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Proliferation in ParliamentBack to Proliferation in Parliament, December 2007 - February 2008 Westminster ParliamentKey to Column Numbering
Ballistic Missile Defence
Global Security: Russia, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report, HC 51 of 2007-08, 25 November 2007, Excerpts on Missile DefenceMissile defence 265. The row which erupted with Russia in 2007 over planned anti-ballistic missile defence (BMD) deployments in Europe began with the announcement by the US Department of Defense in January that the US was opening talks with the Czech Republic and Poland on the deployment there of elements of its BMD system.[562] US officials had given initial indications in March 2006 that sites in Central Europe were being considered for BMD deployments. The planned US deployments in Central Europe would form part of the integrated multi-continental and multi-faceted BMD system which is aimed against the perceived post-Cold War threat of ballistic missile acquisition and use by rogue states or terrorists. President George W. Bush promised to develop such a system during his 2000 presidential election campaign and announced the plans as President in December 2002. The Bush Administration's BMD plans build on those for National Missile Defense set out by former President Clinton in 1999, but they are more ambitious, aiming to cover not only the continental US but also US allies and US troops deployed overseas, and to be able to intercept all types and ranges of ballistic missile at any point during a missile's trajectory. His wish to develop such a system caused President Bush, after negotiations with Russia had failed, to announce in December 2001 the United States' unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The ABM Treaty had placed severe limits on the deployment of BMD systems by the US and USSR, in order to sustain the form of stability that came with mutually assured destruction between the then superpowers. 266. The initial phase of the planned US BMD system involves the deployment of radar and other sensors on satellites, at sea, and on land in Alaska, Greenland and the UK, and of interceptors at sea and at two land sites, Alaska and California. An initial BMD operational capability was achieved by the end of 2005 and the system was temporarily activated in July 2006 when North Korea tested a missile. The US plans involving the Czech Republic and Poland are for a further phase of the BMD system. The US plans the deployment of an early warning radar to the Czech Republic and 10 interceptor missiles to underground silos at a site in northern Poland. The US plans to achieve initial deployment of its Central European BMD elements in 2011 and their full operational capability by 2013. With the deployment of further additional elements, the complete BMD system is planned to be in place by 2015. The entire BMD system is being funded by the US only. The bases involved in the planned US BMD deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland would remain the host states' sovereign territory, but host state permission would not be required for an interceptor missile launch. 267. Whether the full US plans for the BMD system will be realised, on time or at all, remains uncertain. There are doubts about the technical effectiveness of several elements of the system, and about the willingness of the US Congress to provide the necessary funding. Justifying their unwillingness to provide the full funding requested by the Administration, some US legislators have pointed to political opposition to the BMD plans in the Czech Republic and Poland, and to a perceived lack of adequate consultation with NATO allies.[563] 268. Russia has reacted angrily to the planned US BMD deployments in Central Europe. Partly, Russia denies that the threat from rogue states which the BMD system is designed to counter is likely to exist in the timeframe covered by the US plans. In his February Munich speech, President Putin said "Missile weapons with a range of about five to eight thousand kilometres that really pose a threat to Europe do not exist in any of the so-called problem countries. And in the near future and prospects, this will not happen and is not even foreseeable."[564] Russia also argues that the deployment sites in Central Europe are not ones that make sense if the aim is to counter missiles launched primarily from the Middle East.[565] Moscow alleges that the BMD deployments are in fact aimed at Russia. US officials have sought to counter such claims, pointing out that the few interceptors planned for Poland could have no impact against Russia's missile arsenal. However, Russian officials often seem to find such assurances inadequate, instead believing that the purpose and nature of the proposed Central European facilities could be changed once they are established. 269. Whether or not Russia's opposition to the US BMD plans reflects a genuine belief that the facilities could be used against Russia, our witnesses felt that Russia's opposition to the proposals definitely reflected their symbolic value and a general sense of Russian insecurity in the region. For example, Dr Pravda told us that "there is genuine concern about missile defence systems, but it is more of a symbolic than of a military material nature. They are seen as symptomatic of an offensive and aggressive intention on the part of the United States."[566] Dr Pravda went on:
Professor Light told us that "the question of missile defence and the placement of missile defence in the European countries bordering Russia is very deeply felt. It goes back to the genuine concern about the abrogation of the ABM treaty and what that has done to the strategic stability of the world."[568] Similarly, Ms Aldis told us that Russia sees the proposed US deployments in Central Europe as a "deliberate policy of encirclement of Russia by the West".[569] 270. At the G8 summit in June 2007, President Putin appeared to surprise President Bush by suggesting cooperation on BMD, via joint US and Russian use of an existing radar facility at Gabala in Azerbaijan which Russia currently leases.[570] The Minister for Europe welcomed the Russian offer, saying that "by the nature of the Russian offer there is an acceptance of the capacity of the equipment and the intention of its deployment and that is a positive signal."[571] Meeting President Bush in July, President Putin offered to transform BMD into a 'strategic partnership', perhaps involving joint early-warning centres. The US has also made proposals for cooperation on BMD. However, the US has made clear that it would regard the Azerbaijani radar at most as a complement to, not a replacement for, its existing BMD plans in Central Europe.[572] 271. In October 2007, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates went to Moscow for talks with their Russian counterparts, primarily on the US BMD plans. The US delegation proposed that Russian inspectors be given access to the planned BMD sites in Central Europe, and that Russia be included in some way in the BMD system.[573] The US officials also offered to delay activating the BMD system until Russia and the US both agreed that there was a threat from Iran.[574] Russian officials reportedly regarded this idea as "promising" and a "positive signal",[575] but Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov maintained that the planned BMD deployments themselves were "anti-Russian".[576] Russia wants to see development of the Czech and Polish sites halted while further talks take place.[577] 272. NATO appears latterly to be gaining a greater role in the discussion of the US BMD plans. Several NATO members, most notably Germany, have called for the BMD issue to be handled primarily through the Alliance, both among the Western allies and with Russia, via the NATO-Russia Council. At a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council in April 2007, ministers noted that Russia had "fundamental concerns" about BMD and said that there was "consensus on the need to take this discussion forward in the NATO-Russia Council in the future, focusing in particular on threat assessment."[578] In his evidence to us, the Minister for Europe agreed that "The Russia-NATO dialogue is the key way of potentially resolving the issue".[579] In June 2007, the Alliance agreed by February 2008 to carry out an assessment of the US BMD plans. NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has appeared most concerned about the prospect that the US BMD shield would cover only some European NATO members. In April 2007, NATO members agreed to try to link the US BMD plans with NATO's own for theatre missile defence, so as to create a shield covering the whole Alliance. 273. We conclude that Russian opposition to US ballistic missile defence (BMD) plans in Central Europe largely reflects Moscow's sensitivity about the presence of NATO infrastructure in its former satellite states. As such, Russian opposition will be hard to overcome. We welcome signs that the US, Russia and the NATO allies may be engaging in a more substantive dialogue and search for cooperation on BMD. As long as it remains committed to the US BMD plans, we recommend that the Government seek ways to build cooperation around them, both within NATO and with Russia, so that they do not become a source of further divisions in Europe. 274. As for the UK's involvement, in 2003 London agreed to a US request for the upgrading of the radar at RAF Fylingdales, so that it could be incorporated into the BMD system. However, on 25 July 2007, in a written statement the day before the House rose for recess, the Government announced that equipment would also be installed and operated by the US at RAF Menwith Hill to receive satellite warnings of missile launches. The Government's statement ran:
275. The previous substantive Government statement on BMD came in a written answer on 4 June. On that occasion, the Government had said that "discussions are at an early stage and there are no formal proposals."[581] We regret the manner and timing of the Government's announcement that RAF Menwith Hill is to participate in the US ballistic missile defence (BMD) system, and the resulting lack of Parliamentary debate on the issue. In its response to this Report, we recommend that the Government inform us of the date on which it received the formal proposal from the US to include Menwith Hill in the BMD system. We recommend that there should be a full Parliamentary debate on these proposals. Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to the Foreign Affairs Committee Report on Global Security: Russia, Cm 7305, February 2008We conclude that, driven partly by changes in Russia’s economic position, and partly by the cumulative effects of the country’s post-Cold War relations with the West, the results of Russia’s recent rethinking of its international role are likely to endure beyond the presidential election scheduled for March 2008. In the period before the presidential election, the UK should be especially realistic not to expect movement from Russia on areas of difference with the West. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government set out what consideration it has given to the likely impact of Russia’s forthcoming election season on Russia’s foreign policy, and how it considers the UK might respond. (Paragraph 34) 9. The Government wants to see progress with Russia on areas of difference with the West. Discussions with Russia on issues such as Kosovo, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and ballistic missile defence will continue to be diffi cult. The Government will continue to engage with Russia both bilaterally and in the range of multi-lateral fora we have at our disposal. We will continue to pursue the UK’s interests vigorously, not allowing Russian pressure to defl ect us from key issues of principle. We conclude that Russian opposition to US ballistic missile defence (BMD) plans in Central Europe largely refl ects Moscow’s sensitivity about the presence of NATO infrastructure in its former satellite states. As such, Russian opposition will be hard to overcome. We welcome signs that the US, Russia and the NATO allies may be engaging in a more substantive dialogue and search for cooperation on BMD. As long as it remains committed to the US BMD plans, we recommend that the Government seek ways to build cooperation around them, both within NATO and with Russia, so that they do not become a source of further divisions in Europe. (Paragraph 273) 80. The Government intends to continue efforts to engage Russia on BMD and as such will support and participate in discussion at the NATO-Russia Council. Specifi c concerns regarding the US missile defence system are for the US to discuss bilaterally with Russia. The UK is, however, fully supportive of these discussions and notes recent progress made at talks in Moscow and Annapolis. The UK fully supports the US offer to include Russia in a Joint Regional Missile Defence Architecture and proposals for additional transparency measures which should go some way towards addressing Russia’s concerns. We regret the manner and timing of the Government’s announcement that RAF Menwith Hill is to participate in the US ballistic missile defence (BMD) system, and the resulting lack of Parliamentary debate on the issue. In its reponse to this Report, we recommend that the Government inform us of the date on which it received the formal proposal form the US to include Menwith Hill in the BMD system. We recommend that there should be a full Parliamentary debate on these proposals. (Paragraph 275) 81. MOD has confi rmed, in answer to parliamentary questions, that the request from the US to use RAF Menwith Hill as part of the US missile defence system was made in a letter to the Secretary of State for Defence on 29 June 2007. The Defence Secretary announced on 25 July government agreement to the use of the data relay station at RAF Menwith Hill for missile defence purposes. MOD published a discussion document on missile defence in November 2002 and Parliament debated missile defence in early 2003 after the Government received a US request to upgrade the missile tracking radar at RAF Fylingdales. The principles underlying missile defence, as they affect the UK, have not changed in the intervening time and the decision to use RAF Menwith Hill as a further contribution to the US missile defence system is in line with these basic principles. The Government does not, therefore, see the need for a further full Parliamentary debate. It was a decision for the Secretary of State for Defence to make, and he did so in consultation with the rest of the Cabinet... We recommend that in its response to the Report, the Government share with us its assessment of the likelihood of Moscow retargeting its strategic missile forces if the US ballistic missile defence deployment goes ahead. (Paragraph 295) 85. The Government regrets the Russian statements that it would re-target
its strategic missile forces if the US goes ahead with its BMD deployment.
This would be wholly inappropriate. It is diffi cult to assess the likelihood
of this happening.
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