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Proliferation in ParliamentBack to Proliferation in Parliament, December 2007 - February 2008 Westminster ParliamentKey to Column Numbering
Ballistic Missile Defence
Armed Forces: US Missile Defence, House of Lords, Debate, 10 Jan 2008, Column 949, Excerpts
Lord Wallace of Saltaire rose to call attention to the United Kingdom’s commitment to participate in the United States missile defence system, and to the implications of recent negotiations between the United States and other states for the deployment of that system; and to move for Papers. 10 Jan 2008 : Column 950 The noble Lord said: My Lords, the context for this debate is provided by the Government’s commitment to participate in the United States missile defence system, slipped out in a Written Statement one day before Parliament rose last July. Since then, the Government have offered no opportunity to debate this decision in either House; despite the promise that Tony Blair, as Prime Minister, made in the other place last February that:
He was forced to say that only because the Economist had just published an article detailing negotiations under way between the UK and the US in Washington, based on Washington sources. Mr Blair also promised that when a decision was made there would be a,
No such discussion has yet taken place. We therefore offer the Lords the opportunity to consider Her Majesty's Government’s acceptance that the US will install new equipment at Menwith Hill, in addition to switching on the enhanced radar at RAF Fylingdales, in the hope that the Government will be sufficiently embarrassed to provide a fuller and more detailed justification of their decision, and to grant time for an appropriate debate also in the other place. We are not, as a party, opposed in all circumstances to the concept of missile defence—no more than we are opposed in desperate circumstances to nuclear weapons, dreadful as they are. We are however committed to a multilateral approach to international security and to the development of a treaty-based framework for controlling and reducing the world’s dependence on armaments, most of all nuclear weapons. In the course of the 1970s and 1980s an extensive multilateral framework was constructed for limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the treaty to ban weapons in outer space and the 1972 bilateral US-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. This framework has sadly been significantly weakened over the past seven years by the actions of the Bush Administration. The case for a more determined effort to build a multilateral regime to control fissile materials and to reverse the proliferation of nuclear weapons was strongly argued in an article jointly signed by George Shultz, Bill Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn in the Wall Street Journal on 4 January last year—not a group of lily-livered liberals but hard-headed and experienced American statesmen who recognise that a stronger global framework to end what they called “the nuclear madness” is essential. In that context, some precautionary research on the long-term possibilities of missile defence, in case efforts at multilateral regime-building fail, is justifiable—but not a rush to deployment. That was, until 2001, the position of the Labour Government. When the Republican majority in Congress attempted to push President Clinton towards a programme of national missile defence in 1999-2000, Peter Hain, as a Foreign Office Minister, declared: 10 Jan 2008 : Column 951
while Geoff Hoon, as Secretary of State for Defence, expressed concern that such a development would breach the ABM treaty, telling the Commons,
An alternative, unilateral approach to missile defence has been a core element of the ideology of the American Republicans for the past 30 years, supported vigorously by the companies that form America's military-industrial complex and which have benefited so well from the enormous expenditure on the Star Wars programme over the years. When President Reagan promoted the strategic defence initiative in the 1980s, Margaret Thatcher, to her great credit, used her personal relationship with him to insist that the SDI programme must remain compatible with existing arms control agreements, including the ABM treaty. After the Cold War ended, the programme was scaled back, and scaled back further when the Democrats under Clinton recaptured the White House. But neo-conservatives and other believers in American exceptionalism kept the faith and declared their willingness to tear up arms control treaties to achieve it. This is, after all, an essential part of the project for a new American century: to establish global American hegemony behind a secure missile shield, unconstrained by treaties or by unreliable allies. The Rumsfeld Commission in 1998 encouraged the Republican Congress to push national missile defence forward; and the US Air Force Space Command, for which much of the additional funding was provided, developed proposals for the potential militarisation of outer space in response, which would break another pillar of the arms control regime. It is astonishing how completely our Labour Government—a supposedly progressive Government committed in principle to international law, multilateral institutions and the limitation of armaments—have since caved in to the neo-conservative Bush agenda. In February 2001, Prime Minister Blair told Forbes magazine that the missile defence issue needed to be marked “handle with care” in Washington. By the autumn of 2002, the MoD, in a public discussion paper, cautiously indicated:
In January 2003, Mr Hoon announced that Her Majesty’s Government had agreed to upgrading the Fylingdales radar, telling the Commons that this,
He did, however, admit to Sir Menzies Campbell that the Government had not discussed this decision with any of our major European partners—so much for ensuring that it would strengthen the NATO alliance. Over the past few months the German Government in particular have asked for much more multilateral discussion about the current proposed deployment of 10 Jan 2008 : Column 952 US missile defence across Europe, but the British Government have not responded to the German Government on that. In January 2003, in recognising that there were some arguments for upgrading Fylingdales, the Commons Defence Committee said:
Amid persistent rumours that the Government were negotiating with Washington for a major role in the US system, Des Browne assured the Commons as late as April last year that:
That must have been a misleading statement. Formal letters on the use of Menwith Hill were exchanged only two months later, although Parliament was not informed for several more weeks to avoid embarrassment to the Government. Noble Lords may not be familiar with the exact status of Menwith Hill. I have a particular interest because this American base is sited on the ridge between Wharfedale and Nidderdale, and I see its multiple sensors and radars on the horizon—in their giant golfball cladding—every time I walk up from Saltaire onto Ilkley Moor. Unlike Fylingdales, which is operated by the RAF, Menwith Hill is under American control. It is a field station of the US National Security Agency. It has been described as the largest electronic monitoring station in the world. Between 1,500 and 2,000 US nationals from various agencies work at the base. Contacts in Harrogate council tell me that numbers rose by several hundred in the months after September 11 2001, although that was unreported to the British Parliament. I hope that the Minister can enlighten us on the exact status of this base. As I understand it, it was granted to the United States under a bilateral exchange of letters in December 1951, and a 21-year lease was confirmed by a further exchange of letters in 1955. In 1976, when the first 21-year period was up, the Pentagon admitted that it had lost the original exchange of letters. Nevertheless, the MoD granted a further 21-year occupation until 1997. In February 1997, Nicholas Soames, as a Conservative Minister, stated:
He went on to say that,
Nevertheless, the base is still very much there, serving American interests on British soil. Noble Lords will remember the European Parliament inquiry several years ago which investigated the Echelon programme when it was said that Americans were being allowed to listen in on European communications and to feed back commercial as well as security information to the US authorities and the companies with which they had close relationships. The British Government at the 10 Jan 2008 : Column 953 time had no comment to make on these investigations. My good friend Norman Baker MP has tried without success through successive parliamentary questions to discover exactly what the terms are under which the US NSA now occupies and operates this base. Over the coming months we will hear a great deal in both Houses and in the British press about the limitations to British sovereignty involved in ratifying the EU reform treaty. But the abandonment of British sovereignty involved in the operation of Menwith Hill—and of course also in the more distant Diego Garcia—presents a far deeper incursion into British sovereignty than anything the EU has to offer. The ministerial Statement of 25 July 2007 stated clearly that,
This is Britain as “Airstrip One” for a hegemonic USA, not the basis for a co-operative partnership among allies. It seems appropriate that Menwith Hill should have appeared in a slide map presented by an official from the US Missile Defence Agency to the WEU Assembly in December last year in military newspeak as the “UK situational awareness node”. An even clearer indication of Labour’s subservience to the Rumsfeld-Cheney agenda was the Defence Secretary’s use of the term “rogue states” in his 25 July Statement in order to explain “the emerging threat” which this US system is intended to counter. Do the Government really believe that there are states beyond the reach of international pressure or diplomacy that presently constitute existential threats—an axis of evil against which only a military response is possible? In January 2003 Mr Hoon justified the upgrading of Fylingdales in terms of the threat from Iraq, but the threat was then defeated and discovered to be rather insubstantial. Some Washington policy makers then were more focused on North Korea; but the United States has, sensibly, shifted towards a multilateral effort to contain North Korea through sanctions and negotiations. Libya used to be on the list; but successful British and American diplomacy has persuaded Libya to dismantle its nuclear programme. Now it is Iran which is called on to justify the project, assumed to remain an implacable enemy over the 10 to 20 years needed to get the system up and running and justify its cost... The Economist story last February reported, on good authority, that our then Prime Minister, with the support of our then Chancellor, was pressing the American Administration to station not only sensors, radars and communications networks in Britain, but also missile interceptors. In the event, Washington chose to place the interceptors in Poland rather than in Britain, with additional radar facilities in the Czech Republic. A change of government in Poland has since thrown this in doubt, with the robustly right-wing Polish foreign minister, Radek Sikorski, bluntly stating,
which jeopardises Polish relations with Russia unnecessarily. On 8 October, the Daily Telegraph reported that the British Government were still pursuing negotiations for closer involvement; that—quoting a Foreign Office spokeswoman—
when he took up his post as UK ambassador in Washington; and that the likeliest site for a UK missile interceptor base would be at RAF Lakenheath in Suffolk. Well, at least that makes a change from placing everything in Yorkshire. Can the Minister possibly assure us that in the event of the new Polish Government declining to accept these missiles, the Government will not leap into the gap to accept them instead? Foreign Minister Sikorski raised another query about current US plans in his interview last week, reported in Monday’s International Herald Tribune. He said that,
leaving Poland to carry the costs of a deterioration in relations with Russia without any gain in longer-term security. The same fate could of course meet our Labour Government, to find themselves—after years of subordinating their principles to Republican unilateralism—faced with a Democratic President who thankfully prefers a multilateral course. I, for one, hope that that indeed will be the outcome. But in the mean time, this House, and this Parliament, deserves a much fuller justification from the Government of the commitments on the use of British soil for US missile defence than they have given over the years. The British public deserve that explanation, too. I beg to move for Papers. To begin with, I should say that I have very considerable disquiet about how the Government have approached this issue and its wider implications. Many points can be made about this and I am sure that they will be made by other speakers. I will not discuss whether the thing will work because I find it impossible to conceive that a failsafe anti-missile system could be constructed. You would need a hell of a lot of trust in it to sit underneath it while someone launched a missile at you. I want to raise three points which to some extent overlap with those made by the noble Lord. First, I turn to the manner in which the decision was taken by the Government on further involvement with the US missile system. As they say of marriage, it left a lot to be desired. The Defence Select Committee said:
That is a strong statement. The Government responded to it by saying, “Oh well, we have had quite a bit of consultation with different interest groups”. But that is not the same as having a proper public debate on the issues, so I agree fairly strongly with what the noble Lord said about that. The other countries involved in the missile shield are Poland and the Czech Republic, both of which at least were governed by far-right Administrations. It is quite significant that the new Polish Government have started to make different noises from those of the previous Administration about their involvement. A YouGov survey in this country showed that only 26 per cent of the population thought that our involvement with the missile shield might make either the UK or Europe safer, and the percentages against it in the Czech Republic and Poland are considerably higher, at around 70 per cent. Therefore maybe this should have been a more substantial debate given that, at least in those parts of the European Union affected by the shield and that have agreed to go along with it, the weight of public opinion is against it. Secondly, the literature the Government have published on the missile shield seems consistently to downgrade its importance. They speak of an upgrade in our radar protection system. Of course, in a technical sense it is an upgrade because it is in large part a modification of what we already have, but in a wider sense it is very different from that. As the noble Lord also said, the initial introduction of the missile shield was made against the backdrop of one of the most significant shifts in international relations that we have seen for the past 30 to 40 years. Most noble Lords, and I am sure most noble Lords present, will have read President Bush’s address made at West Point in 2001, not long after the attack on New York, where he said that he would define the world primarily in terms of American power, that America would be the dominant state in world society, and that he did not intend to go along with the multilateral 10 Jan 2008 : Column 956 agreements which have existed so far. Even before that, the United States had withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, so the existence of this project is quite interlocked with—I do not like the word “neoconservativism”, which is a sort of scare term—a fundamental shift in international relations in which, if I understand the position of Prime Minister Brown’s Government, to whom I now belong, there is a return to multilateral negotiations. There is a clear inconsistency here. Thirdly, the Government say blandly that they will work on further co-operation with the EU and NATO, but the decision to take part in this endeavour is one fraught with implications for the whole of Europe and beyond. When the Minister in the other place was asked about the effects of this, he said that it would make Britain a safer place. But if it creates a belligerent and hostile Russia on the edge of Europe, in what sense are we in a safer place? We all know that Russia’s response to the missile shield has been consistently hostile. The latest statement, made yesterday by the Russian Foreign Minister, reiterates the position taken previously, so you cannot pretend that this decision does not have very wide geopolitical implications. I ask the Minister three questions. First, would she accept that the siting of installations here marks a distinct loss of UK sovereignty? I do not mean this question in the same way as the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, asked it, because I do not think that the issue here is who controls the base—whether you have an American commander or British control. I take it that this Government will have sovereignty over what goes on inside the base, but will we not lose sovereignty in terms of wider decision-making? If we get involved with an installation, we are involved necessarily in a wide project whose parameters will be sketched by the large-scale powers, not by the UK—by America, Russia and, it is my hope, anyway, the European Union and maybe China. I cannot see that the UK will have a significant impact on something that it has committed itself to. Therefore, it seems a loss of sovereignty in a rather broader and more significant sense than the noble Lord sketched in. Secondly, how would the Minister counter the argument that the introduction of a missile shield, or a missile shield project, inevitably brings a strong possibility of further confrontation, and further escalation in the existence of missile systems and hostile arrangements of armaments in the world? Russia has already said that it is producing a missile system with multiple warheads, more sophisticated than those that have existed for some years previously, and which it says will outwit any possible missile shield. How can one prevent further escalation—if you like, a renewed arms race—in which Europe again might be the pawn, caught in the middle, if such an escalation should happen? I think that the Government at least owe us an explanation of why this would not be the outcome of the project in which they are involving us. Thirdly and finally, if there is indeed to be a new missile system—and unlike the noble Lord, I am not a fundamentalist; I am not against the idea in principle, under certain conditions—it would manifestly be 10 Jan 2008 : Column 957 safer if Russia, the EU and the United States collaborated on it. Russia, of course, has set out a plan, which the American President has straightforwardly rejected. My final question is: does the Minister see a way in which Russia could be involved, and in which therefore there could be a missile shield that would indeed protect us all, because it would be based on a multilateral set of agreements, rather than the international relations regime that the Bush Government have perpetrated? 10 Jan 2008 : Column 958 The likelihood of nuclear proliferation is growing. It is probably safer to use military technology to counter it, if it happens, than military force to prevent it, because nuclear weapons remain unusable, as they have been since August 1945. I believe that we can be reasonably confident that no state that has even the semblance of a diversity of power will use them. None the less, we must have the best defence against them. For those reasons, I strongly support the principle of ballistic missile defence in Europe. There are important obligations on the Government. First, they must keep Parliament properly and fully informed. Many of these issues are not state secrets. The decisions made must and should depend on the feedback from the people in a parliamentary democracy. Secondly, they must ensure that we have the financial resources to meet any commitments. I have said before that the Government have to choose between providing the resources to meet their military commitments and adjusting their military commitments to their resources. At present they are doing neither. Let us be aware that the economic prospects mean that the cash flow from taxation over the coming years will look pretty sick. The fact remains that we are dependent on the United States for our key defence technologies. That is why I believe that we were silly to embark on competitive technologies such as the EU Galileo 10 Jan 2008 : Column 959 system, which duplicates the American navigational satellite system. Its design and development are costing the UK Government €142 million, with a further £2.3 billion for Europe as a whole for deployment and initial operation of the system up to 2013. That was ill considered indeed. The Government must answer other questions, too. Are interceptor missiles, as well as the method of detecting missile attacks, to be stationed in the United Kingdom? I am very unclear about where we are on that and we must debate it. We will not necessarily all agree, but this must not be done surreptitiously. We have heard about the enormous scale of Menwith Hill from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire. I had not realised what a huge operation it is. It is important that local people should be consulted on the implications for them. Then there are the potential benefits for British business in developing these new systems. The world outlook is bleak. Never have we more needed a competent Government of integrity. Let us hope that we soon get one. I should say at the outset that I do not believe that either the United States or its allies can simply afford to ignore the potential future threat from weapons of mass destruction armed missile attacks, launched by one or more of the growing number of countries seeking to acquire such a capability. So I do not favour attempting to place a blanket ban on the development or deployment of any form of anti-missile defence. There I take the same view as, I think, the noble Lord, Lord Giddens, and certainly the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford. To do so, in my view, not only would be doomed to failure, but could leave the United States and its allies with no better form of deterrence against such attacks than the appalling prospect of massive retaliation. That form of deterrence may have worked in the special circumstances of the 10 Jan 2008 : Column 960 Cold War, with two equally armed nuclear superpowers, each with the capacity to destroy the world, squared off against each other, but would it work in the much more fragmented, fissiparous world in which we live? There must be some reasonable doubt about that. Will it work in the medium to long-term future, whose shape we never seem terribly good at predicting? Nor do I consider the Russian response to US policy to be other than disproportionate and excessively aggressive. The idea that a very small number of anti-missile missiles deployed in Poland will pose a serious threat to Russia’s security is not convincing. The initial approach of the US to the handling of the perceived threat seems to me to have been deeply flawed and to bear all the marks of that unilateralist approach to policy-making that has inflicted such damage on the US’s reputation and its alliance relationships over recent years. Was it really wise not to ensure firm support or at least clear understanding of the reasoning behind the policy in NATO before moving ahead? Was it sensible not to consult Russia at an early stage and at every level before firm decisions were announced, given the fraught negotiations that preceded the setting aside of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002? My answer to both questions is, “Clearly not”. The need now, surely, is to proceed much more circumspectly and cautiously towards any future decisions, particularly those on the timing and practicalities of any actual deployment of missiles, seeking to meet concerns where they are legitimate and to find ways around problems rather than bulldozing one’s way through them. In all this, the element of timing is surely critical and, in the light of the recent US National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, there may be slightly more of that commodity available than was thought by some a short time ago. After all, a world in which the potential threats from North Korea and Iran have been met by peaceful negotiated responses will be a totally different world from one where the diplomatic approach has definitively failed, and we are not yet at a point where we can say one or the other of those two outcomes is the more likely. It would be good to hear from the Minister whether the Government are urging such a more circumspect and cautious approach on our US allies when it comes to deployment. That brings us to the wider significance of this anti-missile defence issue to arms control and disarmament in general. Developments in this wider field since the turn of the century have almost all been negative. The major shift towards substantive measures of arms control and disarmament that marked the 1980s and 1990s ground to a halt and was then reversed. This was no random event, born simply of neglect or inadvertence. Any reader of Surrender is Not an Option, the recent memoir of the former US ambassador to the UN and Under Secretary for Arms Control, will see there the glee and enthusiasm with which the Bush Administration set about unilaterally dismantling existing agreements such as the ABM Treaty and destroying future ones on biological warfare verification and on a fissile material cut-off treaty, as well as blocking any prospect of bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force. This in my view misguided policy 10 Jan 2008 : Column 961 seems, fortunately, to have pretty well run its course, but it has not yet been reversed, as it surely needs to be. That is what makes 2008 a crucial year for arms control and disarmament, one in which we can either stand aside helplessly as the world slides towards disorder and greater insecurity for all, or one in which we collectively begin to resume the process of multilateral arms control and disarmament and to strengthen the effort against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We should be under no illusion that those two matters are closely connected. If the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference is to avoid being the fiasco that its predecessor was in 2005, if the now certain major expansion of civil nuclear energy in the years ahead is not to lead to major proliferation risks from the increasingly widespread existence of countries controlling the full fuel cycle, and if the cases of Iran and North Korea are to be handled satisfactorily, the existing legitimised nuclear weapon states will need to honour their commitment to move towards nuclear disarmament. That is the view of a number of extremely distinguished US statesmen known more for their realism than for any ideological commitment to disarmament and led by two former Secretaries of State, George Shultz and Henry Kissinger. It surely should be the view, too, of our own Government, but on that I wait to hear the noble Baroness when she winds up. This year’s election in the US provides an opportunity and is, indeed, a necessary precondition for such a reversal of recent negative trends, as probably is the emergence of Russia from its cycle of parliamentary and presidential elections. But the debate needs to go wider than that and it would surely be wrong if the British Government—one of the legitimised nuclear weapon states—were to regard themselves simply as a spectator in this process. Is it not high time that the Foreign Secretary or the Prime Minister set out fully and publicly the British Government’s thinking on the whole range of issues covered in this debate? What are we ourselves prepared to contribute to the sorely needed renaissance of multilateral arms control and disarmament? What are we doing to bring about a concerted European view on these matters, particularly a view concerted with our fellow European nuclear power, France? What progress is being made at the International Atomic Energy Agency to take decisions and to implement the Government’s proposals for a uranium enrichment bank or drawing rights? ... A disastrous outcome of this logic can be that huge amounts of money are pumped into a system which is inadequately deployed to meet most of the threats and others are inspired to take countermeasures. The countermeasures would, quite obviously, take out the early-warning systems, thus creating a situation in which one has to strike back earlier. That is a very familiar scenario to anyone who grew up, as I did, under the reality of mutually assured destruction. One would strike back earlier, there would be cut-off points and people would, I hope, back away. That is how the system appears to me... We are using vast amounts of resources to meet a threat that does not exist, but which will annoy Russia. Whatever goes on in the mind of Russia, it is a country that, throughout its history, has shown a degree of fear and nervousness about its neighbours, which probably should be drawn to the attention of the rest of the world. It is potentially a threat to China and to India. If it is likely that the current approach will not work, the easiest way of deterring the threat is to take away valuable resources from what is going on, so alienating your potential allies who, between them, might stand a much better chance of cracking down on the problem. What are we buying into? It is something that might blight some form of diplomacy in international relations in the future; it could build up a victim culture in all those states—big and small—that see it potentially being directed against them; and ultimately it will not work. I suggest that we remove ourselves from it. We need to get enough distance to say that it is not the way forward. If we do not do that, we will commit ourselves to something that is ultimately counterproductive. Some may say that the proposed missile defence system is in any case a US initiative and that all we are doing is facilitating the priority of a friend and ally. That is naïve. The political implications and knock-on effects on our own priorities of our involvement are immense, and we need to be convinced that they are beyond question necessary in pursuit of what we believe are our own security interests, let alone those of Europe and the wider world. Surely, as the noble Lords, Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Lord Hannay, with his vast experience, argued, a multilateral approach is indispensable, as is the imperative of a regenerated commitment to global disarmament. Against that background of the imperative for intellectual rigour we shall make an unforgivable mistake if, because of whatever misplaced emotions, we allow ourselves to be seduced—as arguably we were in the saga of the Iraq war—into an increasingly irreversible momentum. We have never honestly resolved whether the route of travel was a wise, rational and justified one. There is a debate about this in the United States. Fundamental re-evaluation of strategy in both the Democratic and Republican Parties is taking place. This would be a disastrous time to add to a momentum that risks thwarting the potential of all that exciting new thinking across the Atlantic. The Government would deserve the widespread support of us all in deciding to pause, to think extremely hard and deep, and to help our American friends to do the same before proceeding—if they decide to do so. 10 Jan 2008 : Column 965 In previous debates on US defence infrastructure in the United Kingdom the Government have provided assurances that any new missile defence system would not result in additional built development at Fylingdales, which is of course in the North York Moors National Park. A similar reassurance from my noble friend today would be good. I hope that she will give it. However, the fear must be that the major infrastructure needed will amount to a vast intrusion. I am thinking of the new and extra roads, buildings—the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire has already spelt out graphically what that means—fences and additional security, not to speak of the further loss of public access. Unavoidably, there will be substantial public interest in any plan that would prolong the military use of Fylingdales and could lead to a major new development in a national park. It is important, therefore, that due process is followed. This means a full environmental impact assessment, which the Government require for new, renewed or intensified military use of national parks. They require that any proposals be tested against the guidance on planning policy. This guidance includes a presumption against major developments in national parks. A public consultation should therefore take place on the future use of the site, including on whether it should remain in the national park at all, should the Government wish to sanction its use for any missile defence system. It would be helpful to have the observations of my noble friend on all this when she comes to reply. What the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, said is something that none of us can escape. Is this part of the sovereign territory of the United Kingdom? Does the law and practice of the Untied Kingdom apply? If not, why the hell not? We need clear answers on that... Ideally, diplomatic pressure and non-proliferation measures would be the best defence against this threat, but they are patently not working in the case of Iran, any more than they did for Pakistan. Equally, no Government want nuclear retaliation to be the only option for defending against a future threat, so a modest second line of defence, in the form of ballistic missile defence, makes a great deal of sense. Of course, BMD cannot stop nuclear weapons hand-delivered by terrorists, but it is the only possible defence against missiles, if not a foolproof one. It is a useful deterrent because it reduces the chance of such missiles reaching their target, and it forces a country which might consider using them to accept that the chances of success are much reduced, while the likelihood of retaliation is just as great. Bear in mind that all countries that have so far acquired nuclear weapons have also acquired the missiles to deliver them. It is a worthwhile investment... Those defensive missiles have to be based where they can be effective. Since current technology means that they cannot catch up with an attacking missile from behind, they have to be in such a missile’s path in order to intercept it. Poland and the Czech Republic fulfil that criterion. Obviously, those countries will want to negotiate with the US about the terms and 10 Jan 2008 : Column 967 conditions of deployment there. They will certainly, sensibly, want reassurance that an incoming American Administration next year will not simply drop the proposal altogether, leaving them to suffer damage to their relations with Russia for no ultimate advantage. That is likely to mean that it will be some time before deployment can take place, which is time for further negotiations with the Iranians and to come to a sensible arrangement with the Russians. By far the best place to station such interceptors is the United Kingdom. It is a great pity that the Government are not doing more to secure their stationing here. Hosting them would secure the maximum influence over the circumstances in which they are used, while minimising our financial contribution. It is about as close to a free lunch as one gets in international security. Ballistic missile defence will be the strategic system of the 21st century. I suspect that, 10 years or so from now, we shall end up buying our own missile defence system at much greater cost. I understand that the Government originally considered an offer to host the system, but were reluctant to take on simultaneously the political challenges of replacing Trident and hosting a ballistic missile defence system. They made the right decision about the Trident system. I hope it is not too late to revisit the decision on stationing BMD missiles here and come to an arrangement that is beneficial to the defence of Britain and the rest of Europe, and a system that threatens no one: not the Iranians, not the Russians—no one. Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer: Issues of whether the programme makes us more vulnerable or safer, although critical considerations, are not what have brought me to speak today. I have 10 Jan 2008 : Column 968 been encouraged to speak by the abuse of Parliament—the lack of parliamentary involvement in these important decisions. A theme runs through the Government’s approach to this. It is a litany of after-the-event announcements, as enunciated by other noble Lords today. The Government say that they cannot talk about it while negotiations are going on, then that they cannot reveal exactly what is being negotiated as it is of course still confidential. Then, when negotiations are finished, they just issue a Written Statement saying what is going to happen. My first experience of this was in 2003 when I tabled a Written Question. The reply of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, to Question HL3913 was:
On 15 January 2003, Mr Hoon outlined the Government’s initial reactions to the US request. In 2003, the MoD relented a bit and published a missile defence discussion paper which asked some important questions. Of course, the Government then answered the questions themselves because, in October 2004, they signed an agreement with the US Administration, and merely informed the House through a Written Statement. This prompted the first outrage of the Defence Select Committee:
History then repeated itself last year when the Government again made a decision, to give permission to the US Administration to use Menwith Hill. My honourable friend Norman Baker asked what formal agreement and Memorandum of Understanding was produced. The answer was most unsatisfactory because the agreement was simply given in an exchange of classified letters, and no comment at all was made on the Memorandum of Understanding. I could go on, but other noble Lords have spelt it out. A theme of absolute failure to involve Parliament runs through this. Again, the Select Committee voiced its concern in absolutely unequivocal terms:
The Select Committee went on to recommend that there should be full parliamentary debate on these proposals, but it has been left to the Liberal Democrats to bring any debate at all, which we are pleased to do. But the Government really must give the other place the chance to debate this in full. At none of these stages before the fait accompli, therefore, has Parliament been give the chance to debate and, I suggest, vote on so critical and important a principle. My noble friend Lord Wallace suggested that this was an extremely important part of international agreements. I thoroughly agree. Perhaps I am more of what the noble Lord, Lord Giddens, described as a fundamentalist. Probably the only place where I would part company with my noble friend Lord Wallace is that I am unilateralist, and I do not believe in nuclear weapons under any circumstances. It would 10 Jan 2008 : Column 969 take something to persuade me about missile defence. However, these questions need to be debated extremely widely. Before I close, I also want to pay tribute to the Campaign for the Accountability of American Bases. It operates in Yorkshire near Menwith Hill. It has been the eyes and ears of the public for what is happening there; it first revealed in 1997 that Menwith Hill was to be designated as the European ground relay station. It has continued to raise this issue ever since. Its members have suffered an awful lot of personal aggravation, and I ask the Minister to look into some of the history of this. They have been arrested but not charged, and charged but the charges have been dropped; they would have welcomed those charges being pursued so that they could have had their day in court. In one case, violence was used against a member, and no satisfactory explanation has ever been given for that. However, it has been incredibly important that people on the ground have been there to see what is happening with planning permissions and some of the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Judd. I wish them well in their campaign. They regularly campaign on Tuesdays outside Menwith Hill to draw attention to the unaccountability of this American base on British soil. Whether the Government ultimately come to the conclusion that we need the missile defence system or not, it must still be on British soil and accountable to the UK. I am fully supportive of the principle of a missile defence system in Europe. The threat that we are confronted with through nuclear proliferation underlies the important need to look at such a system very seriously. We must be able to defend ourselves, and while few would wish to see a growth in the number and sophistication of weapons around the globe, it is essential that we have the capacity to defend those values that constitute our national culture against the ever growing threats and dangers. Ignoring the risks is no safe way to reduce the number of weapons or the dangers that we face... There has been some negative impact on relations with China and Russia as a consequence of the handling of the missile defence system programme. It is important that ways are found to ensure that no permanent damage is done, and that good channels of communication are kept open. Yet the Government have failed to be as open to the House as would be beneficial on the development of a missile defence system in Europe. Parliament has a right to be treated better, and it does the Government no credit that they have not decided to be more open in their communication on the project. I could cite the example of dozens of parliamentary questions which demonstrate the evasive approach that the Government have adopted in communicating with Parliament. This may seem to be a constant critique on the conduct of this Government, and it is a real shame. With that in mind, it is also a shame that this debate is not being held in government time. Will the Minister update us on the discussions that have been held with her counterparts from the United States, and give a commitment to returning to the House in government time for a further debate in due course? Baroness Falkner of Margravine: ... It is a sad reflection on parliamentary accountability that the Opposition have to use their time on debates of this matter of national and international significance, which should in any event be discussed in Parliament, on the back of a serious and meaningful dialogue within the whole country. I am not a defence expert so will not go into the scientific arguments of ballistic missile defence, or the merits of these new hit-to-kill systems. My concern is with why the UK has nailed its colours to yet another American mast, of something that I regret is again sailing in the wrong direction, and what this means for international peace and security... Apart from the evident loss of sovereignty and the danger of increased nuclear proliferation, there is a further symbolic aspect: our role as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. We are still seen—less so after the Iraq war—as a moderating and balancing power which, due to its historic connections in most parts of the world, can sometimes play a restraining hand. What appears to be our uncritical engagement with this project will diminish that role. That will have a cost beyond the tenure of this Government to the security of future generations. Lord Young of Norwood Green: ... Listening to the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, I am reminded that these debates always take place against the backdrop of whether you are coming from a unilateralist or a multilateralist position. My attitude towards nuclear weapons has gone through the full spectrum, from a totally unilateralist position to one where I recognise that, although I do not like nuclear 10 Jan 2008 : Column 974 weapons—I abhor them—they are there. As the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, reminded us, they are an unfortunate reality with which we must deal. That is why I have moved towards a multilateralist position... I share some of the concerns that have been expressed to the Government. I think that the critics who said that there has not been enough transparency and accountability have a point, which it is essential for the Minister to answer in her response. This is going to be a continuing and important debate. In their Statement on 25 July, the Government said:
I do not mind them keeping it under review but I would like an assurance that there will be a debate before a decision is taken. That is vital. Baroness Williams of Crosby: ... The debate has had two specific purposes. The first—and I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Young, said what he did in 10 Jan 2008 : Column 976 the last few minutes—relates to what I can only describe in quite strong language as virtually a contemptuous treatment of Parliament. Over several years now, we have consistently had responses from Ministers to the effect that we are not entitled to comment on anything to do with this bilateral system—and it is a bilateral system, not, as the noble Lord, Lord Young, suggested, a NATO system. I will give two recent examples. On 14 June 2007, Mr Hoon said:
It was not an issue for anybody else. In a debate in this House on 22 November, when my noble friend Lord Wallace raised a question on this matter, the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor—I know that we all regret that she is indisposed at the present time and not able to take part in this debate—replied:
Yet we find ourselves faced with a proposal for a substantial increase in the facilities at Menwith Hill. We even face the possibility of the United Kingdom becoming the next area for a ballistic missile interceptor system. However, Parliament has been entitled to talk about this hardly at all over the past few years. As my noble friend Lady Falkner said, it is extraordinary that it should have been left to one opposition party to bring this matter to the attention of the House. That is the first point and I think that we should make it very seriously. If Parliament is to be treated as a significant part of the decision-making processes of a democracy, the Government have to be more open, more frank and more informative about this crucial aspect of our defence policy. The second, wider issue was raised by the noble Lords, Lord Giddens and Lord Hannay, and by many others: how do we deal with the extremely disturbing situation that we face in the world at present? Let me refer back, as did the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, in an interesting historical speech, to the fact that the period in which there was the greatest advance in not only controlling the dissemination of arms but in creating far less opportunity for terrorists was immediately after the end of the Cold War. Last month, I attended a conference in the United States at which Mr Gorbachev pointed out repeatedly the extraordinary advances that were made at that time: a reduction of some 6,000 nuclear missiles, destroyed between the United States and Russia; a huge advance in securing nuclear materials; and a huge advance in establishing a whole set of safeguards for the whole world with regard to the Cold War legacy of a huge number of nuclear materials and weapons strewn across a vast range of the world. It was in that period immediately after the Cold War that Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other countries completely gave up any ambitions that they might have had for developing a nuclear weapon. At the conference, Mr Gorbachev repeatedly said that there had to be a return to multilateral controls because, without them, it is impossible to see how we can control the dissemination and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is simply an illusion 10 Jan 2008 : Column 977 to suppose that some form of missile defence in eastern Europe or, for that matter, in the United Kingdom can deal with an issue so great as this. It is a tragedy that we have seen a gradual erosion—as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, said in his eloquent speech, and as the noble Lord, Lord Giddens, pointed out—of the whole system of arms control and disarmament that has protected the world for the past 40 years from the possibility of a major nuclear exchange. Let me say one more thing about that period. Gradually a large part of the world became committed to looking at some of the dangers of terrorism. It is vital to point out to those who believe, as the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, did, that the proposal called MAD—mutually assured destruction—still holds good that many of the most serious situations involve not state actors but non-state actors. We have to address that problem. The noble Lord, Lord Powell of Bayswater, made somewhat light of Russia’s reaction to the attempt to place missile defences in central and eastern Europe. I do not believe that we should treat it so lightly. Russia may be exaggerating; she may be going over the top. But anyone in this House or elsewhere who has studied the history of Russia will know that a consistent theme runs through it: the fear of encirclement, which was mentioned only in the past two weeks by such players as the Russian Foreign Secretary and the Russian Prime Minister. Russia’s reactions may be emotional and not wholly rational, but that does not mean that they are not real and do not need to be taken into account. We already know what Russia’s response has been. Just in the past few days, she has withdrawn from the crucial conventional forces in Europe treaty, which has limited the number of troops and conventional weapons based in Europe to the great advantage of peace in the world. We know that Russia is now talking about the possibility of a nuclear response to the use of missiles or the return of missiles as an anti-missile defence in central and eastern Europe. It is true that General Baluyevsky, head of the central command of the Russia armed forces, may be going over the top in what he says. But when he says that Russian missiles are automatically trained to respond immediately to any missile attack and that there is the possibility therefore of a grave mistake that would lead to nuclear-tipped weapons landing in Europe, we would be very foolish not to take that threat at least fairly seriously. As others have said in this debate, on top of that the Russians are now talking about moving towards a more sophisticated system of missiles that would be capable of withstanding anti-missile defences. I do not know whether that is true, but it is a significant question that needs to be addressed and about which Parliament should hear the concerns that many people have. In the short run, more disturbingly to me, Russia is showing signs of ceasing to co-operate with the western world, and with the United States in particular, in the very area where its co-operation with the United States has been most successful: the securing of nuclear 10 Jan 2008 : Column 978 materials, control over the supply of fissile materials and all the things with which we should be profoundly concerned, given the massive increase in civil nuclear power that now lies before us. Scores of countries will now have access to uranium and other forms of nuclear fuel. We will have to depend on their trustworthiness in deciding that they do not become nuclear powers. The anti-missile defences in no way address this issue, yet the issue is one of the most important to confront us today. There are those who believe that one of the reasons why the United States pursued the proposal bilaterally with Poland and the Czech Republic was Donald Rumsfeld’s attempt to divide old and new Europe. Certainly, there was no attempt to discuss the proposal with the rest of the NATO countries of Europe, although there should have been. We now know that Poland and the Czech Republic are beginning to reconsider their position. In Poland, on this very day, the Polish Foreign Minister is meeting his opposite number in the Czech Republic to see what their combined reaction should be to the American proposal. Today, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister is in Warsaw to discuss the implications of the proposal for Polish-Russian relations. A few days ago in the Czech Republic, 1,000 people demonstrated against Czech involvement in missile defence. In Poland, there has been a marked swing of opinion, with Mr Sikorski, the Foreign Secretary, specifically saying that, although the missile defence is in the interests of the United States, it is not clear whether it is in the interests of Poland. Changes of government in Poland and the Czech Republic have put this whole project at risk, yet so far the United Kingdom has not been consulted or, as far as I know, informed about the way in which these relationships are going. The most important issue in this debate was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Giddens, in an impressive speech, and in the eloquent speeches made by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and others. I believe that the United Kingdom Government, our Foreign Office and our Ministry of Defence are increasingly out of touch with a significant movement in American opinion. The noble Lords, Lord Hannay and Lord Giddens, referred to the proposal—the so-called Wall Street Journal letter of last year—signed by Mr Kissinger, Mr Schultz, Mr Perry and Senator Nunn, calling on a redirection of nuclear weapons disarmament policy gradually towards the destruction of all such weapons. Congress has already decided that it will not go ahead with appropriations for the ballistic missile defence system unless there is full agreement from Poland and the Czech Republic. I have already mentioned the doubts raised on that issue. Congress has decided specifically that it wants to make sure that the missile systems work. My noble friend Lord Addington spoke powerfully on whether or not they do. It is perhaps worth quoting an extremely impressive and, I believe, important editorial in the New York Times on 30 December. It states:
10 Jan 2008 : Column 979 That theme has run through a great deal of the American debate. Does this system work? Has it been presented as working when it has essentially been manipulated to produce a successful result? My noble friend Lord Addington referred to recent tests in which it was known where the missile was coming from and what its route would be; even then, many of the tests failed. Perhaps most important are the Russian offers of co-operation made last summer. Russia did not initially respond by marching out of one multilateral agreement after the other. Incidentally, more frightening still, Russia is now threatening to march out of the intermediate nuclear force treaty and even START, which has reduced the arsenals of nuclear missiles held throughout the world by large proportions and which dies out in 2009. Have Her Majesty’s Government embarked on any serious study of the extension of that crucial treaty in order to allow for a new verification system, given that the present one will die in 2009 and it is all that we have? On the American reaction, there has been little debate—almost none, as many have said—in our Parliament. In the United States, during the presidential primaries, the Republican and Democrat candidates have put forward their suggestions and ideas. As my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire pointed out, in the case of the Republicans the discussion has largely been about whether this is directed at Russia or someone else. It is important that two of the leading contenders think that it is directed at Russia, which goes some way towards explaining why Russia is so profoundly worried about the whole development. The Democrat candidates have been discussing to a much greater extent how we can deal with the whole issue of proliferation. They have been attracted to the ideas put forward in that Wall Street Journal letter and, subsequently, in the Congress and by the body to which I belong, the Nuclear Threat Initiative. American opinion is moving towards a new approach to this huge issue. I am deeply worried by the extent to which Her Majesty’s Government appear to be still talking the language of an Administration who are shortly to leave office, as the language of an exchange of deterrents is increasingly made foolish by the existence of non-state actors and terrorist groups. I would plead that the Government reconsider their attitude towards anti-missile defence in the light of recent developments. I am not saying not that it should not exist; I am arguing that the Government should take much more seriously the possibility of co-operation between Russia, the United States and others in mounting an effective international system of defence. I will conclude with a quotation from the significant New York Times editorial, which has had deep influence on the primary elections in the United States, about the offer that Putin made last summer of sharing a Russian early warning radar system in Azerbaijan. The Americans dismissed the offer at the time, but the editorial said:
10 Jan 2008 : Column 980 It is crucial to make sure that Iran does not move to get a nuclear bomb. It is crucial that Iran should be reassured that she will not herself be the victim of a nuclear attack; that is a crucial part of the outcome. I believe that we should look at the New York Times approach carefully and see whether we could not now get an international agreement and abandon what has been much too unilateralist, much too exclusive and much too destructive an approach. I am very aware that it is not an easy task to debate this question. It brings with it some uncomfortable truths. The international community is not a safe place and sadly it has not become safer since the end of the Cold War. With each new horrific terrorist attack, it becomes more grotesquely clear that there are rogue states and organisations that will stop at nothing in the pursuit of territorial, political and, sadly, religious expansionism. The need for this House even to consider such a thing as a missile defence system is its stark manifestation. We on these Benches are in favour of preserving human life and therefore ensuring global peace. Therefore, if the missile system enables this, then we are in support of it. However, we will not support Her Majesty’s Government entering into any particular missile system without sufficient parliamentary discussion or gauging popular consent. In July last year when Her Majesty’s Government said that they would take part in the next stage of the proposed US Ballistic Missile Defence initiative, at RAF Menwith Hill, they came close to such circumvention. The decision to upgrade the existing radar technology to allow the US to collect it for its own BMD system was indeed a major decision, but it was announced just before the Recess. I wonder whether the Minister can adequately defend Her Majesty’s Government against the claim of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee that they “buried” the statement. We stand foursquare behind Her Majesty’s Government’s diplomatic friendship with America and of course the special relationship. While the MoD believes that currently there is no significant ballistic missile threat to the UK we cannot and must not ever ignore the increasing number of states that are seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction and missile capabilities... Any threat to Russia from the defence system is nonsensical. As the noble Lord, Lord Young, said, Russia could one day come into the system. Will the Minister comment on the recent sale by Ofcom of the radio spectrum band used by Fylingdales? Is she confident that a commercial user of the band, having bought it, will not be adversely affected by any subsequent US military installation at Fylingdales? It is lunacy if our effort to safeguard our nation provokes hostility and fear from other nations. I feel Her Majesty’s Government must be committed to showing the world that the missile defence system is not seen as an alternative to diplomacy, not even as a back-up, but as a last resort only. Will the Minister give an assurance that the UK’s future negotiations with the US regarding this defence mechanism will be proceeded with through open negotiations? I am anxious that Her Majesty’s Government should avoid stoking any further the fires of Russia's increasing—and unnecessary—suspicion over US defence measures by seeming to act covertly. Does the Minister agree that we must avoid any situation arising again like that of February 2007 when there was so much media speculation that the Government might have offered to base the third missile interceptor site on UK soil instead of in Poland? ... To conclude, I reiterate that we on these Benches support the concept behind missile defence. That being said, any further addition to US military assets or expansion of military facilities in this country should go through a proper review and debate both in this House and the other place. The Government have never been afraid of debating the issue of ballistic missile defence. Indeed, a Commons debate on this issue took place in early 2003 after the Government received a US request to upgrade the missile tracking radar system at RAF Fylingdales, and after the Ministry of Defence had published a discussion document on missile defence in November 2002. The principles underlying missile defence have not changed in the intervening time. The noble Baronesses, Lady Williams of Crosby, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer and Lady Falkner, my noble friend Lord Judd, the noble Lord, Lord Sheikh, and my noble friend Lord Giddens, who said that he is a critic of the Government’s position, have all raised the issue of a lack of opportunity for a proper debate on the issue as they see it. I would say that both Houses have had an opportunity to question Defence Ministers on missile defence, both in writing and orally, and rightly so. As the then Prime Minister said on 28 February last year, if the Government need to re-examine their position on missile defence and take further steps on participation, then we will present those propositions to the House and have the necessary discussions, but we would seek to do this only when there are proposals or propositions to be made. At present, there are none... There have been reports in the international media that UK and US Governments are also discussing the basing of interceptors here in the UK. I say now that that is simply not true—there are no plans to base interceptors here. If in the future we decide that the acquisition of such technology becomes essential to the security of the United Kingdom, we will re-examine this position. This re-examination would come not from a desire to follow blindly the defence policy of other nations—as we have been accused of in the 10 Jan 2008 : Column 985 debate—but from a recognition of our need to ensure our national security against emerging threats... The Government have been criticised over the way that they announced the decision to allow US Governments to use the satellite relay station at RAF Menwith Hill to route early warning data to the missile defence system. The original decision to allow the US to use RAF Menwith Hill as a relay station for satellite data was taken in March 1997. The purpose of the relay station was then—and remains—to warn the UK and the US of any missile attack on our countries. What the Government agreed to recently was that the US could use this same satellite data in their missile defence system. The fact that satellite early warning information flows through RAF Menwith Hill has not changed. All that is different is that the US Government are now able to use this early warning information to inform their missile defence systems of possible missile launches from states of concern, and to assist in the interception of these missiles. The Written Statement that was given in another place on 25 July—it was quoted by my noble friend Lord Young in his excellent speech—was not “sneaked out” or “slipped out”, as the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire observed, or “buried”, as the noble Lord, Lord Luke, stated. The Government’s agreement to this arrangement was given in an exchange of classified letters between the US Defense Secretary, who wrote on 29 June 2007, and the Secretary of State for Defence, who replied on 16 July 2007. The timing of the announcement to the House on 25 July, just prior to the Summer Recess, was therefore entirely appropriate. The Ministry of Defence also produced a press release on the Written Statement on 26 July... The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, also asked me about Germany’s request for more multilateral discussions on missile defence, and stated that the UK had not responded. The UK provides regular updates on missile defence activities through NATO. This includes statements on UK policy and on missile defence, and updates on co-operation with the US on its BMD system. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, said that my right honourable friend Des Browne, the Secretary of State for Defence, had misled the House on the issue of Menwith Hill. I strongly reject any suggestion that the Secretary of State for Defence misled Parliament over the request from the US for the use of Menwith Hill for missile defence proposals. In April last year, the UK Government had received no request from the US. A formal request was received in a letter from the US Defense Secretary, dated 29 June. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, and other noble Lords, made strong points about the issue of sovereignty in relation to Menwith Hill. The Government take the issue of sovereignty extremely seriously. Menwith Hill is United Kingdom territory. The base is under the command of an RAF officer—there is no question of UK sovereignty being compromised... The noble Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Marlesford, asked whether the UK will accept US interceptors if negotiations with Poland fail. There are no plans to offer the UK as a potential site for interceptor missiles should negotiations with the Polish Government fail. However, as the Secretary of State for Defence said in his Written Statement on 25 July, the UK,
My noble friend Lord Giddens asked about the threat to the UK from hosting missile defence assets. The 2003 report by the House of Commons Defence Committee agreed that the upgrade to Fylingdales would not increase the threat to the UK. Even with the US now able to use Menwith Hill to route early warning satellite data through its missile defence system, the Government feel that the situation has not changed. The US missile defence system is designed to counter a limited threat from a state of concern and these missiles would be limited in terms of numbers and their ability to accurately strike their target. It is felt that it is unlikely that a state with limited opportunities to strike against the US and her allies would wish to target a relatively small target such as a radar station, which it may not hit, when a large population centre offers a more attractive and potentially devastating target. 10 Jan 2008 : Column 987 The noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, asked about the economic benefits to the UK from BMD. The UK signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2003 that allows bilateral information exchanges and co-operative work that prepares the way for fair opportunities to be given to UK industry in participation in US systems... We on these Benches do not withdraw our criticism of the Government that we have had in effect contempt of Parliament on this issue. This is the first substantive debate on missile defence in either House for five years. To say that there has been the opportunity to table Written Questions in the interim does not provide an alternative, as the Government are well aware. The agreement to allow additional equipment at Menwith Hill was such a proposition, and to slip it out on the last day but one of Parliament sitting last July was, in our opinion, improper. The idea that the letter from the United States of 29 June came as a surprise out of the blue and that there had been no previous correspondence or discussions is a little hard to take. My suggestion about the Defence Secretary’s Statement in late April was that of course discussions must have been under way then. The fact that that correspondence was completed on 16 July, after which there were seven sitting days of Parliament still remaining, allowed plenty of time for an earlier Statement, preferably an Oral Statement. It was not provided, and that was not adequate. We are not reassured by the use of that familiar phrase, “The UK has no plans”. It has been used on many previous occasions while negotiations were under way, after which we are told, “Agreement has just been reached”. I see that in the letter of 17 October from Des Browne to Sir Menzies Campbell, he wrote:
10 Jan 2008 : Column 988 That gives some substance to the suggestion by the Daily Telegraph that negotiations were indeed under way. We on these Benches have made some play of the sovereignty issue, and we will continue to do so, because the suggestion by the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, that we have little controversy in Britain about the effective subordination of sovereignty and security to the United States relates to the question of how far we share sovereignty with our partners in the European Union. We will come back to that. As to how much Menwith Hill remains subject to British control, I have had discussions with local MPs and county councillors in north Yorkshire about the degree of access that it is possible for anyone to have inside the wire at Menwith Hill and about the role of the MoD police, operating under US control, at Menwith Hill, which leave me extremely unhappy about the extent to which it remains effectively under British sovereignty. Several noble Lords have set out very powerfully our commitment to a multilateral approach, first within NATO and, secondly, within a broader context. The question of Iran has come up. Clearly, we need to address on another occasion—perhaps during a debate in this House—the question of how the West handled its relations with Iran. This House deserves a full debate on relations between the West—both NATO and the European Union—and Russia. I found the Foreign Affairs Committee report from the other place of last November on relations between Russia and the West extremely helpful in preparing my speech. I am conscious that currently there is an inquiry by our EU Committee under way on relations between Russia and the EU. When that report is complete, the Government should allow time in this House for a substantial debate not just on relations between Russia and the EU but on relations between Russia and NATO, so that we can address the many overlapping issues between the missile defence debate and the involvement of Russia in global security issues, about which we have concerns. Having made those points, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate. I beg leave to withdraw the Motion for Papers. Back to Proliferation in Parliament, December 2007 - February 2008 © 2008 The Acronym Institute. |