Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Safeguards, Export Controls and Nuclear Energy
By Jenni Rissanen

The Main Committees on safeguards and nuclear weapon free zones (MC.II) and nuclear energy (MC.III) have now each convened three plenary meetings and proceeded to discuss various working papers. MC.II, chaired by Ambassador Adam Kobieracki of Poland, has heard plenary statements from 17 countries. MC.III, chaired by Ambassador Markku Reimaa of Finland, has heard from 28 countries so far. This briefing looks at what the general debate and MC.II and III statements have said about safeguards, exports controls and the non-military uses of nuclear energy.

The IAEA's Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, spoke on the first day of the Conference on the IAEA's verification and non-military nuclear co-operation activities. ElBaradei stressed the NPT States Parties' responsibilities in the strengthening of the safeguards regime, noting that 54 States Parties continued to be in non-compliance with the obligation to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA and urging them to do so without delay. Expressing his disappointment with the slow progress in signing and bringing the 1997 Model Additional Protocol into force, ElBaradei underlined that without it the Agency "can only provide limited assurances that do not adequately cover the absence of undeclared material or activities." He urged NNWS to conclude their Protocols, saying that such a step would be further evidence of their non-proliferation commitments. He said also that "verification, no matter how good it is, cannot work in a vacuum" and must be supported by effective physical protection and export control arrangements, enforcement mechanisms, and by regional and global security arrangements. International co-operation in the 'peaceful uses' of nuclear energy was viewed as a key component of the Treaty that needed to be honoured and faithfully implemented. ElBaradei drew attention to the funding of the Agency's safeguards and technical co-operation activities, underlining that the funds to carry out these activities had to be adequate, assured and predictable. He reminded the Conference that although the NPT regime was not perfect but "clearly the best we have" and urged it to "cement it and build upon it."

Safeguards

The statements reaffirmed the IAEA as the authority responsible for verifying compliance with the NPT. Many shared ElBaradei's concerns regarding the NPT Parties which have not yet brought their safeguards agreements in force. South Africa, however, recognized that the failure to complete the agreements was often due to the lack of a nuclear infrastructure. In most cases, the simplified requirements for the agreements and safeguards would apply, so the IAEA was urged to give more support to countries to fulfil their obligations. It was stressed that the integrated safeguards system of the 'old and new' should not be an add-on but optimised to be flexible and cost-effective. In this context, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) advocated regional safeguards approaches. Many also urged Iraq and the DPRK to co-operate with the IAEA.

Disappointment was expressed over the sluggish pace in which states have signed and/or ratified additional protocols, although Hungary said "tangible progress" had been made with regard to adherence to the additional protocols. Ireland called the 1997 Model Protocol an important achievement that showed political will by the NNWS to enhance the non-proliferation assurances. In their N-5 statement, the NWS urged all NNWS to sign the additional protocol and said that they were in the process of seeking ratification for their agreements.

Australia, Canada and New Zealand suggested that not only the safeguards agreement but also an additional protocol should in the future be regarded as constituting the full-scope safeguards required by Article III of the NPT and specified as a condition of supply in the Principles and Objectives. It is expected that the Group of 10 will propose that the Conference's forward-looking documents include a reference that the 2005 Review Conference consider the adoption of the additional protocol as a condition of supply in the future. The proposal comes at a time when there are reports that China and the Russian Federation have allegedly expressed reservations about the principle agreed in the 1995 package, that the recipient country must have full-scope safeguards in place and pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons. According to an article by Mark Hibbs in Nuclear Fuel on April 17, these views came to light during the drafting of the NSG and the Zangger Committee reports. The question is reportedly a hot topic at the NSG at the moment due to an announcement on April 6 that Russia is planning to sell two new nuclear power reactors to India, an action the US is expected to object to. Ireland stated in its MC. III statement that "under no circumstances should those who have refused to accept the non-proliferation commitment... be treated more favourably than those very many States who have taken on this obligation." The US called for "preferential treatment" for NPT Parties. China stated in its plenary statement that it abides by "three principles" on nuclear exports: they must be used solely for peaceful purposes; be subjected to IAEA safeguards; and not be transferred to third countries without China's approval. The NAM extended its support to the principle under which the supply of special fissile materials would require the acceptance of full-scope safeguards as a precondition. However, neither the statement nor the paper talk about the strengthened IAEA safeguards arising from Programme 93+2 developed after the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. The EU said additional protocols "form an integral part" of the IAEA agreements, are relevant for the implementation of the NPT, and that adherence to them should be considered mandatory.

Iraq referred to the IAEA Director General's report from 1998 and said it was "in full compliance" with all its obligations under the NPT and the IAEA's safeguards regime, protesting that "no action had been taken" to force Israel join the NPT and place its facilities under safeguards. In this regard, Egypt called for "the establishment of an effective legal obligation to apply the safeguards regime of the IAEA to all nuclear activities in states parties alike, as a precondition for the transfer of nuclear technology or material to them."

The EU and the NAM called for fissile material regarded as excess to defence needs to be placed under IAEA safeguards. The N-5 were committed to placing their excess materials under IAEA or other verification "as soon as practicable". Britain, for its part, said it had placed its excess material under EURATOM safeguards and subjected them also to inspection by the IAEA. The United States said it was working together with Russia and the IAEA on this.

Export Controls

Concern was expressed again by several NAM states that export controls were administered in ways that hindered their right to participate in the "fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information" provided for in Article IV. Furthermore, perceptions differed as to whether the goal of increased transparency on export controls, called for in the 1995 Principles and Objectives, had been reached. Italy, currently chairing the NSG, gave examples of the measures the NSG had taken to increase transparency, and stressed that the process was still on going. The EU assured that it would take part in the promotion of further measures. Australia said that both the NSG and Zangger Committee "have acted with determination to improve transparency..." The United States argued that export controls were "more transparent than ever." In contrast, Egypt, whose view was shared by many NAM states, said the objective of increased transparency had not been achieved yet and that instead "the limitations...are increasing in a flagrant contravention of the letter and spirit of both the Treaty and the Decisions on Principles and Objectives."

Iran said that the record of commitment to Article IV of the NPT had not been promising, arguing that the progress made on cooperation in and transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes had been "slow and dismal". Iran expressed its "dismay over the systematic denial of transfer of technology... and restrictive export control policies" by the nuclear suppliers. It said that the main objective, the domination and exclusive possession of nuclear technology by developed countries, was disguised "under the pretext of non-proliferation" and called for the situation to be rectified. Iran's view was reflected in the NAM working paper, which called for the removal of "unilaterally enforced restrictive measures beyond safeguards" and instead promoted "multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements" as the best way to address proliferation concerns. Furthermore, the NAM argued that no NPT Party should be denied technology, equipment or assistance on the basis of "allegations of non-compliance not verified by the IAEA". Thailand, calling for a balance between the promotional and regulatory activities of the IAEA, proposed that nuclear-related export control regimes should be reviewed once the IAEA's new strengthened system of safeguards is fully implemented. In contrast, the EU called export controls a "sovereign responsibility - a right as well as an obligation - of each NPT Member State". The EU commended the NSG and the Zangger Committee and asked the Conference to recognize their work, calling on other States Parties to follow the NSG's guidelines on exports. Australia stressed that it was "more willing to export because of the existence of a regular framework" to ensure non-diversion.

Nuclear Energy

Statements on the non-military application of nuclear energy reaffirmed the NPT's "inalienable right" to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The developing world particularly emphasized the need for unrestricted transfers of technology and better cooperation and technical assistance and stressed that the IAEA's technical cooperation funds must be made adequate. Ensuring the safety of nuclear material and waste were stressed, particularly in transhipment.

The NAM reaffirmed "the inalienable right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes... and the responsibility of supplier states to promote the legitimate energy needs for developing countries." Russia said it stood ready for further expansion of cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and had "specific proposals concerning the joint development of peaceful nuclear cycle technologies". Mauritius deplored the "protracted reluctance" of the nuclear powers to fulfil their obligations under Article IV, arguing that the transfer of nuclear materials and technology is "the only tangible benefit that the developing countries expect out of the NPT". South Africa pointed out that although many interpret Article IV to be about the promotion of nuclear technology, and that this was true, the needs of many developing countries were basic: nuclear energy was needed for health, agriculture and industry uses. Along with many other NAM countries, South Africa was concerned about the ability of the IAEA's technical co-operation fund's ability to meet the needs of the developing countries, and urged States Parties to pay their contributions. Thailand believed the fund should be "treated as a political commitment".

The FYRO Macedonia thought that while "the Conference should encourage all parties to the NPT to develop research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes" the dangers of the old nuclear plants should be addressed because "another Chernobyl should not occur" again. Japan talked openly about the criticality accident that occurred in Tokai-mura last September and said information sharing was necessary so that others too could learn from such experiences. Amidst the many nuclear energy embracing statements, some had reservations. Ireland reminded delegations of the dangers of nuclear energy, saying that although the world had been relatively fortunate until now, "the potential for catastrophe is always there". Austria spelled out its position, saying that nuclear energy did not contribute to sustainable development and could therefore not play a key role in future energy policies.

In expressing concern about the maritime transport of nuclear materials and radioactive waste, New Zealand was joined by Australia, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Ireland, MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) plus Bolivia and Chile, and the South Pacific Group (SOPAC). These countries raised the issues of safety, security, liability and compensation in the case of an accident, underlining the need for further discussion. New Zealand said it was disappointed that the dialogue on compensation and liability issues with Japan, France and Britain had recently been "suspended" by them. It was seeking a regime of prior notification and, ideally, also prior consent for the transboundary movement of radioactive waste. France said that it intended to be fully transparent and inform concerned countries of the conditions of the shipments of nuclear material and waste, but stressed that "the right of navigation and the freedom of the seas... cannot be infringed upon". The South Pacific States want the shipments only to be made if the cargo is of minimal risk, the ships of the highest standards, and by states that agree to promote the safety of the material, and in the case of an accident, are prepared to provide compensation to countries harmed.

© 2001 The Acronym Institute.