Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

1998 NPT PrepCom - Briefing No 10
Agreement denied

The second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2000 Review Conference of the States Parties to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), chaired by Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner of Poland, ended after midnight on May 9 with no agreement on substance, recommendations or rules of procedure. After a day of tense and difficult discussions, and despite long negotiations on the Chair's working paper, which managed to achieve compromise language on fourteen paragraphs of substance, the divisions over the Middle East and the role of the strengthened review process appeared only to harden. In the end, just the first part of the PrepCom report was accepted. This described the procedural aspects of the 1998 meeting, which had been attended by 97 States Parties, and confirmed the decision to hold the Third PrepCom in New York, from 12 to 23 April, with Andelfo Garcia of Colombia as its designated Chair.

There was no agreement on background documentation for 2000, which is normally prepared in advance under the auspices of the United Nations and relevant bodies such as the IAEA and the secretariats of the various nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ), for papers to be discussed and agreed at the Third PrepCom. This means that if official background information is to be prepared in time for the 2000 Review Conference, the decision will need to be taken in 1999, leaving little time for States to review and accept it before 2000, unless a fourth PrepCom is held. Some wanted the documentation to cover the articles of the Treaty only; others wanted several papers following the line of the Principles and Objectives, including universality, non-proliferation (articles I and II), nuclear disarmament (article VI), security assurances; safeguards (article III) and non-military uses of nuclear energy (article IV) and on the CTBTO and the various established NWFZ.

The main sticking point was the request by fourteen Arab States, backed by the NAM, for background documentation dealing with the Resolution on the Middle East. The United States refused, holding that background documents should be limited to addressing the Treaty articles only. The US argued that though the Resolution on the Middle East was adopted at the 1995 Conference, it was inappropriate to have documentation on an issue that is not referred to in the Treaty itself. This was just one of many clashes over whether and how to refer to the Middle East Resolution. The US appeared to want to distance the review process from the 1995 resolution, arguing that it was a one-off, stand alone resolution and not part of the package of decisions adopted to extend the Treaty and strengthen the review process. Their position drew no visible support from other delegations and outraged the Arab States, who considered that their backing for the consensus decision on indefinite extension had been contingent on the adoption of the Middle East Resolution and that the resolution was therefore an integral part of the 1995 agreements.

There was also no agreement on the rules of procedure. The major block was over rule 34, covering the work of Committees. South Africa wanted the mention of 'working groups' to be supplemented by explicit reference to 'subsidiary bodies'. Backed by the NAM and others, they argued that this was the intention of paragraph 6 of Decision 1 taken in 1995, which stated that subsidiary bodies could be established within the respective Main Committees "for specific issues relevant to the Treaty, so as to provide for a focused consideration of such issues". South Africa wanted the concept to be explicitly in the rules of procedure, although it did not insist on the explanatory language. Russia objected to all mention of subsidiary bodies and claimed that the term 'working group' was sufficient. Attempts to include both terms also foundered. Failing to agree, the PrepCom remitted the rules of procedure for consideration at the 1999 PrepCom.

Although appearing to be over a minor difference in terminology, the conflict represented a much deeper division that ran through the entire PrepCom, and in the end caused it to fail. This debate was about the role, purpose and limitations of the Strengthened Review Process initiated in 1995. Objecting to use of the term 'subsidiary body' in the rules of procedure was another way to slam down South Africa's proposal for addressing nuclear disarmament or security assurances more coherently as part of the review.

Although the participants in the Chair's Consultations had worked long and faithfully on trying to achieve agreement on paragraphs to be added to the 'rolling text' of recommendations on issues in paragraph 3 of the 1997 Chair's working paper, few went much beyond the paragraphs agreed last year, so a number of delegates were not sorry to see these fall by the wayside as well. Wyzner has decided to issue the draft working paper and the compilation of proposals from 1998 as official documents of the PrepCom, so the content will at least be available to inform future deliberations.

A further important factor in the PrepCom's failure to adopt a substantive report was the opposition by the major nuclear weapon States to the recommendations proposed by Canada concerning reporting on the special sessions and raising current issues, and from South Africa and Egypt for allocation of time in 1999 for priority discussion of nuclear disarmament and the Middle East resolution respectively. Despite the actually more focused debate on the three issues allocated special time in 1998, the United States continued to argue that such sessions were a waste of time. The US and Russia, in particular, seemed to want to roll back the precedents set last year, as part of a concerted attempt to turn the review process into a talk shop and conveyor belt of text for the next Review Conference to consider. Countries such as Canada and South Africa, which had played important roles in achieving the 1995 agreements, were determined that the promise and intentions of those agreements should be developed appropriately and honoured in the implementation.

Reasons for Failure

What were the reasons for the failure? There were many components, not all negative. Extreme and ideological positions were less in evidence from expected quarters among the non-nuclear-weapon states. The NAM arrived much better prepared than last year, and organised more effectively around the proposals in the NAM working paper and from individual members, such as Egypt and South Africa. Though they fought hard on issues of importance to them, especially nuclear disarmament, they also offered flexibility and compromise. They were quick to support constructive proposals from western delegations, while at the same time western, including EU countries, expressed qualified support for issues of importance to the NAM. Thus some important bridge building was accomplished, including: recognising that existing fissile material stocks cannot be ignored, supporting a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, the Canberra Commission proposals on nuclear disarmament and 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, more transparency regarding export controls, and so on.

The fact that the NAM came with more coherent and reasoned positions resulted in the real locus of divided opinion being brought into sharper focus: the fundamental incompatibility of the interests of the five NWS and those of the vast majority of NNWS Parties to the Treaty. The NWS -- prominently the United States -- had made a considerable effort to respond to calls for greater transparency and accountability by providing more concrete information on what they were doing to comply with their obligations in terms of controlling and reducing military stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, decommissioning and so on. However, they seemed to want to stop there. Acting individually, the NWS appeared to support each other in a primary objective of limiting the potential role and relevance of the enhanced review process.

Russia is enmeshed in its own political difficulties and took an exceedingly conservative position on almost everything. China said little in the procedural debates but was clearly unhappy with the idea of the review process having a role in facilitating and commenting on current issues. In relation to EU positions, France held the line on behalf of itself and Britain to prevent the positions of anti-nuclear partners from being expressed in EU statements, but on the floor of the PrepCom, France was significantly among those seeking constructive ways through the deadlocks. Britain was not positively negative but the absence of new policy (blamed on the delayed publication of the Strategic Defence Review undertaken in 1997) resulted in Britain playing a conservative role and appearing curiously disengaged. Britain had several important hats, as a depositary government, President of the EU and Chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In view of the constructive role it might have played, Britain's forced constraint and passiveness was unhelpful and must be assessed as a real lost opportunity.

Another important lesson learned is the necessity for more preparation in advance of the meeting and for the Chair/Bureau to have some game-plans for dealing with the most contentious issues. There is not much that a meeting can do about external events, but some conflicts are recurring or predictable and might be handled differently in the future. Taking place at a time of NATO expansion and START at a standstill, as well as high political tension and the lack of concrete progress in British and US initiatives on the Middle East peace process, the PrepCom was saturated with the spray thrown up by external political events.

It was difficult for delegations -- and not only from the Arab States -- to accept the US attempts to marginalise the Middle East Resolution. The existence of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and non-accession by a small number of countries to the Treaty are relevant issues to the content and scope of the NPT and its review process. The US only undermined its own commitment to non-proliferation by its attempts to exempt Israel's nuclear capability from discussion, although it is also important to prevent the Treaty being misused in the pursuit of wider political objectives. The US became increasingly isolated in its approach, inviting comparison with the ludicrous interventions by Bhutan and Mauritius at the end, in which they attacked the references to South Asia in various NPT documents and the NAM statement.

NPT Briefing 10 provides a final snapshot analysis of the issues, dynamics and tactics that led to the failure of the Second PrepCom. A fuller analysis will take more time and is planned for publication in the June edition of Disarmament Diplomacy. The general feeling, however, is that although the PrepCom could not get agreement, the time was not wasted. Substantive issues were addressed; constructive and interesting proposals were offered not only for the NPT review process, but also to facilitate progress in the CD and in nuclear arms control in general, for consideration by the States directly concerned. The outcome of the Second PrepCom is not (yet) indication of a failing review process, as it foundered on real and relevant political differences. If it acts as a warning to those who would subordinate this important cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime to their narrow national interests and if lessons can be learned and applied, the problems of the Second PrepCom may prove to have beneficial consequences for the NPT regime as a whole. But only if there is the political will on the part of all the States Parties, especially the NWS, to make it work for the good of all.

WRITTEN BY REBECCA JOHNSON

BRIEFING FROM THE ACRONYM INSTITUTE - May 8 1998

1998 NPT PrepCom - Briefing No 9
Brinkmanship

With just one day to go and facing the prospect of getting even less than in 1997, the non-nuclear-weapon Parties to the NPT are facing a stark choice: whether it is better to have a minimal agreement or no agreement at all. As the President of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference pointed out in a recent article: "the importance of 1995 as a watershed demanding a fundamentally different approach to the review process does not appear to have been grasped and, instead, a 'business as usual' attitude is being self-righteously adopted by some countries." [Jayantha Dhanapala, in the UNIDIR newsletter 37, March 1998, p 9]

An hour short of midnight, delegates to the Second PrepCom of the 2000 Review Conference emerged from open-ended consultations under the auspices of the Chair, Eugeniusz Wyzner of Poland. Some appeared quietly pleased that the PrepCom appeared to be heading for oblivion; some were frustrated or angry, because even the modest gains of 1997 have been put in jeopardy; a few were complacent that the lid would stay on and the PrepCom would close with some form of lowest-common-denominator report; all were hot and tired. Disagreements are sharpest on three issues: the Middle East, security assurances and nuclear disarmament.

During the day three sets of negotiations were pursued among representatives of some 30-35 delegations (in addition to those identified in Briefing 8 are Argentina, Belgium, Italy, Hungary, Netherlands, Morocco, Syria, South Korea, with a few others participating at times). The main consultations focused on trying to get agreement on around 22 paragraphs of compromise language proposed in a Chair's "non-paper" which, if accepted, would probably be destined for inclusion in paragraph 3 of the Chair's working paper. Two other groups met, under the auspices of Andelfo Garcia (Colombia) and Markku Reimaa (Finland), with a view to ascertaining whether agreement would be possible on procedural recommendations to the next PrepCom and to the 2000 Review Conference and to consider Canada's proposal that current issues should be reflected in the Chair's paper or PrepCom report.

After hours of intensive negotiations, 11 or 12 paragraphs had been agreed, with compromise language on universality, non-proliferation, NWFZ, safeguards, illegal trafficking, nuclear energy, safety and transport. Outstanding issues include several paragraphs relating to Article VI on nuclear disarmament, security assurances and proposed language on export controls and attacks against nuclear facilities. Some of the NWS want to dilute a proposed reference to the ICJ opinion 'to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects...' and water down references to fissile material stockpiles. On security assurances they would prefer to emphasise the assurances associated with NWFZ and their unilateral assurances, as well as UNSC 984 (April 1995), rather than negotiations on a legally binding treaty or protocol to the NPT.

Garcia's consultations concerned the procedures for the Third (1999) PrepCom, including whether to recommend that additional time be allocated for specific issues, as proposed by South Africa on nuclear disarmament and Egypt on the Middle East, and already provided to three issues at this second PrepCom. Despite -- or because of -- the fact that the special sessions on the FMCT, the Middle East and security assurances generated more focused papers and constructive suggestions than the generalised cluster debates, the NWS are reportedly opposing the allocation of time to any issues in the future. Their intransigence is giving rise to concern that they are seeking to roll back the precedents set by the First PrepCom in 1997, which some delegations are determined to defend. Due to further opposition from some of the NWS, Garcia's group was reportedly unable even to find language that would reflect (let alone recommend) the proposal from South Africa for establishment of a subsidiary body at the 2000 Review Conference.

Reimaa's consultations looked at Canada's proposals for the PrepCom to report on the issues which had been given particular time and attention and to have some provision for commenting on relevant issues of the day. The NWS appear set against giving the PrepComs this kind of relevant role or provision, arguing that paragraph 3 could adequately reflect any such issues as were capable of attracting agreement. Despite achieving no agreement on the concept, however, the group attempted to find language that would reflect the special sessions on FMCT, security assurances and the Middle East, the latter being the subject of difficult negotiations between Egypt and others.

The NPT Parties are due to return to the Chair's consultations on Friday morning to try to find agreement on the remaining issues. This will not be easy, as a growing number of delegations are already indicating that they will resist what they see as a concerted attempt by the nuclear weapon states to turn the review process into a mere drafting exercise. While there is still time to show a willingness to engage constructively, build on the work of the first PrepCom, and provide room to make progress on important procedural and substantive questions towards the year 2000, the optimistic mood of the first week has vanished.

Cluster Debate Summaries

The cluster debates finished on Wednesday, after statements were delivered on Article IV and security assurances, to which a special session had been devoted. Due to the fact that the cluster debates are open only to NPT Parties, it has not been possible to do more than provide a snapshot or gist of the issues, as raised. As more of the papers become available, however, I hope to provide more extensive coverage of the substantive issues discussed during the Second PrepCom in a longer analysis which will be published in June in Disarmament Diplomacy 26.

Nuclear energy

In this short debate, many statements supported the Article IV provision on nuclear energy and called for wider financial contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund. Austria, however, refused to back nuclear power and criticised the increasingly common argument that enhanced nuclear energy use is the solution to the problems of fossil fuels and climate change. Some concerns were raised about the environmental and health risks from nuclear operations and the transshipment of radioactive waste and plutonium, and several countries called for wider adherence to the various conventions on nuclear safety, and the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste, civil liability etc. Many statements welcomed the IAEA's recently published Plutonium Management Guidelines.

Both China and Iran objected to measures that went beyond the IAEA safeguards, arguing that 'peaceful uses' were still being impeded. Repeating its concerns about export controls, arguing that "these unilaterally restrictive measures had negative consequences" on the development of countries, Iran proposed that "effective transfer guidelines" be multilaterally negotiated among all supplier and recipient states. While EU states and others reiterated the importance of the export control regime to enable supplier states to comply with their Treaty obligations under Articles I and II, Britain, as current Chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, also reported on the first steps being undertaken by the NSG to provide greater transparency, in line with the 1995 P&O decisions.

In response to a request made by Kyrgyzstan in the General Debate, the IAEA briefly reported on various radiological assessment studies of areas affected by nuclear production, testing, dumping or accidents, including Chernobyl, Tomsk, Moruroa and Fangataufa, Bikini Atoll, Semipalatinsk and the Arctic around the Kara and Barents Seas.

Security Assurances

In the time allocated by the first PrepCom for focusing on security assurances, South Africa called for negotiations on legally binding security assurances "within the NPT umbrella, as opposed to some other forum". South Africa has also issued a working paper on security assurances in which it argues that the beneficiaries of such guarantees should be the non-nuclear weapon parties to the NPT, and that the differences between NNWS which are part of nuclear alliances and those which are not would also need to be reflected. The general NAM position favours unconditional security assurances to all NNWS, regardless. China called for a legally binding international agreement on no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against NNWS, and said there was "no reason to impose various obligations" on the NNWS. China also called for a no-first-use agreement among the NWS. Despite the frequent references in NAM countries' statements to the ad hoc committee on negative security assurances (NSA) recently established in the CD, there seems to be a growing eagerness among NAM countries to pursue this issue in the NPT context as well. Myanmar argued that a protocol to the NPT or other legally binding instrument on NSA was a goal "achievable in time for the 2000 Review Conference only if the nuclear weapon states show a greater measure of political will."

Although acknowledging the support by many States for a global NSA treaty, the United States said that the time was not ripe, but that it was "useful to continue consideration of this issue" in the CD. In the US view, "the best opportunity to make progress" on NSA was in the context of regional approaches involving NWFZ. Australia agreed, but also would not rule out the option of a protocol to the NPT. Reminding NPT Parties of the substantive work on security assurances accomplished in 1995 under the auspices of Richard Starr, as Friend of the Chair of Main Committee I, Australia attached his report, although the 1995 NPTREC's failure to agree a Final Document meant that the report could not be formally adopted.

WRITTEN BY REBECCA JOHNSON

BRIEFING FROM THE ACRONYM INSTITUTE - May 6 1998

1998 NPT PrepCom - Briefing No 8
The Review Process at Risk

Process and Products

The cluster debates have now covered safeguards, nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ), including the session especially allocated to the Middle East Resolution, and have begun to consider nuclear energy issues. Additionally, the NPT Parties are grappling with different options for how the strengthened review process should be developing. Beginning last Friday, representatives of around 26 key delegations have begun to hold meetings under the auspices of the Chair of the Second PrepCom, Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner, to determine how best to report on the work and outcome of the PrepCom.

This informal 'Friends of the Chair' group, similar to those which assisted Jayantha Dhanapala in 1995 and Pasi Patokallio in 1997, appears to include: Algeria, Australia, Britain, China, Chile, Colombia (Vice Chair), Canada, Egypt, France, Finland (Vice Chair), Germany, Iran, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Poland (Chair), Russia, Romania, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, United States and Viet Nam. At present it is wrestling with how to characterise and transmit the many proposals arising from the first two PrepComs.

There are conflicting viewpoints about the structure and scope of reports or 'products' of the meeting. The major problems hinge on two very different perspectives about the desired role and relevance of the strengthened review process as a whole. The NWS and some of their allies appear to favour a 'minimalist' approach, in which the primary job of the PrepComs is to accumulate proposals for text which would eventually end up in the hands of the Review Conference participants in 2000. In that case, the 1997 model is favoured, in which the Chair's working paper contains a shortish section reflecting generalised affirmations or agreement on certain issues (as in paragraph 3 of the 1997 Chair's working paper), while the rest of the proposals end up in a long compilation, regardless of their degree of backing. In 1997 the compilation was placed as paragraph 4 and extended for 30 pages.

At the time of the First PrepCom, Mexico and some of the NAM countries gave notice that they did not want the Chair's working paper to be relied upon too closely as the basis for future work. Concerned that the PrepComs should have relevance in their own right, and not merely be conveyor belts of text for the quinquennial review conferences, several delegations are therefore exploring ways in which the report(s) could better represent the more substantive role given to the PrepComs in the 1995 decisions on strengthening the review.

Consistent with its proposals for the PrepCom to issue statements on the CTBT and START, Canada has suggested that in addition to general agreements and compiled proposals, the PrepCom or Chair's report should contain two sections which would specifically reflect the important issues at the time, likely to change with each PrepCom. Thus one part would briefly report on the issues to which special time had been allocated (for this year that would be security assurances, the resolution on the Middle East, and FMCT) and another section would contain collective perspectives or agreements of a time-urgent or more specific nature than envisaged in the general agreements, since the current paragraph 3 is directed more to the 2000 Review Conference.

The intention would be to enable NPT Parties to comment on relevant issues of the day, providing somewhere to highlight calls for the ratification of specific measures, like START II, the CTBT, or the additional protocols to IAEA safeguards agreements, or give support to up-coming activities, such as the political 'entry-into-force' conference of the CTBT or the meeting of five Central Asian states in Bishkek to develop their proposed NWFZ.

South Africa has suggested that the PrepCom should issue three documents: one with recommendations on 'principles, objectives and ways' to implement the Treaty, following the format of the 1995 P&O, updated where necessary; a second with specific proposals and initiatives that had not yet obtained agreement; and thirdly, the procedural arrangements for the review conference, financial arrangements etc. South Africa also suggested that the review conference should focus on producing two documents: a 2000 Principles and Objectives, to be a guide and yardstick for progress towards the next review conference in 2005; and a Final Declaration, to review and evaluate the previous five years.

Though several delegations have expressed interest in looking more closely at these ideas, the focus has so far been weighted towards reproducing the 1997 model. A first draft of a possible Chair's working paper along those lines ran to 46 pages, adding proposals from this year to last year's compilation. As the informal Chair's group began to look at whether certain recommendations in the (paragraph 4) compilation could be 'moved up' into the paragraph 3 section, denoting general agreement, it became clear that such a process would be very time consuming and, possibly, unworkable in the long run.

It would be a pity if the PrepComs are drowned in a sea of proposals aimed at the year 2000 when they themselves have a more direct role to play in contributing to the strength of the non-proliferation regime. The first week of substantive discussion had been characterised by genuine attempts by the NAM and a number of other States, including some of the NWS, to seek more flexible and constructive ways of moving forward on issues such as the FMCT, NWFZ and transparency. Those who backed the special allocation of time to certain issues could see their hopes confirmed to a considerable degree by the more focused and solution-oriented contributions in the session allocated to the FMCT, markedly different from the wider restatements of national positions and exhortations which seem to characterise cluster debates. Such positive developments need to be encouraged, built upon and reported, so that they can facilitate and feed into bilateral or regional processes or the work of negotiating bodies like the CD. If the PrepComs do not successfully carve out a more relevant and substantive role we are likely to see many NPT Parties begin to lose interest. If that happens there is a danger that the strengthened review process may not last much beyond the year 2000.

Safeguards

The debate on safeguards was short, with little apparent disagreement. States urged each other to accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards and conclude their agreements with the IAEA on the additional protocols developed under the 93+2 programme to strengthen the safeguards regime. Some also urged the non-NPT States to consider applying some provisions of the Model Protocol. Some statements raised concerns illicit trafficking and several urged North Korea and Iraq to comply fully with their NPT obligations and safeguards agreements. There was support for the NWS to place 'excess' fissile materials irreversibly under IAEA safeguards and the EU statement also backed an intended project by France, Germany and Russia to turn excess weapons plutonium into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. Many also affirmed support for nuclear-related export controls, which Iran and some NAM states have already criticised.

NWFZ

This short debate conveyed general support for the various NWFZ now in existence and called on the NWS to respect their provisions and to sign and ratify relevant protocols where that had not yet been done (notably with respect to the Bangkok Treaty). In the General Debate, Ukraine had reaffirmed its backing for the establishment of a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe. Following on from general debate statements from Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan updated NPT Parties on the progress being made together with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, to develop a NWFZ in Central Asia. The next consultations between these five countries, the P-5 and representatives of the IAEA and United Nations are scheduled to take place on July 9 and 10 at Bishkek, with the intention of working out the elements of a Treaty.

South Africa not only endorsed the objective of a NWFZ in the Middle East, but made specific reference to South Asia as well. Noting that the possession of nuclear weapons "provides only the illusion of security", South Africa argued that after destroying its own nuclear capability, it now realised that "security is provided by nuclear disarmament rather than by nuclear proliferation" -- a lesson relevant for the declared NWS as well as the 'threshold' States.

The Middle East

Although Israel's unsafeguarded nuclear facilities were alluded to during some of the cluster 2 discussions on safeguards and NWFZ, time was specifically allocated to the Middle East in accordance with the intentions of the 1997 PrepCom. The EU and a number of other countries expressed support for the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East "provided that all States in the region are involved". Egypt proposed several paragraphs for actions and recommendations to implement the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. These included: endorsement of the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process; suggestions for studies and action on eliminating nuclear, chemical and biological weapons from the region; reference to the continued existence of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities; calls for Israel to accede to the NPT and put its nuclear facilities under full scope IAEA safeguards; support and assistance from NPT states, the United Nations and the IAEA for "early conclusion of the text of a treaty on a NWFZ as a step towards the establishment of a WMDFZ in the Middle East". Egypt's position was supported by a number of other Arab States. The United States responded that singling out one country would not be conducive to resolving the problems in that troubled region. Little of the debate was available to those outside the closed doors.

WRITTEN BY REBECCA JOHNSON

BRIEFING FROM THE ACRONYM INSTITUTE - May 4 1998

1998 NPT PrepCom - Briefing No 7
Procedural Questions and FMCT

Where is the PrepCom leading?

As the first week of the Second PrepCom drew to a close, questions need to be asked about where this is all leading. After a constructive week of debates, including a number of useful and interesting ideas for facilitating the start of negotiations on a fissile materials production ban and making further progress on nuclear disarmament, the frustration level was high as diplomats from about 25 key NPT Parties emerged from a "private meeting" held under the auspices of the Chair, Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner of Poland, late on Friday.

More clarity is needed regarding what NPT Parties want the Review Process to achieve and what they want to come out of this PrepCom in particular. The Polish delegation itself offered some general guidelines, saying that it was necessary for the strengthened review process to meet a "two-fold objective": to review the operation of the Treaty, in order to satisfy the requirements of Article VIII.3; and to "promote the practical implementation of the 'Principles and Objectives' of 1995". Yet as more states put in text to the already heavy compilation of proposals attached to the Chair's working paper in 1997, what is all this profusion of language leading to?

Was the entire review process intended to be a four-year gathering of text for the final document or other agreements to be adopted in the year 2000? Much of the language being proposed now and carefully laid down will be redundant by the year 2000. The Main Committees at the 2000 Review Conference will end up reviewing all these issues and will generate even more text. Devoting the review process to elongating the tedious process of accumulating text does not seem a very good use of the time and money and would not adequately fulfil the aspirations of the States Parties in 1995 for a meaningful and strengthened process for reviewing and implementing the Treaty.

What, then, should the review process be doing? A majority of States now seem to agree that the 1995 P&O should stand as a benchmark of its time, but not be revised or amended in the future. Instead, they seem keen to see an updated (new) set of Principles and Objectives being developed for each Review Conference in the future. Not all will be new, of course, as many of the principles in the P&O are enduring and need only to be re-stated. Time-dependent objectives, however, such as the programme of action on nuclear disarmament or references to specific NWFZ, would need to be reformulated and updated. This would seem to be a useful and workable proposal, providing that States agree i) that P&O should be renewed in this way every five years; and ii) that in between the Review Conferences, a primary task of the strengthened review process is to work on implementing the P&O agreed at the preceding review conference. Otherwise, why go to the bother of adopting them in the first place?

If it is agreed that a major task of the review process is to facilitate the implementation of the preceding P&O, then proposals at PrepComs should go into three categories: i) actions to be undertaken by the PrepCom itself, such as Canada's proposals for the PrepCom to issue a statement on START or endorse holding the CTBT conference on entry into force in 1999; ii) recommendations to the next PrepCom, such as proposals for special time to be allocated for certain issues; and iii) recommendations to the next Review Conference, such as deciding that future Review Conferences should formulate their own set of P&O or South Africa's proposals for a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament.

Although NPT Parties cannot impose their recommendations directly on other fora, such as the CD or bilateral or regional bodies, a further very important function of the review process should be to provide a sounding board for constructive ideas aimed at resolving obstacles or conflicts that stand in the way of negotiations or activities relevant to the NPT's full implementation. In that respect, the discussion on the FMCT has been helpful, even if NPT parties cannot themselves go further than expressing a formal or informal call for more to be done to facilitate progress. Nevertheless, the ideas can be channelled back to the CD or the bilateral or regional participants in ways that can exert pressure or assist solution-building.

As for accumulating text and recommendations for the next Review Conference, it would seem sensible not to start gathering language for an updated P&O until the 2000 Review Conference itself and to spend less energy on repetitive language proposals for potential review documents that are likely to be out of date before they are even considered for agreement. The strengthened review process deserves to have more relevance than that.

FMCT

Many States spoke positively of the debate on addressing fissile materials. Several useful proposals for getting beyond the 'nuclear disarmament versus non-proliferation' debate have been advanced. While the NWS are still adamant that the first stage should be a limited cut-off treaty, some, including Britain and France, are accepting that the Shannon mandate did not preclude discussion of wider issues within the context of the negotiations. The United States and Russia emphasised what they were already doing to declare some plutonium and HEU as 'excess' and place it under IAEA safeguards.

Although the NAM statement referred to the objective of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile materials for nuclear weapons et al, many States took heart from the fact that they did not make their call for the immediate commencement of negotiations dependent on CD negotiations for timebound nuclear disarmament. In a similarly constructive vein, while supporting Austria's February proposal for the CD to start negotiations on the basis of the 1995 Shannon mandate, a number of Western delegations have suggested ways in which the thorny question of asymmetric stockpiles could be addressed in conjunction with a cut-off treaty. Canada reiterated its CD proposal for a Presidential statement to redefine the context of the core Shannon mandate, especially with respect to scope negotiations and entry into force, a suggestion backed by several states. Norway affirmed the four points in its 1997 proposal for voluntary transparency measures, including cooperative international measures to clarify and confirm the voluntary declarations, with encouragement for the NWS to permit inspections of their holdings and agreed monitored reductions of the stockpiles.

One of the more innovative proposals came from Australia, building on the statement of the Foreign Minister to the CD in February. Recognising that if approaches to a FMCT are to succeed, they must take account of the security situations of the NWS and non-NPT states and their regions, Australia put forward the view of a cut-off treaty not as a stand alone, one-off negotiation, but rather as "a framework instrument which evolves into a comprehensive regime governing the production, stockpiling and disposition of fissile material". Accordingly, Australia proposed that the conclusion of a first treaty codifying a basic FMCT should be followed by "a second agreement providing for greater transparency over fissile material inventories and gradually bringing fissile material stocks under strict and effective international control". Verification would also require "an innovative, multifaceted approach involving a balance of bilateral, plurilateral and appropriate international -- and possibly regional -- arrangements..."

NAM countries, however, including Egypt, Indonesia and South Africa, emphasised the importance of any fissban covering not only future but also past production as well as the management of weapon-usable fissile materials. Indonesia posed five questions to be addressed in fissban negotiations and called for plutonium and HEU from dismantled warheads to be placed in internationally-monitored storage "in order to assure that they will not be re-used for weapons"

WRITTEN BY REBECCA JOHNSON

BRIEFING FROM THE ACRONYM INSTITUTE - May 4 1998

1998 NPT PrepCom - Briefing No 6
Cluster 1: Nuclear Disarmament

Around 30 delegations spoke during the closed Cluster 1 debates on nuclear disarmament, of which some 23 papers were made available. Recurring themes included: calling on all States to sign and ratify the CTBT; expediting the start of negotiations on a fissile materials production ban as early as possible (as the subject of a specially allocated session, the FMCT/fissban issue will be addressed separately in NPT Briefing 7); welcoming progress in the bilateral START process and urging the ratification of START II by the Russian Duma plus the encouragement of further measures under the rubric of START III; urging progress involving all the NWS, especially with regard to measures identified by the Canberra Commission for immediate action; increased levels of transparency, confidence-building and information sharing by the NWS; and instituting an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the CD, with or without a negotiating mandate.

The NAM working paper reiterated its position from 1997, for the CD to negotiate a phased programme of nuclear disarmament leading to a nuclear weapons convention, a position stressed by several states including Malaysia, Indonesia, Colombia, Mexico and Egypt. As China, Russia and the United States had done in the General Debate, France and Britain outlined the steps they have already taken towards compliance with the NPT obligations on nuclear disarmament. None of the NATO States responded to the criticism by NAM states questioning their compliance with Articles I and II. The NAM have urged the NWS and NNWS to refrain from "nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements" and Egypt specifically proposed that the PrepCom recommend to the 2000 Review Conference to state in "clear and unambiguous terms that Articles I and II...allow for no exceptions and that the NPT is binding on States Parties at all times".

Implementing P&O programme

Many of the statements outlined national positions with regard to nuclear disarmament and some proposed language to be included in a 'rolling text' of recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference. Several delegations made direct or oblique reference to item 4c of the P&O, "to pursue systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons", and to the importance of the steps identified by the Canberra Commission which should be undertaken by the five NWS without delay, such as: taking nuclear weapons off alert; transparency measures for nuclear weapons and military stockpiles of fissile materials; restrictions on the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons; opening the ABM Treaty to accession by Britain, China and France; commitments not to modernise or increase the size of nuclear arsenals, and so on.

Also building on the practical proposals put forward by the Canberra Commission, US National Academy of Sciences and others, South Africa went a step further with a pragmatic proposal for using the NPT Review Process to give the P&O programme concrete content. Taking the implementation of item 4c as its starting point and recognising the need for "a structured opportunity to deliberate on the practical steps" for implementing Article VI and the programme of action outlined in the P&O, South Africa proposed i) specific time to be allocated at the Third PrepCom in 1999; ii) for the 2000 Review Conference to decide to allocate specific time to practical consideration of nuclear disarmament steps at future PrepComs; and iii) the establishment at the 2000 Review Conference of a subsidiary body to Main Committee 1 to provide more structured and focused deliberations on the implementation of the nuclear disarmament provisions of the P&O and Article VI.

The NAM states, including Mexico, have welcomed these proposals as a positive step forwards. Although western countries such as New Zealand, Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium have expressed interest in this practical approach to addressing nuclear disarmament issues in the review process, others have seemed reluctant, either because they argue that nuclear disarmament gets sufficient attention in the cluster debates, or on the grounds that such focused action by NPT Parties could detract from the work of the CD or the bilateral START process underway. South Africa, however, had emphasised the continued importance of the bilateral reductions (and also future negotiations involving all the NWS). Pretoria's recent role at the forefront of efforts to enable the CD to address nuclear disarmament more effectively also clearly demonstrated its commitment to addressing nuclear disarmament issues in both fora, as is appropriate. In many ways, the South African proposal to provide a structured mechanism for information exchange between the NWS and NNWS regarding practical steps towards nuclear disarmament is also consistent with growing calls for greater transparency coming from many sides, including the NAM, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, the Netherlands, Australia, Finland and Belgium.

Furthering START

A large number of delegations stressed the importance of furthering the START process and hoped that Russia would ratify soon. While some appeared reasonably satisfied with current progress, others, notably the NAM states, expressed concern that such "limited agreements" did not go far enough. A number of States, including Russia, Sweden, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Germany, Japan, and several NAM delegations have alluded to the importance of involving China, Britain and France more in the future and to encouraging five-power talks on nuclear disarmament issues. Arguing that NPT Parties should be able to take a direct role, as well as evolving text for future review documents, Canada proposed a 'Draft Statement on Current START Standstill', intended to be issued either by the PrepCom or as a Chair's statement at the end of this meeting. The statement built on the 1997 UN General Assembly resolution co-sponsored by the US and Russia (among others), and was intended to encourage START II ratification and further progress on START III. Although Canada's proposal has attracted interest from a number of delegations, Russia and the United States have so far shown little enthusiasm for issuing such a statement from the PrepCom.

CTBT

Many States also want the NPT Review process to urge all States to accede to the CTBT. The NAM statement further called on the NWS to refrain from "conducting all types of tests" and to "comply with the letter and spirit of the CTBT". While Switzerland underlined the CTBT's role in limiting the development of new or qualitatively improved nuclear weapons, others were even more explicit. Sweden, for example, urged the NWS to exercise the "utmost restraint regarding any activity that could undermine the fundamental objectives of the CTBT, including so-called sub-critical experiments." Canada proposed that the NPT PrepCom endorse calls for the political conference to facilitate the CTBT's entry into force (as per Article XIV of the Treaty) to be convened in 1999, before the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Canada's proposal is supported by many States, although there have been reports that Russia and possibly others are pushing for the Conference to take place after 2000.

CD Nuclear Disarmament Committee

The NAM working paper called explicitly for the CD to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, "taking into account all proposals which have been submitted by members of the Group of 21...". This would include proposals made in 1997 by Egypt and by 26 NAM members of the CD for multilateral negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament, including time-tables, and also South Africa's proposal for it "to deliberate upon practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as to identify if and when one or more such steps should be the subject of negotiations..." Several Western States also now back CD work on nuclear disarmament, ranging from support for South Africa's non-negotiating mandate or Canada's proposal for "substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues with a view to identifying if and when one or more such issues might be negotiated multilaterally" to Belgium's very mild proposal for an "ad hoc group for reflection and study". Japan called for information exchange and discussion of practical issues in various fora, including the CD and the NPT review process, and hoped that a session of the UN Disarmament Conference in November in Nagasaki would be devoted to practical aspects of nuclear disarmament.

The NWS

China and Russia's positions on nuclear disarmament questions were outlined and reported on earlier. France and Britain both gave similar accounts, which also mirrored many points emphasised by the United States, which elaborated further on its general statement. Emphasis was placed on nuclear safety and security, bilateral negotiations and also French and British unilateral steps to end their deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, as well as increasing transparency and halting fissile materials production. All pushed for commencement of FMCT negotiations in accordance with the Shannon report and mandate, as well as stressing other States' responsibility for making progress on nuclear disarmament possible. Many States have commended the early ratification of the CTBT by France and Britain, of which both were justifiably proud, and the NWS all urged support for the test ban treaty and its early entry into force. France described closing its Pacific test site and dismantling operations at Moruroa and Fangataufa, and also pointed out that it has taken a further step of decommissioning its plutonium and HEU production facilities at Marcoule and Pierrelatte.

Most of the nuclear disarmament debate was general, with much rhetoric on making further progress. Proposals fell into two categories: text for taking to the 2000 Review Conference, and specific proposals for action to be taken by this PrepCom, such as Egypt and South Africa's recommendations and Canada's proposals on START and the CTBT. However, there was little agreement on how to move forwards.

WRITTEN BY REBECCA JOHNSON

BRIEFING FROM THE ACRONYM INSTITUTE - April 30 1998

1998 NPT PrepCom - Briefing No 5
General Debate Concludes

The general exchange of views at the Second PrepCom concluded on Wednesday morning with statements from Viet Nam, Chile, Argentina, Malaysia and also the United Kingdom on behalf of the five declared nuclear weapon states (P-5). In addition, this briefing will cover several statements given during Tuesday's debate.

The debate on cluster 1, dealing with nuclear disarmament, is taking place on Wednesday and Thursday, with the special debate on the fissile material production ban or cut-off (FMCT) scheduled for Thursday afternoon, but likely to spill into Friday. There have been numerous statements with some interesting new proposals, notably from South Africa, Canada and Australia. As the cluster debates are now closed to NGOs, however, it will take a bit longer to collect and assimilate the various interventions that I was not present to hear, so briefings on the nuclear disarmament and FMCT debates will not be ready until Monday.

Review Process

In the General debate, Mexico made clear its view that the Review Process should go beyond the "first exercise" and results of the 1997 PrepCom, in order to put together a coherent compilation of ideas, principles and concrete methods that could serve as recommendations for the full implementation of the Treaty's objectives, and "above all, nuclear disarmament". Sri Lanka emphasised that the PrepComs should be viewed as a "cumulative process that would drive the 2000 Review" and reminded delegates that it was their responsibility to "formulate strategies to influence and accelerate the progress leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons". Sri Lanka stressed that the nuclear disarmament cluster should have priority and be given sufficient focus and time. Iran argued for the establishment of a "follow-up mechanism" to ensure full implementation of the Treaty and recommendations, and proposed creating an "open-ended standing committee" to address all aspects of the NPT, including compliance issues. Chile suggested that the ideal method for progress should utilise the Chair's paper from the first PrepCom and incorporate national positions and new elements with the aim of formulating concrete and constructive proposals. Chile also expressed support and interest in Canada's proposals. Australia backed South Africa's view that it would be "logical and desirable" to work for a new P&O document "which would guide our nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in the period after the 2000 Review Conference..."

Egypt proclaimed that the "ultimate aim of the NPT is universal nuclear disarmament" and proposed that NPT States should "submit written reports on the progress achieved to date and their future plans to implement each provision of the Principles and Objectives" (P&O). South Korea backed calls for the NWS to be "more forthcoming in informing the international community of the activities and progress in their efforts toward nuclear disarmament".

Principal Issues Raised

Several states proclaimed that nuclear disarmament was of the highest priority. Malaysia and Egypt argued that "outmoded nuclear deterrence strategies and doctrines" must be delegitimised and abandoned. Malaysia regretted that the unanimous ICJ opinion which "unambiguously underscored the States Parties' obligation under Article VI of the NPT" and had twice been endorsed by the UN General Assembly (1996 resolution 51/45M and 1997 resolution 52/38O) "has yet to be responded positively to by the nuclear weapon states".

Several NAM delegations endorsed the non-aligned statement, with Viet Nam and Colombia expressing their fullest backing. Colombia also underlined the priority importance of nuclear disarmament and the ICJ's authoritative advisory opinion. Sri Lanka called on the Review Process to address nuclear smuggling and terrorism, issues of safety and the environment, export-import control of illicit nuclear material, and institutional support from the IAEA. Sri Lanka wanted nuclear disarmament to be addressed in the CD as well as by the NPT review process. Calling on all states to promote the entry into force of the CTBT, Sri Lanka also warned that "if testing continues, under whatever pretext, technical or other" it could undermine the CTBT. Egypt expressed its scepticism that the presidential consultations on nuclear disarmament recently agreed by the CD would bear fruit, citing the lack of political will of some of the NWS. Chile gave its general support to the NAM statement but mentioned that it had reservations on certain paragraphs.

While many delegations affirmed their support for negotiations on the fissban, Australia argued for the PrepCom to make recommendations that would enable the CD to get to work on the FMCT on the basis of the 1995 Shannon Report. Egypt again argued that it supported the general aim of banning fissile materials, but "it can only be effective if it is applied to both future as well as already produced fissile material, i.e. stockpiles". Malaysia and Viet Nam mentioned the South East Asian NWFZ Treaty (Bangkok), which entered into force on 27 March 1997, hoping that consultations between the NWS and countries in the region would enable the protocols to be signed and ratified by all the NWS. Several countries, particularly Egypt, Syria and Iran, raised concerns about the current obstacles to establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and hoped that the review process would work out practical steps towards implementing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

Chile and Argentina both raised concerns about shipments of nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel moving through adjacent waters, wanting coordination in the international fora to strengthen safety regulations. Argentina especially recalled two communiqués in January 1997, from Argentina and from Chile, Brazil and Uruguay, calling for regulations including guarantees on routes, obligations to communicate to coastal states for emergency planning in the event of accident, and provisions for salvage and compensation if such an accident should occur.

Many, including Chile, Colombia, Algeria, Egypt and Viet Nam, emphasised the importance of negative security assurances, which Algeria called an essential measure to accompany the non-proliferation regime. Although they generally seemed to endorse the goal of an NSA protocol to the NPT, Egypt summed up the dominant NAM support for this work to be done by the recently-established ad hoc committee in the CD, rather than through the NPT Review Process.

Several countries also emphasised the importance of the Article IV commitment to the "inalienable right" to nuclear energy. Chile called for more transparency on export controls and said that the export control regime should be progressively multilateralised in its structure and scope. Australia called for a "strong but transparent nuclear export control regime". Iran focused a significant part of its intervention on criticising the policies and practices of the export control regime set up under the auspices of the Nuclear Supplier Group, quoting the 1995 P&O regarding the promotion of transparency and claiming that the NPT declaration had recognised the IAEA as the "sole competent authority", although that language was not adopted in any of the consensus decisions. Iran also called for security arrangements to prevent safeguarded nuclear facilities from being attacked.

South Korea gave 'ardent backing' to the activities of the CTBT Organisation's Preparatory Commission and Provision Technical Secretariat in establishing the verification regime, urging all States to sign and ratify. This just preceded a detailed statement on the CTBTO PrepCom's progress towards implementing the test ban treaty, presented by Masabumi Sato, Director of the Legal and External Relations Division of the PTS. South Korea also raised concern about North Korea's "non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement", citing three inter-related elements.

In this regard, I would like to apologise to the DPRK for wrongly attributing part of the delay in starting the first NPT PrepCom in 1997 to their request to be seated as an observer rather than a State Party and for implying that they might do the same this year. I now understand that the delay was wholly due to the difficulties over Yugoslavia's seat, and that beyond an initial inquiry, DPRK has not attempted to attend the NPT meetings since 1995.

P-5 Statement

The five declared NWS have continued with the precedent, set in 1997, of presenting a paper with their "shared views" regarding NPT implementation. Read by a British representative, the P-5 statement called on all states to "contribute to the success" of the CTBT and urged immediate commencement of negotiations of a FMCT in accordance with the 1995 Shannon report to the CD. Most of the statement was a bland but collective reaffirmation of support for various aspects of the Treaty, with particular emphasis on the enhanced IAEA safeguards regime and nuclear security and safety issues, including transparency in the development of nuclear energy. The P-5 interest in transparency did not appear to extend to nuclear weapon-related activities, however.

Although they reaffirmed their "determination to continue the pursuit...of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally..." and welcomed their countries' achievements so far in the START process and in steps towards placing fissile materials "no longer required for their defence purposes" under IAEA safeguards, the NWS seemed particularly keen to emphasise the responsibility of other States Parties in implementing the Treaty, including Article VI. The P-5 concluded, however, by promising to "continue to work together for the success of the preparatory process and the 2000 Review Conference and on related issues".[Emphasis added]

WRITTEN BY REBECCA JOHNSON

BRIEFING FROM THE ACRONYM INSTITUTE - April 29 1998

1998 NPT PrepCom - Briefing No 4
NGOs Address the PrepCom

Non-governmental organisations made 13 statements to delegations at an 'informal session' of the Second PrepCom, chaired by Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner. The statements were the result of a collective process undertaken during the past months to ensure the participation of many NGOs with diverse views, whether or not they would be able to be in Geneva during the PrepCom. In keeping with this spirit, I shall not highlight the individual names or affiliations of the speakers. My short summary cannot possibly do justice to the rich variety of information and ideas put forward, but the full statements are available at http://www.itu.ch/ipb/

Spiritual, Ethical and Humanitarian Appeal

The opening statement noted "the terrible suffering caused by nuclear weapons, their potential for total destruction, and their perversion of the fundamental nature of matter". The NWS and their allies were urged to free themselves of their "self-imposed and self-destructive addiction" with the help of "tough love" from the non-nuclear-weapon states, to help them "embark on a course of action that moves toward nuclear abolition." With regard to Article VI, and the ICJ unanimous ruling in July 1996, it was stressed that "good faith" meant "basic honesty...abiding by one's commitment".

Nuclear colonialism and environmental racism

A representative of Indigenous peoples of the Pacific spoke of how "modern technology has been used to perpetuate the historical devastation of Indigenous lands", and made specific reference to "the superpower nuclearisation of the region, nuclear testing, toxic dumping..." He demanded the "final cessation of these genocidal acts of nuclear colonialism" and called for NPT Parties to support and respect nuclear weapon free zone treaties and contribute to the environmental cleanup of the radioactive waste and contamination, emphasising the importance of ending the transhipment, storage and dumping of nuclear waste in the Pacific and the necessity for ongoing monitoring of contaminated areas and support for test site workers affected by nuclear testing. A number of subsequent statements reinforced this message with documented evidence of the terrible destruction wreaked on Indigenous Peoples and lands during the nuclear age.

NATO nuclear weapons sharing

Concerns were raised about the continued siting of around 150-200 nuclear weapons in seven European countries as part of NATO nuclear sharing arrangements: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom. In view of U.S. plans to transfer control over nuclear weapons to Allied countries and the involvement by additional States in nuclear planning, such arrangements contradicted "the intent and possibly the letter of Articles I and II of the NPT". NPT Parties were thus recommended to "explicitly and clearly state that the Treaty remains in force in time of war," building on the results of the 1985 Review Conference. In addition, to exclude any possible future development of European nuclear forces through integration of French and British nuclear weapons, EU members should declare that in the event of full political union, the EU would become a non-nuclear member to the NPT.

Fissile materials

Two broadly different perspectives were identified: those who favoured getting a cut-off agreement underway as soon as possible, on the basis of the 1995 Shannon mandate; and those who considered that "without specific disarmament steps" by the NWS, a cut-off agreement would "simply reinforce existing disparities." Both approaches advocated additional steps, such as greater transparency and accurate accounting, as well as designating more plutonium and HEU as "excess", to be put under IAEA safeguards and irreversibly removed from future military re-use. The first sought ways to address stocks in parallel with the FMCT, whereas the second argued for specific disarmament steps to be undertaken together with a fissile materials ban, including the dismantlement of all military materials production facilities and a ban on the production of nuclear pits and tritium. The proliferation risks associated with the commercial use of fissile materials and various options for dealing with plutonium and HEU stocks to minimise the risks of proliferation and environmental contamination.

Health and Environmental Effects

Detailing the "extensive health and environmental damage" resulting from nuclear weapons production and testing, including human experiments conducted without informed consent, the statement emphasised that the effects were not confined to the NWS, but have had harmful effects worldwide. A "Global Truth Commission on the Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Production and Testing" was proposed, either as a commission of the UN General Assembly, or under the joint auspices of the WHO and the UN Environmental Programme, with the task of documenting and evaluating the health and environmental effects and developing ways to assist the affected populations. Since "the mothers of the world are...often its first epidemiologists", the Commission should also invite the participation of citizens from around the world.

Nuclear Power and Sustainable Energy

In addressing the current status of nuclear power, the sixth statement identified trends and issues to enable NPT delegates and decision-makers to place nuclear power in the overall perspective of energy needs. In particular, the speaker noted that the "nuclear industry is in a period of stagnation worldwide and in actual decline in many countries" due to several factors including: its cost, diminishing political support, a failure to address safety, environmental and proliferation issues, and significant public opposition to nuclear technology in many countries. To meet the growing world-wide demand for energy, it was proposed that "contemporary Article IV" should be taken up, to "promote research, technology transfer and assistance in developing sustainable energy development, including energy efficiency...encourage strengthened forms of cooperation...[and] allow the energy aspirations of the developing world... to be met in a sustainable manner."

Immediate Steps on CTBT and START

The seventh statement focused on bringing the CTBT into force, implementing START II and achieving deeper reductions in nuclear arsenals. The fundamental importance of the CTBT as both a nuclear disarmament and a non-proliferation measure was stressed, all States were urged to sign and ratify the Treaty, and the NWS were reminded that "the CTBT does not give them a blank check to pursue the development and qualitative improvement of new types of nuclear weapons or modifications of existing weapons types..." In addition, it was proposed that NPT Parties urge Russia to ratify START II without further delay and encourage the United States and Russia to initiate negotiations on START III, with the aim of signing and ratifying it by the year 2000.

Anti-disarmament policies and programmes

The eighth statement raised concern about new weapons and facilities being developed by some of the NWS under the rubric of 'Stockpile Stewardship' and provided details on laboratory testing programmes and capabilities in some of the NWS, with particular emphasis on the United States. The statement called for: full disclosure and public debate on national policies regarding the threat and use of nuclear weapons; the renunciation of polcies of threatened first use or massive retaliation; elimination of laboratory testing capabilities; national policies to prohibit the design, development or production of new warheads or modifications for new military capabilities; negotiations leading to the abolition of nuclear weapons.

Next Steps

Emphasising the importance of uniting the non-NNWS in order to "be a powerful irrefutable voice to which the NWS will be compelled to listen", this statement proposed the de-alerting of the current nuclear forces, by removing warheads from operational missiles and long-range warheads, reducing the number of warheads on submarines or cutting the nuclear submarines' patrols. Such measures could be accomplished in the near term, thereby contributing practically to the growing acceptance of the case for abolishing nuclear weapons. The statement further proposed that the final stage before complete nuclear disarmament should be one involving the immobilisation of the remaining (few) nuclear weapons of the declared and undeclared NWS. According to this, warheads and delivery systems would be separately stored under international monitoring. Such a measure would "protect the security interests of the NWS while eliminating all possibility of surprise attack or threats to use nuclear weapons".

Nuclear weapons convention

Describing the reasons for and basic provisions of the model nuclear weapons convention (UN doc A/C.1/52/7), it was proposed that NPT Parties should establish an intersessional working group on implementing Article VI, to consider how to bring about negotiations. It was stressed that now was the time to begin devising a plan for complete nuclear disarmament -- including verification mechanisms -- "to be ready when the political climate is favourable".

Regional Initiatives

Existing nuclear weapon free zone arrangements were strongly supported. Noting that these were primarily in the South, further NWFZs were advocated in the Northern Hemisphere, in areas such as Central Asia, Central Europe, the Balkans and the Adriatic, and especially in zones where nuclear weapons are currently deployed. International seas and oceans should be free from nuclear weapons. Zones free from all weapons of mass destruction were important, especially in the Middle East, and countries wishing to declare themselves nuclear free should be encouraged.

Security beyond Nuclear Deterrence

Noting that "the security challenges we face now arise from threats to the earth's life-support systems", ranging from economic disparity and misuse of scarce resources to environmental degradation, overpopulation and climate change, it was clear that nuclear weapons were "a security problem, not a solution" and that we need "to shift the image of nuclear weapons from political virility symbol to the stigmatised status of chemical or biological weapons". Arguing that effective solutions will require "cooperation, imagination and vision", the statement concluded: "Cold War alliances have had their day; we must all be allies now if we are to avoid disaster."

A Call to Action

The final statement summarised the main arguments and recommendations and urged fuller NGO participation in the Review Process. Supporting the 1997 Marshall Islands proposal for an inter-sessional working group to start work on preparing the ground for negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, the NGOs stressed the importance of immediate, intermediate measures such as taking nuclear weapons off alert and halting sub-critical nuclear tests and the modernisation of nuclear weapons, concluding "It is time to put away these deadly instruments of war, clean up the toxic legacy of the nuclear age, and use our precious resources to provide for the genuine needs of our human family on planet Earth."

WRITTEN BY REBECCA JOHNSON

BRIEFING FROM THE ACRONYM INSTITUTE - April 29 1998

1998 NPT PrepCom - Briefing No 3
Non-Aligned Positions Set Out

The Chair of the Second NPT PrepCom, Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner, announced the likely time-table for the next two weeks. It has been decided to devote 9 sessions to debating issues under the three clusters based on the Main Committee divisions of nuclear disarmament, safeguards and nuclear energy, with three additional sessions specifically devoted to the fissban/FMCT, the Middle East and negative security assurances, as intended by the First PrepCom in 1997.

The continuing general debate was dominated on Tuesday by NPT Parties who belong to the Movement of Non-Aligned States (NAM) and included the publication of a NAM working paper, introduced by Makarim Wibisono of Indonesia. Twelve delegations spoke: Australia, Mexico, Syrian Arab Republic, Uzbekistan, Algeria, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Iran, Colombia, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Not all papers were available and since the general debate will conclude on Wednesday, some of Tuesday's statements will be covered in the next briefing.

The NAM Working Paper

In an early move indicative of more effective coordination, the NAM tabled a comprehensive working paper and proposed that "recommendations which have been deliberated upon throughout [the] preparatory process should be forwarded to the Review Conference in 2000 for further refining, finalisation and adoption". The paper comprised 37 substantive paragraphs, related to the Articles of the Treaty.

Nuclear sharing

Under the section dealing with Article I of the NPT, in addition to castigating nuclear assistance which may contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the NAM for the first time unmistakably condemned the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of allies, such as in NATO, and called on the NWS to "refrain from, among themselves, with non-nuclear weapons States and with States not party to the Treaty, nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements". This challenge was reinforced in the paragraph relating to Article II, which would require the corollary commitment by non-NWS to refrain from participation in nuclear sharing.

Safeguards and export controls

Under Article III, the NAM sought to called on all NWS and non-NPT Parties to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards and backed the principle that full-scope safeguards were to be made a condition of new supply of nuclear-related material and equipment. Referring to export control arrangements such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the NAM reiterated their view that "unilaterally restricted measures which prevent peaceful nuclear development should be removed". However, where previously they had sought to have the IAEA accepted as the "sole" authority for NPT compliance, the statement reaffirmed the IAEA as "an essential element in guaranteeing compliance".

Five paragraphs were devoted to Article IV. In addition to reaffirming NPT Parties' "inalienable right" with regard to nuclear activities "for peaceful purposes", including preferential treatment for developing States in the Treaty, concerns were raised about the vulnerability of nuclear facilities to attack and the need for improved international regulations regarding the shipment of radioactive wastes and spent fuel.

CTBT

Article V's commitment to "peaceful nuclear explosions" was superseded by three paragraphs relating to the CTBT, which banned all nuclear explosions. There was a strong call to all States to sign and ratify the test ban treaty. To "build confidence [in] the full implementation of the Treaty", the NWS were enjoined to "comply with the letter and spirit of the CTBT", to provide "transparency on-site" and to "refrain from conducting all types of tests in conformity with the objectives of the CTBT" -- presumed to be a slightly fudged reference to sub-critical testing and other controversial programmes associated with the ongoing nuclear weapon programmes of at least some of the NWS.

Nuclear Disarmament Nine paragraphs were devoted to Article VI, representing an uneasy but challenging balance between ideal and pragmatic positions, designed to squeeze the NWS between a rock and a hard place. Thus the call for a nuclear disarmament committee in the CD gave some room to manoeuvre on its initial tasks, while continuing to aim towards "the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapon convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination." Similarly the unanimous ICJ opinion which reinforced Article VI was cited in a context that would involve regular information exchange from the States Parties, but especially the NWS, on their efforts towards implementing their international legal obligations on nuclear disarmament.

Some observers drew hope from a positive call, without preconditions, for the CD to get going on negotiating "a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons..." and implying acceptance of the Shannon report as a basic mandate.

Security Assurances

The NAM also called for the PrepCom meetings to negotiate a legal instrument on security assurances "to be finally adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference as an annexed protocol to the NPT".

Middle East

Nuclear weapon free zones are supported, with particular mention of the Middle East, South Asia and Central Asia, and to "consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas". The final five paragraphs push for implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and for establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Efforts to isolate Israel and embarrass its key ally, the United States, are being intensively renewed, aided by the deteriorating political support for the present government and the fact that all states in the region except Israel have now acceded to the NPT.

Central Asia

Two statements focused particularly on the initiative by five countries to establish a NWFZ in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Calling for international and United Nations support for this initiative, Uzbekistan said that a Central Asian NWFZ would contribute towards international cooperation and universal nuclear disarmament. Moreover the process of multilateral diplomacy in building such a zone was also important: to strengthen the nonproliferation regime, to work out effective measures for environmental rehabilitation and to develop and reinforce regional security measures.

Kyrgyzstan also pledged its support for a Central Asian NWFZ and hoped that the PrepCom would take a positive attitude towards the initiative's progress. Kyrgyzstan also expressed its serious concern about the legacy of environmental damage from nuclear weapons production still being borne by countries such as theirs, long after the end of the Cold War, and called for assistance from governments and international organisations, especially the IAEA, in cleaning up the region and disposing of the radioactive contaminants.

Ukraine

Ukraine, which voluntarily gave up what would have been the world's third largest nuclear arsenal after the break-up of the Soviet Union, also drew attention to the problems caused by the Chernobyl disaster on its territory. Noting that the concept of a nuclear-free world was now on the international security agenda, Ukraine called for the NPT Parties to work towards achieving specific practical steps, including: practical measures to promote the universality of the Treaty; further reductions in nuclear arsenals; entry-into-force of the CTBT as soon as possible; immediate negotiations and early conclusion of a fissile materials cut-off; measures to combat nuclear terrorism; and the comprehensive implementation of NWFZ agreements and the establishment of new zones.

WRITTEN BY REBECCA JOHNSON

BRIEFING FROM THE ACRONYM INSTITUTE - April 28 1998

1998 NPT PrepCom - Briefing No 2
General Debate Begins

The Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2000 Review Conference of the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) opened on 27 April at around 11.15 am and swiftly appointed Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner of Poland as its Chair. Ambassador Andelfo Garcia of Colombia and Ambassador Markku Reimaa of Finland were appointed Vice Chairs. Additionally it was agreed that Garcia, who had been nominated by the Movement of Non-Aligned States, should be Chair of the Third PrepCom, due to be held in New York in 1999. To the relief of many, there was no repeat of last year's delays over whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and North Korea would be seated as Member States.

The first two days will be devoted to general debate, including a three hour informal session on Tuesday afternoon for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to address the delegates. General statements were made on the first day by sixteen delegations: South Africa, the United Kingdom for the European Union and others, China, Indonesia, Japan, Switzerland, Myanmar, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey, Russia, Bangladesh, Morocco and Iraq.

Some interventions were near-facsimiles of past statements to the 1997 PrepCom, while others were cliché-rich but thin on content, so as space is limited, this summary will seek only to highlight a few of the more interesting issues to emerge. Other themes are likely to be addressed more fully in future NPT briefings, as more delegations put their ideas and concerns on the table.

Nuclear Disarmament

Grigori Berdennikov gave Russia's gloomier overview. After enumerating Russian arms reductions under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and START I and noting the realisation of "unilateral disarmament initiatives" in reducing tactical nuclear weapons, Berdennikov spoke of Russia's efforts to withdraw plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) from military programmes and welcomed initiatives to make Central and East Europe and Central Asia into areas free of nuclear weapons. Taking aim at NATO's continuing nuclear policies, he reiterated Russia's call for nuclear weapons not to be placed outside the territory of the nuclear States. Referring almost certainly to US plans for modernisation and missile defence, Berdennikov warned that continued progress in nuclear weapon reductions would only be possible "if appropriate guaranties are provided against reproducing the nuclear arms race of the past". He also issued a challenge to Britain, China and France, saying that Russia "would like to see the other nuclear powers joining the efforts to reduce nuclear weapons".

Sha Zukang's statement for China was also rather pessimistic. He accused "some countries" of clinging to a "Cold War mentality" by expanding military blocs and developing "sophisticated hi-tech weapons" and argued that the NWS should abandon nuclear deterrence policies and conclude legally binding no-use and no-first-use agreements. China's concerns about US plans to develop strategic missile defence systems were underlined several times, as Sha noted that such plans "violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, jeopardise regional and global strategic security and stability, hamper further progress in nuclear disarmament, and may even trigger a new round of the arms race."

Indonesia, however, castigated "self laudatory" references which "cannot conceal that there are still an estimated 36,000 nuclear weapons with their inherent dangers". New Zealand urged the NWS to take seriously the proposals in the Canberra Commission Report, saying "we want to see progress on steps such as taking nuclear weapons off alert; no first use undertakings; removing warheads from delivery vehicles; [and] ending deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons". Canada referred to START being "at a standstill" and proposed text to reaffirm the importance of the US-Russian bilateral process and further progress on nuclear disarmament, including the engagement of the other three NWS. Several States criticised the lack of a nuclear disarmament committee in the CD. Myanmar called on the Second PrepCom to make recommendations for the CD to negotiate "a universal and legally-binding multilateral instrument... committing all states to the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons". Japan called on the NWS to "share information on various practical issues which they are encountering in their current nuclear disarmament efforts" including financial and technical problems regarding the dismantlement of nuclear weapons.

The British Ambassador, Ian Soutar, spoke on behalf of the European Union (EU) and 13 associated countries. As we have come to expect from committee-drafting by 15 states with diverse security perspectives, the EU statement sounded positive but said little, reduced to making approving noises about the range of issues, utilising the language of the 1995 Principles and Objectives (P&O) so as to avoid controversy among its members. It did, however, express the hope that "START III will be followed by further reductions with the aim of eliminating these weapons globally."

We will have to wait until the cluster debates for more substantive statements from Britain and France regarding their role in the fulfilment of this hope.

FMCT

One issue on which all the nuclear weapon states (and several others from the Western group) seemed to agree was the necessity for getting negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT) underway. Japan made a particularly strong pitch, condemning three "wasted" years of deadlock in the CD and calling on the NPT PrepCom to express "as a whole, its firm determination to commence FMCT negotiations" on the basis of the 'Shannon Report' and mandate agreed in March 1995. Norway reiterated its call for voluntary transparency measures from all nuclear capable states, with particular responsibility on the NWS. Although encouraging greater openness with regard to existing fissile material stockpiles, Norway seemed to back away from its 1997 statement calling for declaration, clarification and inspections of stocks. Canada proposed language for a P&O rolling text supporting the FMCT commitment and urging the NWS to increase transparency with regard to military stocks of fissile materials and "increase the amount of fissile material declared excess", putting this under permanent safeguards. Morocco said it was essential for the CD to give utmost priority to a fissile materials ban and castigated that body for "wasting time" on less important issues that were already being dealt with in other fora. Indonesia, however, condemned the NWS who, "while willing to end their production are unwilling to give up existing stockpiles". Indonesia wanted a "ban on existing material which also bans future production of weapon-usable fissile material."

Other Issues

Several statements made obligatory references to "peaceful uses" of nuclear technology and export controls. Many others mentioned security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states, an issue expected to be discussed in greater detail in a specifically allocated session. A number of delegations emphasised the importance of the CTBT, welcoming the early ratification by Britain and France and urging others to follow. While Russia and China made oblique reference to NATO's expansion, Bangladesh was rather blunter, calling the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear weapon states a "violation of the spirit of the NPT". Turkey, for its part, informed the PrepCom delegates that "apart from the nuclear umbrella of the NATO alliance" Turkey did not possess nuclear weapons and had no intention of doing so. Reha Keskintepe also emphasised Turkey's concerns about Middle East security but said that it was "disingenuous to single out any one country for the lack of progress" on establishing a nuclear weapon free zone in the region. Iraq accused the United States of exercising a "double standard" because it backed away from implementing the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the same time as the 1995 decisions on extending and strengthening the review of the NPT.

Strengthening the Review

WRITTEN BY REBECCA JOHNSON

BRIEFING FROM THE ACRONYM INSTITUTE - April 27 1998

1998 NPT PrepCom Briefing No 1
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

The second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2000 Review Conference of the States Parties to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will take place in Geneva from 27 April to 8 May 1998.

When the NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995, the States parties adopted a package of decisions intended to strengthen the Treaty's review process. These established a set of Principles and Objectives on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and provided for three to four PrepComs to be held in the four years leading up to the five-yearly Review Conferences. Under the strengthened review process, the Review Conferences were mandated to look forward, evaluate the Treaty's operation and identify the areas and means for making progress on its implementation.

Where previously the PrepComs had been regarded as having only a preparatory function, the 1995 decisions clearly intended them to become more far-reaching and substantive, with the stated and practical purpose of promoting the full implementation of the Treaty. It will be important at this early developmental stage not to close off any potential means, procedures or opportunities that could help to strengthen the non-proliferation regime in the future. Subject to the terms of the Treaty, States parties can empower the review process to do whatever they collectively agree it should do, including establishing subsidiary bodies and making substantive recommendations, if they consider that these structures can assist in achieving the objectives of the Treaty and the enhanced review process.

Addressing Substance

Debating issues of substance is not the same as addressing substance. Limiting substance to general discussion and exchange of views does not necessarily facilitate progress. The way in which such debates are presently conducted may not be conducive to accomplishing the PrepCom's wider tasks. If extra time is allocated to the Middle East, security assurances and the fissile materials production ban, as intended by the 1997 PrepCom, it will be important to ensure that the remaining time is allocated fairly. At present, discussions are structured around the 'clusters' of issues covered by the three traditional Main Committees. Cluster debates may provide some continuity with the Review Conferences, but too many issues are now crowded into cluster 1 on nuclear disarmament for a three-way equal split to be balanced.

A distribution of time that would better reflect the weight accorded the different components of the Treaty, as indicated in general statements and negotiations on the 1995 decisions, could be achieved if the sections in the Principles and Objectives were taken as a guide instead. This would enable half the time to be allocated to the several issues in the nuclear disarmament cluster, with the remaining half divided equally among safeguards and nuclear energy.

While the device of informal 'Chair's consultations' among some 25 key delegations was utilised effectively in 1995 and 1997 and may continue to play a useful role, it will be important to ensure that all the main players are involved and that there is effective communication between those on the 'inside' and the rest of the States Parties.

Nuclear Disarmament

Although universality, safeguards and exports were also of major importance, the need for more progress on nuclear disarmament was the driving force behind the negotiations to strengthen the review process. Paragraph 3 of the Principles and Objectives reaffirmed the Article VI commitment by the nuclear-weapon States (NWS) to pursue negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament.

Paragraph 4 set forth a programme of action with three components: (a) completion of a CTBT by a specified date (1996); (b) a ban on the production of fissile materials; and (c) progress by the NWS in efforts to reduce and eliminate their nuclear weapons. In the absence of clarity on what 4 (c) means, it would be useful if the NPT Parties could identify some of the concrete elements they would envisage. The status of the Principles and Objectives mubst therefore be determined for the future.

This PrepCom also needs to establish a clear right to make recommendations, which would most usefully take the form of practical proposals on specific aspects or measures within the purview of the Treaty.

For the credibility of the Non-Proliferation regime, it will be important to build on the precedents set by the 1995 decisions and institute greater accountability. In addition to encouraging implementation of the bilateral START process, the time has come for the NWS to work together on specific issues of 'qualitative nuclear disarmament' and to keep the non-nuclear-weapon States informed of their progress. Such 'qualitative' measures could reduce nuclear dangers and contribute towards implementing paragraph 4 (c) of the Principles and Objectives. They could include:

• taking nuclear weapons off alert;
• transparency measures leading to the setting up of a register of nuclear weapons and military fissile material holdings;
• commitments not to modernise or increase nuclear arsenals;
• no stationing of land-based (tactical) nuclear weapons outside the territory of NWS;
• multilateralising the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty;
• no first use.

Energy Cooperation

Regarding Article IV, the Principles and Objectives emphasised the importance of non-discriminatory exchange of materials and technology for non-military nuclear applications, giving "preferential treatment" to NPT Parties. Widespread commercial nuclear use may create "a nuclear-weapon-world in waiting". For most States the key appeal of Article IV was the promise of a cheap and reliable energy supply, not necessarily its nuclear generation. While it is daily becoming clearer that nuclear power is less able to deliver cheap, safe and reliable energy than alternative and sustainable technologies, the NPT may be diverting countries with the legitimate objective of energy security into an unequal relationship with big nuclear business dominated by a few developed States. What is now needed is a new, non-contradictory mandate for the IAEA and a multilateral strategy of technology management to prevent proliferation.

Tough Challenges Ahead

The 1998 PrepCom is likely to be tougher than in 1997, reflecting a sharper awareness of what is at stake and some frustration over the Conference on Disarmament's continued inability to negotiate a fissile materials ban and agree the level of multilateral involvement in nuclear disarmament. More States will come prepared to fight for procedures, precedents and substantive proposals to advance their interests, giving rise to sharper conflicts over how to address nuclear disarmament, export controls, and the nuclear-capable States in the Middle East and South Asia. Additionally, security assurances and the nuclear dimension of NATO expansion will be hard fought, though with little prospect of constructive progress. There are likely to be delays on the first day over seating Yugoslavia and North Korea followed by diplomatic absences by both. The future credibility of the Review Process could well rest on the tools which are developed and the ideas put forward at this Second PrepCom, which should aim to be pertinent and constructive rather than smooth!

NPT PrepCom Briefing No 1 is an edited version of the Executive Summary of ACRONYM Report No 11, Reviewing the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Preparing for the Future, published by The Acronym Institute, London, April 1998. This latest 'Red Report' is available in Geneva or from representatives of The Acronym Institute.

© 1998 The Acronym Institute.

BASIC will be posting the text of NPT documents and drafts as they appear on www.basicint.org

ACRONYM Report No 12 has now been published. Entitled 'Reviewing the Non-proliferation Treaty: Problems and Processes', ACRONYM 12 analyses the conduct and outcome of the second preparatory committee meeting for the 2000 Review Conference. The report is in three parts with an executive summary.

Summary and analysis of the 1997 PrepCom is available from Disarmament Diplomacy No 14.

A detailed report and analysis of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT is available as Acronym Report No 7. This includes the Text of the 1968 Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and the Text of the Package of Decisions adopted in May 1995.

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