Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Nuclear Disarmament Priorities
By Rebecca Johnson

The Main Committees and subsidiary bodies are busy ploughing through draft text from their various Chairs, in some cases negotiating line by line in a tortuous verbal war of attrition. The President of the Conference, Ambassador Abdallah Baali of Algeria, has issued a draft paper on strengthening the review of the Treaty, to which several countries have objected. This briefing considers the drafts on nuclear disarmament and also summarises views on the CTBT and nuclear testing, and negotiations banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (fissban). Other recurring disarmament-related themes, such as the need to involve non-strategic/tactical nuclear weapons in the elimination process, nuclear weapons in strategic concepts, missile defence, de-alerting, and security assurances, will be covered in further briefings this week, as time and space allow.

The Chair of SB 1, Clive Pearson of New Zealand, initially divided his mandate to "discuss and consider the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Principles and Objectives" into two parts: unfinished business, encompassing the CTBT, fissban and START process; and further measures and next steps. Suggested further measures included: the principle of irreversibility; further development of the Trilateral Initiative on fissile materials (US, Russia and the IAEA); arrangements to place fissile materials designated 'excess' for defence purposes under safeguards; increased transparency and information regarding both nuclear arsenals and fissile material holdings; accountability in the form of regular reporting from the NWS; non-strategic nuclear weapons; detargetting (already declared), de-alerting and the de-activation of nuclear weapons; security policy and the role of nuclear weapons; early participation of all the NWS in the disarmament process; verification; and commitment to elimination. Following a first round of discussions, these were integrated into a single working paper comprising 17 paragraphs, taking on board some suggested amendments.

The disagreements over next steps have now emerged more starkly. Representatives of Britain, Russia and the United States deny rumours that they may be ready to accept a commitment based on the New Agenda requirement for "an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and, in the forthcoming NPT review period 2000-2005 to engage in an accelerated process of negotiations and to take steps leading to nuclear disarmament". Britain has proposed that the specific reference to the next five years be deleted. France, meanwhile, is perceived as unwilling to negotiate on this language at all.

'Strategic stability', used in the N-5 statement in the context of the START process and 'preserving and strengthening' the ABM Treaty, has clearly become the nuclear weapon states' favourite buzz-phrase, rivalling their Orwellian conversion to 'unequivocal commitment'. Russia has problems with irreversibility and addressing tactical nuclear weapons, unless put in the context of 'strategic stability'. Britain wants any references to de-alerting or the de-activation of nuclear weapons to be "consistent with the maintenance and promotion of strategic stability". Most particularly, where the Chair's first draft called for "a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to prevent the risk of the use of these weapons..." Britain was keen to put this in the context of maintaining strategic stability.

Though 'strategic stability' used by Russia and China tends to be diplomatic code for their opposition to missile defence, it is increasingly clear that when any of the nuclear powers refers to 'strategic stability' or 'strategic balance', they really mean the mutual retention of comparable levels of nuclear weapons -- i.e. that neither threats to the ABM regime nor steps towards nuclear disarmament identified by the NNWS should interfere with their relative positions within the nuclear club.

France has acquired a reputation for opposing almost everything proposed by the Chairs of both Main Committee I and SB 1. The United States is attempting to stay in the background, expressing a willingness to find common ground, but reserving its bottom line positions till later. Britain reportedly agreed with comments by Russia and China that the nuclear disarmament issues could not be dealt with separately from one another. While not opposing outright, Britain would rather have transparency, irreversibility and accountability viewed as voluntary offers or guides rather than perceived as necessary components towards fulfilling Treaty obligations, as the NNWS want. Similarly, China does not like references to irreversibility, transparency, or de-alerting, and wants to include a commitment to no first use, which Russia and the NATO NWS predictably reject.

In related developments, South Africa presented a statement and proposal on nuclear testing. Recalling the various statements made by the weapon states during negotiations on the CTBT, South Africa proposed that the NPT Review Conference should "call upon all States not to conduct tests for the further development and modernisation of nuclear weapons". This language was also proposed in a working paper from the New Agenda states late last week which further called for inclusion in the report of the UN Secretary General's concerns about "some 35,000 nuclear weapons" remaining in the arsenals and the NWS' reaffirmation of nuclear weapon doctrines. Following statements made by the United States at the time of signing the Pelindaba Treaty implying that its security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states may not apply in the event of chemical and biological weapons threats, the NAC wanted clear affirmations that the security assurances provided to NPT states parties were without condition or limitation. While welcoming Russia's ratification of START II, the New Agenda also noted that the Treaty's implementation was contingent on US Senate approval of the 1997 Protocols. Under present political circumstances, the chances of this in a US election year appear thin.

Malaysia and Costa Rica submitted a working paper and text following up the ICJ advisory opinion and proposing multilateral negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention or framework convention, with consideration of the legal, technical and political elements. These would include "non-discriminatory general obligations, applicable to States and non-State actors, prohibiting the acquisition, development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons"; steps to remove the role of nuclear weapons from security doctrines; interim control, protection and accounting of nuclear weapons and fissile material holdings; phases and steps for the systematic and progressive destruction of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles; and establishment of an international verification and implementing organisation. The proposal by Malaysia and Costa Rica begins to flesh out the nuclear weapon convention concept endorsed in recent UN GA resolutions and called for in general terms by the NAM. Though the NWS and their allies portray the very idea of a nuclear weapon convention as unrealistic or wildly premature, ensuring that it will be excluded from any final document, a growing number of states are becoming frustrated with the slow pace, fragmentation and back-sliding that has seemed to characterise the step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament so far.

CTBT

Very few plenary statements failed to mention NPT parties' concerns about the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998 and the urgent necessity of early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Perhaps because there is wide agreement over how to characterise the importance of the CTBT, nuclear testing has not been a contentious part of deliberations at this Review Conference. The Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organisation in Vienna, Wolfgang Hoffmann, presented details on the provisions of the Treaty and the establishment of its verification and monitoring requirements. Britain and France were generally praised for being among the first to ratify, and many welcomed that the Duma had managed to approve Russian ratification just before the NPT Conference opened. Over 24 statements expressed concern at the rejection of the Treaty by the US Senate. Some of these also referred to other key countries such as China and Israel, both of which have signed but not ratified. Judging that the point was to bring India, Pakistan, and also the United States Senate on board rather than alienate them with condemnation, the widespread disappointment about the CTBT was often tied to positive expressions noting the US Administration's continuing backing for the Treaty and India and Pakistan's expressed intention to sign and not to test again.

A joint paper from five NATO countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway) welcomed Japan's efforts (as Chair of the Article XIV Conference) to facilitate further ratifications and called for the "earliest possible entry into force of the CTBT, but not later than the 2005 Review Conference". This modest target date, however, looks unlikely to make it into the final document. Several presentations, particularly from NAM countries, raised concerns about sub-critical testing, described by Switzerland as "incompatible with the preamble of the CTBT". The NAM called for compliance "with the letter and spirit of the CTBT". As noted above, South Africa and the New Agenda countries have now further underlined such concerns by proposing text on testing and modernisation.

Language under negotiation in MC.I and SB 2 'condemns' the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998, and calls upon them comply with UN SC 1172. In addition to specific calls on these two South Asian countries, draft paragraphs stress the "importance and urgency" of all signatures and ratifications, "without delay and without conditions, to achieve the early entry into force" of the CTBT. Pending entry into force, there are calls for a complete moratorium on nuclear explosions.

Fissban

Western states unanimously expressed their disappointment that the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament was still preventing negotiations on a fissban/FMCT from getting underway. Wanting to avoid multilateral negotiations on stockpiles, these statements stressed the importance of abiding by the Shannon report and mandate adopted by the CD in March 1995 and endorsed by NPT parties in the 1995 Principles and Objectives. Notwithstanding the N-5 statement's fudge linking fissban negotiations in the CD to a programme of work. China has reiterated its position that outer space issues are now more urgent for its national security than any FMCT, and that the CD should therefore accompany fissban negotiations with work on preventing the weaponisation of outer space and on nuclear disarmament. The European Union has led the way in rejecting any conditions or linkages, a position presently reflected in the MC.I and SB 2 Chair's working papers.

Japan and Australia called for conclusion of CD negotiations "preferably before 2003, but not later than 2005". The NATO-5 supported by also indicating a target date of 2005 for the fissban to be concluded. Both endorsed the many calls for there to be a moratorium on fissile material production pending entry into force of a Treaty. Among the NWS, only China has refused to declare such a moratorium, despite being reckoned to have ceased production some years ago. Outside the NPT, India, Israel and Pakistan are busy producing away.

The non-aligned states explicitly mention "production and stockpiling" in their working paper. The NWS continue to reject efforts to address the plutonium and highly-enriched uranium already in their stockpiles, although they have proposed or supported further voluntary initiatives to put fissile materials they deem surplus to military requirements under IAEA safeguards. Among Western states, however, there were a few who wanted to go further. South Korea said that it was necessary to be transparent about the stockpiles, while Ireland and Austria proposed that the NWS should work out a draft treaty and submit it to the CD for finalisation and adoption.

Norway, as it has done in the past, suggested ways to address stocks without complicating the work of the CD. Norway's Foreign Minister Thorbjorn Jagland, proposed a four-part strategy for parallel negotiations aimed at bringing fissile materials "under control with a view to net reductions". In addition to endorsing FMCT negotiations, Norway noted the proliferation risks associated with growing surpluses of weapons-usable fissile material, wanting assurances that these would not be 'diverted' into weapons programmes. Arguing that HEU produced for non-explosive purposes must also be addressed, Norway proposed that "voluntary transparency measures should be established for military inventories of fissile material". Furthermore, "reporting, inspection and safeguard procedures should... be developed... to prepare the ground for agreed monitored net reductions" of military-usable fissile materials.

During the NPT Rebecca Johnson and Jenni Rissanen can be contacted at mobile phone 917 302 2822 and fax 212 935 7690.

© 2001 The Acronym Institute.