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British Policy and Parliament

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Executive Summary

Timeframe 2015: The 'new world order' should more appropriately be called the changing global equation. The ability of British governments to provide for the defence and security of the British people will increasingly depend on our ability to cooperate with other nations and international organisations to solve or mitigate global challenges: water, food, energy, resources, agricultural land, sustainable development, environmental degradation, climate change. These are all security threats in their own right. They also contribute to some of the most intractable political and regional conflicts. It is likely that if environmental conditions and global poverty worsen in the next two to five decades, they may precipitate acute shortages, civil unrest and possibly war. The prognosis is pessimistic. The rise of nationalism and religious and ethnic intolerance and conflict in some regions also spell danger, although territorial claims, unemployment and the fight for scarce resources are generally linked with such 'identity' conflicts. Regional problems, if left unmanaged and unresolved, may pose a security threat to Britain, with political chaos, refugees, economic disruption and the risk of the conflict spreading. Besides that, poverty, armed aggression and war are an affront to civilisation and human rights, and we must play our part in changing the structures and context of human and international relations to reduce the abuses suffered by civilians in these circumstances.

Recommendations

• NATO expansion was the wrong answer to a legitimate aspiration by former Eastern European bloc countries to join Western European economic development, political stability and security. Britain should urgently reconsider, with its EU and NATO partners, the post Cold War role and function of NATO and the long term implications of this hasty bid to extend the remaining Cold War military alliance up to the borders of Russia, which is striving to democratise. The wrong decisions now could tip the balance in the most dangerous direction possible by pushing power into the hands of Russian nationalists and the nuclear-military old-guard.
• Consideration should be given to reconfiguring and training the armed forces more specifically to carry out cooperative duties in peace-keeping, conflict resolution, humanitarian missions (such as large scale rescue, feeding and management of refugees or victims of natural disasters such as earthquakes and flooding). Britain should consider offering trained sappers and specially adapted equipment for humanitarian mine-clearance on a much larger scale than presently possible. This would ideally be as part of an international force, under UN auspices.
• Weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical and biological, are significant and potentially increasing threats. Delivery is more likely to be by single or small-group terrorist act (with or without a particular government's sponsorship) than missile attack or during a warfighting scenario. The major threat from nuclear weapons is not war among the nuclear weapon states (NWS) but accidental or unauthorised launch, loss of safety and security (especially at Russian sites), nuclear smuggling and blackmail, terrorist threat or use. Britain's own possession of such weapons cannot offer defence against this kind of use and may provide some of the materiel and rationale (or excuse) for the terrorists. Trident's strategic role is no longer relevant. Attempts to define a sub-strategic role lack credibility.
• The decision on replacing Trident will be taken in the next 10-15 years. If Britain is unable to cut its losses on deploying Trident at present, it should at least recognise the pointlessness of replacing Trident with another or similar nuclear weapon system. Aldermaston skills and facilities should be re-assigned for dismantling, research into safe storage and disposal of radioactive materials, and the complex tasks of verifying arms control and disarmament agreements. Given these considerations, Britain must not only say it is prepared to enter multilateral nuclear disarmament talks, but actively work to bring them about.
• Britain should continue to work with other countries to strengthen all aspects of the chemical and biological non-proliferation regimes, and work for universal adherence to the BWC and CWC. The far-sighted approach to nuclear security would be fully to implement the NPT by negotiating a nuclear weapon convention or similar multilateral agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether, with stringent verification to ensure that fissile materials and technology are kept out of circulation forever. The next important step is a fissile materials ban. Britain is formally committed to this, but will need to negotiate with the other P-5 and with the non-aligned countries, especially India, to overcome the political obstacles.
• Recognising that nuclear disarmament is some distance away and the government is not politically ready to commit British weapons to the process, there are immediate, interim steps, including confidence-building and transparency measures, which this country should consider. These include working with the P-5 on arrangements or agreements for:
  • transparency on fissile materials stocks
  • commitment not to increase nuclear arsenals
  • de-alerting of nuclear weapons, e.g. by removal of the guidance systems or de-mating the warheads from delivery vehicles and storing separately
  • no stationing of nuclear weapons outside the NWS' own territory
  • reciprocal no first use undertaking and non-use commitment to the NNWS
  • commitment not to develop new or qualitatively advanced nuclear warheads or weapons systems
• Other longer term measures which could be considered by the P-5 or under the auspices of the enhanced review process of the NPT include:
  • transparency on nuclear weapon holdings
  • a nuclear arms register
  • mutually verifiable sequestration or immobilisation of nuclear weapons pending verified elimination
• Other multilateral measures to enhance non-proliferation and security include:
  • banning tactical nuclear weapons
  • prohibiting or restricting short and intermediate range missiles (this would also reduce the international threat from missile delivered CBW)

The multipolar world emerging from the Cold War provides new opportunities, complexities and also obstacles to achieving long term security and reliable non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. None of these options will be easy for the British government, but they need to be considered and worked for.

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