France needs the NPT Conference to acknowledge and welcome the actions already undertaken to limit reliance on nuclear weapons, and to consolidate that progress by ensuring entry into force of the CTBT and negotiation and entry into force of a fissile material (cut-off) treaty. France, however, cannot see the point of the non-nuclear weapon states' need for the NWS to make an 'unequivocal commitment' to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Some weapon states appear ready to say the words, either because they can persuade themselves that it boils down to Article VI, to which their Treaty adherence already commits them, or because they do not mind making political gestures they have no intention of fulfilling. France has so far demurred, considering that the NNWS should concentrate on getting the practical steps agreed and not worry about the rhetoric. Of all the weapon states, Britain has proved most willing to recognise that in addition to wanting agreement on a set of modest, practical steps, there is a sense of betrayal among the NNWS with regard to the NPT. It is the belief that the NWS wrapped Article VI in so many conditionalities and have not, in over 30 years, really committed to the nuclear disarmament part of the NPT bargain that, together with the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, has fuelled their demand for a clearer, more binding commitment and undertaking.

Main Committee Reports

Eight paragraphs of MC.III, chaired by Markku Reimaa of Finland, remained in dispute, covering: nuclear energy, technical cooperation and sustainable development; the transporting of radioactive material and spent fuel, particularly by sea; liability and compensation for the victims of nuclear accidents or radiation releases; the financing of the IAEA's technical cooperation activities; transparency and cooperation with regard to nuclear-related export controls; and the conversion of nuclear weapons materials to non-military uses.

In MC.II, chaired by Adam Kobieracki of Poland, some 28 paragraphs, including a footnote, were still contested after long hours of debate. Among the issues requiring agreement were the role of difference international bodies, including the IAEA and the UN Security Council in upholding compliance; comprehensive and strengthened safeguards, including the additional IAEA protocol and voluntary-offer safeguards by the NWS; calls for the prohibition of cooperation in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields which could enable a state not party to the NPT to "produce or develop nuclear weapons capabilities"; a reference to a Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; references to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee; how to deal with nuclear materials taken out of weapons programmes; the Middle East and the Belarus initiative on establishing a nuclear weapon free space in Central and Eastern Europe (see Briefing # 12).

Missing Issues

Two issues that had been expected to be difficult at the Sixth Review Conference have been barely discussed in the committees: the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and NATO nuclear sharing. Concerns about US plans to deploy missile defences were raised by a large number of countries in their national statements, but once the N-5 statement from the nuclear weapon states came out, the issue seemed almost to be dropped. Inevitably there was relief that China, Russia and the United States (not to mention France and Britain) had come to agreement on a paragraph about the ABM Treaty, but there was also frustration: every time the issue was raised, the NNWS were made to feel that it wasn't any of their business. Or at least that the ABM Treaty did not fall within the purview of the NPT. But if the deployment of NMD will rule out future reductions in strategic nuclear forces, then it clearly relates to the commitment, intention and ability of the NWS to fulfil their nuclear disarmament commitment under Article VI.

Ruling out future reductions seems to be exactly what the US negotiators have in mind. According to documents published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and The New York Times, the United States team has been keen to allay Russian concerns over the proposed national missile defence system by encouraging Moscow to maintain its nuclear forces on hair trigger alert and to keep its strategic nuclear forces above a thousand. In effect, as the New York Times explained, the US negotiators were "trying to convince the Russians that the Cold War doctrine of mutually assured destruction... remains in place and would survive the deployment of any anti-missile system".

During the NPT opening debate, Russia's Foreign Minister acknowledged the dangers of missile proliferation and proposed an alternative way of countering them. He proposed a Global Missile and Missile Technology Non-Proliferation Control System (GCS). Although Russia has not pursued this initiative through the NPT, the proposed system would consist of an "independently functioning mechanism" with a set of international measures, including: global monitoring of missile launches; security guarantees for participating states which have renounced missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction; incentives for states to renounce weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; and a mechanism for regular consultations. Russia envisages the Global Missile Control System as being operated under United Nations auspices. It would be open to all States and have to be negotiated as part of a step by step process. As a first step, Russia held a meeting of experts in March, 2000.

Several other countries proposed actions to restrict missile proliferation. Canada wanted to make the current, voluntary Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) more effective, with stricter export controls, verification and wider participation. Germany spoke of the "increasing obvious danger" of missile technology development. Japan regarded the missile launch programmes of several countries as a "set back", and said it recognised "the difficulty of pursuing disarmament while maintaining strategic stability in a dramatically changing security environment with rapid missile proliferation". Austria argued for the NPT 2000 programme of action to include a code of conduct or guidelines for missile production and export. Canada also suggested that a joint or internationalised early warning system could offer mutual confidence and greater collective security.

In view of the predicted consequences of US plans to deploy NMD in the near future, as well as the cosy reassurances to Russia that it need not worry about losing the value of nuclear 'deterrence' providing it maintains high levels of strategic weaponry on alert, the lack of debate over missile defence at the NPT Conference is all the more worrying. The signal going back to Washington is that despite the rhetoric of concern about missile defence, China and Russia can be bought off, and no-one else has the political will to brave US wrath by pursuing the issue in the context of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. At present, the draft text from the subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament (SB 1) urges "the early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions". This is probably the most that is achievable from a dispirited NPT Conference.

Nuclear sharing, principally among NATO members, attracted growing criticism after 1995, and was included in the working paper from Non-Aligned Movement to the 2000 Review Conference. The NAM wanted paragraphs calling on the NWS and NNWS to "refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements, among themselves... and with states not party to the Treaty". The NAM were concerned that the United States would transfer control of the nuclear weapons to NATO members in time of war. Some NATO states argued that the opposite would occur: they would transfer control of the nuclear-carrying planes and their pilots to the United States in time of war, so that it would continue to be the NWS which would assume responsibility for the decision of how and when to use the nuclear weapons. That argument has not satisfied the NAM and New Agenda states, which have raised nuclear sharing in the past as an issue of concern. However, few individual states have taken their concerns further, and the Chair of MC.I, Camilo Reyes, has put forward much milder text, affirming "that the strict observance of the provisions of the Treaty remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing, under any circumstances, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons..." Unless the NWS object to this, nuclear sharing is unlikely to become a stumbling block at this Conference.

During the NPT Rebecca Johnson and Jenni Rissanen can be contacted at mobile phone 917 302 2822 and fax 212 935 7690.

© 2001 The Acronym Institute.