The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NPT Review Conference 1995
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1995 NPT Review Conference, the Package of Decisions Adopted
Decision 1 : Strengthening the Review Process for the
Treaty
- The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons examined the implementation of article VIII, paragraph
3, of the Treaty and agreed to strengthen the review process for the
operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of
the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.
- The States party to the Treaty participating in the Conference decided,
in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, that Review Conferences
should continue to be held every five years and that, accordingly, the
next Review Conference should be held in the year 2000.
- The Conference decided that, beginning in 1997, the Preparatory Committee
should hold, normally for a duration of 10 working days, a meeting in
each of the three years prior to the Review Conference. If necessary,
a fourth preparatory meeting may be held in the year of the Conference.
- The purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be to consider
principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation
of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations
thereon to the Review Conference. These include those identified in
the Decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament, adopted on 11 May 1995. These meetings should also
make the procedural preparations for the next Review Conference.
- The Conference also concluded that the present structure of three
main Committees should continue and the question of an overlap of issues
being discussed in more than one Committee should be resolved in the
General Committee, which would coordinate the work of the Committees
so that the substantive responsibility for the preparation of the report
with respect to each specific issue is undertaken in only one Committee.
- It was also agreed that subsidiary bodies could be established within
the respective Main Committees for specific issues relevant to the Treaty,
so as to provide for a focused consideration of such issues. The establishment
of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee
for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of
the Review Conference.
- The Conference agreed further that Review Conferences should look
forward as well as back. They should evaluate the results of the period
they are reviewing, including the implementation of undertakings of
the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which,
and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the
future. Review Conferences should also address specifically what might
be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve
its universality.
Decision 2 : Principles and Objectives for Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
"The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons
Reaffirming the preamble and articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons,
Welcoming the end of the cold war, the ensuing easing of international
tension and the strengthening of trust between States,
Desiring a set of principles and objectives in accordance with
which nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and international
cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be vigorously
pursued and progress, achievements and shortcomings evaluated periodically
within the review process provided for in article VIII, paragraph 3, of
the Treaty, the enhancement and strengthening of which is welcomed,
Reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of
nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control,
The Conference affirms the need to continue to move with determination
towards the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions
of the Treaty, and accordingly adopts the following principles and objectives:
Universality
- Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
weapons is an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty
are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly
those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Every effort
should be made by all States parties to achieve this objective.
Non-proliferation
- The proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the
danger of nuclear war. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons has a vital role to play in preventing the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. Every effort should be made to implement the Treaty
in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and
other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.
Nuclear disarmament
- Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of
international tension and the strengthening of trust between States
which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The undertakings
with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons should thus be fulfilled with determination. In this
regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as stated
in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures
relating to nuclear disarmament.
- The achievement of the following measures is important in the full
realization and effective implementation of article VI, including the
programme of action as reflected below:
(a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations
on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending the entry into
force of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States
should exercise utmost restraint;
(b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations
on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special
Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained
therein;
(c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic
and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the
ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general
and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control.
Nuclear-weapon-free zones
- The conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized
nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived
at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional
peace and security is reaffirmed.
- The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions
of tension, such as in the Middle East, as well as the establishment
of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction, should be encouraged
as a matter of priority, taking into account the specific characteristics
of each region. The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free
zones by the time of the Review Conference in the year 2000 would be
welcome.
- The cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their respect
and support for the relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum
effectiveness of such nuclear-weapon-free zones and the relevant protocols.
Security Assurances
- Noting United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which
was adopted unanimously on 11 April 1995, as well as the declarations
of the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security
assurances, further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon
States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally
binding instrument.
Safeguards
- The International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority
responsible to verify and assure, in accordance with the statute of
the Agency and the Agency's safeguard system, compliance with its safeguards
agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations
under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices. Nothing should be done to undermine
the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard.
States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the
safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct
such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the
Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary
actions in accordance with its mandate.
- All States parties required by article III of the Treaty to sign and
bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and which have
not yet done so should do so without delay.
- International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards should be regularly
assessed and evaluated. Decisions adopted by its Board of Governors
aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness of Agency safeguards
should be supported and implemented and the Agency's capability to detect
undeclared nuclear activities should be increased. Also, States not
party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should
be urged to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the
Agency.
- New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable
material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for
the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to
non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition,
acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally
legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices.
- Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful
nuclear activities should, as soon as practicable, be placed under Agency
safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in
place with the nuclear-weapon States. Safeguards should be universally
applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy
- Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise
of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II as well
as III of the Treaty.
- Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange
of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information
for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented.
- In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon
States party to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries
particularly into account.
- Transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted
within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested
States party to the Treaty.
- All States should, through rigorous national measures and international
cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety,
including in waste management, and observe standards and guidelines
in nuclear materials accounting, physical protection and transport of
nuclear materials.
- Every effort should be made to ensure that the International Atomic
Energy Agency has the financial and human resources necessary to meet
effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation,
safeguards and nuclear safety. The Agency should also be encouraged
to intensify its efforts aimed at finding ways and means for funding
technical assistance through predictable and assured resources.
- Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful
purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding
the application of international law on the use of force in such cases,
which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions
of the Charter of the United Nations.
The Conference requests that the President of the Conference
bring the present decision, the decision on strengthening the review
process for the Treaty and the decision on the extension of the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to the attention of the
heads of State or Government of all States and seek their full cooperation
on these documents and in the furtherance of the goals of the Treaty.
Decision 3 : Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons
The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons,
Having convened in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995, in accordance
with articles VIII, paragraph 3, and X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty and affirming that
there is a need for full compliance with the Treaty, its extension and
its universal adherence, which are essential to international peace and
security and the attainment of the ultimate goals of the complete elimination
of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control,
Having reaffirmed article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty and
the need for its continued implementation in a strengthened manner and,
to this end, emphasizing the decision on strengthening the review process
for the Treaty and the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament, also adopted by the Conference,
Having established that the Conference is quorate in accordance
with article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty,
Decides that, as a majority exists among States party to the Treaty
for its indefinite extension, in accordance with article X, paragraph
2, the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely.
Resolution on the Middle East
(Proposed by the Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.)
The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons,
Reaffirming the purpose and provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons,
Recognizing that, pursuant to article VII of the Treaty, the establishment
of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to strengthening the international
non-proliferation regime,
Recalling that the Security Council, in its statement of 31 January
1992, affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear and all other weapons
of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and security,
Recalling also General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus
supporting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle
East, the latest of which is resolution 49/71 adopted of 15 December 1994,
Recalling further the relevant resolutions adopted by the General
Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the application
of Agency safeguards in the Middle East, the latest of which is GC (XXXVIII)/RES/21
of 23 September 1994, and noting the danger of nuclear proliferation,
especially in areas of tension,
Bearing in mind Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) and particularly
paragraph 14 thereof,
Noting Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and paragraph 8
of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995,
Bearing in mind the other decisions adopted by the Conference
on 11 May 1995,
- Endorses the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process
and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts,
contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons
as well as other weapons of mass destruction;
- Notes with satisfaction that, in its report (NPT/ CONF. 1995/MC.III/1),
Main Committee III of the conference recommended that the Conference
"call on those remaining States not Parties to the Treaty to accede
to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment
not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities";
- Notes with concern the continued existence in the Middle East
of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and reaffirms in this connection
the recommendation contained in section VI, paragraph 3, of the report
of Main Committee III urging those non-parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that operate unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities to accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
- Reaffirms the importance of the early realization of universal
adherence to the Treaty, and calls upon all States of the Middle East
that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty
as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
- Calls upon all States in the Middle East to take practical
steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, inter
alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone
free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological,
and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures
that preclude the achievement of this objective;
- Calls upon all States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to
extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view
to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle
East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery systems.
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