Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Half Time
By Rebecca Johnson

The NPT Review Conference has reached its half way mark, and no-one (with the possible exception of the President, Abdallah Baali of Algeria) is yet sure how it will turn out. Baali, who has shown a very deft hand at brokering compromises on contentious procedural issues, is determined that the Conference should be successful in adopting some 'realistic' recommendations by consensus. His hand has been strengthened by the N-5 statement from the nuclear weapon states, published on May 1. Although the language agreed to by the nuclear powers on the ABM Treaty and getting fissile material negotiations underway in the CD has pleased few if any non-nuclear weapon states, most expect they will have to accept it in the end. The Chairs are capable and the mood is 'workmanlike', although one senior diplomat described it as the "calm before the storm". While many welcome the avoidance of direct confrontation, there is also a subtext of concern that if this meeting of NPT parties sweeps pivotal issues such as missile defence and the reinforcing of nuclear doctrines under the carpet, the dust that flies after the Conference closes may do greater harm to the credibility of the regime.

By Friday, the Chairs of the three main committees had issued first draft working papers, intended to focus attention both on the areas where consensus is emerging, and on the issues of contention. In opening discussion in MC.I, Camilo Reyes of Colombia noted that since Subsidiary Body 1 was still deliberating on 'unfinished business' and 'next steps', the MC.I working paper dealt primarily with the review of recent progress on nuclear disarmament-related issues.

Nuclear disarmament

The MC.I draft runs through 29 paragraphs, many of which reaffirm commitment to the relevant articles of the Treaty and the "full realisation and effective implementation" of the provisions of the NPT and the decisions taken when the Treaty was extended in 1995. Iraq has already objected to the paragraph calling on states which are non-compliant to "move promptly to full compliance with their obligations". The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan are condemned, with regret that the promised signing of the CTBT has not yet taken place. The draft stresses "that notwithstanding their nuclear tests, they do not have the status of nuclear weapon states" and calls on both South Asian countries to undertake the measures set out in UN security council resolution 1172 (1998).

One paragraph reiterates the language of paragraph 4(b) of the 1995 decisions on negotiating a fissile materials ban, without reference to the CD programme of work that China insisted on in the N-5 statement. There is particular mention of the N-5 declaration that all nuclear weapons are now detargetted. There are paragraphs on nuclear weapon free zones, and the necessity to conclude a "legally binding negative security regime". A paragraph on "the need for the commitment, without any condition, by all the nuclear weapon states not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, and conclude international legal instruments to this effect" was widely welcomed by non-nuclear countries, even as they acknowledged that the NWS will try to prevent such a commitment from appearing in the final document.

Subsidiary Body I, chaired by Clive Pearson of New Zealand, was given the task of looking forward and has been considering a Chair's draft summarising 'unfinished business'. The seven short paragraphs relate principally to the 1995 programme of action and cover: the urgency of achieving further signatures and ratifications to bring about entry into force of the CTBT, unconditionally; a moratorium on nuclear test explosions pending CTBT entry into force; negotiations and early conclusion of a fissban on the basis of the 1995 Shannon mandate "taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives"; a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, pending the entry into force of a fissban; the establishment of a CD "subsidiary body" on nuclear disarmament; and entry into force of START II, and further efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals unilaterally and within the START process.

By steering clear of specifying whether the CD subsidiary body should be an ad hoc committee, as proposed by the non-aligned states and others, or just a working group, as supported by some NATO members, such a paragraph may be accepted by the NWS, despite present objections. While Pearson's paper does not go as far as many NNWS would like, they consider it to be realistic, given the limitations imposed by the NWS' positions. China, which wants to ensure that fissban negotiations do not go forward without a programme of work that also includes outer space issues, has also sought to augment the calls for moratoria on nuclear testing and fissile material production with moratoria on the deployment of national missile defences and the development and deployment of weapons in space.

Safeguards

The draft working paper from Main committee II, chaired by Adam Kobieracki of Poland, contained 58 recommendations, of which 14 are forward-looking and 'action-oriented'. IAEA safeguards are endorsed as the "fundamental pillar" of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Since even the NAM working paper has rejected Iran's emphasis that the IAEA is the "sole" competent authority, there is little opposition to reaffirming the Agency as "the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring... compliance with its safeguards agreement... with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses..." The draft fully endorses the measures contained in the Model Protocol additional to the safeguards agreements under article III, notes that they will "provide increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities", and regards them as "an integral part of the IAEA's safeguards system". NPT parties are urged to conclude and apply their relevant additional protocols as soon as possible. A further 7 paragraphs are devoted to safeguards on the NWS (on whom article III (paras 1 and 4) are not legally binding, but who have all made "voluntary offer safeguards agreements" with the IAEA) and non-NPT parties.

The NWS are urged to broaden the scope of their additional protocols and to cease production of fissile material for nuclear weapons (if they have not already done so). The NWS are also enjoined to submit any nuclear materials or nuclear installations transferred from military to non-military uses to IAEA verification. There are sections covering more resources for safeguards, more transparency and effective management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), effective physical protection and security for nuclear materials, and illicit trafficking and nuclear terrorism. Export controls, which some NAM countries dislike, are described as "complementary and important", but better transparency is recommended. All States are invited to "adopt the understandings of the Zangger Committee" in connection with nuclear cooperation and to consider further ways of cooperating to prevent the diversion of nuclear technology for weapons. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is not mentioned, but the Zangger Committee "and any other supplier arrangement" are urged to ensure that their export guidelines do not hamper nuclear energy development per se.

Regional

The draft presently contains little on non-compliance, regional issues, nuclear weapon free zones and the Middle East, as it is awaiting recommendations from SB 2, chaired by Christopher Westdal of Canada. In response to US insistence that questions of non-compliance with the Treaty (specifically Iraq and North Korea) were relevant to both MC. I and in SB 2, Baali ruled that non-compliance should be addressed in both places, as it related to the subject matter of nuclear disarmament and regional issues respectively. Having devoted one session to South Asia and a further two primarily to the Middle East, SB 2 now faces the uphill task of pulling the arguments together. In Friday's session on the Middle East, Egypt's proposals for a follow-up committee, a special representative-envoy, and for the three depositary states (Russia, US and UK) to pursue discussions with Israel were endorsed by the NAM and many Arab colleagues. While the United States continues to be opposed to singling out Israel in this way, France gave a fairly positive response, viewing Egypt's arguments as having practical merit.

Nuclear Energy

MC.III, chaired by Markku Reimaa of Finland covered some of the same ground as MC.II and said much the same things about ensuring that the IAEA had sufficient resources. MC.III focussed on nuclear cooperation and assistance to developing countries, nuclear safety, nuclear waste, liability, technical cooperation, and conversion of nuclear materials to non-military uses. The draft notes that "although safety is a national responsibility, international cooperation on all safety-related matters is indispensable". Due to pressure from a number of Island nations, as well as Ireland and New Zealand, there are six paragraphs on 'safe transport by sea', dealing with issues of cask and carriage safety, cooperation and exchange of information, and prior notification of shipments. Noting that "a major issue in the debate over the use of nuclear technologies is the safety of the management of spent fuel and of radioactive waste", the draft calls on the IAEA to strengthen its efforts and assist member states in safety standards for handling radioactive waste.

Review Process

The last session of the second week was devoted to consideration of ways to strengthen the review process. It heard statements from Colombia, Ireland, Japan, Canada, Norway, the United States, the Netherlands, China, Egypt, Finland, Iran, Britain, Mexico, Australia, Brazil, Nigeria, Switzerland, France, Sweden, Spain, Chile and New Zealand. Although most interventions elaborated on proposals put in the general debate and various working papers, the session unnecessarily took place behind closed doors. Despite the different terms employed, there was a noticeable congruence among many positions being put forward. There was a general sense that the 1995 decisions needed to be built on and revitalised, but not dropped or replaced. With the exception of Britain, France and the United States, most pushed for at least four meetings, focussing mainly on substantive discussions, reserving the later session(s) for drafting recommendations and procedural preparations. Several, including Norway, Netherlands and the United States, considered that items for discussion could be distributed among the PrepComs in advance, but others thought it would not be feasible to restrict the PrepComs so rigidly.

Although the US, UK and France spoke out against having "mini-reviews", many delegations seem to have come round to supporting Canada's argument that the PrepComs should be able to comment on regional or contemporaneous events, though without necessarily formulating recommendations for a future review conference. Canada's proposals for greater participation by NGOs was backed by a number of delegations, including Mexico, Brazil and New Zealand. When Baali summed up the discussion at the end, however, saying that he hoped to wrap up agreement on the review process by Wednesday, there was some consternation that he had 'pre-cooked' some of his recommendations in advance. Finland argued for further discussions on the review process. Baali has agreed to consult on a one-to-one basis with interested delegations and is expected to bring a working paper out early in the third week.

During the NPT Rebecca Johnson and Jenni Rissanen can be contacted at mobile phone 917 302 2822 and fax 212 935 7690.

© 2001 The Acronym Institute.