Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Endgame
By Rebecca Johnson

The Sixth NPT Review Conference suddenly shifted gear when Russia accepted a paper negotiated first in Subsidiary Body 1 on practical steps on nuclear disarmament, and then between the nuclear weapon states and seven non-nuclear states of the New Agenda Coalition. Russia's endorsement was widely viewed as an important breakthrough, paving the way for agreement on forward-looking principles and objectives to underpin the full implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the future.

After apparent deadlock in the early hours of Thursday morning, the Russian ambassador, Yuri Kapralov, was reportedly applauded when he said that in the spirit of compromise, Russia was ready to accept the negotiated package of steps, including the 'unequivocal undertaking... to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals", despite security concerns which he did not feel that the Conference had sufficiently acknowledged or understood. Kapralov said that in light of such concerns, the emphasis on strategic stability was understandable and necessary; stressing that without strategic stability, Russia could not take risks in arms control and disarmament, he said that Russia would no longer insist on linking the words to actions in the statement.

Russia's announcement came by noon on Thursday, after the President of the Conference, Ambassador Abdallah Baali of Algeria, had summoned the P-5 and New Agenda to explain to the rest of the Conference why they had had failed to get agreement on a forward-looking action plan. Antonio de Icaza of Mexico told them that the New Agenda states would have been happy to accept the Subsidiary Body 1 paper originally drafted by its Chair, Clive Pearson (New Zealand). He said that the NAC had entered into the small-group negotiations at the request of the P-5, in order to help them; but notwithstanding the considerable concessions made by the NAC, the nuclear powers had not come to agreement. Meanwhile, the New Agenda countries had been criticised for conceding too much. De Icaza agreed that the draft was too weak and commented that for that reason he himself did not much like the paper: however, it offered a practical way forward, and apart from the problems of "one or two states" over "one or two paragraphs", the paper had been close to agreement. However, de Icaza stressed that the New Agenda states had gone as far as they could in diluting their own positions or watering down the package originally crafted in Subsidiary Body 1.

After Russia, France then confirmed that it too would accept the P-5/NAC package as it stood, despite reservations about some aspects, particularly the phrasing of the "unequivocal undertaking". The United States and Britain had been prepared to accept the paper the previous evening, and said so. China was suddenly put on the spot. Ambassador Hu Xiaodi reiterated China's opposition to the paragraph calling for transparency, and said that as a confidence-building measure, China would also want a paragraph committing all the NWS to the no first use of nuclear weapons.

In a later session, Baali focussed negotiations on getting wider agreement among states parties as a whole. The P-5/NAC paper received endorsements from the non-aligned states, comprising some 110 NPT Parties, and from western states, although some were miffed that the negotiations had proceeded without their participation, accusing the process of being non-transparent and selective. Japan, Germany and others continued to stress that they wanted the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a fissile material (cut-off) treaty without delay and without conditions.

China wanted deletion either of the entire transparency paragraph, or of the reference to "nuclear weapons capabilities". Hu argued that providing such information leaves the countries with smaller nuclear capabilities, like China, vulnerable, but that China would not be opposed to providing more information in the context of negotiations on nuclear arms control or disarmament. At present, China is not involved in such negotiations, and is viewed as one of the main obstacles to negotiations on a fissile materials ban in the CD. One of the non-aligned states, Myanmar (Burma), proposed a slight amendment putting transparency in the context of agreements, thus: "increased transparency...with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities through the implementation of agreements and other measures pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure." Although the day ended without agreement, few believe that China will block consensus if other outstanding issues have been resolved.

Non-compliance

Elsewhere, however, things were looking decidedly sticky. What many had characterised earlier in the week as "near agreement" on regional issues, including the Middle East, suddenly looked like unravelling, principally on the issue of Iraq and non-compliance. Furthermore, a number of countries have once again complained that the proposed language on the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998 is much weaker than the actual concerns expressed States Parties on this, and that the Conference should more clearly reflect those concerns and call for nuclear weapon capabilities to be dismantled and put under safeguards.

With the work of Main Committees II and III on safeguards and nuclear energy all but wrapped up (except for the Belarus proposal on a Central and Eastern European nuclear weapon free space), attention also turned to the review of disarmament progress since 1995. A Chair's paper on this had been developed in Main Committee I but not agreed. A small group comprising the P-5, New Agenda states, and a handful of others, including representatives of the NAM and NATO-5, met for much of the day to go through the Chair's paper with a view to finding areas where consensus would be possible. By 1.00 am they gave up, having deadlocked on several issues, including criticisms of nuclear doctrine and deterrence. Views of the reasons for the break-down differed. Some blamed particular non-nuclear weapon states for being unreasonable, while others saw the fault as lying with the NWS, for not being prepared to acknowledge that they had not yet done enough under Article VI. The NWS reportedly rejected quotations from the UN Secretary-General's opening address, in which he had noted that there were over 35,000 nuclear weapons in the arsenals, thousands of which remain on hair trigger alert, and the proposal for an international conference on nuclear disarmament.

Adopting Agreements

The question now is: having achieved significant, if provisional, agreement on next steps, including an undertaking to eliminate nuclear arsenals, will these get lost or sacrificed because of disagreements in other areas of the Treaty, especially the review of nuclear disarmament and the Middle East? Loss of a substantially-agreed review document has occurred in the past, and is not being discounted. Few, however, would relish the prospect of being blamed for the failure of the Conference after it had achieved such a significant breakthrough on disarmament next steps. A second, related, question concerns how the NPT parties will adopt their agreements.

The President has not yet explained whether he will seek to get one final document, containing both backward (review) and forward-looking (action) elements. Earlier in the week when he attempted to separate the forward-looking from backward looking paragraphs on certain issues, some countries had been less than enthusiastic. And there is still the question of whether there should be a separate statement or decision on strengthening the review process. It is understood that the Drafting Committee, chaired by André Erdös of Hungary, has prepared building blocks of text received from the various committees and subsidiary bodies, which could be structured in various different ways, depending on the will of the Conference. The President, too, is thought to be working on a paper intended to draw the main areas of agreement together, if necessary.

Corrections Department

Briefing # 16 was riddled with unfortunate typos due to loss of sleep and brain function. Of most importance, I inadvertently omitted a crucial 'not', thereby transporting Egypt into the Zangger Committee, when it is not in fact a member (the point of its objections). In a freudian error I also typed "equivocal undertaking", which of course was not written or intended by paragraph 6 of the P-5/NAC paper, though we cannot look into the hearts of those making it. In a couple of briefings we wrote that Iran and Iraq were promoting language relating sustainable development to nuclear energy, when in fact Iraq did not participate in this proposal or debate; it was carried forward principally by Iran, with support from some others. Apologies to all those who may have been misrepresented.

Grateful Thanks

As we come to the last day of the NPT Conference in New York, there are various people The Acronym Institute would like to thank. Although these reports were written by Rebecca Johnson or Jenni Rissanen, we owe our information and understanding (especially of events behind closed doors) to many generous souls among the diplomats and officials, who did not mind stopping and updating us, sharing papers where possible, and often coffee, tea and gossip. To avoid embarrassing anyone, we will not name names, but you were from all sides of the discussions; you know who you are and we thank you! Many thanks also to Nicola Butler, for her help during the first week, and Mary Beth Nikitina, who joined our team from the Monterey Institute for the last week.

There are also many NGOs who have lightened our load in a variety of ways, but I would especially like to thank Felicity Hill of WILPF for the wonderful team of women she brought together for this Conference. Last, but definitely not least, I express my gratitude to Hannelore Hoppe, Secretary-General of the Conference, and to the staff of the Secretariat and Department for Disarmament Affairs, who generously helped us to obtain elusive speeches and statements, especially during the early part of the Conference. If we were sometimes shut out by mistake, the fault lies with the confused procedures and definitions and not with individuals doing a difficult job under stress. If we sometimes inadvertently strayed into meetings which really were closed, we ask for forgiveness.

© 2001 The Acronym Institute.