British Policy and Parliament
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Institute's Submission to the SDR
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Executive Summary
The Acronym Institute's Submission to the Strategic Defence Review,
8 July 1998
Timeframe 2015: The 'new world order' should more
appropriately be called the changing global equation. The ability
of British governments to provide for the defence and security of
the British people will increasingly depend on our ability to
cooperate with other nations and international organisations to
solve or mitigate global challenges: water, food, energy,
resources, agricultural land, sustainable development,
environmental degradation, climate change. These are all security
threats in their own right. They also contribute to some of the
most intractable political and regional conflicts. It is likely
that if environmental conditions and global poverty worsen in the
next two to five decades, they may precipitate acute shortages,
civil unrest and possibly war. The prognosis is pessimistic. The
rise of nationalism and religious and ethnic intolerance and
conflict in some regions also spell danger, although territorial
claims, unemployment and the fight for scarce resources are
generally linked with such 'identity' conflicts. Regional problems,
if left unmanaged and unresolved, may pose a security threat to
Britain, with political chaos, refugees, economic disruption and
the risk of the conflict spreading. Besides that, poverty, armed
aggression and war are an affront to civilisation and human rights,
and we must play our part in changing the structures and context of
human and international relations to reduce the abuses suffered by
civilians in these circumstances.
Recommendations
- NATO expansion was the wrong answer to a legitimate aspiration
by former Eastern European bloc countries to join Western European
economic development, political stability and security. Britain
should urgently reconsider, with its EU and NATO partners, the post
Cold War role and function of NATO and the long term implications
of this hasty bid to extend the remaining Cold War military
alliance up to the borders of Russia, which is striving to
democratise. The wrong decisions now could tip the balance in the
most dangerous direction possible by pushing power into the hands
of Russian nationalists and the nuclear-military old-guard.
- Consideration should be given to reconfiguring and training the
armed forces more specifically to carry out cooperative duties in
peace-keeping, conflict resolution, humanitarian missions (such as
large scale rescue, feeding and management of refugees or victims
of natural disasters such as earthquakes and flooding). Britain
should consider offering trained sappers and specially adapted
equipment for humanitarian mine-clearance on a much larger scale
than presently possible. This would ideally be as part of an
international force, under UN auspices.
- Weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical and
biological, are significant and potentially increasing threats.
Delivery is more likely to be by single or small-group terrorist
act (with or without a particular government's sponsorship) than
missile attack or during a warfighting scenario. The major threat
from nuclear weapons is not war among the nuclear weapon states
(NWS) but accidental or unauthorised launch, loss of safety and
security (especially at Russian sites), nuclear smuggling and
blackmail, terrorist threat or use. Britain's own possession of
such weapons cannot offer defence against this kind of use and may
provide some of the materiel and rationale (or excuse) for the
terrorists. Trident's strategic role is no longer relevant.
Attempts to define a sub-strategic role lack credibility.
- The decision on replacing Trident will be taken in the next
10-15 years. If Britain is unable to cut its losses on deploying
Trident at present, it should at least recognise the pointlessness
of replacing Trident with another or similar nuclear weapon system.
Aldermaston skills and facilities should be re-assigned for
dismantling, research into safe storage and disposal of radioactive
materials, and the complex tasks of verifying arms control and
disarmament agreements. Given these considerations, Britain must
not only say it is prepared to enter multilateral nuclear
disarmament talks, but actively work to bring them about.
- Britain should continue to work with other countries to
strengthen all aspects of the chemical and biological
non-proliferation regimes, and work for universal adherence to the
BWC and CWC. The far-sighted approach to nuclear security would be
fully to implement the NPT by negotiating a nuclear weapon
convention or similar multilateral agreement to eliminate nuclear
weapons altogether, with stringent verification to ensure that
fissile materials and technology are kept out of circulation
forever. The next important step is a fissile materials ban.
Britain is formally committed to this, but will need to negotiate
with the other P-5 and with the non-aligned countries, especially
India, to overcome the political obstacles.
- Recognising that nuclear disarmament is some distance away and
the government is not politically ready to commit British weapons
to the process, there are immediate, interim steps, including
confidence-building and transparency measures, which this country
should consider. These include working with the P-5 on arrangements
or agreements for:
- transparency on fissile materials stocks
- commitment not to increase nuclear arsenals
- de-alerting of nuclear weapons, e.g. by removal of the guidance
systems or de-mating the warheads from delivery vehicles and
storing separately
- no stationing of nuclear weapons outside the NWS' own
territory
- reciprocal no first use undertaking and non-use commitment to
the NNWS
- commitment not to develop new or qualitatively advanced nuclear
warheads or weapons systems
- Other longer term measures which could be considered by the P-5
or under the auspices of the enhanced review process of the NPT
include:
- transparency on nuclear weapon holdings
- a nuclear arms register
- mutually verifiable sequestration or immobilisation of nuclear
weapons pending verified elimination
- Other multilateral measures to enhance non-proliferation and
security include:
- banning tactical nuclear weapons
- prohibiting or restricting short and intermediate range
missiles (this would also reduce the international threat from
missile delivered CBW)
The multipolar world emerging from the Cold War provides new
opportunities, complexities and also obstacles to achieving long
term security and reliable non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. None of these options will be easy for the British
government, but they need to be considered and worked for.
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© 1998 The Acronym Institute.
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