 Proliferation in Parliament
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UK Parliament Debates Trident
Excerpts from the Debate, March 14, 2007
Prime Minister's Questions - Blair, Cameron and Campbell
Full text is available from the UK Parliament website at:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070314/debtext/70314-0002.htm#07031475002517
Mr. David Cameron (Witney) (Con): Replacing Britain's independent
nuclear deterrent is in the national interest. A submarine-based alternative
is the right answer, and the decision needs to be made now. Does the Prime
Minister agree that in a dangerous and uncertain world, unilateral nuclear
disarmament has never been and will never be the right answer?
The Prime Minister: For precisely the reasons that I gave when
I made my statement to the House, I think it right that we make the decision
now to begin work on replacing the Trident nuclear submarines. I think
that that is essential for our security in an uncertain world. It is important
for us to recognise that, although it is impossible to predict the future,
the one thing that is certain-as I said in my statement-is the unpredictability
of it. For that reason, I think it sensible that we make this decision
today.
Mr. Cameron: I agree with the Prime Minister. Does he agree that
replacing Trident meets both the spirit and the letter of our international
treaty obligations? Will he confirm that the last Conservative Government
cut the number of warheads, that his Government cut the number of warheads,
and that there will be further reductions in the future? Does he agree
that, as a result, the argument against replacing Trident on the basis
of non-proliferation simply does not stand up?
The Prime Minister: We are very proud of our record in this respect,
and making sure that we reduce the number of warheads is important, as
we have said. It may be possible to reduce the number of submarines, although
that is a decision that will have to be made at a later stage.
Yes, of course it is important that we conform fully with our non-proliferation
treaty obligations, and we are doing so. I think it is possible for us
to continue to play our full part-under the non-proliferation treaty-in
the multilateral negotiations that I hope will take place over the years
to come, so that the world becomes a safer place with fewer nuclear weapons.
However, I think that we shall be best able to achieve that if we maintain
our nuclear deterrent.
Mr. Cameron: We are discussing this now because the system could
take about 17 years to put in place, so the timing is right, the legality
is clear and maintaining the deterrent is in our national interest. Because
the Prime Minister has the support of the Conservative party, we can work
together in the national interest.
14 Mar 2007 : Column 279
Will he tell us clearly that tonight's vote is the vote and that there
is no going back after tonight's vote? Will he also confirm that he will
stand by his policy and that he will not appease those in his own party,
or the Liberal Democrats, who simply want to run away from a tough decision?
The Prime Minister: It is precisely because I believe that this
decision has to be taken now that we have the vote today in the House
of Commons. I entirely understand why people might want to put off this
decision, but the fact is that we need to take the decision today if we
want to get parliamentary approval for the work that has to begin now
on the concept and design phase-of course, the actual contracts for the
design and construction are to be left for a later time. If we want to
get proper parliamentary authorisation, this decision has to be taken
now. I entirely understand and respect the views of those who hold a different
opinion on this issue, but I have been pretty clear and firm on it from
the beginning, and I think that we should continue to be so...
Sir Menzies Campbell (North-East Fife) (LD): ...
I cannot help remembering that the last time that the right hon. Member
for Witney (Mr. Cameron) and the Prime Minister voted together in the
same Lobby on an issue of national interest was on Iraq, and that has
not proved to be a comforting precedent. Does the Prime Minister accept
that the most immediate nuclear threat is from other countries acquiring
nuclear weapons? What then will be the role played by his Government at
the nuclear non-proliferation review conference in 2010?
The Prime Minister: We will continue to play a positive role
on this issue. However, I must say to the right hon. and learned Gentleman
that there is absolutely no evidence whatever that if Britain now renounced
its independent nuclear deterrent that would improve the prospect of getting
multilateral disarmament. On the contrary, I think that the reverse is
the case. I must also say to the right hon. and learned Gentleman that
although of course I understand why he wants to put off this decision-I
understand that that is his position-the fact is that the 17-year programme
is what has been advised by the experts who advise us on this issue. I
recommend that he reads the evidence given to the
14 Mar 2007 : Column 280
Defence Committee on this very point by Rear-Admiral Mathews. So the
17-year period is clear, and that must be worked back from 2024, which
takes us to 2007. That means that we have to take the decision now if
we want parliamentary approval for the concept and design phase. I am
sure that if we did not seek parliamentary approval but continued with
the work on the concept and design phase, the right hon. and learned Gentleman
would be standing up and asking why I had not sought such approval.
Sir Menzies Campbell: The Prime Minister surely accepts that
a hasty decision to replace Trident is bound to undermine our ability
to have influence at the conference in 2010. Should we not now be offering
to reduce the number of warheads on Trident in order to give a lead to
others?
The Prime Minister: We are set to reduce the number of warheads,
but it is absurd to say that we can somehow put off the question of whether
we take a decision now on this concept and design phase. That is absurd
because obviously we have to take the advice of the experts, such as the
director general who is in charge of this matter in the Ministry of Defence
and others, who say to us that it is a 17-year programme and it must therefore
begin now if we want to maintain the nuclear deterrent. Therefore, we
cannot put this decision off; we have to take it now. I recall that a
few days ago, the right hon. and learned Gentleman said on this issue,
"I will not sit on the fence."
I am afraid that "on the fence" is exactly where he is, and as I think
that he will find, it is not a very comfortable place to be.
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Mr. John Denham (Southampton, Itchen) (Lab): Does my right hon.
Friend understand that today's motion on Trident effectively commits this
country to the possession of an independent nuclear weapons system for
the best part of the next 45 years without the House being guaranteed
any future opportunity to consider whether it remains the best strategy?
Does he understand that many of us accept the need to ensure our ability
to replace the Trident system, but none the less believe that in a fast-changing
world this House should be guaranteed the chance to revisit that decision
at an appropriate point in the future?
The Prime Minister: I entirely understand my right hon. Friend's
point. If I may put it like this, it is at what I would describe as the
reasonable end of the opposition to what the Government are doing. However,
let me try to explain why I think we have still got to take this decision
today. It is absolutely right that this Parliament cannot bind the decisions
of a future Parliament and it is always open to us to come back and look
at these issues. He is right to suggest that when we get to the gateway
stage-between 2012 and 2014-when we let the main contracts for design
and construction, it will always be open to Parliament to take a decision.
However, I believe that the reason why we have to take the decision today
is that if we do not start the process now, we will not be in the position
in 2012 or 2014 to continue with the nuclear deterrent should we wish
to do so.
The real dilemma is that we decided rightly or wrongly-but I think rightly-that
we should seek parliamentary approval even for the design and concept
stage. When we came to the previous Trident nuclear submarine, it was
only at a later stage that parliamentary approval was sought. That was
much criticised at the time, so we decided that we should seek parliamentary
approval at the very beginning of this process. Of course, it is a statement
of fact that the gateway takes place at a later stage and in a later Parliament
but if we want to spend at least the more limited sum of money now on
the concept and design stage, we have to take a decision now.
Excerpts from the Debate
Full text including motions and voting record is available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070314/debtext/70314-0004.htm#07031475000005
14 Mar 2007 : Column 298
Margaret Beckett
"Let me set out the nature of the decisions that the House is being asked
to support today. They are whether or not to take the steps necessary
to maintain a minimum strategic nuclear deterrent for the UK-a single
system comprising submarines, missiles and warheads-and to take further
steps towards meeting our disarmament responsibilities under article VI
of the non-proliferation treaty."
14 Mar 2007 : Column 299
Dr. Nick Palmer (Broxtowe) (Lab): Does the Secretary of State
accept that all these issues must be subject to review over the years,
and that many of us who will support her today reserve the right to review
our positions when the warheads are considered in the next Parliament?
Margaret Beckett: As my hon. Friend is aware, we are not making
any decision about the warheads in this Parliament, so the matter will
inevitably come before a subsequent Parliament...
Mr. Frank Field (Birkenhead) (Lab): Is the Foreign Secretary
saying that we are making a decision today to keep all our options open,
or are we making a decision that would commit a future Parliament to large
expenditures when we go through the big gateway decision in due course?
Margaret Beckett: My right hon. Friend will know that that question
was raised with the Prime Minister a few moments ago and he answered it
clearly. It is the decision of principle that we are required to make
today. It is inevitable that there will be future discussions, and there
will be decisions down the road as the programme proceeds.
14 Mar 2007 : Column 300
There are four key issues. I will address each in turn. The first is
what are we doing to fulfil our obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation
treaty. The second is whether it is still in the national interest to
maintain a nuclear deterrent. The third is why such a deterrent should
be in the form that we now propose. The final issue is why we need to
make this decision now...
The NPT created two distinct categories of states. Those that had already
conducted nuclear tests-ourselves, the US, the Soviet Union, China and
France-were designated nuclear weapons states and could legally possess
nuclear weapons. All other states-signatory were designated non-nuclear
weapons states. Article VI of the NPT imposes an obligation on all states
"to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating
to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament".
The NPT review conference held in 2000 agreed, by consensus, 13 practical
steps towards nuclear disarmament. The UK remains committed to these steps
and is making progress on them.
We have been disarming. Since the cold war ended, we have withdrawn and
dismantled our tactical maritime and airborne nuclear capabilities. We
have terminated our nuclear capable Lance missiles and artillery. We have
the smallest nuclear capability of any recognised nuclear weapon state,
accounting for less than 1 per cent. of the global inventory, and we are
the only nuclear weapon state that relies on a single nuclear system.
The Prime Minister has announced a further unilateral reduction in our
nuclear weapons in line with our commitment to maintain only the minimum
necessary deterrent. We will reduce the stockpile of operationally available
warheads by another 20 per cent. to fewer than 160 warheads during the
course of this year. This will involve the eventual dismantlement and
disposal of about 40 warheads. The UK will then have cut the explosive
power of its nuclear weapons by three quarters since the end of the cold
war. That is more than any other nuclear weapon state has yet done...
Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab): I want to be
clear about the point that my right hon. Friend is making in comparison
with her answers to earlier interventions. Is she saying that today's
decision is a reduction of 20 per cent., or is she saying, as I thought
she was, that during the 2012 to 2014 window there will be a decision
that can be made by this House to determine whether the 20 per cent. reduction
could be increased to, say, 50 per cent.?
Margaret Beckett: That depends, of course, on whether the House
votes for this motion. If it does, we are committing ourselves to making
that reduction by the end of this year...
14 Mar 2007 : Column 301
Simon Hughes (North Southwark and Bermondsey) (LD): Obviously,
as the Foreign Secretary rightly said, we are not the biggest player among
the nuclear arms powers-and, yes, there have been steps to disarmament.
Why, however, would the Government's position, which is in principle to
retain the nuclear deterrent, be a better trigger for disarmament in the
2010 talks than a decision to defer on the basis of reduction now and
prospective reduction or abolition of nuclear arms later?
Margaret Beckett: Let me first say to the hon. Gentleman that,
as I have already pointed out, we have been disarming over the course
of the past 10 years, with singularly little response. There is therefore
no evidence whatever for the notion that if we defer this decision, that
will somehow magically produce a different response from other players
than we have had hitherto.
Mike Gapes (Ilford, South) (Lab/Co-op): Before my right hon.
Friend moves away from the issue of proliferation, can she give the House
an assurance that if we vote for the Government's motion today, there
will be renewed efforts to secure the measures on nuclear weapons disarmament
mentioned in article VI of the non-proliferation treaty, particularly
to try to get India, Pakistan and the other non-signatories to the NPT
into the global nuclear arms control system?
Margaret Beckett: I can certainly give my hon. Friend that assurance
without any difficulty. The next step that we hope to take is to bring
forward negotiations on the fissile material cut-off treaty. He is also
absolutely right that it is extremely important to work with other states
that are known to have a nuclear weapons capacity and have not come within
the ambit of moving towards disarmament. We will certainly continue such
work.
Richard Burden (Birmingham, Northfield) (Lab): Does my right
hon. Friend agree that for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to be
effective, two things are important: first, it has to be enforced; and
secondly, non-nuclear states have to be convinced of the logic of it?
If someone was in Israel at the moment considering whether to get rid
of the nuclear weapons that they have, or if someone was in Iran-I mean
a secular Iranian, not Ahmadinejad-wondering whether it is a good idea
to acquire nuclear weapons, would it really be logical for them to think
that they should not acquire nuclear weapons if the message they get from
this country is that we need to prepare for producing the next generation
just as an insurance policy for things that we do not know are going to
happen?
Margaret Beckett: ... I would simply say to my hon. Friend that
that is the most dangerous argument of all. It does nothing. Those who
want to see nuclear disarmament, and those who are anxious and nervous
about the decision that the House is being asked to make today, are doing
nobody any service by encouraging the notion
14 Mar 2007 : Column 302
that any decision that we make gives an excuse to others, who are, in
the case of Iran, signatories to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty
-[ Interruption. ] I hear the words, "He didn't say that." No, but it
was quite heavily implied. There is no justification for others in the
decision that we are being asked to make.
Mr. Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth, East) (Con): This debate has
come about not because of Trident coming to the end of its shelf life
but because the Vanguard-class submarines will need to be replaced. Could
the Secretary of State clarify how much it will cost to decommission the
four submarines and what budget that will come from?
Margaret Beckett: I cannot, offhand, but I am sure that my right
hon. Friend the Defence Secretary will able to give the hon. Gentleman
the figures later on...
Mr. Alex Salmond (Banff and Buchan) (SNP): If what the Foreign
Secretary says is internationally accepted, why does Mohamed el-Baradei
so fundamentally disagree with her on the impact that it will have on
proliferation?
Margaret Beckett: I appreciate that Dr. el-Baradei has of late
made a number of remarks about his wish that Governments-nuclear-armed
states-should not pursue such measures. However, he knows, as we know,
that all nuclear-armed states have indeed taken steps to modernise and
keep up to date the weapons and facilities that they have. That is exactly
the decision that the United Kingdom is making, no more and no less. I
must say to the hon. Gentleman that I have looked to
14 Mar 2007 : Column 303
see whether I can discover Dr. el-Baradei making similar comments when
other nuclear weapon states made those choices; so far I have not been
able to unearth such comments...
Mr. John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con): Could the Secretary of State
give those of us who desperately want multilateral disarmament to succeed
an idea of what the chances are for other nuclear states to match our
unilateral action in getting rid of all battlefield and tactical weapons?
Margaret Beckett: I cannot speculate on those chances, but these
are steps that we thought that it was right to take. We continue to urge
them on others, and we will continue to do so through the conference on
disarmament. I share the view of many in the House that it is perhaps
time for a fresh push on these measures on the international stage. How
successful such a push would be remains to be seen, but there have been
a series of bilateral agreements since the end of the cold war, which
have greatly reduced the major nuclear arsenals...
Britain remains committed to the abolition of nuclear weapons, and we
are actively engaged, and encouraging others to be engaged, in a process
that will lead to that goal. But progress will be steady and incremental,
and only towards the end of that process will it be helpful and useful
for us to include our own small fraction of the global stockpile in treaty-based
reductions.
So there is no basis to suggest that we have done anything other than
fully comply with our obligations under the NPT. Indeed-I say this to
the House with some respect-I regard it as dangerous folly to equate our
own record, as some have tried to do, with that of countries such as North
Korea and Iran, which have stood or stand in clear breach of their obligations
as non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT. There is no legal or moral
equivalence between their position and ours. I would urge people, whatever
other arguments they might use to oppose the motion, not to use that one,
because it undermines the very basis of the treaty itself: that those
recognised as non-nuclear weapon states should not seek to acquire nuclear
weapons. The international non-proliferation regime is not perfect, but
it has prevented the wide-scale proliferation of nuclear weapons. I regard
it as dangerously irresponsible to use the excuse that the UK is retaining
its weapons to justify others seeking to acquire them, and it runs the
real risk of increasing the global nuclear threat, not reducing it.
Andrew George (St. Ives) (LD): Does the Secretary of State not
think that it might be dangerous folly to use the expression "nuclear
deterrent" in this context? Does she accept that these proposals are hardly
going to deter Iran and North Korea? Will she explain her policy in the
context of its deterring those two countries from continuing with their
plans?
14 Mar 2007 : Column 304
Margaret Beckett: We are working on deterring Iran and North
Korea from pursuing their present course of action by other, diplomatic,
means, as I hope the House would want. I sincerely hope that everyone
in the House wants those negotiations to succeed, and wants North Korea
and Iran to be deterred from continuing on their present course of action.
I really hope that people will not use arguments that suggest that they
have every cause to continue.
That brings me to the second of the four pivotal questions. Why does
this country need to retain its nuclear weapons? I am inclined to turn
the question on its head and ask instead whether this is the time for
us to abandon our nuclear deterrent, or to deny future Governments and
Parliaments the ability to maintain it...
Norman Baker (Lewes) (LD): The Secretary of State will know that
our nuclear weapons have been pointing at nobody since 1994. Does she
not recognise that the immediate, and perhaps medium-term, threat comes
from those countries that are developing biological and chemical weapons?
Does she not think that the money spent on upgrading and renewing our
nuclear weapons system would be better spent on dealing with that particular
threat, or on ensuring that our troops in Afghanistan were properly equipped
with what they need?
Margaret Beckett: I shall come to the proportion of the costs
in a few moments...
Jeremy Corbyn: I thank the Foreign Secretary for giving way.
She will recall that, in the past, our party and others have campaigned
against nuclear weapons and for disarmament. She has made much of the
adherence to the non-proliferation treaty, but is it not the case that
the message going around the world is that a vastly enhanced delivery
system-achieved through a new generation of submarines-will be contrary
to the whole spirit of the treaty and likely to encourage proliferation
rather than reduce it?
Margaret Beckett: I am sorry to have to say this to my hon. Friend,
but that is complete and utter rubbish...
Mrs. Claire Curtis-Thomas (Crosby) (Lab): My right hon. Friend
has already pointed to the difficulties of delaying a decision on Trident.
Does she agree that sourcing the technical capacity to support the existing
nuclear provision is a fundamental difficulty and that we need to send
a clear signal, both to the academic institutions of this country and
the companies that will be involved in the provision of Trident, that
we intend to make a commitment, so that they can begin to prepare for
that and ensure that we have the expertise to secure our nuclear capacity,
both militarily and domestically?
Margaret Beckett: My hon. Friend is entirely right and, if I
may say so, displays her engineering expertise and understanding of how
the industry works. The decision to be made by the House is not on anything
other than the political, strategic and security needs of the country.
However, it is also necessary to take into account the industrial implications,
and those implications certainly reinforce rather than weaken the case
for making a decision now.
Mr. David Chaytor (Bury, North) (Lab): If the costs described
by my right hon. Friend were exceeded-defence projects have a track record
of exceeding their budgets-will she also guarantee that those excess costs
would not impact elsewhere in the defence budget?
Margaret Beckett: The whole purpose of the scrutiny to which
the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh), who chairs the Public Accounts
Committee, referred is to make sure that that is not the case. I think
that my hon. Friend will find a reference in the White Paper to the costs
of the existing system, which, in real terms, are pretty close to identical
to the likely costs of the new system. The kind of overrun that he describes
has not been the case with that programme...
Margaret Beckett: The final question is, why must we make a decision
now? Some have suggested that the decision can be delayed. Let us make
no mistake-the net result of that would be not to delay the decision,
but to run the risk
14 Mar 2007 : Column 308
of making it by default. All our advice is that if we do not start the
process of designing the new generation of ballistic missile submarines
now, it will already be too late.
Mr. Clive Betts (Sheffield, Attercliffe) (Lab): The Foreign Secretary
has indicated that we must make a decision now to begin the design process
for the new submarines. She has also indicated that further decisions,
which we are not making today, will have to be made about ordering the
submarines, renewing or replacing the warheads or ordering successors
to the D5 missile. In reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton,
Test (Dr. Whitehead), she indicated that future Governments and Parliaments
will have to
"discuss the most appropriate form of Parliamentary scrutiny"
for those decisions. If this Government are still in power when those
decisions come to be made, will she indicate whether she believes the
most appropriate form of parliamentary scrutiny to be further votes and
debates in Parliament on those matters?
Margaret Beckett: I understand entirely my hon. Friend's point,
but he knows that I am a former Leader of the House. No one is less likely
to be prepared to commit future Governments and Parliaments to a certain
course than a former Leader of the House. I simply draw his attention
to the words uttered by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and to
the clear facts before the House-the decision in principle must be made
today, but the decision on the warheads, for example, will not come in
this Parliament. It would be improper for me to bind a future Government
or Parliament, but every party in the House will have heard the questions
and points raised, and every party will take account of them. I certainly
assure my hon. Friend that this Government will do everything that we
can to keep the House fully informed and to make sure that the Select
Committee is kept up to date...
Some Members have sought assurances on whether this is only a provisional
decision, dependent on further decisions down the line. Today's decision
does not mean that we are committing ourselves irreversibly to maintaining
a nuclear deterrent for the next 50 years, no matter what others do and
no matter what happens in the rest of the world. That would be absurd,
unnecessary and, indeed, incompatible with the nuclear proliferation treaty...
Of course, if there were a fundamental change for the better in the strategic
environment-in particular, massive significant progress on non-proliferation
and disarmament-it would obviously be right for future Governments to
look at the issue again, and inevitably they would. As I have said, further
decisions will in any case be needed on the precise design of the submarines,
on whether we need four or three, on whether to renew or replace the warhead,
and on whether to participate in any American programme to develop a successor
to the D5 missile. It will fall to future Governments and Parliaments
to discuss the most appropriate form of scrutiny for those decisions.
As I have said, this Government will ensure that there are regular reports
to Parliament as the programme proceeds, and we will give the Select Committee
our full co-operation as it maintains its regular scrutiny of these issues.
Mr. Denham: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. On the question
of parliamentary scrutiny, I understand that she cannot bind future Parliaments.
I noted that the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
announced yesterday that the Climate Change Bill would bind future Parliaments,
but I understand that my right hon. Friend is reluctant to do the same.
However, will she at least express the opinion to this Parliament that
it would be desirable and appropriate for it to be able to take a view
at some point in the future-perhaps around the time that the main contracts
are let-on whether international circumstances still require us to maintain
an independent nuclear missile system?
Margaret Beckett: I do not want to add anything to the words
that either my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister or I have already
uttered to my right hon. Friend, but I will say to him that I am not sure
whether
14 Mar 2007 : Column 310
we are at cross purposes. The stage to which he refers is not likely
to be reached during the present Parliament. With the deepest respect
to my good and right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs, who is a very fine Minister indeed, he has not
of course been Leader of the House. [Laughter.] Yet...
While such a risk exists, the Government believe that maintaining a minimum
nuclear deterrent remains a premium worth paying on an insurance policy
for our nation...
William Hague
Mr. Redwood: If my right hon. Friend were Foreign Secretary now,
what additional steps would he take to try to achieve more multilateral
disarmament on the back of our unilateral moves?
Mr. Hague: I think there is a very strong case for an intensified
effort by this country and our allies to strengthen the non-proliferation
treaty...
Mr. Peter Kilfoyle (Liverpool, Walton) (Lab): The right hon.
Gentleman is giving a fine exposition of traditional Tory policy in the
area under discussion, but does he agree that the key issue-which will
be debated today, given that the selected amendment addresses it-is timing?
Does he accept the Government's verdict on the timing? That is an important
question, bearing in mind the fact that the Opposition accepted the Government's
argument about weapons of mass destruction, which was found to be fallacious.
Mr. Hague: Of course, timing is a very important issue. I agree
with the Government's view...
Norman Baker: The right hon. Gentleman did not mention Israel
in his list of nuclear states. Does he accept that Israel's possession
of nuclear weapons is a major destabilising factor in the middle east
and that it is encouraging Iran to acquire nuclear capability; and what
is his policy on dealing with that matter?
Mr. Hague: People cite the example of Israel having nuclear weapons,
although I suspect that if we had been in Israel's situation over recent
decades we would have wanted to have nuclear weapons, so I am not going
to give advice to the Israeli Government about that...
Mr. Willis: All Members of the House have enormous respect for
the right hon. Gentleman and we do understand the arguments that he is
putting forward. However, the logic of his position is that if every single
state in the world were given a nuclear weapon, the world would be safer.
That is nonsense, is it not?
Mr. Hague: That is not the logic, and it is the reason why we
have the non-proliferation treaty, to which we are signatories...
Willie Rennie: The right hon. Gentleman mentioned the cold war
earlier. Does he agree with former President Gorbachev, who said that
"A responsible course of action for the...Government would be to postpone
the decision on the future of the nuclear arsenal at least until the next
review conference of the NPT in 2010"?
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Mr. Hague: For all the reasons that I have given, I do not agree
with former President Gorbachev about that...
Pete Wishart (Perth and North Perthshire) (SNP): As the right
hon. Gentleman knows, the submarines are to be based in Scotland, which
has the greatest opposition to the renewal of Trident. Some 80 per cent.
opposed it in the last opinion poll. Why should the submarines be based
in Scotland; and would he respect the views of the Scottish people as
expressed through their Parliament, if it decided to vote against Trident?
Mr. Hague: These decisions are made on a UK basis, as the hon.
Gentleman well knows. I do not think that the people who do such a tremendous
job in Faslane and other locations in Scotland would thank him for saying
that those facilities should be closed...
Nigel Griffiths (Edinburgh, South) (Lab)
After reading the White Paper, "The future of the United Kingdom's nuclear
deterrent", I have concluded that it has no future-that this country has
to become a country for peace, not a country for war. We have led the
world in campaigning to meet the Kyoto targets. We have led the fight
to eradicate global poverty. Now we must lead the world in campaigning
for the eradication of the nuclear threat-and we must lead by example.
As the poet and essayist Emerson said:
"The real and lasting victories are those of peace, and not of war."
I have seen colleagues wrestle with their consciences and lose their
beliefs. That is not a path that I have chosen to follow...
There are those who oppose any spending on defence and our armed services,
but I am not one of them. There are those who argue that the decision
is premature, but I am not one of them, either. Tough decisions must never
be put off. However, there are those who question the wisdom of the £15
billion investment in Trident, and I am most certainly one of them, for
I cannot foresee any circumstances in which this country or its territories
would be threatened by a nuclear weapons state and we would need to retaliate
with a nuclear strike, or where the threat of a nuclear strike by the
UK would shape such a state's actions.
The truth is that we have led the world in decommissioning land mines
and now in nuclear weapons. The world is watching us now. Let us be leaders
for peace. Whatever the good intentions of the White Paper to ring-fence
the budget, I remain concerned that funding will be diverted by future
Governments from more pressing defence equipment needs.
14 Mar 2007 : Column 322
I now leave the Government over this issue. I recognise that others hold
equally sincere but opposite views, which I can respect. Perhaps I am
a little self-indulgent in that. But others can still not seem to make
up their minds, and of them I am less tolerant. To maintain the present
Vanguard submarines and delay a replacement decision is not a credible
stance, and I shall not vote for such options. I will, however, vote against
the White Paper for the reasons that I have given. I go with a heavy heart,
but a clear conscience.
Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD)
The Government ask for various practical measures to be taken, but they
also ask for a great decision to be taken in principle. The practical
measures on which the Government wish to embark are the concept and design
work that will keep open the option of having replacements for the Vanguard
submarine. The White Paper also refers to participation in the life extension
programme for the Trident D5 missiles. If we had before us a simple appropriations
motion, seeking the House's approval to proceed with those practical steps,
I would have no difficulty whatever in supporting it-but that is not what
the Government are asking...
The strategic context is very dangerous, and that makes the forthcoming
review conference of the NPT in 2010 all the more important. It should
be Britain's objective to play as constructive, positive and progressive
a part as it can at that conference, and we have done that in the past...
Mrs. Curtis-Thomas: I note what the hon. Gentleman says, but
is not the reality that to maintain the deterrent that we have now, we
have to send a clear signal to those involved in the industry and in the
execution of the work that we have a long-term commitment? If we do not
give them that, we will not retain the skills and our capacity. Without
that, we can have no future deterrent and we will remain vulnerable to
those powers across the world that will continue to develop their nuclear
capacity. Unfortunately, because we will not have the knowledge of what
they are doing, we will fall even further behind. Is that not an invidious
position in which to place this country?
Nick Harvey: We need to establish a policy for Britain and not
for British Aerospace. With respect to the hon. Lady, I believe that British
companies are guided by the basis of the contracts that they sign. If
we sign a contract approving their doing the concept and design work,
they will be rather more interested in that rather than our sending some
signal. In the process of sending the signal that she wants to be sent,
we will send a signal right around the world that Britain was going to
remain a nuclear power until 2055. The workers in British Aerospace will
be rather more interested in the contract that the Government sign than
they will be in getting the signal of the sort that she suggests...
I refer back to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline
and West Fife (Willie Rennie) made earlier. Former President Gorbachev
was exactly on the mark when he said that Britain should not make a decision
before the 2010 NPT conference. He added:
"The UK Government's rush to deploy nuclear missiles whose service life
would extend until 2050 is...astonishing".
He is entirely right. I also refer to the comments of Kofi Annan speaking
in November. He recognised the more dangerous strategic context to which
I have referred and said:
"We are sleepwalking towards disaster...worse than that-we are asleep
at the controls of a fast-moving aircraft. Unless we wake up and take
control, the outcome is all too predictable."
14 Mar 2007 : Column 326
He went on that to say that if Britain took the decision to renew our
system now to take us through to 2055, it would inhibit and damage the
part that we could play. [ Interruption. ] Yes it is what he said; it
is pretty much exactly what he said.
Nick Harvey: The hon. Gentleman says that it is a cop-out and
the Defence Secretary rises to his feet. If it is a cop-out, how come
that is exactly the way in which the Thatcher Government did it with Trident?
When they came to the House and said that they were going to embark on
the Trident programme, the concept and design work had already been done,
as the White Paper acknowledges. I am calling for the same procedure to
be adopted at that stage next time as it has been this year. We have already
heard from Members that much of the concept and design work for Trident
was carried out in secrecy because the Government did not even want certain
members of the Cabinet to hear about it. I applaud the Government for
the openness of this procedure. It is good that there has been a White
Paper and that there is a parliamentary debate. But they are not asking
us to approve the concept and design; they are asking us now, seven years
before they are going to let the contracts, to take a decision on the
whole thing. It may be the last opportunity that we get for the best part
of 50 years.
Nick Harvey: What I am saying is that the final approval of Parliament
should be given at the point at which the contract is going to be let,
when the money is going to be spent and when we reach the point of no
return, as was said by the Defence Committee in its report and is said,
in effect, in the White Paper from the Government. There is nothing particularly
radical about that view. It is what the amendments tabled by the hon.
Member for Southampton, Test and the right hon. Member for Birkenhead
say. It is the meaning of the amendment that has been selected, which
was tabled by the hon. Member for Hemsworth. It seems a perfectly rational
view. It is one that many external commentators have picked up on. The
Financial Times leader this morning commends exactly that course of action.
Jon Trickett (Hemsworth) (Lab)
I beg to move, To leave out from "House" to the end of the Question,
and to add instead thereof:
"notes the Government's decision, as set out in the White Paper The Future
of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent (Cm 6994), to take the steps
necessary to maintain the UK minimum strategic nuclear deterrent beyond
the life of the existing system and to take further steps towards meeting
the United Kingdom's disarmament responsibilities under Article VI of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but believes that the case is not yet proven
and remains unconvinced of the need for an early decision."
Colin Burgon (Elmet) (Lab): May I draw to the attention of my
hon. Friend a quotation from Eisenhower? He was certainly no sandal-wearing
hippy, and he said:
"In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition
of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial
complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists
and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger
our liberties or democratic processes."
In the light of that quote, what role does my hon. Friend think that
companies such as British Aerospace have had in our decision-making process?
Jon Trickett: My hon. Friend makes a telling point by referring
to a Republican President. There is no doubt at all that British Aerospace
has many excellent work people with all kinds of engineering skills. One
should pay attention to that skills base. However, it seems that the Government
lapse from time to time into the argument that the reason behind the decision
is industrial, rather than political or in terms of defence...
I want to move on to address equally specious arguments that have been
developed, such as that about the reduction of warheads. Obviously, the
destruction of any warhead is a welcome development, so the Secretary
of State's announcement in the White Paper-this was reaffirmed today-that
the number of warheads would be reduced was good. However, that is not
a non-proliferation measure. Everyone who has read the Defence Committee's
report knows that the number of warheads active on the seas will still
be 48. There will thus be no non-proliferation. While it is welcome that
the stockpile of warheads in the UK is being reduced, that is not an argument
that we are complying with our legal obligations to engage in non-proliferation.
The Select Committee report clearly makes that case.
The Defence Committee was unconvinced about the timing. Paragraph 7 of
the conclusions and recommendations of its ninth report says:
"Neither the White Paper nor the exchange of letters between the Prime
Minister and the US President"-
I will refer to them later-
"explain adequately why decisions on UK participation in the...missile
life extension are required by 2007."
If the Select Committee is unconvinced, so am I. Frankly, many aspects
of the report argue clearly that it would be possible to delay the decision
for some years...
Finally, I want to refer to the exchange of letters between the Prime
Minister and the President. Some 72 hours after the White Paper came out
as a consultation document, the Prime Minister sent a letter, on 7 December,
to the President in which he wrote:
"We have therefore...set in train the steps necessary to maintain our
current submarine-based nuclear deterrent system".
I asked the Attorney-General's view about the letter because it seemed
to be a binding commitment effectively to bring about the process of beginning
to rearm. The rest of the two letters referred to the missile system.
The Attorney-General's response failed to convince me that a decision
has not already been taken. This afternoon's debate has thus been pre-empted
by a Government decision. That is a serious charge to make, but the letters
stand in an appendix to a Select Committee report for any Member to have
a look at. If that is the case, surely the Government ought to say clearly
where we stand legally. Today's edition of The Guardian reports that work
has already begun on the process of rearmament. I wonder whether the House's
decision has been pre-empted. The Attorney-General's letter tells me that
the Government will have regard to any vote of the House today. I hope
that the House is the sovereign body in this country. If we were to choose
to delay, or to refuse to accept, the decision, I would hope that we had
not already entered into an agreement with George Bush that would effectively
pre-empt the House.
Mr. James Arbuthnot (North-East Hampshire) (Con)
First, I would like to go through the arguments against the Government's
proposal. This is an awful lot of money to spend on something of doubtful
usefulness. At a time when we are funding our armed forces at a peacetime
level, this seems an odd priority. We believe that we are the closest
allies of the United State of America, and what do we add by buying this
deterrent? We add a bit of uncertainty in the minds of the potential aggressor,
but that is an awfully expensive bit of uncertainty. And how can we say
to North Korea and Iran, "We can, but you can't"? It is not that our going
for unilateral nuclear disarmament would have any persuasive power with
them-clearly it would not-but making such statements does reduce our moral
authority.
The Government have made little attempt to explain how deterrence works.
The purpose of having nuclear weapons will have failed if we ever have
to use them, yet the only point of having them is that someone might think
that we might use them. It is on the basis of such arguments that we are
spending £20 billion. When could we use them? Perhaps the only scenario
is that the United Kingdom will not know who has exploded a nuclear weapon,
and then what would we do? Could we use them in retaliation? I believe
that retaliation, as such, is illegal. We can use them to hit back in
self-defence, but by the time that we are involved in a nuclear exchange,
all thoughts of stopping anyone else from doing anything again will be
long dead, along with most of us. Perhaps those rules are suspended in
war, but that is far from clear. Legally, perhaps we could only use the
weapons if we were firing them in first use, and that is a rather scary
prospect.
The Foreign Secretary said that the deterrent was an "insurance policy"
against an uncertain threat, but talk of an insurance policy is simply
wrong. If someone destroys a house, the purpose of an insurance policy
is to pay to rebuild the house; it is not to destroy the house of the
person who destroyed it. Let us find a better analogy. The best one that
I can think of is a booby trap. The Secretary of State assures us that
if someone walks into our "house", there is a likelihood
14 Mar 2007 : Column 333
that that devastating booby trap, wandering round the oceans of the world,
will go off. That is not like any insurance policy of which I have ever
heard. In what circumstances could the horribly high rate of collateral
damage caused by a nuclear weapon be justified? It is hard to deter those
who have a religious conviction that death is better than life, or who
are irrational, so the weapons are aimed at a tiny proportion of the threats
against us-those from rationally led states. That is not a conclusive
argument, but the equipment is very expensive for deterring that sort
of threat...
Clare Short (Birmingham, Ladywood) (Ind Lab): The right hon.
Gentleman has expertise as the Chair of the Select Committee on Defence.
Could the UK purchase American submarines more cheaply, and delay the
decision? I am asking him as an authority on such matters. Would that
not be a possible strategy for the UK?
Mr. Arbuthnot: That is a good question, because the Secretary
of State for Defence came before the Select Committee and said that there
was no certainty that the Americans would sell us nuclear weapons. [Interruption.]
Sorry, nuclear submarines.
As for the arguments in favour of the decision, given that other countries
are pursuing nuclear weapons, it is an odd time to be disarming unilaterally.
While our moral authority may be reduced if we tell Iran to do as we say,
and not do as we do, our actual authority is increased by the possession
of nuclear weapons. Unilaterally disarming would not have any beneficial
effect on non-proliferation. Nobody reduced the number of their warheads
when we reduced ours to 200. We gave ourselves moral authority by doing
that, but countries such as Iran and North Korea were interested in military
authority, not moral authority....
Mr. Arbuthnot: For the reasons that I have given, I have decided
to support the proposal. I am not inclined to take the risk of allowing
the unilateral nuclear disarmament of this country to send us naked into
the conference chamber, as Nye Bevan once put it. The trouble is that
those considerations apply just as strongly to Iran as they do to the
United Kingdom.
14 Mar 2007 : Column 334
Why should we expect a proud Iranian nation to go naked into the conference
chamber? It is a difficult question. My answer is that we have the world
that we have.
We would like a world with no nuclear weapons in it, but there is not
the smallest hope of achieving that without gradually reducing the nuclear
weapons of those states that have them, while doing our utmost to ensure
that no new countries acquire them. Will we succeed? I am sad to say that
I doubt it, because I am profoundly pessimistic about the future of the
world. Climate change has the capacity to make the planet uninhabitable
for humans, and now that nuclear technology has been invented, it will
never go away. There are nuclear weapons around, and sooner or later one
or more of them will get into the hands of people who we would rather
did not have them. We now have the ability to destroy the world, and I
regret to say that it is natural human behaviour that when we have the
ability to do something, sooner or later we try it out. I believe that
that will happen before climate change has had time to do its work.
Mr. Bruce George (Walsall, South) (Lab)
I long ago reached the conclusion that nuclear weapons are a disagreeable
necessity...
We are living in a highly dangerous world. To throw one's conscience
at countries that do not share those liberal values is highly dangerous...
Mr. Michael Mates (East Hampshire) (Con)
The House will not be surprised to hear that I agree that we should keep
it, although the arguments in favour are quite different from the time
when we were debating
14 Mar 2007 : Column 337
whether to replace Polaris with Trident, as my right hon. Friend the
Member for North-East Hampshire (Mr. Arbuthnot) said, and the case is
not as clear cut as it was then. I want to explain why I believe that
if we update our deterrent, the sort of deterrent we need will be different
from when we took that decision...
It has always been the position of successive Governments that the only
way to guarantee one ballistic missile submarine at sea all the time is
from a fleet of four. That relates to the right hon. Member for Walsall,
South's point about the possibility of an accident. However, if an understanding
could be reached whereby the at-sea and, therefore, invulnerable deterrent
was shared between ourselves and France at times, it seems to me possible,
or even likely, that each of us could manage with one submarine fewer.
Such an arrangement need not in any way affect the integrity or independence
of our deterrent, nor need there be any degradation of the security relating
to targeting, pay loads, patrol patterns or anything else. It would simply
involve an agreement over the timing of the departure and return of each
country's deterrent patrol. There would thus be a guarantee of a European
deterrent at sea in the unlikely event of a surprise or short-notice nuclear
attack. Such a scenario may seem unlikely or even impossible as we speak,
but we are talking about the uncertainties, both strategic and political,
of the next 30 or 40 years...
The second area where I believe the change in the type of threat merits
a change in the operation of the deterrent is over the size of any submarines.
We can
14 Mar 2007 : Column 339
reduce their size and we do not need as many tubes. If we can get some
sort of synergy between the next generation of ballistic submarines and
the next generation of hunter-killer submarines, there are huge potential
cost savings.
Dr. Gavin Strang (Edinburgh, East) (Lab)
The end of the cold war brought a window of opportunity to make real
progress in fully implementing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The
tragedy is that this is not the way in which it is turning out. In recent
years, there has been growing disillusionment among the non-nuclear weapons
states. They fear that the nuclear weapons states are not prepared to
fulfil their disarmament obligations. The world's non-proliferation mechanisms
desperately need strengthening. That window of opportunity still exists...
No country is better placed than Britain to make a major contribution
internationally in this field. After all, neither Britain nor western
Europe is subject to any
14 Mar 2007 : Column 340
direct military threat and the Government have stated that no such threat
is foreseen. This is the time when Britain should be taking the initiative
to encourage nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It is profoundly
depressing that the Government want to procure a new generation of Trident.
The decision to buy a new generation of Trident would damage non-proliferation
efforts. After all, we have an obligation to move towards complete disarmament,
and making provision to renew Trident clearly runs counter to that obligation.
We seek to persuade non-nuclear weapons states not to pursue nuclear weapons
programmes, and we seek to persuade the international community of the
need to strengthen the world's non-proliferation mechanisms. Those exhortations
will be met with increasing cynicism if, at the same time as we make them,
we buy a new generation of Trident. It will not be just our credibility
that is damaged-faith in the world's non-proliferation regimes will be
further undermined. By renewing Trident we will effectively say to other
countries that nuclear weapons are so vital that we are prepared to spend
billions of pounds to make sure that we have them in the 2020s and beyond,
even though the Government admit that we do not face a foreseeable direct
military threat. Far from persuading other nations to remain non-nuclear,
we will send a signal that nuclear weapons are vital.
The Government argue that we should renew Trident, not because of any
foreseeable threat, but because we cannot accurately predict the nature
of the world in 30 or 50 years' time. Surely, the same is true for any
country in the world. Germany, Japan and Egypt, for example, do not know
what threats will face them in the 2020s and beyond. There is nothing
in the Government's justification for renewing Trident that does not apply
to every country in the world. That clearly undermines our argument that
non-nuclear weapon states should continue to forgo nuclear weapons. The
Government rightly say that we do not know what the future holds, but
we can be sure that a decision not to renew Trident would avoid the damage
that would be done to non-proliferation efforts if we go ahead with renewal.
I would like the UK to decommission Trident. Other countries have given
up nuclear weapons: South Africa abandoned its nuclear programme, as has
Libya, and Ukraine got rid of its nuclear weapons too. We applauded those
countries for the course that they took. None of the countries that abandoned
their nuclear programmes are any less secure, and neither would we be.
Indeed, Britain would be a safer place if we did not renew Trident because,
first, we would avoid the detrimental impact of Trident renewal on the
non-proliferation regimes and, secondly, we could spend our defence budget
more effectively. Instead of spending £20 billion on renewing Trident
and £1.5 every year running it, Britain could put more resources into
defence equipment and operations more relevant to our security needs in
the 21st century.
Mr. Michael Ancram (Devizes) (Con)
The effective decision to replace Trident is premature, it has not been
fully considered, and it is not justified. The debate is not about being
for or against nuclear weapons. I was strongly supportive of Trident and
our other nuclear deterrents during the cold war. Trident will be with
us for the next twenty years, and possibly longer, so that is not the
issue.
This debate is about the deterrent which, in 17 years' time, we will
bequeath to the next generation. None of us can predict what international
relationships will be like so far ahead, yet we are being asked to make
a full commitment to a highly expensive weapons system that, in the event,
could prove ineffective as a deterrent and is questionable in its justification.
We are committing not ourselves but the next generation, who may have
very different views on deterrence and, indeed, on which defence priorities
we should spend the massive sums involved...
There are three key questions. First, do we need a deterrent? My answer
is yes. In an uncertain world, it is surely better to deter aggression
than to respond to it after it has occurred. To be successful, however,
a deterrent must be proportionate to the perceived threat; it must be
clearly effective and credible; and therefore need never be used. Belief
in the aggressor's mind that there is the will if necessary to use that
deterrent is essential to its credibility, which is why it must be proportionate.
Cold war deterrents worked because the balanced threat of mutually assured
destruction and the nuclear doctrine between two rational enemies who
understood the consequences assured its success. Any future deterrent
must be powerful enough to create fear in the potential enemy; its nature
must be such that the enemy believes we would really use it if attacked;
hence it must proportionate to the threat that the enemy poses.
The next question, which is crucial, is: does the deterrent need to be
nuclear?
Since 1989 things have dramatically changed. The enemy today and in the
future is unclear and its threat is unquantifiable. Proponents of replacing
Trident argue that there might be a revival of the Russian confrontation.
That is a pretty long shot. Even longer is the scenario of a new cold
war-style ideologically-driven nuclear arms race where our nuclear deterrent
would once again become relevant. The only ideological conflict that I
can see is one where it would not be a deterrent anyway, because of the
nature of that ideology. We are told that Trident is an insurance against
such remote possibilities, but £20 billion is a pretty hefty premium against
a pretty unlikely threat.
Today's and, I suspect, tomorrow's threats come more from international
terrorism and so-called rogue states. Iran is sometimes cited as encompassing
both. Let us, for the sake of argument, assume that she could pose a nuclear
threat to the United Kingdom. Does the House really believe that a British
Government, even in response to an attack, would in the 21st century be
prepared to obliterate Tehran? I do not believe that and, more importantly,
I do not believe the Iranians believe it, yet that is the stark key to
successful deterrence, and if that belief does not exist, it is not a
deterrent...
To me, Trident was a deterrent of the 20th century; it is not a deterrent
of the 21st. We should be looking for something more proportionate and
therefore more credible, and that might well not be nuclear. If we need
time to do that, we should make that time...
If the deterrent is nuclear, should it be Trident?
... In fairness to the generation upon whom we are effectively seeking
to dump an irreversible commitment to "son of Trident", we should at least
show that we have examined the options before doing so. I believe and
have argued previously that before the House takes a final decision, we
need a senior independent examination of and report on all the options,
not just those in the White Paper. The decision is far too important to
railroad through the House.
Sir Gerald Kaufman (Manchester, Gorton) (Lab)
Defeating the Government tonight-which is what must be the intention,
in all honesty, of anyone who
14 Mar 2007 : Column 345
votes against them-could so reduce our party's credibility as to contribute
to a Labour defeat at the next election... Futile gestures can be personally
satisfying, but what do they get us? I will tell the House what they get
us: 18 years in opposition. It is one thing to revisit the scene of the
crime; it is quite another to revisit the scene of the suicide.
Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington and Chelsea) (Con)
We now know that, during the Gulf war, the United States made it clear
to Saddam Hussein that, if he used the chemical weapons that he had at
that time, he would invite a similar response. There is every reason to
believe that that carried considerable credibility...
In the context of half a century, we cannot assume that the nuclear umbrella
that the United States has provided will necessarily continue to be available...
We live in a difficult and uncertain world...
We know already that some Governments have been willing to provide terrorist
organisations with the most vicious armaments. It is those Governments
whom we can deter by making clear, as we must, that in the event of any
attack involving weapons of mass destruction-certainly nuclear weapons-we
would not simply go for the terrorists concerned. We would go for those
who had supplied them as well, even-especially-if they were Governments
who did not accept the proper international constraints...
It is not as if we are saying that progress towards multilateral disarmament
is either undesirable or unattainable...
The Government deserve the House's support not because this decision
will be irreversible, but because it gives a clear indication of our national
intent.
Mr. Don Touhig (Islwyn) (Lab/Co-op)
Now we are faced with new dangers and new threats from international
terrorism and potential rogue states that would seek to undermine international
security by sponsoring acts of terrorism, which could involve dirty bombs
and nuclear weapons...
we are renewing the insurance policy...
Mr. Alex Salmond (Banff and Buchan) (SNP)
Even thus far in this debate, I have detected that there is still that
underlying argument about Britain deserving the best, because I think
that ultimately this argument is about not deterrence, but Britain's place
in the world. It is about virility and vanity, aspiring still to that
superpower status, and saying, "We need a submarine platform, ultra-ballistic
missile system, and Trident is still the best, so that's the one that
Britain should have."
The Foreign Secretary tells us that that system amounts to only 1 per
cent. of the nuclear weapons in the world and that we are negotiating
that away to virtually nothing. In fact there are, according to the Foreign
Secretary, so few warheads left in the Trident system that I sometimes
wonder why on earth we have it in the first place... Perhaps we could
have a virtual nuclear deterrent in order to have deterrence. The destructive
force of the real Trident system-the destructive force that is still available-is
awe-inspiring and deadly, and, as several Members have said, when we think
about it possibly being used, that force is calamitous...
Members will recall that Scotland is, after all, to be the scene of the
deployment of this new weapons system for the next 50 years, so what the
people of Scotland think about it might be of some interest and concern
to the House. It is not just that 80 per cent. of people oppose it; throughout
Scottish civic society, people are pointing out, led by the Scottish Trades
Union Congress, that it is unacceptable. Some Labour MSPs make the mistake
of saying that there will be a jobs boost. They claim that 11,000 jobs
will be created, but unfortunately, parliamentary answers in this House
reveal that the figure is 1,300. The cost works out at £5 million a job.
As the Scottish TUC has pointed out, the alternative cost is the many
thousands of jobs anywhere in the public sector that could be generated
by such a figure.
However, there are not just economic arguments but moral arguments, too.
Scotland's Cardinal, Keith O'Brien, has written to me enclosing a statement
not just from the Catholic Church in Scotland, but from all the Christian
Churches in Scotland: the Church of Scotland, the Quakers, the United
Free Church, the United Reform Church, and the Scottish Episcopal Church.
Talking about the Churches coming together to make such a statement, our
Cardinal said:
"I think you would be right in saying in your own statement to Parliament
that this is a unique even in the history of the Christian Churches in
Scotland"...
When people in this House say that there is no possibility that Iran
or North Korea-or even the French-would respond to our renunciation of
nuclear weapons by doing the same, they miss the point entirely. They
miss the encouragement that will be given to proliferation if we go ahead
and invest in a system for the next 50 years...
Mr. Salmond: The point is well made, and of course, it is not
just Mohamed el-Baradei; Mikhail Gorbachev and Hans Blix have made very
similar arguments, pointing out the dangers in terms of proliferation
if the Government go ahead with this disastrous course of action...
In a world of 200 nations, 10 of which are nuclear powers and 190 of
which are not, I would like an independent Scotland to be one of the 190,
not one of the 10. The desultory argument that has been made is that unless
we have nuclear weapons, we will be threatened. If the former Foreign
Secretary, the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea
(Sir Malcolm Rifkind), for whom I have great respect, had been the Defence
Minister of the state of Iran, he could have put forward exactly the same
argument: "We will be threatened unless we acquire a nuclear deterrent."
It was said earlier by the Conservative Front-Bench spokesman that we
should understand
14 Mar 2007 : Column 352
why the state of Israel requires nuclear weapons, but that is against
every international agreement. Every country in the world could say, "We
are under threat, we require nuclear weapons." The path on which that
argument would set us is not to 10 countries having nuclear weapons, but-given
their declining cost-to 100 or 150 having nuclear weapons. Do we really
think that in those circumstances, any form of international agreement
would stop a nuclear exchange?
It is really important that we try to exert whatever moral force we can
towards the de-escalation of the nuclear threat. My point about the Prime
Minister is that he said that there was a serious risk of Scottish independence.
We believe that it is a fantastic opportunity, but if it is a serious
risk, why do people want to put their nuclear weapons in a country that
could shortly be independent? Is that really a risk that this House would
like to take? I can tell the House that this is something up with which
the people of Scotland will not put. Surely in those circumstances the
safe course of action for the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington
and Chelsea, now that he no longer sits for a Scottish constituency, would
be to advocate that the replacement of the weapons system be sited on
the River Thames, as opposed to the River Clyde.
Mr. Michael Meacher (Oldham, West and Royton) (Lab)
Like others, I do not believe that the Government have adequately or
convincingly answered certain fundamental questions about renewing Trident,
in particular its true cost, why a decision has to be taken now, whom
it is meant to deter, and how it is genuinely compatible with non-proliferation.
Nor has there been a real opportunity to obtain fuller answers, because
the process of consultation has been unjustifiably squeezed. There is
an unmistakable sense in this latest exercise that both Parliament and
the electorate are being bounced into this decision. I still believe that
there is a strong case for further and fuller consultation of the electorate
before such a momentous decision-which will cost taxpayers some 6 per
cent. of GDP-is made...
Mr. Meacher: I am pleased to see the widespread support that
I receive-at least on one side of the House! I would certainly reopen
this decision, as I believe that consultation has not been adequate. I
would like to see a consultation along the lines of the first strategic
defence review, which lasted for a year-1997 to 98, I believe-as nothing
less would be right now. On that basis, and taking account of all the
relevant options-they have not all been put sufficiently to the electorate-I
believe that we should have a further two-day parliamentary debate. I
give an absolute commitment that I would abide by the result. I believe
that it would provide a fresh and genuine mandate...
No one-certainly not me-supports the view that Britain can unilaterally
bring about nuclear disarmament worldwide. That is a complete canard.
Of course we cannot, but there is a window of opportunity. Most experts
agree that there is no requirement for an immediate decision to be taken
on this issue before at least 2014. That gives us an invaluable opportunity
to take the lead, which is what I think we should do, in trying to set
up a multinational, multilateral nuclear disarmament conference embracing
not only the existing nuclear states but also the non-nuclear states who
might be tempted to go down this route, in order to give a decisive multilateral
push to halting nuclear proliferation.
John Barrett (Edinburgh, West) (LD)
If anyone is still wondering why there is a rush to make a decision now,
the answer is clear. The Americans are extending the life of their D5
Trident missiles and they want answers in 2007. They need to know whether
we are willing to join them. There is no pressing military, political,
technical or other reason to make the decision now. The only reason we
are being bounced into this decision is because of the current Prime Minister
and his wish to leave the country's hands tied long after he has gone.
It is not the submarines that are reaching the end of their shelf life;
it is the Prime Minister...
John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)
Mr. Graham Stuart: Does the hon. Gentleman think that the world
would be a safer place if all western democracies unilaterally gave up
all nuclear weapons?
John McDonnell: I believe that it would be a more dangerous place
if we invested in a new phase of nuclear development; it is as simple
as that. Our job is to promote security and peace, not to undermine it.
There is a feeling in our country that the Prime Minister has avoided
the meaningful, widespread consultation and debate that a decision of
this magnitude deserves. Complaints have been made in the House today
about decisions being bounced. There are allegations of a done deal with
President Bush and the pre-emption of the parliamentary vote. That does
not convey the impression that the country is at ease with the decision-making
process that the Labour leadership has fixed on for this critical policy
decision, and that is no way to determine a fundamental policy that will
affect the lives of the next generation.
Robert Key (Salisbury) (Con)
We need a decision on the issue now. I stand by the three reports that
the Defence Committee, of which I am a member, has taken a year to prepare.
They lead me to make various conclusions. I regret that the Government
did not participate in the Committee's first report, because that meant
they failed to consider publicly the threats the UK faces and how they
might evolve in the future, which the House should consider.
At present, I am the only Member of the House who is a member of the
General Synod of the Church of England, and I think it is extremely important
that we should listen to the message sent by the established Church. It
is because it is the established Church that it should make its views
clear. The Church of England did not simply say that it was opposed to
any kind of nuclear deterrent. The Archbishop of Canterbury said:
"I believe that the least a Christian body ought to do in these circumstances
is to issue the strongest possible warnings and discouragements to our
Government."
He made a strong moral case against nuclear weapons in general. Of course,
his views are not unanimous. On 11 October, the Bishop of Liverpool said:
"Nuclear knowledge can't be unlearnt, its evil genie of weaponry can't
be sucked back into the test tube. It's a fact of the modern world, as
factual as those sinister imaginations that can not only contemplate human
terror but actually inflict it."
The Bishop of Rochester, writing in The Sunday Telegraph under the heading
"I believe in Trident, and using it if necessary", said:
"The task of the Churches...is to resource the debate by setting out
the moral criteria which need attention rather than trying to make Government
policy from the sidelines."
I concur absolutely. Last week, I took part in a debate in Synod where
I made it clear that I believe we should proceed with Trident.
Joan Ruddock (Lewisham, Deptford) (Lab)
Many right hon. and hon. Members tonight have acknowledged that the cold
war is over, but the White Paper on the future of Trident is still rooted
in cold war thinking. It makes no real analysis of the future role of
the US-led and nuclear-armed NATO alliance of which we are a part, nor
of the new Europe in which we live. It is a mass of assertions with no
attempt to examine how best to approach security in a world where climate
change and competition for resources and markets will be paramount...
The third threat posed in the White Paper is that countries might sponsor
nuclear terrorism from their soil. This, frankly, is the most preposterous
assertion of nuclear deterrence. Do we really believe that the dirty bomb
in the suitcase is going to have a survivable country-of-origin label
on it? We all know that suicidal terrorists cannot be deterred by nuclear
weapons and they know that it would be impossible immediately to identify
a sponsoring state so as to justify nuclear retaliation...
The White Paper asserts continually the deterrent value of British nuclear
weapons without advancing a single plausible threat scenario. But it is
not even that simple. As the Prime Minister wrote to George Bush last
December, in the letter to which my hon. Friend the Member for Hemsworth
(Jon Trickett) referred, the new British nuclear weapons coming into service
in 20 years' time would be assigned to NATO, as now. With the end of the
cold war and an expanded Europe, do we really think that we would get
agreement from all our allies to use British weapons of mass destruction?
Or that the US would not intervene if Britain wanted to act independently
but that did not suit the US? It is just not credible...
At the 2000 non-proliferation treaty review, Britain made
"an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear
weapons".
Tonight, however, we have been asked to spend billions of pounds and
years of endeavour so that we can deploy new weapons of mass destruction
to patrol the seas until 2050...
A weapons system is credible only if it can be used, and I have not heard
any argument showing how Trident could be used to our advantage. I know
the consequences of using it, however-thousands of innocent people would
be vaporised; millions would die in agony; and radiation would persist
for generations. The health and environmental consequences are incalculable:
I have never been willing to be party to such a barbarous act, and I will
not support my Government tonight.
Clare Short (Birmingham, Ladywood) (Ind Lab)
First, the decision does not need to be made now, and the argument that
it must is an effort to embarrass the Liberal Democrats and is not credible.
The Prime Minister said at Prime Minister's Question Time that the next
Parliament could revisit the decision, which makes it clear that the decision
does not have to be made tonight... The Prime Minister is trying to lock
the Labour party into policies that he supports, and the Chancellor is
suddenly trying to prove that he is tough on security by spinning on the
back of a speech about the economy his support for a replacement for Trident,
without any proper debate about Britain's foreign policy and its role
in the world after the disastrous mistakes in Iraq.
Secondly, there is no argument in the White Paper, in the Prime Minister's
introduction to the White Paper, or in the speech by the Conservative
spokesman, that could not be reasonably made by Iran and many other countries...
The third reason why the UK should reconsider its approach to nuclear
weapons is that they chain us into the role of US poodle... I do not believe
for a moment that we should seek to fall out with the United States. We
have a long shared history, a common language and so on. However, every
post-war Prime Minister apart from Edward Heath, bless him-because he
was so focused on entrenching us in the European Union-has been obsessed
with the special relationship as the centrepiece of our foreign policy.
Why? It goes back to Britain losing an empire and failing to find a role.
We are not the big power that we used to be, but we are best friends with
the biggest power in the world, so if we can get a weapon from the US
and stand alongside it, we are still important and powerful. That is an
almost pathetic role to see for ourselves in the world. It is like the
child who is frightened of others and therefore makes best friends with
the biggest bully in the playground...
Lots of the speeches that have been made today have sought to re-run
the old arguments about unilateral nuclear disarmament, but that is not
what we are talking about. We are talking about whether we commit ourselves
to replacing our weapon in 20 years' time or whether we could look for
a strategy that uses our influence and our willingness to disarm to strengthen
non-proliferation, with a stronger multilateral system, greater equity,
more authority for the United Nations and a just settlement in the middle
east.
What Britain needs is an independent foreign policy to make a real contribution
in the world and to make up for the humiliation that we imposed on ourselves
with our dreadful policy on Iraq. To decide to replace Trident in 20 years'
time is to continue to tie us to that mistake and continue to humiliate
our country.
Linda Gilroy (Plymouth, Sutton) (Lab/Co-op)
Alison Seabeck (Plymouth, Devonport) (Lab): Does my hon. Friend
agree that the work force in my constituency at DML and at the dockyard
would not accept the argument that the issue of the industrial skills
base is specious? It is important that we take the decision now; otherwise,
we will lose those skilled workers to the domestic sector, not the maritime
industrial sector.
Linda Gilroy: I accept my hon. Friend's argument and will go
on to make it in more detail...
I believe that retention gives us a more powerful hand in working for
non-proliferation. ... We should maintain the multilateralist position
of seeking something for something, not something for nothing. The arguments
are, at heart, not only simple but the same as they have always been:
something for something, or something for nothing; multilateralism versus
unilateralism.
For the reasons that I have set out, all the amendments tabled today-including
the one that has been selected-would result in back-door unilateralism,
even though people do not quite understand that...
Knowing the risks of letting the skill base fall apart, only those who
believe in giving away something for nothing-unilateralists-
14 Mar 2007 : Column 368
should go on into the Aye Lobby on the amendment. Multilateralists cannot
credibly share the same lobby with them.
Mr. James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)
Incidentally, those who support the "delay" amendment, notably the Liberal
Democrats, are merely fooling themselves, or fooling the people out there.
This evening we must reach a decision: either we support the notion of
nuclear deterrence, or we do not. While I respect the argument of those
who say that we do not, it is not my argument.
I do not believe that even those who have spoken from the CND standpoint
believe that the world would be a safer place if we abolished nuclear
weapons. We all know perfectly well that if we did away with them, or
indeed with conventional weapons-for the same argument applies to them-the
world would be a worse place, not a better place.
It is with a heavy heart, in a sense-because I personally feel unhappy
about these matters-that I concluded that I would support the Government
this evening.
Mr. Doug Henderson (Newcastle upon Tyne, North) (Lab)
One of the key points made to me has been that if the United Kingdom
renews its Trident submarine, it will breach the non-proliferation treaty.
I do not accept that that is the case, and I think the public should be
told loudly that it is not the case...
If Mr. Gorbachev has lessons to teach the British, he also has lessons
to teach the Russians. The song he is singing now is not the song he was
singing when I met him in Moscow many years ago. The nuclear non-proliferation
treaty is about trying to de-escalate nuclear dependency. It is in that
context that the world's courts must interpret it. We must strongly say
that...
Mr. Stephen Crabb (Preseli Pembrokeshire) (Con)
Like a previous speaker, I have received not a single letter from any
of my constituents urging me to vote with the Government tonight in favour
of replacing Trident. However, not for one moment do I think that there
is not a strong understanding in my constituency and throughout the country
of the need for this House
14 Mar 2007 : Column 372
to vote in favour of a replacement tonight...
A number of constituents and local church and environmental groups have
contacted me, expressing concern about, and opposition to, the notion
that we should support replacing Trident. I do not intend to discuss all
the various arguments, a number of which have already been covered more
than adequately, but one idea that has some currency in the country is
that Parliament has not been given enough opportunities to examine rigorously
all the issues affecting the decision that we are about to take. That
notion has been scotched well and truly, however.
Mr. Peter Kilfoyle (Liverpool, Walton) (Lab)
We should not be bounced into taking a decision here tonight that pre-empts
the sort of informed debate that needs to happen before the House can
take a properly objective and science-based decision.
Mr. Alan Reid (Argyll and Bute) (LD)
In the current uncertain international situation and all the threats
of proliferation, I believe that this is no time for Britain to give up
its nuclear deterrent...
What I find puzzling is the Government's proposal to declare now that
we will proceed to build replacement Trident submarines after the conclusion
of those talks, irrespective of their outcome. That is a proposal whose
logic I simply cannot understand. In order to maintain Britain's nuclear
deterrent, the only decisions that need to be taken now are to participate
in the missile life extension programme and to commence the initial concept
and design work for the replacements to our Vanguard-class submarines.
I believe that the Government should authorise that work. However, I do
not support the Government's decision now, which is far too premature,
to build a new generation of submarines some time in the middle of the
next decade...
As I said in response to the intervention, I fully support the Liberal
Democrat proposal of an immediate cut in Britain's nuclear arsenal of
50 per cent. to reinvigorate multilateral disarmament talks and re-energise
the negotiations. The remaining warheads would be sufficient to provide
Britain with a credible deterrent.
Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North) (Lab)
I remind the House that a few years ago we debated with great earnestness
the situation in Iraq in relation to weapons of mass destruction. A nuclear
weapon is automatically a weapon of mass destruction. It cannot be targeted
individually at a military target. It can be used only to destroy a whole
area and to kill a very large number of people. It has no deterrent effect
whatsoever. We are promoting this position largely through a sense of
vanity, rather than anything else. If we pass the resolution tonight to
endorse the Government's position, we will be set on a road that is both
costly and illegal.
I want to make two points about the law relating to this issue. There
is something called international humanitarian law and there are two important
principles that are part of it. First, there is the general rule that
a party to an armed conflict must always seek to distinguish between the
civilian population and the combatants. A weapon that is incapable of
drawing such a distinction is unlawful under international humanitarian
law. A nuclear weapon cannot, by its very nature, make that distinction.
Secondly, there is the principle that a party is entitled to use only
that force that is required to achieve a legitimate military objective.
A weapon that is bound uselessly to aggravate the suffering of combatants
is unlawful under international humanitarian law...
14 Mar 2007 : Column 378
I would also make the point that in 1996, the International Court of
Justice ruled that
"the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be generally contrary to
the rules of international law applicable to armed conflict and in particular
the principles and rules of humanitarian law."
We face an important decision tonight. Either we endorse this vast expenditure,
or we encourage a public debate that I believe will come down on the side
of sanity, sense and peace in the world, and we do not go ahead with this
vast expenditure that can lead only to a more dangerous world.
Anne Milton (Guildford) (Con)
There is considerable misunderstanding in the House about what we are
deciding. The Foreign Secretary's comments that we are not committing
ourselves irreversibly to a nuclear deterrent, but are taking steps to
maintain a nuclear deterrent beyond the life of the existing system, are
important...
There are three points that I would like the Secretary of State for Defence
to clarify in simple terms that can be understood by hon. Members, especially
those who have concerns about the proposal. We need a justification for
why the decision needs to be taken now...
We need to know whether the replacement of any part of the deterrent
will remain solely and completely in the control of the UK. We also need
to know whether the process would harm or compromise any part of the non-proliferation
treaty. Will we continue to pursue a reduction in nuclear weapons and
will multilateral disarmament continue to be our aim?
My right hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hampshire (Mr. Arbuthnot)
probably summed up my view almost word for word: with some unhappiness,
it is yes to the decision tonight...
Mr. David S. Borrow (South Ribble) (Lab)
Twelve months ago, when the Defence Committee started its first inquiry
on Trident, I adopted a fairly sceptical approach. However, several issues
have become clearer to me over those 12 months, principally the question
of the timing of the decision. Believe me, if I thought that it was reasonable
to delay the decision until after the next election, I would be voting
for that tonight and I would have been urging the Select Committee to
make that one of its recommendations. However, we must consider the industrial
base and skills that are required. All the advice that we received from
the UK military said that the process would take 17 years. Our first report
questioned why the time period was 17 years rather than 14 years, which
was the case at the time of the 1980 decision. We have heard a good explanation
for that-although the initial design and conceptual work had been done
prior to 1980, it has not yet been done at this stage...
It would be undemocratic if we made a decision today that made it impossible
for the people of this country to elect, in three years' time, a Government
who could build a new Trident successor. If the White Paper had put forward
the view that we should not replace Trident, I would have expected an
honourable Government such as ours to recommend that the design work and
work on the initial concept still went ahead, so that if, in three years'
time, a Government were elected who wanted to retain the nuclear deterrent,
they would have the capacity to do so. If we do anything other than back
the Government motion tonight, we will go against the manifesto commitment
that more than 600 Members...
Jeremy Wright (Rugby and Kenilworth) (Con)
I shall briefly deal with the main arguments against the motion. The
first is that we set a bad example by renewing Trident and that we weaken
our hand as regards non-proliferation. I do not accept that, and I do
not believe that we are in breach of our non-proliferation obligations
by renewing what we already have; that is not proliferation. I do not
accept that we weaken the message that we send, or that we send the wrong
message.
14 Mar 2007 : Column 381
The wrong message to send would be a refusal to renew Trident. At this
moment in history, that would send precisely the wrong message-a message
of weakness when we need to project strength. It would also be a message
of complete irrelevance, because I do not believe for a second that if
our country gave up what amounts to 1 per cent. of the world's stockpile
of nuclear weapons, it would affect anyone's judgment in any way...
I shall vote cautiously. I will not take chances with our national security,
nor will I play political games with it. I shall vote for the Government's
motion.
Alison Seabeck (Plymouth, Devonport) (Lab)
My support for the new programme is not based simply on its economic
benefits for the south-west defence-based industries, although understanding
the complexity of the procurement process and the nature of their highly
skilled work has informed my position...
Leaving until later a decision on the go-ahead for submarines capable
of launching the missiles-the decision is about giving the go-ahead for
the submarine procurement process-could leave the UK facing an enemy with
one arm tied behind its back...
Delaying the decision would be disastrous on defence grounds...
In Plymouth, a city associated with the armed forces and one of the cities
most heavily bombed during world war two, we understand the deterrence
process. Equally, we understand the importance of the SSBN-ship submersible
ballistic nuclear-programme to the economy of our city and the wider south-west,
as well as to the UK's maritime industrial base. My colleague, my hon.
Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Linda Gilroy), has already made
that case well. I can but reiterate the point that the importance of a
decision to continue with Trident-on what is generally seen throughout
the House as the most effective delivery platform for the missiles-cannot
be understated.
What we have in Plymouth is unique and what the defence industry requires
is also unique. Admittedly, our skills could be used in other fields,
but only the Ministry of Defence buys submarines and wants maintenance
programmes for them. In Plymouth, we have the skills. Submarines cannot
be conjured out of thin air if the strategic position changes at a future
date...
Mr. Bernard Jenkin (North Essex) (Con)
The question before the House is very simple. We are being asked whether
we want the Government to proceed with the preparation of the continuation
of our nuclear deterrent in some years' time or not. Any amendment or
rejection of the motion will mean that the House has instructed the Government
not to continue with the concept, work and preparation of the submarines...
My only other comment is about the strategic context. The hon. Member
for North Devon (Nick Harvey) said that the world was watching us today.
The one way of making sure that the world will watch us no longer and
give us no influence is to wantonly throw away the influence we have.
By wantonly throwing away possession of our nuclear weapons, we will give
something for nothing. I commend the speech of the hon. Member for Newcastle
upon Tyne, North (Mr. Henderson) who dealt with the proliferation point
extremely well. If we throw away our weapons, the world will watch us
no more and will take no interest in anything that our Government have
to say...
Mr. Jim Devine (Livingston) (Lab)
I hope that Front-Bench Members recognise that when someone like me votes
against the Government and resigns as a parliamentary private secretary
at the Department for Health, it is not an easy decision. It has been
a hard decision, but I believed that I should come to the House to explain
it.
As the House is aware, Robin Cook was my predecessor. The week before
he died in August 2005, the very last article he wrote was in The Guardian
on this subject. He said:
"It was the Wilson government of the 60s that built, launched and named
the Polaris fleet. It was Jim Callaghan who first struck the Trident deal
with President Carter... There could not be a more convincing way for
Tony Blair to break from the past and to demonstrate that he is a true
moderniser than by making the case that nuclear weapons now have no relevance
to Britain's defences in the modern world... the spirit of the cold war
lives on in the minds of those who cannot let go of fear and who need
an enemy to buttress their own identity. Hence the vacuum left by the
cold war has been filled by George Bush's global war on terror...nuclear
weapons are hopelessly irrelevant to that terrorist threat. The elegant
theories of deterrence all appear beside the point in the face of a suicide
bomber who actively courts martyrdom. And if we ever were deluded enough
to wreak our revenge by unleashing a latter-day Hiroshima on a Muslim
city, we would incite fanatical terrorism against ourselves for a generation."
I hope that when my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence
sums up, he gives some indication of when he would see a nuclear weapon
being used.
The article pointed out that
"all levels of the Trident system depend on US cooperation. The missiles
are not even owned by us, but are leased from the Pentagon in an arrangement
that Denis Healey once dubbed as 'rent-a-rocket'. Renewing our collaboration
with the US on nuclear weapons will deepen the bonds between Downing Street
and the White House, at the very time when the rest of the nation longs
for a more independent stance."
It is absurd that Britain should maintain its nuclear weapons to guarantee
its security while lecturing Iran, et al, that the safety of the world
will be compromised if they behave in the same way. Despite the anxieties
about proliferation, more nations have given up nuclear
14 Mar 2007 : Column 384
weapons in the last generation than have developed them. It has been
pointed out that Brazil, Argentina, Ukraine and South Africa have given
up weapons, and none of them regard themselves as less safe or secure
than before; nor need we if the leadership can find the courage to allow
Trident to be the end of Britain's futile and costly obsession with nuclear
weapon status.
Mr. Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)
the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond) asked what it would
be like to have a facility like Faslane in the Thames valley. If he came
and stood in my bedroom -[ Interruption ]-a remote possibility, I grant,
and looked across the Kennet valley, which is part of the Thames valley,
he would see the rooftops and chimneys of the atomic weapons establishment
at Aldermaston, which I revere for the work that it has done to safeguard
this country's security in times past and, I hope, in times future.
I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will understand when I say that I wish
that that facility did not exist. More precisely, I wish that we lived
in a world in which the atomic weapons establishment at Aldermaston did
not need to exist. Unfortunately, however, we live in the real world,
not in a utopian one. If the hon. Gentleman came with me to the hill above
my house, and looked further into the distance, he would see Greenham
common, which is a living, breathing example of the peace dividend. More
people work there in real jobs than were stationed there at the height
of the cold war. The arguments around the perimeter of Greenham common
now are about planning issues and whether the missile silo should house
a museum or be used as a storage site for cars. That achievement demonstrates
previous Governments' strength of purpose and the support and the sacrifice
on the part of Members on both sides of the House...
When one compares the evidence of Professor Garwin, supported by the
Oxford Research Group, with that of organisations such as the Royal United
Services Institute and, more
14 Mar 2007 : Column 385
importantly, the Royal Navy, the evidence comes down firmly on the Government's
side of the argument.
Dr. Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
I support the retention of Britain's nuclear deterrent. I also support
the renewal of Britain's nuclear deterrent. I am sorry that the amendment
tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr.
Denham), my hon. Friend the Member for Slough (Fiona Mactaggart) and me
was not selected. The choice before us today is to take no decision at
all or to take an irrevocable decision to continue with Trident as our
platform for nuclear deterrence over the next 40 years...
As things stand, we may have a Trident system that lasts until a few
years away from the time when we claim that we will have reduced our carbon
emissions by 60 per cent. from 1990 levels and will be living in a different
world and a different economy. We need to take decisions on design and
concept, and on the future, but I am not convinced by the argument that
we should commit ourselves irrevocably today. I do not believe that future
investment hangs on this decision. I do believe, however, that a vote
in Parliament before final commissioning, in addition to a decision to
go ahead with development of concept and design, is the right way forward.
I hope hon. Members will reflect on that when they consider our deterrent
in future.
Willie Rennie (Dunfermline and West Fife) (LD)
I believe in the deterrence theory. It has worked for
14 Mar 2007 : Column 386
decades to protect our country. Although I believe that, I also want
to seize every opportunity to negotiate those massive weapons away. To
me, the crucial question in this debate is whether the White Paper adds
to the non-proliferation talks. Does it make it more likely that we will
have a successful round of talks in 2010? The answer is clear. Without
doubt, the White Paper is a barrier to progress.
The Defence Committee, which has been mentioned on numerous occasions
this afternoon, was right to criticise the Government for failing to have
a strong strategy for nuclear non-proliferation. The preparations for
those talks in 2010 start next month. There is no indication that sufficient
emphasis has been placed on the talks. The White Paper devotes many more
pages to justifying why the UK needs to renew its deterrent than to setting
out its ambitions for disarmament. What hope do we have if the Government
have already given up on those talks in 2010? What hope do we have if
this Parliament decides prematurely to renew Trident? The Government seem
determined not to give the talks a chance. The message that will be sent
to Iran and North Korea by the Government deciding to proceed today is:
"Do as we say, not as we do."
As I said in my opening remarks, the real test in this debate is whether
the White Paper furthers the cause of nuclear disarmament. That is why
we reject the premature bid to renew Trident...
Ms Diane Abbott (Hackney, North and Stoke Newington) (Lab)
Today we live in, if anything, a more dangerous world than ever, but
if this evening this House takes a vote in principle to go forward with
Trident, we will make it even more dangerous. That is partly because the
vote will be premature and partly because we will not be doing it on the
basis of full information, including scientific information. I refer the
House to what Kofi Annan, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations,
said on this issue:
"the more those States that already have"
nuclear weapons
"increase their arsenals, or insist that such weapons are essential to
their national security, the more other States feel that they too must
have them, for their security."
...
In reading past debates on this issue, I came across a quote from the
current Chancellor, then the Member for Dunfermline, East, who said about
Trident that it is
"unacceptably expensive, economically wasteful and militarily unsound."-[
Official Report, 19 June 1984; Vol. 62, c. 188.]
I defer to no one in my admiration for the Chancellor. He was right then,
and what he said he is even more right today.
Mr. Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth, East) (Con)
It has also been argued that we should extend the life of the Vanguard
class submarines, but placing them in dry dock, replacing their reactors
and carrying out complete refits would cost more than buying new submarines.
That argument does not hold water. Nuclear powered submarines, be they
Vanguard class or Ohio class, are as complicated as the space shuttle.
That is why they cost so much money, and why we have to take care about
what we buy. I wonder whether we should be looking to the Vanguard class
or the Astute class of submarines for a more versatile platform that can
fire Tomahawk missiles as well, as that would provide a bigger threshold
for utilising the submarines in a different way.
Mr. Mohammad Sarwar (Glasgow, Central) (Lab)
I am grateful for the opportunity to take part in this important debate.
In the past three months, I have received hundreds of campaign postcards,
letters and e-mails that are against the replacement of Trident. To date,
I have not received a single letter in support of its replacement. That
is a clear indication of the strength of public opinion in my home city
of Glasgow and in Scotland against the replacement programme...
Lord Kinnock, who ended our party's commitment to unilateral disarmament,
has said that the Government have failed to make the political, technical
or military case for enhancing Britain's weapon system. He is right. The
Government have not made the case for the need to replace Trident and
for that decision to be made now.
I want to ask right hon. and hon. Members one question: why do we believe
that it is right for Britain, the United States of America and Israel
to possess weapons of mass destruction and expand their nuclear weapons
arsenals, but that it is not right for other nations to develop nuclear
weapons? Is it because we have more wisdom, because we are more responsible
or because we are a rich nation? If we spent the billions of pounds that
we are spending on war and our nuclear arsenal on alleviating poverty,
we would live in a safer world.
Mr. Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)
We live in a very different world now, however. In the 1980s, during
the cold war, I was eventually persuaded to accept acquisition. I did
so as a multilateral disarmer: I believed that the only real purpose for
which the possession of such weapons could be countenanced was to get
rid of them. I think that some justification for that position was provided
by the progress that we made in the late 1980s and the 1990s, but, as
I have said, the world today is very different. The threats to world security
no longer come from superpower blocs; they come from regional conflicts,
from rogue states and from cellular terrorist organisations.
In recent years, the arguments in favour of possession of nuclear weapons
have become progressively thinner. A number of Members have spoken today
about the position of Iran. I think that one of the major motivations
for Iran's seeking to become a nuclear power-which, like everyone else,
I deplore-is the fact that Israel is believed to be a nuclear power. That
is the way it goes. I think it is the major flaw in the argument we have
heard from the Conservatives today, the ultimate logic of which is that
eventually every sovereign state will have the right, and indeed the obligation,
to become a nuclear state.
What the Government are asking of us today is of a different order from
what I have been prepared to live with in recent years. They are talking
not about maintenance, but about renewal and extension. If we approach
the argument on a pragmatic rather than a principled basis, that is where
the tipping point shifts. Where will be our moral authority to attend
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty talks in 2010 if we back the Government's
position today?
Mr. Gordon Prentice (Pendle) (Lab)
14 Mar 2007 : Column 391
The White Paper is full of assertions. Our friend the Member for Lewisham,
Deptford (Joan Ruddock) made that point. It asserts, as if it were a truth,
that
"Renewing the current Trident system is fully consistent with the NPT
and with all our international legal obligations."
I simply do not believe that.
When I asked Ministers three weeks ago to supply me with the Attorney-General's
advice-the legal advice that allowed the Prime Minister and the Government
to say that-I was told that it was confidential. I am not prepared to
take these matters on trust, not after Iraq, not after weapons of mass
destruction and not after the "45 minutes" assertion. If the Prime Minister
came here and told us that we had to invade Iran, do you think the military
would go along with that without having sight of the Attorney-General's-
Mr. Speaker: Order. I ask the hon. Gentleman not to draw the
Speaker into the argument. That is one thing that I will not allow.
Mr. Prentice: I do not think it possible that the Prime Minister
could persuade the House of Commons to embark on a military adventure
against another country without tabling the Attorney-General's opinion.
I think that this is such an important matter, for all the reasons that
we have heard during this long debate, that it is unacceptable for the
Government to proceed on this basis.
The way in which the Government have consulted the Labour party has been
an absolute disgrace. All the motions that were put before the Labour
conference in September were ruled out of order as the matter was going
to be referred to the national policy commission. When it was discussed
at the national policy commission there was a debate-there always is-but
no vote, because under new Labour nothing crystallises into a vote. The
only time when I ever vote is when I am here in the House of Commons.
That is disgraceful.
I hope that my hon. Friends will, like me, vote for the amendment, and
if the amendment is lost I hope that they will vote against the Government.
Ms Katy Clark (North Ayrshire and Arran) (Lab)
It is with great pleasure that I say that I-along with, I suspect, several
other Scottish Labour MPs-will vote against Trident's replacement this
evening. I would vote against Trident's replacement wherever in the United
Kingdom it was based, but the reality is that it is based in the west
of Scotland and for many decades vast majorities of people in Scotland
have made it clear that they oppose nuclear weapons being based in Scotland.
I think that that is because they, perhaps more than people in any other
part of Britain, are very aware of what those weapons represent. They
are weapons of mass destruction that have been designed to target civilian
communities and to maximise death and suffering.
Dr. Liam Fox (Woodspring) (Con)
I want to take head-on the argument in the amendment to the motion. The
basic case made by the hon. Member for Hemsworth (Jon Trickett) and of
many who spoke in support of his ideas was that we are beginning a so-called
process of rearmament that is encouraging others to develop nuclear weapons.
That is nonsense. There is no way that what we are voting on tonight could
be described as rearmament. We have a single delivery system and a minimum
credible deterrent, with a falling number of warheads, and there has been
a 70 per cent. cut in our nuclear arsenal since the cold war. We are within
not only the letter but the spirit of the non-proliferation treaty. That
view was echoed in a number of excellent speeches, including that by the
hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Linda Gilroy), who made those points
extraordinarily clearly.
My hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury (Robert Key) brought another
dimension to the debate. In an excellent speech, he touched on the intervention
of the Churches-many of us have had letters from them-regarding the moral
implications, which have frequently been cited in this debate. Let me
briefly deal with that issue. According to some, it is apparently not
only unchristian to use nuclear weapons, but irreligious even to retain
them to prevent a war. Yet if these arguments are valid, they are also
timeless-retrospective, as well as applicable to the future...
The timing of the decision has been a cause of genuine division and some
confusion in the House today. The Foreign Secretary made the case clearly
at the outset. Our first Trident submarine will be out of service by 2022
and our second by 2024. We need to have a new system in place by then.
If we estimate that it takes 17 years to design, build, test and deploy
a new system, this is the right time to make the decision...
We cannot predict the future. The nature of the threat that we face has
changed quickly from the cold war to a range of other threats, and it
could change quickly again. The onus is not on those of us who wish to
retain a deterrent, but on those who want to scrap it to tell us why they
believe that they can predict the risks that we will face in half a century's
time. Tonight is not about the Conservative party coming to support a
Labour Government; it is about doing what we believe to be right for the
country's national security. We in the Conservative party have been consistent
and clear about our belief in nuclear deterrence. The cold war did not
just end; it was won with a clarity of purpose and political resolve,
not least on the part of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. Peace through
strength has a strong historical track record. This is no time to abandon
that track record, or our security.
The Secretary of State for Defence (Des Browne):
This is a significant day for Parliament. There is no denying that deciding
to build a new generation of submarines to maintain our nuclear deterrent
is a big decision, costing billions of pounds, having implications over
several decades and committing us to continue as the guardians of a weapon
of terrible destructive power, with all the responsibility that that brings.
This is a decision that Governments have faced periodically over the years.
The difference today is that Parliament has the chance to debate it and
vote on it at an earlier stage in the process than ever before, and I
hope that it is better informed than ever before...
The first was the speech by the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr.
Salmond), who I must say is a skilled debater, but his sense of moral
righteousness and certainty was not matched by the quality of his argument...
The second discordant note-I say this with some diffidence-came from
the contributions of my hon. Friends the Members for Liverpool, Walton
(Mr. Kilfoyle) and for Pendle (Mr. Prentice), which were unworthy of them
and were based on constant assertions of dishonesty, which they simply
could not make stand up. On the question of legal advice-
Mr. Speaker: Order. I hope that the Secretary of State is not
associating dishonesty with any hon. Member. I do not like interrupting
him, but I would not like him to associate any hon. Member with dishonesty
in this House.
Des Browne: Not dishonesty, but constant assertions of misleading,
which could not be made to stand up.
Mr. Speaker: "Inadvertently misleading" would be better. We try
to work our way around words here, so inadvertently misleading is better,
but I think it would be best if the Secretary of State moved on from this
difficult territory...
Des Browne: Some Members have registered a more serious and genuine
concern. I am thinking of the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member
for Southampton, Test (Dr. Whitehead) and supported, among others, by
my right hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham).
They have made it clear that they accept the Government's case and that
we need to take a decision now, but argue that we should see it as a provisional
or conditional decision, and make it clear that we intend to revisit it
further down the line.
Our position was set out earlier today by my right hon. Friend the Prime
Minister when he said, "It is absolutely right that this Parliament cannot
bind the decisions of a future Parliament and it is always open to us
to come back and look at these issues...when we get to the gateway stage-between
2012 and 2014-when we let the main contracts...it will always be open
to Parliament to take a decision." This happened when the previous generation
of submarines was built, and it would be surprising if it did not happen
again. However, the precise details of how future Parliaments should approach
this issue is something that they must decide.
As the Prime Minister went on to say, the fundamental point is that we
need to take a decision now to start the process, and we have deliberately
chosen to bring this decision to Parliament at the right time at the start
rather than proceeding in secret and then presenting it later as a foregone
conclusion. The hon. Member for North Devon is absolutely right when he
says that we are asking the House not just to keep our options open but
to take the big decision-the decision in principle.
Let me turn briefly to the second camp, who believe that there is no
longer any need for nuclear weapons because the world has changed. The
world has
14 Mar 2007 : Column 398
changed, but a proper understanding of that change suggests that, although
right now there is no nuclear threat and no country with both the capability
and the intent to threaten us, which is why we have de-targeted our missiles,
we cannot rule out the possibility that the threat will re-emerge. Indeed,
recent events reinforce our view that this is not just a mere possibility
but a very real risk. We should remember that other countries' intentions
can change faster than we could possibly rebuild our deterrent if we allowed
it to lapse.
Finally, I come to the first camp, whose objections are essentially moral.
I will not say much about this other than to echo what my right hon. Friend
the Foreign Secretary said in opening the debate. We in this country and
in the Government can be proud of our moral record on disarmament. We
remain absolutely committed to it and we believe that it is completely
compatible with the decision that we are asking Parliament to approve
today. I know that that will not have persuaded everyone. The view that
maintaining our nuclear deterrent is morally wrong, or morally or practically
incompatible with working towards disarmament, is a position I respect,
but one that I profoundly disagree with.
It would be wrong not to acknowledge again the support of the official
Opposition. The right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks asked several detailed
questions about costs and other matters, and he also said that they were
questions for the future. I hope that he will be satisfied if I say that
I will write to him. Given the limited time I had today, I wanted to spend
it on the key arguments and factors in the decision that the House is
about to make.
I should not finish, however, without also acknowledging the contribution
of the hon. Member for North Devon. I do not think that he actually finished
his speech, given that he covered only two of the five points that he
promised. I was particularly disappointed not to hear, finally, an explanation
of why the Liberal Democrats settled on 100 as the right number of warheads-other
than, of course, the fact that it is a round number. However, I think
that I can summarise what he said. His party now accepts that the Government
are now entirely right to make the decision and right to make it now,
but that there was no need to tell anyone about it. Instead, we should
just have carried on in secret without any public scrutiny and only come
to Parliament some years down the line-
It being six hours after the commencement of proceedings on the motion,
Mr. Speaker put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair,
pursuant to Order [13 March].
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